

Autonomy, Ontology and the Ideal: Music Theory and Philosophical Aesthetics in Early Nineteenth-Century German Thought

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Abstract

This thesis falls into two distinct parts. The first gives an account of the economic and social factors which contributed to the emergence of the new post-Cartesian world order in early nineteenth-century Germany and attempts to ground the German response to the French theories of *mimesis* in this broader context. The second, larger, part engages in an analysis of the philosophical aesthetics of the critic and writer Wilhelm Heinrich Wackenroder, and the Idealists Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling and Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, paying particular attention to the notions of musical *closure* embedded in the their usage or intimation of the terms *autonomy*, *ontology* and the *ideal*. To this end, this thesis attempts to analyse the relationship between the organic structures of early nineteenth-century *Naturphilosophie* and aesthetic approaches to music from that same period.

Ian Biddle, the University of Newcastle upon Tyne, July 1995.

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Introduction

The Problem of History

Theory and Practice

To undertake a broad survey of music theory and philosophical aesthetics in early nineteenth-century thought in a work of this size seems foolhardy. Even to limit such an undertaking to a survey of the distinct discourses of the German tradition seems overly ambitious. For this reason alone, this undertaking is focused on an attempt to give an account of the texts on music by Wackenroder, Schelling and Hegel that coheres. That is not to say that there is, implicit to this undertaking, some anxiety in the compilation of disparate sources or that its central aim is to make cohere what otherwise should not. On the contrary, it is the fundamental assertion of this work that there is, in early nineteenth-century German culture, an underlying coherence which is intimately bound to the emergence of the commodity. The emergent specialisation of scholarly labour in the early nineteenth century is thus not to be attributed solely to the 'collapse' of universal Cartesian reason, but also to the radical shift in the economic requirements of post-Napoleonic Europe.¹

In confronting the generic permissiveness of some of the metaphysical writings on music from this time, however, we become painfully aware of the alien nature of these texts and, similarly, in analyses of music by early analysts such as Vogler and the generic theories of Koch, Türk and Forkel, we are constantly bewildered by a language that seems so to blur the distinctions between description, analysis and criticism that they seem wilfully uncentred in any clearly coherent discourse. What many of the aesthetic and theoretical texts of early nineteenth-century Germany seem to have in common is an urge to articulate the boundaries of music - to somehow give an account

¹ For a more detailed analysis of economic and administrative theory in post-Napoleonic Germany, see Chapters 1 and 2.

of how music might be musical. They were, in short, anxious attempts to create a culture of debate in which music could emerge as a self-contained discursive phenomenon, an autonomous art form. The frequency of the designation *Theorie* is thus not surprising in these texts since there are all consistently grounded within a searing dichotomy: how to articulate music's self-quality through the medium of language which is external to it. As if to recognise such a dichotomy, music theory and musical aesthetics at this time were burdened with a the need for metaphorical abstraction, driven both by the systematising requirements of German Idealism and the poetic urge of the Weimar classicism of such works as Goethe's *Die Leiden des jungen Werthers* and Schiller's *Kabale und Liebe*.

The hermeneutic sensitivity that these texts require is perhaps most clearly demonstrable in the early nineteenth-century usage of the term 'theory'. It is not always clear what the German *Theorie* might mean since it is often indiscriminately interchanged with *Wissenschaft* ('science' or 'scholarship' or 'knowledge'). The apparent confusion demonstrates perhaps the early nineteenth-century tendency towards discursive promiscuity. Where such terms seemed, by the end of that century, to be reasonably clearly delineated and disciplined, they were, in the earlier part of that century, less clearly separated, constantly spilling over into organicist resemblance across discourses. It is interesting that Marx saw the need - perhaps the single most unifying tendency of his complete *oeuvre* - to ground theory in the social, economic and political discourses. To read early nineteenth-century theory, therefore, requires a radicalised reinvention of theory as a practice that, whilst admittedly protocol-driven, opens itself across many discourses and blurs the distinction between its own apparent circumspection and the 'otherness' of empirical reality.²

The protocol of early nineteenth-century systematic theorising³ requires, then, a certain purity of form and thus demands, in particular, the extremities of style. Such

² In other words, the procedural 'rules' of a theory spring from its relationship with previous theories. Such a relationship can be expressed in certain structural or stylistic responses to its own past. Similarly, its 'protocol' can also be determined by its historical predicament, the questions with which that theory's contemporary social environment requires it to engage.

³ Henceforward referred to merely as 'theory'.

extremities motivate dissatisfaction with pragmatic reality and theory thereby conjures up for itself, in forced clear relief, a somewhat anxious account of reality's mediocrity. Such extremities, often dogmatically characterised by pragmatists as overblown 'abstractions', are not a retreat from reality, nor are they a kind of reification of reality. Theory's alternative to the mundane does not consist in some kind of surrogate after-life; it is, rather, a drive for the initiation of action. Theory can thus be seen as an instrument to mould reality and in this sense it is profoundly proactive.

Nor is theory a quagmire or a vacuum, free of value. Theory's very existence, its very initiation, springs from the urge which brings forth action - it is a form of social practice, if somewhat abstract. But this qualification in itself, this very abstraction or extremity, instigates critical action. When, however, theory becomes historicised, when it becomes a reified abstraction after the usefulness of its action is overturned, then that theory remains as merely a residue of the social nexus that it once constituted. If we mistake this 'shell' of theory as *Theorie an sich*, then we run the danger of imputing some kind of closed value, a kind of internalised or immanent essence that is somehow moulded into the closed ontological configuration that remains. This is the danger of structuralist accounts of theory that evoke the development of theory merely in terms of the theoretical texts themselves. Thus this strange creature called The History of Theory, largely synonymous with the German *Ideengeschichte*, ignores the proactive dimensions of theory and at best trivialises the presence of theory in praxis.

This thesis is not such an undertaking; it is not an account of a theoretical moment in the closed structuralist history of thought. It is, rather, an account of a theoretical moment *in situ*, as a kind of formal account and response to its synchronous mundane environs. The 'urge' from which this moment sprang, and which, in turn, it constitutes, is presented in its historical context, as integrated firmly in the dynamics of social and political life.

The 'moment' under scrutiny here stretches from 1780 to 1820. This period, barely reaching a few years beyond the defeat of Napoleon, was subject to a massive number of upheavals: the numerous redistributions of land and power within the

German speaking lands played no insignificant part in the refashioning of a new German world vision. The Enlightenment found its expression in Germany in the enlightened despotism of Prussia and Austria and the philosophical idealism of Fichte, Kant, Schelling and Hegel. This confrontation between the enlightened pragmatism of German *Polizeiwissenschaft*, born out of the dissolution of baroque cameralism, on the one hand, and the metaphysical impulses of impotent intellectuals on the other, was part of a unified paradigm: the movement towards an atomisation of reality into self-contained reified commodities. The idealism of Schelling and Fichte, in particular, imported a sense of the absolute, of the immanent self-quality of the individual, whilst Prussian cameralism and the administrative order of the organic state and its *Staatsvernunft* began a dismantling of impedance to state power, actively encouraging a re-ordering of reality around the centrality of the commodity. The autonomous individual, free to exchange commodities with other free-standing individuals: this was the mythology of the early nineteenth-century world vision.

There was thus a heightened urgency to the project of a science of immanent meaning, of a meaning carried deep within the commodity, as inextricably a part of it, its essence. In the second half of the nineteenth century, the empiricism and apparent fragmentation of German science into highly specialised, almost autonomous, disciplines is powerful testament to this process. However, the closure, at the beginning of that century, of the objective realm, the Kantian external, from Cartesian instrumental reason, is the moment which seems to demonstrate the more fundamental epistemological shift. The rejection of the mimesis aesthetic, the emergence of a deeply ontological impulse in philosophy and the negation of Cartesian notions of discursive conspicuity through clear argument and 'visible' truth in favour of demands for a new internalised complexity, a reason more sensual and less sterile, are all symptoms of this profound epistemological schism.

The urgency of a systematic account of immanent meaning is nowhere more palpable at this time than in the emergent symbolic or 'metaphysic' of instrumental music after c.1780. The desire to articulate a certain fluency, a certain intangible, inner,

essence beyond reason, beyond words, represents a closure of music from the instrumentality or functionality of the previous mimesis aesthetic. This closure finds expression both in the technical literature of Koch, Türk, Forkel and Vogler and the metaphysical, meditative writings of Wackenroder, Tieck and Hoffmann.⁴ On the one hand, immanent meaning is seen as articulated in the hierarchy of harmonic, melodic and phrase structures, whereas for the metaphysicists, on the other hand, music is a 'dark' and 'indescribable' realm of intangible wonders.⁵

This departure from the Cartesian *Affektenlehre* in favour of a notion of musical autonomy complies with theoretical protocol. First, it is extreme and motivates a certain disdain for contingent reality and for the text-centrism of the mimesis aesthetic: the 'anxious account' of reality it conjures is addressed by notions of the sublime [*das Erhabene, die Erhabenheit*], as a powerful antithesis to mundane reality. Second, this departure is powerfully present in contemporary reality: structuralist histories of music, analysis and score-centred accounts of music engage with the problematic of immanent meaning in a manner indebted to the moment of Wackenroder's *Phantasien über die Kunst* and Forkel's *Allgemeine Theorie der Musik*. Yet, the German music theories of this time are also profoundly indebted to *Naturphilosophie*, a discourse which attempted to apprehend reality in terms of a broadly metaphysical agenda. In this sense, the position of music in the world system was one which demonstrated not merely a disdain for reality, but also gave account of the emergence of the new ontology such that music existed in reality, not merely in response to it.

This notion of music as existing within reality is charged with the ontological agenda of the *Naturphilosophie* of Fichte, Schelling and, to a lesser extent, Hegel. It rests on the assumption of a closure or self-contentment of the musical work such that

⁴ In terms of the simple division of the autonomists into 'technical' and 'metaphysical', Hoffmann is problematic given that he indulges in both styles of narrative. The main thrust of his oeuvre, however, despite numerous analytical articles, seems to me to be metaphysical.

⁵ See Wackenroder 'Das eigentümliche innere Wesen der Tonkunst und die Seelenlehre der heutigen Instrumentalmusik' in *Phantasien über die Kunst für Freunde der Kunst* (1799). The edition used here is that published with *Herzensergießungen* and titled simply *Wackenroder* by Gustav Kiepenheuer Verlag, Potsdam 1925. The reference here is 182-3.

its defined limits articulate its status as object or entity. Hence, to dismiss the *Naturphilosophie* as mere idealists ignores the powerfully naturalistic reflex of their methodologies. In Schelling, in particular, we shall see the emergence of the notion of an artistic Real, a bountiful, natural complexity as the central category of the pre-Hegelian aesthetic.⁶

Structuralist Histories and their Indebtedness to the Moment of *Naturphilosophie*

The articulation of musical boundaries or limits has profound consequences for the emergence of the systematised discourse of *Musikwissenschaft*. To 'close' the musical work on itself is to lay the way open for an interiority, an immanence of meaning which finds contemporary expression in the notion of a structuralist history of music. The belief that the real, or at least the definable, meaning of music lies somewhere within its mechanisms of construction is central to many of the practices of contemporary musicology. The centrality of autonomy is so ingrained in the psyche of the collective musicological consciousness that it has come to feel like a given, real or authentic predicament. Even in musicologies that attempt to operate outside of this notion of musical autonomy (such as ethnomusicology or the sociology of music) methodologies are constrained by this 'authentic', 'given' predicament. The inconceivability of addressing music without recourse to some kind of examination of its internal mechanisms of construction feels real - it has, so to speak, presence. The methodological consequences of this presence are clear: the score becomes the central object of scrutiny and is seen to give up its secrets, its 'meanings' and its 'essence', to competent specialised scrutiny. The belief is based upon the assumption that music, seemingly more difficult to analyse in terms of 'fixed' or 'literal' semantic content than the other arts, consists in an abstraction or even a kind of perverse representation of reality in terms of a wholly autonomous system. This system, therefore, is 'violated' or 'trivialised' when it becomes the product of a broader historical, cultural or political

⁶ The division between the Schellingian and Hegelian aesthetics is clearly articulated in Tolstoy's *What is Art*, in *Tolstoy Centenary Edition*, 1929, volume 18, 99-100.

context. The 'history of music' becomes a structuralist history, one which concerns itself with internal mechanisms and with comparative methodologies across the continuum of musical works. Outside of this closed stratum lie 'other' disciplines which musicologists often feel inclined to import: sociology, psychology, semiotics, linguistics, history and so on. The schizophrenia implicit in the multi-disciplinary 'new' musicologies is particularly evident in the advent of the so-called authenticity debate where musicologists have needed to become archivists, statisticians and historical sociologists. In a sense, despite the highly autonomous motivations for an 'authentic' performance of a 'reliable' score, this debate has intensified the problematics of a structuralist history of music. The confluence of many disciplines in musicology begins to pose the question of authority: wherein lies the central authority of music? If music should be seen as a history of structures - as autonomous - , then the central object of scrutiny is, inevitably, the score, seen somehow as a neutral or self-evident model for music's dissemination, free from ideology, free from extra-musical 'distortions' of any kind. But if music needs to be 'reconstructed' in its 'authentic' performance context, then the score becomes an object which is seen as fundamentally flawed and 'inauthentic' in so far as it alone cannot furnish the 'authentic' experience.⁷

This crisis of cultural authority is one which characterises our age - the 'postmodern condition' as Lyotard⁸ has called it. This condition is a symptom of a deep pessimism which its proclaimers dress in an hysterical language of celebration. The nature of the relationship between the artist, his/her art and its audience has become highly problematised; or to put it another way, the quest for the authoritative centre of the creative process in art has become, or has been made, so problematic as to negate the very possibility of a centre.

The break with determinist thought⁹ that the pessimism of much postmodern

⁷ The 'authentic aesthetic presence' that is recognised in the score in the notion of musical autonomy is mediated in authenticity by a sense of the 'authentic *historical* presence'. Authenticity's contingency and notions of an authoritative centre *beyond* the score are thus not as compatible with autonomy as they might first seem.

⁸ Lyotard, *The Postmodern Condition*, Manchester, 1984.

⁹ The term 'determinist thought', as used here, refers to thought which attempts to explain reality by recourse to implicit or explicit causal mechanisms.

theory represents, revolves around this loss of cultural authority. It is of no surprise, therefore, that such 'determinist authorities' as Hegel, Marx, Engels and Ranke are the objects of much derision in contemporary theory.¹⁰ If we are to understand the contemporary predicament of musicology, a detailed analysis of the epistemological context from which it sprang is necessary. In so far as this context was characterised by a set of clear ideological agendas and by a wilful dismantling of the older patriarchal discourse in favour of a number of smaller universalising discourses (anatomy, philology, the natural and social sciences and musicology, for example), we can characterise it as a 'rupture' or paradigm shift. The relationship between this 'mother epistemology' of musicology and the paradigm of postmodernism, is thus inevitably highly confrontational. Whereas the determinist nineteenth century presided over a politicisation or socialisation of the population of much of Europe and the heightening of antagonism between specialist discourses, each claiming to be the one authentic truth-retrieval-system, postmodernism has attempted, at least, to blur these distinctions by removing the very notion of an 'authentic truth' from the argument. Musicology's apparently precarious predicament can thus be seen to stem from this fundamental violation of its epistemological premise by the new postmodern 'paradigm'. The confrontation of these incongruous epistemologies, postmodern and determinist thought, can be usefully demonstrated in a short comparison of the attitudes of the Hegelians and Michel Foucault to the possibility of history, this opposition providing a useful case study.

The Postmodern Discourse and its Language

To come to terms with Foucault's non-normative prose style, it is essential to apprehend, first of all, the operations of his discourse in terms of its relationship to the language of modernism. Terry Eagleton addresses postmodernism in the following terms:

¹⁰ The rather overstated claim of the post-modern theorists such as Foucault, Lyotard, or Derrida that German Idealism and its heirs represent a kind of intellectual terrorism, a tendency to violate the complexity of its object of scrutiny is something we shall attempt to re-examine later. See, in particular, Chapters 4 and 5.

The depthless, styleless, dehistoricised, decathected surfaces of postmodernist culture are not meant to signify an alienation, for the very concept of alienation must secretly posit a dream of authenticity which postmodernism finds quite unintelligible. Those flattened surfaces and hollowed interiors are not 'alienated' because there is no longer any subject to be alienated from, 'authenticity' having been less rejected than merely forgotten.¹¹

Although Eagleton fairly acknowledges postmodernism's limited subversive applications¹², his argument is clear: 'the postmodern' is that which positively affirms what the modernists saw as threatening - the loss of political cohesion and the heightening of man's alienation from his environment.¹³ Man's alienation from environment is man's alienation from contextualising discourses - history, narrative - and the consequent denial, after modernism, of 'historical causality'. Whereas the modernist often saw fragmentation to be a hindrance to the utopian vision, the postmodernist sees this fragmentation as a positive, quasi-utopian, phenomenon in itself - as Eagleton puts it, 'fact is value'¹⁴. What characterises this new age, then, is the fragmentation of critical dialogue, and, curiously, the affirmation of the institution.¹⁵ The loss of a dynamic, quasi-narrative, vision of historical change has meant that dialogues requiring historical validation - arguments for social change based on the demonstration of the present's unassailable relativity, for example - are undermined. Without a dynamic vision of historical change, then, political action stagnates on all but the most local, pragmatic, levels and this, in turn, informs a profound disillusionment with active participation in political life. Thus, critique is left fragmented, coherent opposition all but disintegrated and historical determinism discredited; the institution stands to gain much. In this sense, 'the political' has become something of an anathema to the postmodernist, and the institution is moved as far as possible from cognitive and

¹¹ Eagleton, *Against the Grain*, Cambridge, 1986, 132.

¹² *Ibid.*, 95.

¹³ *Ibid.*, 93.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 133.

¹⁵ *Institution* refers to all acts of administration which include not only the acts of government and/or state, but of market regulation, isolationism, and all attempts to organise social life at the macro level as against the anarchic impulse of the market. *Market*, on the other hand refers to all acts of trade in their purest form, as distilled from the organisational encumbrances of the institution. Thus, in these forms, neither institution nor market exists as free from the other's action. The uses here should be understood to represent the deepest impulses of the two polarities and not always necessarily their material mechanisms.

critical range - those mechanisms whereby such institutions can be undermined or criticised are disarmed of their subversive force. The 'postmodern project' has effectively instated the institution as an inviolate absolute.

Where the institution or the organisational impulse is reified, the market is elusive, even anarchic. Its elusiveness has allowed it to pass largely self-determined from a basically subservient role to one whereby it has become almost self-animated, a kind of intangible 'given' that must remain unassailable. With postmodernist mechanisms of fragmentation, the market acquires the ability to appear inviolate and even the most critically-minded uphold this authenticity alone above and beyond any other. 'Future' becomes little more than a minor variant of present and the historical narrative dissolves into a vortex of innumerable existential moments, each concerned only with itself, turning inwards and closing itself completely to scrutiny. The commodity is the only truth.

In language, bourgeois modern man, the precursor of the postmodern consumer, fragmented narrative and sought to problematise cultural authority by an intensification of what might be termed the existential language:¹⁶ this pessimistic response to his/her impotence in the face of the advancing forces of industrialisation was characterised by a fetishism for the extremes of language, be it the estranged mythologising of a Kafka or the naturalistic obsessiveness of a Dostoevsky. These extremes can be defined in terms of either a highly metaphoric language such as in Kafka¹⁷ where sympathetic symbolic meanings compete to undermine narrative, or a highly metonymic language such as in Döblin¹⁸ where a taxonomy of details in proximity undermine linearity. The effect of both these extremes is to create a sense of a heightened existential isolation. Indeed, this existential impulse in the face of the brutalising effects of late capitalism can ultimately be implicated in the collapse of an

¹⁶ The existential vocabulary was one of alienation, separation and agonising autonomy from the external world of political meanings.

¹⁷ See in particular the aphorisms and short prose passages such as *Auf der Galerie* or *Der Geier*.

¹⁸ See, for example, *Berlin Alexanderplatz* which juxtaposes Biberkopf's almost existential discourse with documentary-like passages, seemingly taken from contemporary newspapers and radio broadcasts.

'organised' political offensive and, indeed, forms the basis on which the non-normative subjectivism of postmodernism is constructed. The bourgeois ego is thus enshrined at the centre of a nexus of administrative failures: failure to comprehend unprecedented industrial expansion; failure to respond to the loss of a critical community; failure to halt the expansion of the administered world.

There seems little sense, then, in seeking to separate postmodernism too far from the processes described above. The same fragmentation and existential closures occur in postmodernism that occurred in modernism. The differences, such as they are, consist in postmodernism's 'forgetting' of the misery of this predicament - hence the hysterically celebratory language of much postmodern theory. As Raymond Williams is reputed to have said:

What has quite rapidly happened is that modernism quickly lost its anti-bourgeois stance, and achieved comfortable integration into the new international capitalism. Its attempt at a universal market, transfrontier and transclass, turned out to be spurious. Its forms lent themselves to cultural competition and the commercial interplay of obsolescence, with its shifts of schools, styles and fashion so essential to the market. The painfully acquired techniques of significant disconnection are relocated, with the help of the special insensitivity of the trained and assured technicians, as the merely technical modes of advertising and the commercial cinema. The isolated, estranged images of alienation and loss, the narrative discontinuities, have become the easy iconography of the commercials, and the lonely, bitter, sardonic and sceptical hero takes his ready-made place as star of the thriller.¹⁹

The failed universal market, or the failed project of universal commodity-equivalence is central to the problems of theorising in the postmodern world. The so-called grand theories of the nineteenth century, constantly straining for an ontological absolute or an inviolate basis from which to reconstruct the individual or citizen, have come to be seen as somehow oppressive or intrusive. As an attempt to rebut such grandiloquent attempts at social reconstruction, postmodernism is thus a kind of radicalised or *entartete* liberalism. The poverty of much postmodern theory, then, stems from a kind of forgetting or reification of the isolation of the bourgeois ego, which, as we have seen, has meant that a sense of the existential rather than the historical pervades

¹⁹ Williams, *The Politics of Modernism*, London, 1989, 35.

contemporary thought.

Foucault versus History

To a certain extent, musicology has avoided the more ludicrous excesses of postmodern theorising and, to the extent that it has remained, despite the authenticity debate and its more radical ramifications, largely empirical and score-centred, it has been able to close itself from the more general malaise in systematic thought. Indeed, it has been its very lack of system that has, until now, insulated it from the onslaught of value-destruction. In one sense, this state of affairs must rest on the notion of musical autonomy, one that still permits the ontological impulse of analytical procedures and structuralist histories. One such challenge to the musicological epistemology, in its later guise of the structuralist history, is the work of Michel Foucault. A true postmodernist in the strict sense of one who attempts to avoid a normative notion of truth, his critique of nineteenth-century causal histories owes much to the writings of Friedrich Nietzsche.

Foucault attempts an adaptation of Nietzsche's *Umwertung aller Werte*²⁰ into an anti-historical discourse on change, both social and cultural²¹. Before turning to Foucault's critiques of history, we should first analyse Nietzsche's legacy. Although he rarely acknowledges the influence, Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900) is ever-present in Foucault. A critic of history and the assumptions of that endeavour, Nietzsche launched a scathing attack on historicism as a sign of his age's weakness. He addresses, in particular, the 'cultural' phenomenon of history:

Die zweite Unzeitgemässe (1874) bringt das Gefährliche, das Leben-Annagende und Vergiftende in unsrer Art des Wissenschafts-Betriebs an's Licht:- das Leben *krank* an diesem entmenschten Räderwerk und Mechanismus, an der "Unpersönlichkeit" des Arbeiters, an der falschen Ökonomie der "Theilung der Arbeit". Der Zweck geht verloren, die Cultur:- das Mittel der moderne

²⁰ Nietzsche's call for the *revaluation of all values* has been seen by many to be a call for a value-free manner of operation that sees all truth as relative and reality as wholly culturally mediated. The recognition of cultural value in others requires a sense of value as a autonomous, self-referential, construct. The observer must be untouched by value, or at least recognise the relativity of his/her own values. See Also *sprach Zarathustra*, numerous references.

²¹ See Foucault, *The Order of Things*, 1973, *Discipline and Punish*, 1977, *The Archaeology of Knowledge*, 1977.

Wissenschafts-Betrieb, *barbarisirt*... In dieser Abhandlung wurde der "historische Sinn", auf den dies Jahrhundert stolz ist zum ersten Mal als Krankheit erkannt, als typisches Zeichen des Verfalls.²²

The second Untimely One brings to light what is dangerous and gnaws at and poisons life in our kind of traffic with science and scholarship - how life is made sick by this dehumanised and mechanical grinding of gears, the 'impersonality' of the labourer, the false economy of 'the division of labour'. The aim is lost, genuine culture - and the means, the modern traffic with science, *barbarised*. In this essay the 'historical sense' of which this century is so proud was recognised for the first time as a disease, as a typical symptom of decay.²³

The alternative to history that Nietzsche provides is an existential sense of the relativity of all truth, and thus of all language. The 'symbolic weight' of language is thus to be seen as the product of a particular cultural moment and as nothing more. All truth is thus subject to its momentary context, and the absolute morality, history and theology are merely products of a particular manner of seeing or understanding the world.

So, each age, then, is seen by Nietzsche to be governed by a certain way of understanding the sensual world, such that music, for example, seemed for the nineteenth century romantic to facilitate a discourse of heavy symbolic reference or meaning:

An sich ist keine Musik tief und bedeutungsvoll, sie spricht nicht vom "Willen", vom "Dinge an sich"; das konnte der Intellect erst in einem Zeitalter wahren, welches den ganzen Umfang des inneren Lebens für die musicalische Symbolik erobert hatte. Der Intellect selber hat diese Bedeutsamkeit erst in den Klang *hineingelegt*, wie in die Verhältnisse von Linien und Massen bei der Architektur ebenfalls Bedeutsamkeit gelegt hat, welche aber an sich den mechanischen Gesetzen ganz fremd ist.²⁴

No music is deep and full of meaning in itself, it does not speak of 'will', of the 'thing in itself'; that could be imagined by the intellect only in an age which had conquered for musical symbolism the entire range of inner life. It was the intellect itself that first *gave* this meaning to sound, just as it also gave meaning to the relation between lines and masses in architecture, but which in itself is quite foreign to mechanical laws.²⁵

Nietzsche's point here is that the function of music, or rather its *perceived* function, is springs first and foremost from the state of man's understanding of music as it exists at

²² *Ecce Homo*, in *Nietzsche Werke*, volume VI, published Walter de Gruyter, Berlin 1969, 314.

²³ *Ecce Homo*, trans./ed. Walter Kaufmann, Random House, 1967, 276.

²⁴ *Menschliches, Allzumenschliches* in *Nietzsche Werke*, volume II, published Walter de Gruyter, Berlin 1969

²⁵ *Human, All-Too-Human*. in *Nietzsche, The Complete Works*, translated by Dr. Oscar Levy, 1910, 192-3. Emphases are as given in the original.

the moment of reception. Thus the nature of not only music theory, but, in effect, the nature of music itself constantly shifts according to its socio-historical predicament. Hence, we can see in Nietzsche the emergence of a music aesthetic based upon a deeply relativistic apprehension of the world. The example of music used here demonstrates the sense in which Nietzsche can be seen as a significant precursor to Foucault, who, in his later works in particular, can be described as attempting a *généalogie* of the human sciences. It is in the pervasive relativism, the cold, detached, objective surface of his prose style that Foucault takes the consequences of the Nietzschean relativity to its logical conclusion.

Foucault's oeuvre can be usefully divided into two distinct, but related, methodological phases, the earlier *archéologie* and the later *généalogie*. *Archéologie*, as represented in the published works from 1971 to 1978, can be contrasted with 'classical' Hegelian or Rankean histories in the following manner: whereas 'history'²⁶ attempts to give reality meaning according to bi-polar methodologies based on the category pairs new/old, revolutionary/regressive, or original/banal, *archéologie* attempts a critique of such polarities as representing diffuse manifestations of history as a discourse; whereas 'history' sees contradictions as something to be overcome or explained away in favour of a deeper coherence, *archéologie* takes such contradictions to retain a high degree of autonomy and sees them as the primary objects of scrutiny; whereas 'history' is essentially concerned with narrative, with linear exposition,

²⁶ The term 'history' always refers here to the so-called 'classical' historical models of Hegel, Ranke and the Berlin Revolutionaries. The models, whilst demonstrating many central differences, are all concerned with the dynamics of historical change and its causality. These models might therefore be termed 'determinist' histories. With the collapse of the revolutions in Europe of 1848-9, came a disillusionment with Hegelianism, and a new positivist model for history emerged in the work of the so-called Berlin Revolutionaries. An almost exact contemporary of Hegel, Berthold Georg Niebuhr (1776-1831, born six years after, died same year as Hegel) wrote of the turn of the century in the following terms: 'It was a time when we were experiencing the most incredible and exceptional events, when we were reminded of many forgotten and decayed institutions by the sound of their downfall.' 'History' thus figured large in the nineteenth century consciousness, and the Berlin Revolution in historical thought reacted largely to the metaphysics of Hegel not to the historical model itself. The revolutionaries retained the narrative structures of history compilation that were implicit in the Hegelian system, and owed much to Niebuhr's early empirical histories. Thinkers after Niebuhr brought about a clear agenda for the historical project and under the torch-bearer of the new order, Leopold von Ranke (1795-1886), engaged in a parcelling up of the historical continuum into causes and effects. The 'epic' history is born.

archéologie foregrounds gaps and ruptures, making difference, not linearity or coherence, a central feature of the discourse. In short, we might see this opposition of classical history and *archéologie* as the confrontation of a narrative discourse and a radically empirical discourse.

This case opposition brings into relief the differences between the old and the new histories. This new history, *archéologie*, is one element of the broader new epistemology of postmodernism. Where Foucault ascribes a discursive regularity, by which we presume him to mean a pattern of 'similar enunciations', political meaning is replaced by a nexus of momentary relationships or intertextualities which undermine critical praxis. The autonomy or verticality of such connections relieves the past of its implications or its 'lessons' and relieves the future of its immanence. Foucault's *archéologie* estranges context - an action has little or no causal meaning, has little effect and is lost outside its moment. Whilst many of its surface mechanisms attempt to mitigate the loss of an overtly formal political agenda, *archéologie* is nonetheless opposed to formal political praxis at the fundamental level.

The political impotence of *archéologie* is addressed in the methodology of the latter part of Foucault's oeuvre which he terms *généalogie*. The focus of this second phase is power. Seen in a more or less Nietzschean manner, power manifests itself in numerous ways. Again, these can be contrasted with notions of power in 'classical' histories in the following manner: instead of discovering truth in terms of the polarities mentioned previously, *généalogie* analyses the 'hazardous play of dominations'; whereas history de-prioritises contradiction in favour of unity, *généalogie*, in line with *archéologie*, focuses on singularity and contradiction in order to rediscover the multiplicity of factors that constitute, and not cause, an event; in contrast with history's 'totalising' tendencies, *généalogie* is informed by a profound relativism; above and beyond a linearity of perception, *généalogie* represents the articulation of the action of historical change on the body. So, whereas *archéologie* represents an empirical response to historical linearity, *généalogie* is the articulation of that response, together with an anthropological impulse, so to speak, onto the body - sexuality, power, desire

and hate.

It is to this central role of power in the later Foucault that Marxists have addressed their most vehement critiques.²⁷ Broadly speaking, Foucault's understanding of power differs from the Marxist understanding in several ways²⁸. For the Marxist, power is the mechanism of class oppression, whereas Foucault sees power as the network that constitutes the social domain. As Poulantzas²⁹ has pointed out, Foucault thereby places himself in a position of critical impotence. If power is synonymous with sociality, then the critic is faced with a profound challenge to his/her authority: in failing to distinguish between particulars of power, or, in other words, in failing to allow for differences of value between power(s), Foucault imprisons both the most radical, anti-institutional and the most conservative, institution-compliant, powers in the same impotent existential moment. This represents a profound closure of social reality. Without this value differentiation in power, its analysis becomes merely passive, ordering social reality according to innumerable ontologies. The closure of reality in the empirical fetishism of *archéologie* and then the non-prescriptive ontological fragmentation in *généalogie*, both discard the central category of prescriptive critique: causality.

The Nietzschean-Foucauldian vision of history, then, is informed by a profoundly anti-rationalist impulse. In this reading of Nietzsche, Foucault has much in common with other contemporary French theorists such as Lacan, or Derrida. However, his link with the 'circle' of so-called 'poststructuralists' is too often overstated. Indeed, Foucault is quick to deny the link in the uncharacteristically transparent 'Foreword' to the English Edition of *The Order of Things*. These characteristically post-*Annales* questionings of history, we can say, attempt to analyse those moments when the causal order of history seems at its weakest, when movement erupts into the open world of historical change and old institutions are swept away or fundamentally

²⁷ See Callinicos, *Is There a Future for Marxism?*, 1982, and Poulantzas, *Political Power and Social Classes*, 1973.

²⁸ See also later broader discussion of neo-Hegelian opposition to Foucault.

²⁹ Poulantzas, *Power*. There are numerous references here to Foucault's apparent position of impotence.

mutated in a matter of years. So, if not poststructuralist, we might say of Foucault's works that they fall into the post Marxist French tradition of thought after Sartre that rapidly became uneasy with explicit causality as a way of understanding the basis for institutional change:

The problem of causality. It is not always easy to determine what caused a specific change in science. What made such and such a discovery possible? Why did this new concept appear?...It seemed to me that it would not be prudent for the moment to force a solution I felt incapable, I admit, of offering: the traditional explanations - spirit of the time, technological or social changes, influences of various kinds - struck me for the most part as being more magical than effective.³⁰

Such terms as 'spirit of the time', 'technological or social changes' are aimed directly at the tradition that has most opposed the 'new history', the Marxist and neo-Hegelian traditions.

In an attempt to avoid the characteristically 'magical' explanations of Hegelian and Rankean histories, Foucault's works, in both phases, might be summed up as undertaking the following clearly delineated tasks: first, an inquiry into the nature of the conditions of existence for a certain epistemological phenomenon - notice here the existential imperative *the conditions of existence* and, indeed, this is no causal 'where are we from?' or 'how do we come to be here?' but seeks to analyse from a position of value-less impotence, with little concern for the linearity of a phenomenon's exposition; second, an inquiry into the nature of the structures of connection that govern this phenomenon's contextuality - these 'structures of connection' here, relate to the manner in which the phenomenon related to other phenomena around it so that, enclosed in a momentary web of hidden meanings and resonance, the phenomenon takes on a kind of closed momentary essence, mutating in this 'context' at every moment, constantly deferring its essence; third, an inquiry into the nature of the phenomenon's demise - the posing of the question of the *nature* of the demise - avoids the 'problem of causality' that Foucault refers to in the 'Foreword' to *The Order of Things* and the analysis of the *nature* of the process of change can eradicate any need to address the question of

³⁰ Foucault, *Order*, xii - xiii.

linearity or affect and allows for an ontological fetishism for change as a closed essence in itself rather than an analysis of the effect of that process and its cultural, political and social meanings: its basis in praxis.

Neo-Hegelian Opposition and The Reclamation of Causality

As we have seen, the Foucauldian discourse foregrounds rupture and discontinuity rather than continuity and reference. The implicit opposition to Foucauldian models of the neo-Hegelian models is quite clear: meaning versus context, linearity versus discontinuity. It might be useful here to pause for a moment to recall the Hegelian method in order to reassess the usefulness of linearity in history.

As we shall see later, Hegel's vision of history sees social and political movements as manifestations of the great Spirit or Mind³¹ which manifests itself to the watchful historian and is thus a deep-lying structure, a *zugrunde liegende Idee*, which articulates the great early nineteenth-century fascination with structures that are buried deep below the surface of the visible world, a tendency usefully characterised as *interiority*. Thus, the cohesion of reality has to be somehow decoded or discovered from the apparent confusion of a wilful reality. Furthermore, this tendency towards the interior recesses of the universe, the deep substrata, the great singular metaphysical principle of existence, requires that the watchful historian position himself at the correct 'vantage point', so to speak: only when the time is 'right', when man's thinking has progressed to a point where it can comprehend this single unifying principle, can the subject comprehend the cohesion of the universe.

Hegel's epistemology, then, involves completion of the system at the point of comprehension. Thus Hegel stands at a completion point so that he is able to recognise the system in its totality. Truth, then, is arrived at by the completion of the system. As Michael Rosen has repeatedly pointed out, this leaves the critic of Hegel with a severe difficulty: to criticise Hegel's epistemology is, in Hegelian terms, to criticise the system.³² The system is insufficient or faulty only when it is incomplete, and thus

³¹ In German, *Geist* which can mean either spirit or mind. I use capitals to distinguish the distinctly Hegelian uses.

³² Michael Rosen, *Hegel's Dialectic and its Critique*, Cambridge, 1982.

criticism of the system involves recognition of this incompleteness. The critic is thus faced with a dilemma: how to criticise the system without laying oneself open to the critique of incompetence - the system cannot be faulty if it is complete, and to ascribe 'faultiness' to it is to regard it from a position of incompleteness, from the wrong place. Thus the Hegelian system closes itself to attack by recourse to false completion: closure exists at that point where the system is correct; without the recognition of such 'correctness', the system is not simply faulty but is essentially not a system. False completion can thus be employed to close the system in so far as the system's very premises lie in its completion: the systematiser begins at that point and constructs the system to validate its completion. This paradox, termed somewhat strangely by Rosen the *post festum paradox*, has been seen both as a strength in the Hegelian system³³ and as evidence for the deep-seated totalitarianism of the system³⁴.

The movement of the system falls into three stages and thus Hegel's work is characterised by a succession of trios. First, Spirit, the moving force, the all-encompassing totality of reality in all its past and present forms, is complete - as *thesis* [*These*] - but is naive as it has no comprehension of either its quantity or its diffuse parts; when Spirit begins to comprehend its many parts it disintegrates - as *antithesis* [*Antithese*] - taking difference to mean a lack of unity; when spirit comes to reclaim its cohesion - as *synthesis* [*Synthese*] - it comprehends both its diffusion and its unity. In this manner, the inner and outer, the subjective and the objective, are reconciled dialectically.

This account, perpetuating what has become a crass cliché for readers of Hegel, is criticised by Dunayevskaya as a misrepresentation of Hegel's system and quotes Hegel's own scathing account of Fichte and Schelling's 'triplicity' in *The Science*

³³ See particularly Callinicos, *Marxism*, 1983 and Dunayevskaya *Philosophy and Revolution*, New Jersey, 1973, 3-95.

³⁴ See Rosen's argument in *Critique*. Indeed, Hegel's assertion that the centralised, organic Prussian state represents the final social synthesis of his system, might suggest that this reading is a fair one. However, the system itself can provide a very useful solution to the problem of disunity and can account for differentiation in a value-rich discourse. Hegel's ludicrous misreadings of contemporary history are not sufficient to discredit the mechanics of the system but are a testament to the bizarre metaphysics of the system's application.

of *Logic*.³⁵ The incomprehensibility of Hegel's critique of these triplicities in the light of his own triplicity suggest that Dunayevskaya's remarks miss the mark: Hegel seems here more concerned to rescue the 'originality' of his own work from the contemporary near equivalents.³⁶

The implicit causality of the Hegelian system is still not the causality of the empirical historians of the Berlin Revolution. Hegelian causality concerned itself with a metaphysical abstraction of historical movements and changes. Whilst the Rankeans retained the linearity of historical discourse, so central to the Hegelian system, it was the young Hegelians Marx and Engels that opened the system from its closed metaphysical unity into a world of social relations.

In the aftermath of a Marxist redefinition, Hegel's metaphysical system is dragged from its idealist origins and homed at reality, as an explicit participation within it. Hegel, after Kant, then,

...will have the courage of his idealist virility, penetrating to the very essence of the object and delivering up its inmost secret. He will carry the contradictions of thought right into the thing itself, into the veiled and tabooed, and so will risk fissuring the reality which for Kant must remain chastely intact, dividing it against itself by the labour of the negative.³⁷

As Eagleton points out,³⁸ Hegel attempted to remove Fichte's self-referential autonomy of the subject into the world of objects, to ground the subject in that very reality that Cartesian reason had learnt, in its death throes, to scorn. The metaphysical vocabulary and the abstractions, the transcendental signifiers, are discarded by Marx, in an attempt to reground theory in reality, to collapse the false difference between theory and practice. It has been the ongoing attempt of the Marxist project to bring this reconciliation about so that theory can no longer be hypostatized or frozen in a false

³⁵ Dunayevskaya, *Philosophy*, 13.

³⁶ To be fair, however, it must be stated that the terms *thesis*, *antithesis* and *synthesis* were very probably first used by Schelling and Fichte, and not Hegel. Indeed, the cliché of triplicity in Hegel is further compounded by the notion that synthesic Spirit is some kind of utopian unity of all things. As we shall see in Chapter 5, the notion of spirit as unified with externality at this stage is not accurate. In fact, Hegel goes to great lengths in the *Vorlesungen* to explain *Synthese* as a return of Spirit to itself.

³⁷ Eagleton, *Ideology of the Aesthetic*, Oxford, 1990, 121.

³⁸ Ibid. 123-4.

vacuum by the pragmatism of capitalism.

The postmodern splintering of the creative process into a multitude of closed ontologies, devoid of authorship, of place or of meaning, devoid of authenticity, has meant that autonomy has closed in on itself. We return to Eagleton's critique:

The depthless, styleless, dehistoricised, decathected surfaces of postmodernist culture are not meant to signify an alienation, for the very concept of alienation must secretly posit a dream of authenticity which postmodernism finds quite unintelligible. Those flattened surfaces and hollowed interiors are not 'alienated' because there is no longer any subject to be alienated from, 'authenticity' having been less rejected than merely forgotten.³⁹

Autonomy's closure in on itself, then, has left art bereft of authenticity, bereft, that is, of any demonstrable meaning, the semantics of art having become little more than a rather dubious and speculative non-discipline. This extreme autonomy, the very roots of which lie in the emergent ontological neurosis of post-Cartesian thought, neutralises, or at best minimises, the presence of values in approaches to culture. We are not surprised, therefore, to find a detached coolness in Foucault's almost voyeuristic account of pre-rationalist exercisements of power. In the brutal regimes of the leper colonies, in the ruthless exclusionism of medieval and renaissance culture and the insistent institutionalisation of madness in the enlightenment, Foucault chooses to find no moral questions, no politics, no reason to make value judgements. He is untouched by such barbarity. As Eagleton, leading the neo-Hegelian critique of Foucault, has written:

Foucault's style is scrupulously non-judgmental, his commentaries purged of the least hint of normativity. This stylistic mode is not far at times from a certain perverse eroticism, as the most sensational materials - the torture of a human body, for example - are mediated through a distanced, dispassionate tone, a measured, mandarin French serenely unruffled by its own shocking contents.⁴⁰

The cold voyeurism of Foucault's postmodernism is closely linked with the perceived failure of the Marxist project to bring about a happy mutuality between theory and practice. The possibility of entering into any engagement with

³⁹ Eagleton, *Against the Grain*, Oxford, 1986, 132.

⁴⁰ Eagleton, *Ideology*, 384.

contemporary culture without the correct 'relativist' distance, the correct alienation, from that culture, has fallen so far from our grasp that we have become less concerned with the proactive dimension of theory and, it seems, more concerned with the *jouissance* that such an activity as theory affords.

The corollary of the over-closure of reality in postmodernism is the over-closure of what might be termed the 'work' (the *cultural artefact, object or product*) and this is nowhere more apparent than in the musical work. The musical autonomy recognised by early nineteenth-century German culture is distinctly unique. Its uniqueness lies in the following features: first, there is a kind of urgency to the project of ontological closure - the work becomes self-sufficient in order to enable its exchangeability in the market; second the work's self quality can be articulated *from within* as an expression of the uniqueness of the musical language itself; third, the ontology of music is infused with a nihilism as we see in Wackenroder's short story *Ein wunderbares morganländisches Märchen von einem nackten Heiligen in Phantasien über die Kunst für Freunde der Kunst* (1799)⁴¹ - music is the place where man momentarily escapes the torture and anguish of reality.

The ontological closure of the work at this time began a process of ever-deepening crisis. Meaning retreated into the depths of the work until postmodernism could triumphantly declare the death of the author, of authenticity in a monumental act of forgetting and could announce the poverty, and ultimately the death, of the work in favour of the multiplicity of *the text*. This multi-faceted text, an almost magical incitement to subvert, a pre-packed patriarchy ready and waiting for dismantling, is snapped up by the active critic and devoured in a frenzy of consumption. Yet even this reified subversion, this democratisation of the critical urge is, in the final analysis, little more than a receptacle of interpretative impotence. The alienation of the ego is the corollary of its democratisation: to each text-critic comes the ability to recreate the self and its environment, to close the oppressive forces of coercion and organisation

⁴¹ W. H. Wackenroder, *Phantasien über die Kunst für Freunde der Kunst*, Gustav Kiepenheuer Verlag, Potsdam, 1925.

outside the cognitive realm: in short, this newly acquired ability in the emergent 'radical' consumer is little more than the wholesale commoditisation of the critical process itself. It is as if the radical has been welded into the political system, commoditised in itself, as a process to be bought and sold, acquired at a price and passed on as the next text in the spiral of incitement to consume. The *object itself*, the innocent product of art, one which sprang from the belief in a kind of creative authenticity, has somehow been squeezed dry of its immanence, normalised by the great democratic sweep of late capitalism and ousted by a kind of immanent critique, one which carries in itself the deferred immanence of objectivity, reproduced in itself as a kind of insidious authority. The new micro-centre, the new cultural authority resides now in an impotent response, in a radicalised gesture of acquiescence, to the external world as it is given. From the authority of genius and the autonomous product of art, we moved to the death of the author and the absolute authority of the product, and now, in this paradigm, the draining of the product of all significant internal meaning in favour of a semantic free-for-all, an interpretative jamboree.

This new text, an empty vessel, loudly resonant and yet imbued with a deep semantic ambivalence, is blissfully playful, free to flit across genres or to create new ones at every opportunity. The burying of meaning deep below the surface, far from the grasp of instrumental reason, has resulted in a two-way polarisation of approaches to the old work: in the first approach, the work is seen as a receptacle of aesthetic data, decodable on its own terms, accessible to a specialised scrutiny and yet, in itself empty; the second approach engages in a kind of extravagant fetishism for synchronous detail - an obsession for the minutiae of the historical moment, deliberately and carefully avoiding any explicit ideological position.⁴² In this sense, the emergence of autonomy instigated a kind of witch-hunt against meaning, first of visible surface conspicuity, then of the deeper authentic semantic resonance leading to the authentic object of the New Criticism, and finally to art's return as mere ancillary to the

⁴² See, for example, much of Derrida's work after *Of Grammatology*, Foucault's works from *The Order of Things*

externalised process of creative interpretation.

The notion of musical autonomy can be defined, then, as an ideal one, as a theoretical construct governed by the rules of theoretical extremes: the theoretical, as we have said, must abstract the purest most extreme model from a formidably mediocre reality and make of it a critical perfection. The belief that music is an autonomous, self-regarding system, that music functions free from the intrusion of the outside world and its mediocrity, is necessitated in the early nineteenth century by a moment where the cultural aspirations of the bourgeoisie outstrip the ability of the infrastructure to capitulate to such aspirations. It had long had to live alongside tardy theories of pragmatic meaning and mimetic calls for music's subjugation before the text. Autonomy, in its extreme forms, thus emerges as a defensive aesthetic, driven by the professional desire to sustain an intrinsic commodity status, to sustain music's ontological self-sufficiency, and to wrap that desire in a metaphysic that makes of it an absolute. It has been this stubborn metaphysical basis for the authority of the score that has, as we have said, sustained musicology through these difficult times. In this confrontation we see two ends of the same process slammed together as if in a wilfully bizarre postmodern anachronism - the beginning of the closure and the end of the closure.

In an attempt to re-open some of the concerns of German Idealism, in particular its engagement with the notion of musical autonomy, this thesis undertakes to bring into relief the salient features of the epistemological configuration of the early post-Cartesian paradigm and its consequent attitude to music, grounding this undertaking in a sensitivity to the historical predicament of that paradigm and to the hermeneutic requirements of texts from that period. In the following chapters, we will attempt to find a position which does not buy wholesale into the neo-Hegelian histories but which is nonetheless not afraid to look for causalities or relationships of ideology, political meanings or other more generally epistemological agendas. To this end, the first two chapters of the thesis are concerned with the relationship of music theory to its historical and epistemological environs.

Chapter One:

The Dissemination of Music in the Old Reich

The musical culture of the German speaking lands of the Old Reich in the eighteenth century was one characterised by small, de-centred units of production, each servicing its immediate *Umgebung*. 'Art music' in these servicing centres was consumed by a small number of privileged initiates who were allowed access to this culture only by grace of the local ecclesiastical or monarchical patron. The general structure of this dissemination we can define as *monarcho-corporatist*. As the term suggests, the monarcho-corporatist culture was one which demonstrated features both of monarchical absolutism and the older 'corporatist' communities. In the monarchical community, the production of art music tended to take place in small centres of excellence, dependent on the financial centralism of 'little' monarchy. These centres were connected to each other across great distances by means of mutability: each of the centres was usually well informed on the activity of the others and technical exchanges were common. The corporatist culture, on the other hand, tended more towards the functional incorporation of music into urban ritual. Thus, members of the urban patritiate would patronise music in order to mark certain events in the political calendar.¹ As we shall see, the huge number of states in the Old Reich and their wildly differing structures, and the huge variations in the status of urban centres vis-à-vis the territory in which they were situated, make any generalisations on the musical culture at this time extremely difficult. The term *monarcho-corporatist*, then, designates a culture which is characterised largely by social complexity and, more importantly, strict

¹ The ecclesiastical states could be said to fall somewhere between the two, where religious feasts were invariably marked by music. These ritualist/functional demands were often tempered by the almost monarchical status of some of the archbishops. The powers of the archbishop of Passau over the musical life of the state is a good example. For a fascinating and thorough account of these declining cultures in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, see Donakowski, *A Muse for the Masses: Ritual and Music in an Age of Democratic Revolution*, Chicago and London, 1977.

social hierarchies. The decline of this complexity was a result, first of all, of the shift of power to the territorial monarchs, and thereafter, of the decline of the smaller states in favour of the 'big three', Prussia, Austria and, to a lesser extent, Bavaria. This centralisation of monarchical power and the effective dissolution of the smaller centres had a profound effect on the nature of the musical culture, its dissemination and the manner in which music was understood to integrate into society. In particular, it was the emergence of aesthetics as a global discourse on art that was to have the most profound effect on the epistemological buoyancy of a functional music:

The call for an aesthetics in eighteenth century Germany is among other things a response to the problem of political absolutism. Germany in that period was a parcellised territory of feudal-absolutist states, marked by a particularism and idiosyncrasy consequent on its lack of general culture...A lack of capital and enterprise, poor communications and locally based trade, guild-dominated towns marooned in a backward countryside: such were the unpropitious conditions of the German bourgeoisie in this parochial, benighted social order.²

This is how Eagleton defines the genesis of aesthetics. As 'a response to the problems of political absolutism' then, aesthetics was a *globalising* or *metaphysical* discourse. The metaphysical basis of such a discourse was a fundamental requirement of the emergent centralised monarchical territories. More than that, the global discourse can be seen as a kind of preparation for nationhood: embedded within the grand systems of German philosophical aesthetics at the end of the eighteenth century, then, lies the urgent call for a universal *national* culture. In order to understand this urgency, we must attempt to construct a picture of the passing of the old order into the new and examine the catalysts of cultural change.

The Decline of the Monarcho-Corporatist Order

The reliability of demographic data from this period is notoriously weak. Most contemporary demographic historians³ are agreed, however, that the eighteenth century foreshadowed the remarkable demographic explosion of the nineteenth century to a remarkable extent. Indeed, there is sufficient evidence to suggest significant

² *Ideology of the Aesthetic*, Oxford 1990, 14.

³ De Vries, Meusel, Benzing, Rodgers, Pounds. See bibliography entries.

population growth around the middle of the century, a phenomenon Andrei Rogers calls the *vital revolution*.⁴ The causes for this 'revolution' are extremely difficult to ascertain; Sheehan has suggested that marginal improvements in health care tipped the balance, so to speak, in favour of lower rates of child mortality thus creating a rapid demographic expansion.⁵ This revolution had significant social and cultural consequences, not least for the German⁶ bourgeoisie, such as it was.⁷ As we shall see, Germany's peculiarity in response to the vital revolution is of no small significance for the eventual emergence of an independent bourgeois culture and, indeed, the notion of the aesthetic. It is important, first of all, to realise that the function and character of the bourgeoisie in eighteenth century urban German society should not be accounted for in terms of one unified economic or cultural unit. Suffice to say that the very diverse nature of regional experience was in itself a fundamental element of the German experience. Three basic categories of response to the demographic changes of the eighteenth century are discernible and these models serve to emphasise the fragmented nature of German urban life at this time.⁸

Medieval towns such as Nuremberg, Regensburg or Landshut were characterised by a profound failure to respond positively to the 'vital revolution'.⁹ This demographic upheaval began to weaken the old traditional order which, in essence, had changed very little since late medieval times. Sheehan characterises this stagnation thus:

About many things, Europeans seemed to know little more at the beginning of the eighteenth century than they had in the ancient world: medical students still read Galen, strategists studied Caesar, architects followed Vitruvius. People still travelled as the Romans had, sometimes on roads less

⁴ in De Vries, *European Urbanisation 1500-1800*, London, 1984.

⁵ See Kisskalt, K. 'Die Sterblichkeit im 18. Jahrhundert', in *Zeitschrift für Hygiene*, 1921, 438-511.

⁶ For ease, the terms *Germany* or *German* are used here to denote the German-speaking lands of the old Reich. This usually includes western Austria and western parts of former Bohemia [*Böhmen*] now the larger part of the Czech Republic.

⁷ For the problems inherent in the term *bourgeoisie* as applied to the German situation, see later arguments.

⁸ James J. Sheehan, *German History 1770-1866*, Oxford 1989, 73-90.

⁹ Wherever appropriate, German names will be used. In the case of such well-known towns as Nürnberg, Köln, München or Wien, their anglicised names shall be used: Nuremberg, Cologne, Munich and Vienna.

well constructed; the techniques of farming had not improved much since the Middle Ages; other technological advances, whilst often impressive individually, were scattered and uneven.¹⁰

The proto-bourgeois of the traditional order was constrained by the mechanisms of the older community: craftsmen's guilds exercised considerable constrictive power over its members and the possibility of a bourgeois network of trade and culture across large geographical areas was fundamentally hindered, in Germany in particular, by the lack of a coherent infrastructure and the primacy of the *communal*, and thus *local*, experience. The guilds, for example, existed to protect the common good of its membership not by attempting to maximise the incomes of each individual member but by attempting to ensure there was enough work to keep its members gainfully employed.¹¹ The peculiarly collectivist nature of the guild system reflected the structure of the traditional community - to practise a trade one had to have completed an apprenticeship, thus providing masters with cheap labour, after which one was required to leave the community and travel to serve with a master in the 'outside world' and thence return to submit oneself for membership, available only after competence had been demonstrated and ritual completed. The role of ritual in guilds served to reaffirm community ties and, along with religious ritual at births, marriages and deaths, stated the mutual interdependence of all members of the community. The guild system was characteristically stronger in small communities where it exerted considerable control over the craftsman's social and political life. In the larger walled cities¹² such as Nuremberg, the guilds had a much more limited economic role but, for the traditional citizen, had a strong *putative* or *symbolic* function. This symbolic power could be, and in Nuremberg was, emphasised by the guilds' high profile in city politics. Urban politics in such cases was a chaotic vortex of incongruous interests dictating economic policy in a piece-meal and haphazard manner.

The ramshackle towns of early eighteenth-century middle Germany, with their

¹⁰ Sheehan, *History*, 79.

¹¹ Mack Walker, *German Home Towns*, London, 1971 and Black, *Guilds and Civil Society*, Cambridge, 1984.

¹² See later discussion of the various gradations of the rural and urban orders in the Holy Roman Empire. Nuremberg was an imperial city.

medieval centres largely intact, were extremely insular. Separated from the outside world by both physical and symbolic walls, the city, like its guilds, guarded its privileges carefully. Anyone failing to comply with accepted values and modes of behaviour was in danger of cutting him- or herself off from basic means of subsistence. Traditionally mistrustful of outsiders without trade - *Bodenhasen* - , walled cities accepted newcomers rarely unless they were journeymen. To leave one's community without trade, then, was to invite hunger and severe deprivation. The ties of community and guild membership were thus extremely strong where corporatist community values had come into least contact with the growing international markets. Nuremberg's isolation perpetuated its medieval corporatist guild structures which hastened its demise.

In contrast stood the hanseatic harbour city of Hamburg, the very existence of which as a city depended not on some medieval function as refuge and trading post along some long since defunct overland trading route (as with Nuremberg), but in the modern international market and sea-bound trade. Where the international market had encroached for longest on traditional corporatist order, the guild structure was weakest. Characterised by a dynamic economic life, Hamburg flourished during the vital revolution. International trade required complex administrative procedures to ensure that production, transport and price mechanisms were appropriate and efficient. The role of bankers and other money lending institutions was thus a significant one, for without this venture capital larger concerns were impossible. The existence of the *Fabrik* or *Manufaktur* hails a revolution in production techniques, although surface similarities with the modern factory system are deceiving. Such manufacturing concerns were set up and overseen by an entrepreneur but staffed by independent craftsmen brought together under one roof by the overseer, each working independently of the others. The guild structure still applied, then, as long as the entrepreneur recognised the authority of the guild, but with increased foreign competition, the need to keep production costs at a minimum outweighed his inclination to maintain the traditional order. Thus the tendency to buy in cheaper non-

guild labour spelt the death of the guild system in Hamburg and other progressively minded cities.

The third example Sheehan chooses is Berlin. This city, the capital of the ascendant kingdom of Prussia, demonstrates the largely progressive role played by larger state structures in the production revolution. The growth of Prussia as a military power ensured a centralisation of authority and a decline in the micro-economics of the guild-based communities. Already in 1731, with the issuing of the empire-wide *Imperial Trades Edict*, the Prussian government, despite its vociferous complaints that economic matters were state and not imperial matters, utilised the reforming and anti-corporatist elements of the edict to hinder guild practices¹³. The much later *Allgemeines Landrecht* of 1794 finally placed the guilds under the control of centralised government administration. As in Hamburg, the decline of guild structures was accompanied by the emergence of the entrepreneurial class, which was actively encouraged by the central authorities.

The role of state in the production revolution should not be seen as a purely progressive one. The Krefeld silk industry, for example, suffered constantly under the state's meagre attempts to set up a silk industry in Berlin in competition: Krefeld's dynamism seemed to be of little consequence to the central authorities who deemed it fit and proper to expect silk to be made in the capital. Similarly, the authorities constantly demonstrated a destructive tendency to favour the short term interests of its most loyal subjects over the longer term interests of the industrial infrastructure in general. The example always quoted is that where merchant interests were constantly favoured above the health of the Silesian weaving industry. Thus a tendency towards progressive policy was often undermined by state self-interest; progressive policies could sometimes be high on rhetoric but low in effect.

Alone of all the German speaking cities of the last hundred years of the Holy

¹³ Walker, *Towns*, 93-94. Walker points out that the edict was worded such that different governments could interpret it as they wished. Thus the edict had the effect of strengthening local character and idiosyncrasy and differentiating more rigidly between different types of community. This was *le mot juste* of cameralist administrative practice. See later discussion on cameralism.

Roman Empire¹⁴, Berlin, with the exception of Vienna¹⁵, managed to sustain a level of demographic growth comparable with cities in Europe west of the Rhine. From 20,000 inhabitants in 1650 to 150,000 in 1800, the rapid expansion was bound, more than anything else, to weaken traditional corporate order. Born out of 'the community' as a manageable social environment, the guilds could not respond to the new internationalism of trade without thoroughly undermining the corporatist basis for their existence. The new order, however, at first demonstrated itself to be incapable of filling what we might call the 'guild gap' - the vacuum where social order seemed to have no centre. The number of inhabitants that were without trade had reached nearly half the recorded population of Berlin by 1780.¹⁶ As the number of poor grew, the symbolic power of the urban underworld grew. Crime rates rose dramatically and poverty became a recognised problem in the consciousness of the entrepreneurial classes. The opening of new workhouses in 1774, along with the prohibition of begging kingdom-wide represented the new order's response, *from the centre*, to a broad social problem that violated the corporatist rule of self-contained localised action. The workhouses, a symptom of a new social logic, were designed to institutionally exclude those elements that could not be addressed by the new order's macro-economic basis.

Sheehan's three cities, chosen to demonstrate the diversity of German urban life, represent three paradigms of the urban experience: guild encroachment on economic and demographic expansion and consequent stagnation; long-term exposure to international trading, facilitating an anti-corporate response to demographic expansion; centralisation of state authority and a consequent macro-economy, undermining local communities in favour of a larger unit, *the nation*. These economic upheavals in German urban life, however, are accompanied, paradoxically, by a significant, if short-lived, decentralisation of labour and production away from urban centres. Those cities that failed to hold in check the guilds' active animosity towards the new production methods suffered, but the surrounding rural hinterland of such a

¹⁴ The official demise being in the year 1806 with the victories of Napoleon over Prussia and Austria.

¹⁵ see footnote 3

¹⁶ See De Vries, *European Urbanization, 1500-1800*, 1984. 269ff.

city benefited considerably. Strange as it now seems, it was the ultra-corporatist communities of the home towns and smaller rural settlements that provided the entrepreneur with labour free from the formalised guild hindrances of the city. As the rural population swelled, production necessarily diversified to provide employment for the optimum percentage of the local population. The increase in non-skilled labour meant that the guilds simply lost their 'market share' of labour. The social factors accompanying demographic expansion and diversification in rural areas also contributed to the demise of the rural guild structure: an easing of marriage and fertility controls; the growth of a landless labour force. As testament to the expansion of rural industry at this time, as many as half of all craftsmen in Prussia lived outside the cities as free labourers by 1800.

Sheehan's three paradigms represent a broader geographical separation of German civil life in the Holy Roman empire. The Nuremberg paradigm might be said to represent the imperial cities of the 'individualised country'¹⁷ of Middle Germany. In so far as such cities clung to corporatist order, we might include in this paradigm 'home towns' such as Darmstadt, Würzburg and Bamberg along the Main, the Upper Danube region from Rottweil in Württemberg through Regensburg, Deggendorf and Plattling down as far as, but not including, Passau, now on the Austrian border (Franconia and Lower Bavaria). Some Northern towns might be said to belong to this paradigm also: Osnabrück; Westphalian towns such as Dortmund and Rhineland towns such as Aachen and Bonn. The Prussian state centred around Berlin, home of Prussian cameralism, and the Habsburg kingdom of Austria both exercised a more centralised 'modern' control of fiscal and political policy. The geographical opposition of North and South to middle is thus clear.

The Holy Roman Emperor, traditionally a member of the Habsburg dynasty, thus usually had a monarchy of his own to attend to above and beyond his imperial duties. Administrative practices in the German territories of the Empire were reflections of the bewildering array of diverse governmental structures. Broadly

¹⁷ Mack Walker *Towns*, 1-2, 23.

speaking one can see the following patterns, beginning with the largest units:

Monarchic territories or kingdoms such as Hohenzollern Prussia or Habsburg Austria and, from 1806, Wittelsbach Bavaria

Princely territories and electorates such as pre 1806 Bavaria, pre 1806 Baden, Hannover, Hesse-Darmstadt, Hesse-Kassel, Saxony and Württemberg¹⁸.

Ecclesiastical states such as Main, Trier, Lüttich, Münster, Salzburg and Passau.

Imperial cities (often with ecclesiastical territories, but with a separate status) such as Regensburg, Augsburg and Passau.

Home towns - self-contained, walled towns of the individualised country - such as Deggendorf, Plattling, Fulda, Osnabrück, and Nördlingen.

These distinctions were in practice far from stable, and the list given above should be seen merely as a 'rule of thumb' against which to measure patterns of German civil life. Certainly, the notion of *Reichsunmittelbarkeit*, of an unimpeded, unmediated line to and from the imperial authorities themselves was jealously guarded by the smaller cities and towns. Such towns existed within princely territories or some other administrative structure, but received peculiar rights of autonomy granted at various times by the imperial Aulic Council [*Reichshofrat*] or the Cameral tribunal.

Cameralism: a Baroque Science in Crisis

Perhaps it is from the latter body, the Cameral tribunal, less bound to the cycles of the imperial reign than its Aulic counterpart, that one of the most significant consequences of the crisis in administration in the late Holy Roman Empire gets its name: the bureaucratic science of *cameralism*.¹⁹ In its purest form, cameralism was enacted only in those parts of the Reich where centralisation was least in evidence. Thus, so-called Prussian cameralism represents a centralised bastardisation of this Cartesian 'science'. The essence of cameralism can be seen in its reliance on *the visible*.

¹⁸ Between 1803 and 1806, Max Joseph of Zweibrücken acquired ecclesiastical states and imperial cities including Augsburg, Regensburg and Passau. In 1806, he declared Bavaria a kingdom.

¹⁹ In actual fact it is far more likely that both the imperial body and the science get their names from the German word *Kammer* or *Cammer* referring not merely to the more modern 'room' but to the palace affairs of the local landowner. As a science of domestic administration, cameralism thereby adheres to the Aristotelean unity of house, home and state.

It made all categorisations according to what it could *see*, according to those things that gave themselves up for scrutiny. It was essentially an attempt to marry the apparently diametrically opposed notions of fiscal and/or civil diversity and imperial unity:

Cameralism was a baroque science....Cameralism was a science whose symmetry depended on its being seen from a distance, and whose rationality was in abstract outline seen from the top, subject to giddiness when attention moved from that to concrete detail. It accepted the existence of all discrete parts of German civil society, each with a set of detailed qualities and rules peculiarly its own, and worked from the assumption that if all of them could be comprehended at once an essential harmony among them would emerge above their apparent diversity. That was a metaphysical assumption and even, to begin with, a religious expression of faith. In cameral practice, the medium of harmony among the discrete parts was the state's fiscal administration, analogously a social abstraction composed of men above and beyond the discrete parts of society.²⁰

As Walker points out²¹, this science was based on an encyclopaedic notion of unity - that each part could be indexed, boxed and labelled, accessed later, still retaining its autonomy, whilst, conversely, remaining a *part* of the whole.

The basis of cameral action was to intervene only when a part's autonomy, its essential character, was under threat by such distortions as 'oligarchy and corruption'. Cameralism thereby attempted merely to 'maintain a community's essential character'.²² The cameralist chancellor of the University of Halle, Veit Seckendorff (1626-1692) summed up this process of government as one with '*alles nach Maasse des alten Herkommens und jedes Ortes Gelegenheit*'.²³

Cameralism might thus be seen to extend from the guild theories of Johannes Althusius²⁴ and is first and foremost an affirmation of corporatist diversity. The 'new' element, however, consists in the latter part of the proposition: fiscal and civil diversity

²⁰ Walker, *Towns*, 145.

²¹ Ibid. 146.

²² Ibid. 147.

²³ Walker, *Towns*, 147. Literally 'all in accordance with old custom and each place's circumstance'

²⁴ Also known as Johannes Althaus, d.1638. See Black, *Guilds and Civil Society*, Cambridge, 1984, 131-142. The importance of Althusius' *Politica Methodice Digesta*, first edition 1603, extended second edition 1610, lies in the extensiveness of its argument. Black's book provides a useful bibliography.

within unity. This admittedly encyclopaedic notion of unity found its most radical practice in the administrators and administrative theorists of the Old Reich, notably in the works of, of course, Veit Seckendorff, J. J. Becher (1635-82), Christian Thomasius (1655-1728), Christian Wolff (1675-1754) and the notable conservative Justus Möser (1720-94):

Devoted as he [Möser] was to an ideal of Germanic community implicitly focused upon the small guild town, he decried entrepreneurial commercialism, the putting-out system and large scale manufacture. The implied rejection of the prescriptive power of economics as an autonomous science was to become a feature of nineteenth-century German thought, Marx included: personality and social life - 'ethics' - defined what economics was about.²⁵

If one reads cameralism as a descriptive science, a non-proactive theory 'prone to giddiness', then the element of unity in it must have represented the metaphysical element necessary to make sense of the 'benighted social order' of the Reich:²⁶ the strain for order and unity, despite a wilful reality, is at the root of this Cartesian hybrid.

In Prussia, the unity element was easily subsumed into the post-cameralist bureaucracy of an interventionist state and it is the Prussian paradigm that was to prove the most pervasive in the new emergent order. The culmination of a universalist, state-sponsored administrative science came in the 1790's with the enactment of the Prussian *General Code*. The unity element of cameralist doctrine now required that all parts be measured according to categories based 'not on local corporations and clusters of social relations, but on social and legal types marked out and recognised by the state.'²⁷ Johann Justi's (1705?-71) theoretical strains for *Zusammenhang* in Prussian civil life, based around the individual's answerability to the state alone, now found expression in Prussian administrative practice: diversity existed only in so far as it expressed the all-embracing totality of the organic state.²⁸

The German *Bourgeoisie*

In strict *economic* terms, the middle class, a postulated mid-point between

²⁵ Black, *Guilds*, 128

²⁶ Eagleton, *Ideology*, 14.

²⁷ Walker, *Towns*, 159.

²⁸ Sheehan, *History*, 55-72, 193-5 and Walker, *Towns*, 145-174.

those who control capital and thus inevitably control labour (the capitalists), and those who sell their labour (the proletariat), did not exist in early nineteenth-century Germany. The notion of a bourgeois culture, then, in the sense of a definitive class culture, is problematic: the emergent cultural landscape of the nineteenth century was essentially based, therefore, on a putative culture which was largely *constructed*. This 'classless' culture, born into a post-cameralist climate characterised by notions of state as a unity or organism, thus represented a bizarre perversion of the 'high' art of the rococo and baroque courts, transmuting its 'highness' into an esoteric abstraction of *the universal*: this democratic imperative made the assumption that the new order could reconstruct a kind of community as a larger unit based around the universal inclusiveness of all its members. It is important to realise that this putative 'democratic' high culture was not the culture of the major venture capitalists, whose number was distinctly limited, but of a disparate group of workers whose commodity in the capitalist market was, although still labour, now a labour which brought a sufficient income that enabled the pretence of economic autonomy. If citizenship was a right, given to all 'living under God's grace' then the active exchange of mutual support, the proactive participation in community in order to remain a member, must inevitably give way to the opposite inclination - the urge for separateness, for a degree of autonomy away from the roar of the masses. Those that managed such a partial separation have become known as *the bourgeoisie*. Thus the emergence of *autonomy* under the flag of *universality* engendered a propaganda of the putative home-centred world vision based around a sentimental vision of the family as the base unit on which a democratic and Christian society could rest.²⁹ The non-sentimental imagery of the utility family of the corporatist order now gives way to the new 'universal' aspiration of domestic bliss.

The new post-cameral 'universal' culture and the collapse of the corporatist order are both implicitly bound up in the demographic upheavals of the 'vital revolution'. Without perpetrating a crude causal model, one can clearly discern that this

²⁹ This is, of course, particularly true of the so-called *Vormärz* or *Biedermeier* period between Napoleon's defeat and the 1848 revolutions. For a vivid account of music in this period, see A. M. Hanson, *Musical Life in Biedermeier Vienna*, Cambridge, 1985.

rapid shift in the demographic order played a significant role in the passing of the old and the emergence of the new orders. Whilst the notion of a 'middle' or 'bourgeois' class as a distinct economic unit is problematic, one can see the emergence of the episteme³⁰ of 'autonomy' (both economic and cultural) contributing to this middle layer's sense of 'otherness'. The uneasy coincidence of the notion of a universality of expression and individual autonomy gave rise to a tortured symbolic of the universal individual, that metaphysical mechanism through which the last vestiges of the corporatist world vision are dispelled. Cameralism had at last collapsed into tiny atomised units - individuals. To order this potentially anarchic splintering of Cartesian order, the new culture required what cameralism had required, some notion of or place for unity. Whereas cameralist unity had evolved around the metaphysical symbolism of imperial authority, 'bourgeois' unity invested its material powers in the microcosm of the individual and the fit mechanisms of mutual exchangeability - trade, universal expression and so on.

The rift that capitalism instigated between the disenfranchised labourers without guild status and the venturists who could persuade bankers to finance their *Manufaktoren* was addressed by the rhetoric of a universal mission of piety, Christianity, democracy and nationhood to which every citizen was bound to align himself in the interest of the greater good. What Bracher calls the 'socialisation' or 'politicisation' of the citizens was an inevitable result of the decline of corporatism. Without recourse to the constraining mechanisms of corporatist community, the danger of a mass alignment against the centre became a distinct possibility. As Bracher further argues, the emergence of a 'democratic', majority-rule mode of government was accompanied by an inevitable centralisation of the mechanisms for the dissemination of information and an intensification of censorship. The 'people' were thus mobilised 'through propaganda':

In sum, this development might be called the assertion of the rule of the

³⁰ This Foucauldian term refers to an element of the epistemological paradigm which is clearly active within it. In this Foucauldian sense, the notion of autonomy is bound up with the broader socialisation and politicisation of the individual.

autonomous individual within the state yet at the same time a manifestation of the threat posed to him by this modern, all-encompassing state.³¹

Such cosy formulae can overstate the consistency of the social and cultural transformations of this period. Yet, within the 'bourgeois' culture of the first two decades of the nineteenth century, the notion of an uninterrupted line of communication between individual and state, individual and God was loudly proclaimed if the reality of social practice at that time suggested little to complement such liberal polemics:

The detailed control taught by the chairs of cameralism and urged by eighteenth-century statesmen seemed to have reached the limit of its possibility and failed. It was dropped from the university curricula now. But yet that oddly necessary offshoot of cameralism, the doctrine of the harmony of individual wills, still had a way open to it. It was mainly a change in emphasis and political method, in a sense not more than a change in tactics: but a very important one. Liberalization appeared as an alternative weapon to control, another way to break up the impenetrable and immovable communities, and to integrate them with the larger life and purpose of the society and the state - to make them enter the general estate of the movers and doers³².

New Disseminations

Evidence for a distinctly new network of dissemination mechanisms at the end of the eighteenth and beginning of the nineteenth centuries in Germany can be found in the indices of book fairs and publishing lists. The comparative study of these indices in François³³ demonstrates convincingly that demographic indicators in population censuses can often distort certain features of the cultural landscape. By using book fair and publishing indices, François is able to construct a reasonably reliable picture of the changing dynamics of cultural dissemination practices in this period. Bracher's description of a mobilisation 'through propaganda'³⁴ holds the key to an understanding of the new culture: the policies set out in the Prussian General Code find their demographic expression only during the second phase of Napoleonic occupation. Out

³¹ Bracher, *The German Dictatorship*, Cologne, 1969, 14.

³² Walker, *Towns*, 213-4.

³³ François, 'The German urban network between the 16th and 18th centuries: cultural and demographic indicators' in van der Woude, Hayami and de Vries (ed.'s) *Urbanization in History*, 1990. 84-100.

³⁴ Bracher, *Dictatorship*, 1971.

of the old imperial order, shattered by the Napoleonic wars, emerged the two axis powers of Prussia and Austria. The political reality, however, seems, as François shows, to have had a considerable basis in the cultural dynamics of eighteenth century Germany. The bi-polarity of Berlin-Leipzig and Vienna in publishing lists and indices of authors and publishers underlines a cultural centralisation preceding the political and economic bi-polarity of the nineteenth-century post-Napoleonic German lands:

Table 1.1

*Top Four Publishing Towns
by Number of Titles³⁵*

1610-19		(rank)	1765-1805	
Leipzig	2296	[1]	Leipzig	5556
Frankfurt	1799	[2]	Berlin	2423
Cologne	1375	[3]	Vienna	1235
Wittenberg	804	[4]	Halle	1154

In the second, later index, Frankfurt rated lower in the rank and published only 1137 titles, showing a decline over the specified period. Similarly, Cologne rated lower than 33rd on the later rank thus showing a serious decline. The ratios of the highest ranking town to that of the fourth highest demonstrate the centralism of the later index: approximately 3:1 for the earlier list and 5:1 for the later list. Clearly, however, this simple comparison is not sufficient and, as François shows, these trends can only be determined in the context of the other indices.

The other indices can underline the argument, then. The numbers of publishers in the towns show a similar polycentrism in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, for example:

³⁵ The tables shown here are taken from François' tables. The first earlier index takes its information from book fair lists and the second is taken from book fair catalogues. The problem of the real comparability of these two indices is underlined by the growing importance of the catalogue as both record and advertisement for a house's products. The trend is certainly tangible but not accurately measurable in such indices: methods of storing lists and the efficiency with which such lists were maintained may have significantly changed in this period. We can thus only assume a fair comparability. Note that the later index is based on numbers of titles on a *ten yearly average* between 1765 and 1805, whereas the earlier index refers only to the circumscribed ten years 1610-19.

Table 1.2

*Top Four German Towns
by Number of Publishers in
the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries³⁶*

(rank)		
[1]	Frankfurt/M	118
[2]	Augsburg	107
[3]	Leipzig	88
[4]	Nuremberg	86

Despite a certain bi-polarity that François recognises, centred around the south-west region and around Thuringia and Saxony, the centrality of a single regional capital is reserved only for the north east provinces centred around Leipzig and Berlin. Thus, the south west region demonstrates a high degree of polycentrism at this time.³⁷ A later index demonstrates a distinct alteration in that pattern:

Table 1.3

*The Four Largest Publishing Towns
in 1806 According to Number
of Resident Authors³⁸*

(rank)		
[1]	Vienna	382
[2]	Berlin	288
[3]	Leipzig	178
[4]	Dresden	129

Whilst population indices from the same periods demonstrate a similar trend towards bi-polar centralisation:

³⁶ François has taken these figures from J. Benzing, 'Die deutschen Verleger des 16. und 17. Jahrhunderts: Eine Neubearbeitung', *Archiv für Geschichte des Buchwesens*, 18 (1977), cols. 1077-322.

³⁷ The ratios of the two respective capitals to their second largest towns in that region are given by François thus:

Leipzig-Wittenberg 2.9:1

Frankfurt-Cologne 1.3:1

³⁸ Taken from J. G. Meusel, *Das Gelehrte Teutschland oder Lexikon der jetzt lebenden Schriftsteller*, 1806, xii.

Table 1.4

<i>Population by 1,000s of Inhabitants</i> ³⁹				
(rank)				
1600			1800	
Danzig	50	[1]	Vienna	231
Vienna	50	[2]	Berlin	150
Prague	50	[3]	Hamburg	100
Augsburg	48	[4]	Prague	77
<i>ratio of rank 1 to rank 4:</i>				
25:24			3:1	

François believes there to remain an attenuated polycentrism:

We can draw three conclusions from the preceding arguments. The first related to the unification of the network of 'publishing' towns under the leadership of Leipzig, and more generally to the hegemony over intellectual life in Germany exercised by Berlin and Leipzig. This contrasts with the absence of a clear demographic capitol in Germany and the continuing polycentrism of the German urban network. It was partly due to the fact that integration occurs more easily in the cultural than in the demographic area: books and ideas move more freely than do people. But it also goes to show that the cultural integration of Germany preceded her political and economic integration and that Germany was a *Kulturnation* long before becoming a *politische Nation*.⁴⁰

Whilst population indices clearly point towards a new type of super-city in Vienna and Berlin, the polycentrism of the older German order is maintained in the lower ranked towns :

Table 1.5

<i>Population by 1,000s of Inhabitants, 1800</i>		
(rank)		
[5]	Königsberg	59
[6]	Dresden	55
[7]	Breslau	54
[8]	Cologne	42
[9]	Danzig	40
[10]	Magdeburg	37
[11]	Bremen	36
[12]	Frankfurt	35
<i>ratio of rank 5 to rank 12: c.2:1[1.68:1]</i>		

³⁹ Some of François' figures for population are taken from de Vries, *European Urbanization 1500-1800*, 1984. I found the appendices particularly useful, especially Appendix I, 269ff. The German cities are found on pages 272-3 and entries are given, where possible, from 1500 to 1800 at fifty year intervals. The ratios of this table clearly show that the largest cities of the new post-mercantilist markets are disproportionately larger than the next few cities in the ranking. Compare Prague with Vienna or Berlin.

⁴⁰ François, 'German urban network...' 99.

Indeed, as François points out:

In the different regions there are networks such as those centred on Munich and Dresden, for example, which retained coherence and autonomy. The links between the various decentralised regional sub-systems were provided by the 'relay' towns, ports such as Hamburg, or the market towns, such as Frankfurt, Breslau and Leipzig.⁴¹

The publishing indices after the top four ranking towns demonstrate a very different pattern, as one would expect, given the above assertion:

Table 1.6

<i>Number of Titles, 1765-1805</i>		
(rank)		
[5]	Frankfurt/M	1,137
[6]	Nuremberg	972
[7]	Hamburg	890
[8]	Göttingen	787
[9]	Breslau	569
[10]	Augsburg	466
[11]	Dresden	459
[12]	Jena	445
<i>ratio of rank 5 to rank 12:</i>		
c.3:1[2.5:1]		

Whilst author indices tend to show a polycentrism, explained, possibly, by the role of the new university towns and the proliferation of the so-called *Residenzstädte* during the baroque period:

Table 1.7

<i>Number of Authors, 1806</i>		
<i>us</i> = university town; <i>rs</i> = <i>Residenzstadt</i>		
(rank)		
[5]	Prague	119 ^{us}
[6]	Munich	114 ^{rs}
[7]	Hamburg	106
[8]	Stuttgart	105 ^{rs}
[9]	Breslau	83 ^{us}
[10]	Halle	80 ^{us}
[11]	Göttingen	71 ^{us}
[12]	Nuremberg	70

publishing indices show a much clearer picture of the new centralisms of post-cameral disseminations of culture.

⁴¹ Ibid., 90.

Robert Eitner's Model

The analysis of Meusel and Benzing's materials given by François demonstrates how powerful an indicator cultural indices can be. Clearly, there was some kind of fundamental shift in the manner in which printed matter was distributed well before the forced decline of cameralism under Napoleon's occupation. The absolute necessity of such centralised means of production and distribution seems to have been motivated by what might be termed the commodity-equivalence paradigm.⁴² The metaphysical assumption of this paradigm was free-exchangeability according to coinage value only, either internally within a single state or quasi-nation or, as was later the case, across international boundaries. As we have seen, those towns and cities that sought to trade beyond the small confines of their circumscribed corporatist world began to emerge in the eighteenth century as the strongest wealth creators in the Old Reich. Such cold, levelling, 'democratic' pressures as the commodity required, forced numerous hitherto corporatist communities out from behind the old protecting veil of so-called *Reichsunmittelbarkeit* into the centre stage of German consciousness.

To what degree, then, can the production and distribution of music be seen to participate in this same paradigm shift? Is there any evidence for a similar emergent centralism of publishing towns? The data bases that might answer this question are those by Robert Eitner⁴³, Hannelore Goricke⁴⁴ and Alexander Weinmann.⁴⁵ Of particular use is the oldest source, Eitner's index - still a profoundly useful reference. Indeed, both Weinmann and Goricke have made extensive use of the references given by Eitner and appear to have added few names to his findings. The 'Buch- und Musikalien-Händler....' index⁴⁶ consists of extensive lists of publishers, traders and

⁴² A term used here to capture the sense in which the notion of 'commodity' and fair parity of markets was becoming as much a feature of the epistemological landscape as the economic.

⁴³ His 'Buch- und Musikalien-Händler, Buch- und Musikaliendrucke nebst Notenstecher, nur die Musik betreffend' the *Beilage* from *Monatshefte für Musikgeschichte*, issue 36, Leipzig, 1904. Reprint New York 1962.

⁴⁴ *Der Wiener Musikalienhandel von 1700 bis 1778*, 1960.

⁴⁵ 'Wiener Musikverleger und Musikalienhändler von Mozarts Zeit bis gegen 1860: ein firmengeschichtliche und topographischer Behelf' in *Österreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften, Philosophische-historische Klasse. Sitzungsberichte*, 230. Band 4. *Abhandlung, Festgabe der Akademie für Teilnehmer des Internationalen Musikwissenschaftlichen Kongress*, Vienna 1956.

⁴⁶ Henceforward referred to simply as *Musikalienhändler*.

printers of music, arranged in alphabetical order. As far as one can tell from the index, little or no differentiation is made between entries which own their own business and those which merely participate in a business as an employee. Thus, *Druckerei* might mean 'a printing house' owned by the named entry, whereas *Drucker* might mean 'one who is involved in printing.' This differentiation is not always obvious. Similar problems arise with the pairs *Verlag/Verleger*, *Musikalienhandlung/Musikalienhändler* and *Musikhandlung/Musikhändler*.⁴⁷

The index, which covers Europe and the United States, is, like Meusel and Benzing's earlier indices, taken from a number of sources, but most notably from book fair catalogues, in-house catalogues and municipal tax records. Entries are ordered alphabetically according to surname or firm title. No ordering is made for either period or place. Appendix I has sorted the towns into alphabetical order and grouped all entries for each of those towns into 50 year periods. No references have been reproduced outside the Old Reich borders of 1789, to facilitate a comparison with François' figures. The appendix, ordered in this way, still presents several fundamental problems in the nature of this material. First, through no fault of Eitner's, the information available for the exact dating of many of the publishing/printing/trading entries is scant to say the least. Thus we often find such date references as 'end of the 18th century'⁴⁸, or worse, '19th century'⁴⁹ or even no date at all.⁵⁰ Also, when dates are more specific, there is rarely enough information to ascertain exactly when the entry finished practising his/her craft. The following analysis of the index thus takes for each dated entry the earliest year and constructs an index of participation in the music industry based on this global rule:⁵¹

⁴⁷ To remain as faithful to Eitner as possible, all references given either in the main text or in Appendix I translate trade descriptions as follows: *Druckerei*: 'printing house' or 'printer's'; *Drucker*: 'printer'; *Verlag*: 'publishing house' or 'publisher's'; *Verleger*: 'publisher'; *Musikalienhandlung*: 'sheet music dealer's' or 'dealership in printed music'; *Musikalienhändler*: 'sheet music dealer' or 'dealer in printed music'; *Musikhandlung*: 'music dealer's/ dealership'; *Musikhändler*: 'music dealer'.

⁴⁸ See page 124, the entry for Kunst- und Industrie-Comptoir: '...in Leipzig und Berlin, Ende des 18. Jahrhunderts.'

⁴⁹ See page 148, the entry for Mayer and Wigand: '...Verleger in Leipzig im 19. Jahrhundert.'

⁵⁰ See for example page 120, the entry for Koch. Eitner merely states '...Verleger in Leipzig.'

⁵¹ Wherever possible I have stuck to the accepted Anglicisation of some of these names. The exception, however, is *Kassel* which seems no longer to be called *Cassel* in English.

Table 1.8*Participants in the German Music Industry, (printers, engravers, etc. of music)⁵²*

1600-1650			1650-1700		
[rank]			[rank]		
[1]	Leipzig	28	[1]	Leipzig	32
[2]	Frankfurt/M	23	[2]	Frankfurt/M	23
[3]	Nuremberg	13	[3]	Nuremberg	16
[4]	Erfurt	11	[4]	Augsburg	12
[5]	Rostock	9	[5]	Hamburg	11
[6]	Magdeburg	8	[6]	Dresden	9
[7]	Augsburg	7	[7]	Jena	8
[8]	Hamburg	6	[8]	Frankfurt/O	5
[9]	Dresden	5		Cologne	5
	Jena	5		Lübeck	5
	Vienna	5		Regensburg	5
[12]	Berlin	4	[12]	Stuttgart	4
	Braunschweig	4	[13]	Bremen	3
	Passau	4		Breslau	3
[15]	Danzig	3		Kassel	3
	Innsbruck	3		Ulm	3
[17]	Breslau	2		Vienna	3
	Görlitz	2	[18]	Berlin	2
	Halle	2		Darmstadt	2
	Kassel	2		Freiburg/Br ⁵³	2
	Cologne	2		Görlitz	2
	Regensburg	2		Gotha	2
	Tübingen	2		Halle	2
	Würzburg	2		Munich	2
[25]	Bremen	1		Weimar	2
	Darmstadt	1		Würzburg	2
	Freiburg/Br	1	[27]	Erfurt	1
	Gotha	1		Hanover	1
	Lübeck	1		Mainz	1
	Mainz	1		Passau	1
	Munich	1		Prague	1
	Prague	1		Tübingen	1
	Ulm	1	[33]	Braunschweig	0
[34]	Düsseldorf	0		Danzig	0
	Frankfurt/O	0		Düsseldorf	0
	Hanover	0		Innsbruck	0
	Mannheim	0		Magdeburg	0
	Stuttgart	0		Mannheim	0
	Weimar	0		Rostock	0

⁵² As we have said, the entries were counted and organised in terms of the first dated record that Eitner could find. The low level of information for dating necessitated an analysis of first dates: thus an entry for 1730-80 would only be included in the 1700-1750 figures.

⁵³ i.e. Freiburg im Breisgau, in Baden-Württemberg. Freiburg in Saxony, is referred to throughout as Freiburg/S. Not to be confused with *Freiberg* in Saxony.

Table 1.9*Participants in the German Music Industry, (printers, engravers, etc. of music)*

1700-1750			1750-1800		
[rank]			[rank]		
[1]	Leipzig	25	[1]	Leipzig	68
[2]	Augsburg	19	[2]	Berlin	47
[3]	Nuremberg	16	[3]	Vienna	39
[4]	Hamburg	14	[4]	Hamburg	29
[5]	Frankfurt/M	8	[5]	Frankfurt/M	13
[6]	Erfurt	6	[6]	Braunschweig	8
[7]	Berlin	5		Nuremberg	8
	Jena	5	[8]	Halle	7
[9]	Dresden	4		Mannheim	7
	Vienna	4	[10]	Breslau	6
[11]	Bremen	3		Hanover	6
	Cologne	3		Kassel	6
	Munich	3		Lübeck	6
	Passau	3		Prague	6
	Ulm	3		Stuttgart	6
[16]	Braunschweig	2	[16]	Augsburg	5
	Breslau	2		Magdeburg	5
	Görlitz	2		Mainz	5
	Lübeck	2		Weimar	5
	Magdeburg	2	[20]	Danzig	4
	Regensburg	2		Gotha	4
	Rostock	2	[22]	Bremen	3
	Stuttgart	2		Darmstadt	3
	Weimar	2		Dresden	3
[25]	Danzig	1		Regensburg	3
	Darmstadt	1	[26]	Erfurt	2
	Frankfurt/O	1		Freiburg/Br	2
	Freiburg/Br	1		Jena	2
	Gotha	1		Cologne	2
	Kassel	1		Rostock	2
	Mainz	1		Tübingen	2
	Prague	1	[32]	Düsseldorf	1
	Würzburg	1		Frankfurt/O	1
[34]	Düsseldorf	0		Görlitz	1
	Halle	0		Innsbruck	1
	Hanover	0		Munich	1
	Innsbruck	0		Ulm	1
	Mannheim	0		Würzburg	1
	Tübingen	0	[39]	Passau	0

Table 1.10*Participants in the German Music Industry, (printers, engravers, etc. of music)**1800 - 1850*

[rank]			[rank]		
[1]	Leipzig	80	[20]	Gotha	5
[2]	Berlin	78		Würzburg	5
[3]	Vienna	41	[23]	Mainz	4
[4]	Stuttgart	19		Regensburg	4
[5]	Breslau	16	[25]	Bremen	3
[6]	Dresden	14		Darmstadt	3
	Erfurt	14		Düsseldorf	3
[8]	Hamburg	13		Freiburg/Br	3
	Munich	13		Görlitz	3
[10]	Prague	11		Innsbruck	3
[11]	Frankfurt/M	10		Nuremberg	3
[12]	Augsburg	9		Ulm	3
	Halle	9	[33]	Lübeck	2
[14]	Braunschweig	8		Passau	2
	Cologne	8		Tübingen	2
[16]	Hanover	7		Weimar	2
	Kassel	7	[37]	Mannheim	1
	Magdeburg	7		Rostock	1
[19]	Jena	6	[39]	Frankfurt/O	0
[20]	Danzig	5			

Augsburg

The example of Augsburg can be seen to represent a paradigm of the fate of the inland *Reichsstädte* in the post-Cartesian era. Whereas the patronage and dynamic mercantilism of the Fugger and Welser families had helped to make Augsburg a banking and financial centre for the south west during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, Augsburg demonstrates a severe decline as a result of population decimation during the so-called Thirty Years War (1618-1648). The relatively low level of information in the index for participants in the music industry,⁵⁴ 1600-1650, can be seen to misrepresent Augsburg's cultural importance in the first half of the seventeenth century. Whereas Augsburg lies at rank 7 in the music index, its place in François' indices would seem to suggest a marginally more significant cultural and demographic

⁵⁴ Henceforward to be termed merely 'music index.'

function: rank 4 in the population index and rank 5 in the titles index.⁵⁵ Augsburg's ratio with her nearest large neighbour, Munich, of 6:1 in the titles index and 4:1 in the population index would certainly seem to suggest that Augsburg functioned as one of, if not the most significant, demographic and cultural centres for the individualised country of the south west. Even the emergent giant, Nuremberg, cannot compete at this stage with Augsburg's cultural ranking: 2:1 [Augsburg: Nuremberg] in the authors' index. Thus, Augsburg's disproportionately low performance in the music index might be seen as a result of too small a data base for this period, 7:13 [Augsburg: Nuremberg].

By the latter half of the seventeenth century, however, Augsburg rises to rank 4 on the music index, seeming to underline to a greater extent François' and de Vries' figures. Thus, Augsburg's data can be represented as a factor or proportion, n , of Nuremberg's thus:⁵⁶

$[N(n) = A]$

music index: $n = 0.75$

population index: $n = 1$

authors index: $n = 2$

Again, Augsburg's relationship with her nearest urban neighbour, Munich, would seem to underline her cultural significance as a regional capital for present Bavaria and Baden-Württemberg:

$[M(n) = A]$

music index: $n = 6$

population index: $n = 2$

By the first half of the 18th century, Augsburg takes rank 2 in the music index

⁵⁵ Of course, at this stage, the data margins are so small as to be almost wholly unreliable. Hence, the necessity to contextualise the tendencies shown by each of the indices in the broader indexical contour.

⁵⁶ In all cases, the upper case letters represent the towns referred to in the preceding text. Thus, N = data for Nuremberg, and A = data for Augsburg. It might seem strange to compare in this way the music index, a comparative index, with other 'absolute' indices such as those provided by François and de Vries (see next note). But, there is clear evidence that population growth and cultural growth are not as determinately linked as traditional wisdom would have it. Therefore, I have stuck to non-growth indices or 'absolute' indices for comparison.

having remained consistently ahead of her larger neighbour, Nuremberg, with a ratio of c.6:5. No other indices are available for further comparison apart from de Vries' figures.⁵⁷ Thus the following factors would seem to largely underline the only cultural indicators available, the music index:
[N(n) = A]

music index:⁵⁸ $n = 1.9$

population index: $n = 1$

The second half of the eighteenth century sees Augsburg slip to rank 16, having at last been overtaken by Nuremberg which slips only to rank 6 giving the new ratio of 5:8 [Augsburg: Nuremberg]. A comparison of this with François' and de Vries' figures demonstrates a severe decline for Augsburg, both cultural and demographic, throughout the eighteenth century: rank 16 for population [Nuremberg, 18], rank 15 for authors [Nuremberg 12].

In essence, Augsburg is so far proving herself, like so many of the former *Reichsstädte*, to be a victim both of eighteenth-century rationalisation (the emergence of the new regional *Residenzstädte*) and of a new centralised culture of commodity equivalence. The following table shows Augsburg's participation rate for the music index as a factor of that of rank 1:

[L(n) = A]

Table 1.11

Augsburg's Participation in the Music Industry as a Factor (n) of Leipzig's

	1600-1650	1650-1700	1700-1750	1750-1800
$n =$	0.25	0.33	0.76	0.08

The 1800-1850 indices would seem to show that Augsburg was able to sustain a lesser function, and consolidated its rank position to 12 in the music index. This sustained level of regional servicing contrasts starkly with that of Nuremberg for the same index, from rank 6, 1750-1800, to rank 25, 1800-1850. Thus, in terms of music

⁵⁷ De Vries' figures in *Urbanization*, 272-3.

⁵⁸ Where the factor has more than four decimal places, the figure is approximated to four decimal places. So, whereas the factor here is in fact 1.9047619, the rounded up figure is 1.9048.

participation, when shown as a factor (n) of Nuremberg's participation rates in this index, Augsburg's survival to the detriment of Nuremberg is clearly demonstrable:

$$[N(n) = A]$$

Table 1.12

Augsburg's Participation in the Music Index as a Factor of Nuremberg's

	1600-1650	1650-1700	1700-1750	1750-1800	1800-1850
$n =$	0.54	0.75	1.2	0.63	3

and the same expression of Augsburg's participation with Munich emphasises its emergent regional function in an ever increasing area, eventually to be superseded by Munich's new regional function:

$$[M(n) = A]$$

Table 1.13

Augsburg's Participation in the Music Index as a Factor of Munich's

	1600-1650	1650-1700	1700-1750	1750-1800	1800-1850
$n =$	7	6	6.33	5	0.69

Thus the importance of Augsburg as a regional centre declines, then, in favour of Munich in the nineteenth century. This was due as much to Munich's new status as a *Residenzstadt* as to its emergent industrial function.

Berlin

Berlin demonstrates the trend towards large central places for the dissemination of culture that undermined the older *Reichsstädte's* regional functions. In the first half of the seventeenth century, its population was so small as to remain out of the top 33 ranks. Similarly its position on the music index is only rank 12. Its relationship with its nearest virulent neighbour, Leipzig, is as follows:

[L(n) = B]:

music index: n = 0.14

titles index - [Berlin too low]

[publishers index: n = 0.11]⁵⁹

population index: - 1.79

Thus, despite Berlin's political significance as a population centre point of Prussia, its cultural function seems to be still limited to that of regional servicer. François says the following about such towns:

...their real vitality is less than would appear at first sight based on their size alone, for their demographic and economic potential is not matched by an equivalent cultural dynamism.⁶⁰

During the second half of the seventeenth century, Berlin has fallen to rank 18 on the music index, and its population size falls to only 12,000. In relation to Leipzig, Berlin demonstrates the following factors:

[L(n) = B]

music index: n = 0.06

population index: n = 1.09

The disproportional weight of Leipzig's music industry participation rate suggests a specialisation of the industry in and around Leipzig, to Berlin's detriment. This specialisation is, as we see in Hohenberg and Lees,⁶¹ quite common:

If one compares the big capitals with Bruges or Augsburg, Norwich or Bologna, the former seem almost like a throwback to an older, Asian form: a minimum of autonomy, more consumption than production, shocking contrasts of grandeur and misery. Yet they and the governments and elites they housed came to exert powerful political control and intellectual domain over the plains of Europe.⁶²

Thus Augsburg's disproportional cultural function was often the case across Europe.

⁵⁹ This comparison can be misleading as François takes data from the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. 'The German urban network...', in van der Woude, Hayami and de Vries (ed.'s), *Urbanization in History*, 1990, 92.

⁶⁰ 'The German urban network...', in van der Woude, Hayami and de Vries (ed.'s), *Urbanization in History*, 1990, 93.

⁶¹ Paul M. Hohenberg and Lynn Hollen Lees, *The Making of Urban Europe, 1000-1950*, 1985. Thus, at this stage, Leipzig and Augsburg belong to a similar cultural type-category.

⁶² Ibid. 169.

Similarly, the case of Leipzig would seem to uphold such a model. Berlin's dwarfed cultural function underlines the specialisation in which such cities as Leipzig and Augsburg participated:

They have developed beyond the provision of basic urban services by specialisation in transport functions, industrial production or ecclesiastical administration but are not possessed of central governmental functions.⁶³

By the early eighteenth century, Berlin's function as a cultural centre point for Prussia seems to become comparable with Leipzig's function as the Saxon centre point. Berlin's population grows to 55,000 and Leipzig's to 22,000.⁶⁴ The participation rate in Berlin remains low, but its rank climbs to 7:

$[L(n) = B]$

music index: $n = 0.2$

population index: $n = 2.75$

By 1750, Berlin's position as the biggest population centre of the North East is clear, its population rising to 90,000, compared with Leipzig's to 35,000.⁶⁵ This gives the following factor n :

$[L(n) = B]$

population index: $n = 2.57$

Berlin's rise to rank 2 on the music participation index underlines its emergent cultural function for Berlin served by its *Residenzstadt* status. Thus, its music index factor n of Leipzig's data is improved:

$[L(n) = B]$

music index: $n = 0.69$

For 1800-1850, we can again compare the figures counted from Eitner's *Musikalienhändler* with François' cultural indicators. This comparison demonstrates Berlin's emergence both as an economic and demographic centre point:

⁶³ De Vries, *European Urbanization 1500-1800*, 1984, 48.

⁶⁴ Not given in François. These figures are again taken from de Vries, *Urbanization*, 272-3.

⁶⁵ Ibid. 272-3.

$$[L(n) = B]$$

music index: $n = 0.98$

titles index: $n = 0.44$

authors index: $n = 1.62$

population index: $n = 4.69$

Despite Leipzig's near proximity, then, Berlin does not appear to be stifled by the apparent vibrancy of her neighbour's cultural index. Indeed, there is sufficient cause to argue that Berlin and Leipzig formed a kind of bi-polarity where both functioned as servicers of the north-east region.

In terms of music participation, Berlin demonstrates the following relationship with Leipzig, termed as a factor of Leipzig's participation:

$$[L(n) = B]$$

Table 1.14

Berlin's Music Participation as a Factor of Leipzig's

	1600-1650	1650-1700	1700-1750	1750-1800	1800-1850
$n =$	0.14	0.06	0.2	0.69	0.98

Thus, despite Leipzig's rapid growth as a centre of the music industry, Berlin's later rise is consistent with a bi-polar model. Indeed, the rise of this bi-polar axis can be demonstrated in the relationship of Berlin to the second largest city for music participation in present Germany. Where Berlin itself becomes rank 2, the next highest ranking *German*⁶⁶ (not Austrian or Bohemian) entry is used:⁶⁷

Table 1.15

Berlin's Music Participation as a Factor of the German Rank 2

	[F(n) = B]	[F(n) = B]	[A(n) = B]	[H(n) = B]	[S(n) = B]
	1600-1650	1650-1700	1700-1750	1750-1800	1800-1850
$n =$	0.17	c.0.09	0.26	1.6	3.7

⁶⁶ When italicised in this manner, *German* or *Germany* refers to present day Germany rather than the Old Reich.

⁶⁷ Here, F = Frankfurt's data, A = Augsburg's data, H = Hamburg's data and S = Stuttgart's data.

Therefore, by the beginning of the nineteenth century, Berlin's growth rate was consistently higher in the music index than any other *German* town apart from Leipzig. The above factors demonstrate the degree to which Berlin was able to remain a cultural centre in its own right despite Leipzig's aggressive centrality. The bi-polar centrality of these two towns in the cultural indices, and of Berlin in the population index, is fully born out by François', de Vries' and Eitner's data.

In comparison with Augsburg, then, the royal patronage of Berlin as a centre, its status as a *Residenzstadt* and its ability to sustain a cultural growth almost comparable with the most culturally vibrant town of the Old Reich is testament to its emergent centrality. It is easy to see how such centrality was necessitated by the commodity equivalence paradigm and how Berlin's ability to supply such centrality accounted for its later significance as the centre of the new German *Kulturnation*.

Rostock, Hamburg, Lübeck and Bremen

The decline of the ports in the Old Reich can be seen in the examples of Rostock, Bremen and Lübeck. Hamburg's decline was of a very particular nature and we shall return to her shortly. Whereas such river cities as Augsburg, Frankfurt and Cologne survived as a result of a long and stable tradition of local trading, the coastal towns, particularly those on Prussia's Baltic coast, found international trading to be a delicate enterprise, much more prone to the machinations of inter-state diplomacy and war.

Rostock's relatively small size seems to be out-weighted by its cultural function in the seventeenth century. We can make the following comparison for Rostock and her nearest large neighbour, Hamburg, using de Vries' and François' figures and the music index:

[H(n) = R]

music index: n = 0.66

titles index: n = 1.3

[*publishers index* - [Rostock too low]]

*population index:*⁶⁸ *n = 0.25*

Despite Hamburg's 40,000 inhabitants and Rostock's less than 10,000, we see Rostock able to sustain quite a vibrant music publishing culture. This characteristic specialisation and the port culture of Rostock seems to have been rudely suspended in the aftermath of the population decimations of the Thirty Years War which the North East inevitably suffered. From a music participation ratio of 3:2 with Hamburg [R:H] and a considerable titles rate, the second half of the seventeenth century sees a music participation rate of 0 for Rostock, compared with Hamburg's respectable rate of 11. De Vries' figures for this period show Hamburg's dynamism quite clearly. Whereas Rostock still remains well below 10,000 inhabitants, Hamburg grows rapidly to 75,000 in 1650, sustaining that population at around 70,000 in 1700. Hamburg's demographic growth to 1700 seems to be followed in the period 1700-1750 by a comparable growth in the music index, moving from rank 6, 1600-1650, to rank 5, 1650-1700, to rank 4, 1700-1750. Only in the period 1800-1850 does Hamburg drop below this to rank 13. Thus the music growth and population growth for Hamburg can be compared as follows:

Table 1.16

*Hamburg's Population Change as a Percentage (absolute)*⁶⁹

	<i>1600-1650</i>	<i>1650-1700</i>	<i>1700-1750</i>	<i>1750-1800</i>	<i>1800-1850</i>
<i>n =</i>	+87%	-7%	+7%	+33%	[no figures]

⁶⁸ De Vries merely gives Rostock 0 as a code for less than 10,000 inhabitants in *Urbanization*, 273.

⁶⁹ All these percentage calculations are compound, that is, they are worked out in comparison with the previous previous fifty year period.

Table 1.17*Hamburg's Music Growth as a Percentage (absolute)*

	1600-1650	1650-1700	1700-1750	1750-1800	1800-1850
<i>n</i> =	[no prior figures]	+25%	+17%	+107%	-123%

This clearly shows that despite certain notable periods of dropping population, Hamburg's music industry managed to sustain some kind of growth levels until the early nineteenth century. Hamburg's demise to rank 13 in the 1800-1850 period, however, demonstrates an imbalance in Hamburg's growth vis-à-vis growth as a whole in Germany. The demise of the Hanseatic league must have much to do with this. The so-called 'decline' of the ports, though, should be carefully delineated. The demise of the Hanseatic league was merely part of the process of preparation for nationhood in which German culture was participating at this time. Whereas Berlin emerges as the demographic centre and, with Leipzig, exercises intellectual and cultural domain over the nascent nation, Hamburg becomes a vessel for that new function and its 'decline' seems somewhat attenuated.

Hamburg's apparent decline constituted merely a rationalisation and specialisation of her function in the emergent *Kultur* nation. Thus her growth compared to the average for all de Vries' entries seems large.⁷⁰

Table 1.18*1600-1800 Population Growths as a Percentage⁷¹*

<i>average absolute growth:</i>	+73%
<i>highest absolute growth:</i>	+500%
<i>lowest absolute growth (= decline):</i>	-50%
<i>Hamburg's growth in absolute terms:</i>	+150%
<i>Hamburg's relative growth⁷²:</i>	+77%

Despite the decline of Hamburg's cultural indices rank, she seems to have sustained a

⁷⁰ *Urbanization*, 272-3

⁷¹ These figures do not include present Austria.

⁷² *Relative* growth here means growth above or below the *German* urban average.

growth well over the *German* urban average.

The case of the port and *Reichsstadt* of Lübeck is in many ways similar to that of Rostock. Similar *relative* declines in population are evident: the 23,000 level of 1600 had barely altered by 1800 her rank moving from 11 to 23. The 1650 highest entry of 31,000 seems merely to have been a short-term expansion fuelled by the sixteenth- and early seventeenth-century demand for grain due to the intensified specialisation of the cities' agriculture:

Agriculture in many regions turned away from arable farming and toward specialities after 1500. Dutch tulips and cheese, English and Spanish sheep and Italian silkworms are cases in point. Why? One key to the puzzle is that rising grain prices meant rising property incomes and urban demand for luxuries, including delicacies from the land. Yet if the nearby countryside turned away from producing basic foodstuffs, how could the thriving cities feed their growing mass of workers, servants, and even paupers? The answer is that they drew on more distant breadbaskets. The grain trade expanded greatly in the sixteenth century, and the demand from west European cities stimulated a transformation of agriculture and society to the east, notably in Poland.⁷³

Lübeck's easy proximity to the east must account in part for the sustained growth she was able to make during this period of expanded grain trading. The swelled population of Lübeck, then, can be seen to follow as a result of the affluence of the sixteenth century. Birth rates generally continue to rise some time after such a propitious period, and we might surmise that the apparent high-point of 1650 was the beginning of the decline again. Therefore, for 1600, we see the population is at about 23,000. The decline in the grain trade is explained by Hohenberg and Lees:

The grain trade levelled off in the seventeenth century. In addition to the cyclical reversal in urban fortunes, special factors intervened. The weakening of the Mediterranean region and the Thirty Years War affected the demand for, as well as the production of, grain even in the first half of the century.⁷⁴

Lübeck, more than Hamburg, then, was affected by the grain trade. The increased demand for grain placed Lübeck at the heart of the Hanseatic league, but by the end of the seventeenth century, her strong dependence on this trade meant a severe decline, in favour of the more diversified Hamburg.

⁷³ Paul M. Hohenberg and Lynn Hollen Lees, *The Making of Urban Europe, 1000 - 1950*, 1985, 119.

⁷⁴ Hohenberg and Lees, *Europe*, 119-120.

Lübeck's cultural anaemia, then, is of no surprise. The short-lived mercantilist frenzy of the sixteenth century proved too unstable a basis for the attraction of an indigenous *Gelehrtenstand*. On the music index, Lübeck remains consistently lower than Hamburg. The following factors demonstrate her disproportional cultural anaemia as compared with Hamburg's:

[H(n) = L]

population index: n = 0.575

music index: n = 0.1667

titles index: [Lübeck too low]

[publishers index: n = 1.8696]

Whereas the publishing trade seemed to be flourishing in relation to Hamburg's, the weak state of the music and titles indices for Lübeck might suggest a rather transient cultural centrality for its immediate servicing area.

For 1650, this position is slightly improved:

[H(n) = L]

population index: n = 0.4133

music index: n = 0.4545

[publishers index: n = 1.8696]

despite a slightly lower population factor, Lübeck manages to greatly increase its music factor.

For 1700 and 1750, de Vries gives the population data as 'unknowns'⁷⁵ and we therefore only have the music index as any kind of indicator:

[H(n) = L]

1700-1750 music index: n = 0.1429

1750-1800 music index: n = 0.2069

a large decline in the first instance, followed by a growth, relative to Hamburg.

⁷⁵ *Urbanization*, 272-3. We might estimate these figures according to the decline hypothesis. Such decline has consistently shown itself to follow an attenuated exponential concave curve, whether in terms relative to the average urban growth or in terms of the absolute change in population levels. Thus, for 1700 and 1750 we might estimate an attenuated exponential decline to the 1800 23,000 figure. For 1700 this would suggest a figure of around 27,000 and for 1750, around 25,000.

For 1800, then, there is sufficient data to give us a broader picture of Lübeck's cultural life:

$[H(n) = L]$

population index: $n = 0.23$

music index: $n = 0.1538$

titles index: [Lübeck too low]⁷⁶

authors index: [Lübeck too low]⁷⁷

Thus Lübeck demonstrates a largely static population around the low 20,000's. The following percentages demonstrate this real decline quite eloquently where the average, highest and lowest growths represent those for all of *Germany*:

Table 1.19

*1600-1800 Population Growths as a Percentage*⁷⁸

<i>average absolute growth:</i>	+73%
<i>highest absolute growth:</i>	+500%
<i>lowest absolute growth (= decline):</i>	-50%
<i>Lübeck's absolute growth:</i>	0%
<i>Lübeck's relative growth:</i>	-73%

A comparison of this data with similar data for titles and music-industry participants underlines that, in Lübeck's case, the economic decline was accompanied by an even more massive cultural decline:

⁷⁶ i.e. less than 178. Therefore the factor n would be at least as low as 0.2

⁷⁷ i.e. less than 34. Therefore the factor n would be at least as low as 0.3206

⁷⁸ These figures do not include present Austria.

Table 1.20

<i>1600-1800 Growth in Titles Numbers as a Percentage</i>	
<i>average absolute growth:</i>	+92%
<i>highest absolute growth:</i>	+5,669%
<i>lowest absolute growth (= decline):</i>	-78%
<i>Lübeck's absolute growth:</i>⁷⁹	-324%
<i>Lübeck's relative growth:</i>	-416%

Table 1.21

<i>1600-1800 Growth in Music Industry Participants as a Percentage</i>	
<i>average absolute growth:</i>	+162%
<i>highest absolute growth:</i>	+1,850%
<i>lowest absolute growth (= decline):</i>	-10%
<i>Lübeck's absolute growth:</i>	+100%
<i>Lübeck's relative growth:</i>	-62%

The fact that Lübeck's music industry was so parochial in the early 1600's as to sustain only one participant on this index, probably accounts for the relatively low decline. That Lübeck doubled its count to two participants is such a low margin as to render these figures ludicrous.

For Bremen, another *Reichsstadt*-port, a far more detailed picture of the demographic and cultural profile in this period is available. For 1600, the following figures are available where the factor n is Bremen's data as a factor of the emergent port of Hamburg's:

[$H(n) = B$]

population index: $n = 0.5$

music index: $n = 0.1667$

titles index: $n = 0.596$

[*publishers index:* $n = 0.3488$]

⁷⁹ These figures, of course, exclude Lübeck so that comparisons can be made with the other towns. Hence Lübeck appears to be lower than the 'lowest absolute growth.'

Whereas Bremen only has one participant on the music index for the 1600-1650 period, by the second half of the seventeenth century, her standing vis-à-vis Hamburg improves considerably:

[H(n) = B]

[*population index*:⁸⁰ $n = 0.3425$]

music index: $n = 0.2727$

[*publishers index*: $n = 0.3488$].

This short-lived growth is, however, too anaemic to survive the final demise of the grain trade and the trend towards decline becomes more marked as we approach the 1800's:

[H(n) = B]

1700 [1700-1750]:

population index: $n = 0.3871$

music index: $n = 0.2143$

1750 [1750-1800]

population index: $n = 0.3733$

music index: $n = 0.1034$

1800 [1800-1850]

population index: $n = 0.36$

music index: $n = 0.2308$

The last music index entry does not constitute a real growth but reflects Hamburg's drop from 29 to 13 entries for the periods 1750-1800 and 1800-1850.

In terms of the broader *German* picture, one can compare the following percentages to gauge the real decline of Bremen:

⁸⁰ I have had to estimate the population of Bremen for 1650 as neither François nor de Vries have any figures for Bremen. Given that the 1600 figure given by François is 20,000 and that de Vries' figure for 1700 is 27,000, climbing at fifty year intervals to 28,000 and then 36,000 for 1800, and given the inevitable decline during the Thirty Years War (1618-1648), then an estimate of around the low 20,000's might be in order. I have chosen the rather arbitrary 23,000.

Table 1.22*1600-1800 Population Growths as a Percentage⁸¹*

<i>average absolute growth:</i>	+73%
<i>highest absolute growth:</i>	+500%
<i>lowest absolute growth (= decline):</i>	-50%
<i>Bremen's absolute growth:</i>	+80%
<i>Bremen's relative growth:</i>	+6%

Table 1.23*1600-1800 Growth in Titles Numbers as a Percentage*

<i>average absolute growth:</i>	+92%
<i>highest absolute growth:</i>	+5,669%
<i>lowest absolute growth (= decline):</i>	-78%
<i>Bremen's absolute growth:</i>	+51%
<i>Bremen's relative growth:</i>	-41%

Table 1.24*1600-1800 Growth in Music Industry Participants as a Percentage*

<i>average absolute growth:</i>	+162%
<i>highest absolute growth:</i>	+1,850%
<i>lowest absolute growth (= decline):</i>	-10%
<i>Bremen's absolute growth:</i>	+300%
<i>Bremen's relative growth:</i>	+138%

and, if we ignore the 1600 low point of one entry, too low for any sensible analysis, then the 1650-1800 0% growth leaves Bremen's relative growth over that period, as compared to the average for that period of 65%, at relative decline in the music industry of -64%.

The ports and *Reichsstadt*-ports declined in a fundamentally different manner than the inland *Reichsstädte*. The inland towns tended, on the whole, to have a much more vibrant and sustained cultural index which tended to decline later than the ports'

⁸¹ These figures do not include present Austria.

cultural profiles which seem to have peaked suddenly from nowhere and disappeared just as rapidly. As we have said, the specialisation of the more prosperous ports and the decline of grain-reliant cultures was part of the rationalisation process that characterised the later baroque period in *Germany*. The main reason for the decline of the three lesser ports rests on the auspicious position of Hamburg and the increasing desire of the 'movers and doers' of centralisation to minimise duplication. Despite many efforts by the territorial princes to save indigenous industries from the competition, and to limit intellectual movement, the increased parochialism of the individualised country and the far north-eastern ports was unavoidable.

From *Reichsstädte* to *Residenzstädte*

The following towns all enjoyed the privileges of varying degrees of *Reichsunmittelbarkeit* and had *Reichsstadt* status:

Aachen
Augsburg
Bremen
Cologne
Frankfurt
Hamburg
Nuremberg
Regensburg

Until the end of the seventeenth century, the status of *Reichsunmittelbarkeit* had facilitated a stark division of city and state. With the advent of cameralism and the ensuing rationalisation, the states' increasing role in the execution of *Agrarpolitik* and the seeping of power to the territorial princes all undermined the *Reichsstädte*'s autonomy. The basis on which they had established themselves, the free cultivation of their own *Umlände*, was now threatened by ever more centralised government by the states of the little monarchs. It was in particular this loss of agrarian autonomy which ripped the old corporatist walls asunder. Only Hamburg had managed a sustained growth, accompanied by diversification, over this period. She had been hardly damaged by the Thirty Years War and was quick to engage in the diversified markets of western Europe.

Augsburg and Nuremberg, on the other hand, represent the archetypical decline of the cities of the individualised country of the South. As we have seen, Augsburg and Nuremberg declined with the establishment of Munich as *Residenzstadt*. Thus the following regional political shifts are apparent in the eighteenth century:

<i>Old Reichsstädte</i>	<i>New Residenzstädte</i>
-------------------------	---------------------------

Augsburg
Nuremberg
Regensburg

Munich

Augsburg⁸²

Stuttgart

Aachen
Cologne

Düsseldorf/Kassel

Bremen
Lübeck

Hanover

Frankfurt

Mainz/Mannheim

Whilst these political redistributions of centrality did not always signal a corresponding demographic shift (the older cities had, after all, a long tradition of local servicing that could not be undone over night) they often bled the older corporatist cultures dry and attracted artists and intellectuals away from the old cities.

This apparently simple equation for the cultural effects of the rationalisation of centralisation the eighteenth century, cultural drain from the older cities into the newer central places, is mediated to a considerable extent by the added factor of the university towns. In the early seventeenth century, the following towns had indigenous universities:⁸³

⁸² Augsburg was arguably part of two local systems, that centred around Munich *and* around Stuttgart. Hence the double presentation of Augsburg.

⁸³ François, 'The German urban network...', 91.

rs = *Reichsstadt*

town: *university founded:*

Cologne ^{rs}	1388
Erfurt	1392
Frankfurt/O	1506
Freiburg/Br	1457
Giessen	1607
Herborn	?
Heidelberg	1386
Ingolstadt	1472
Jena	1548 academy, raised to university status 1577
Leipzig	1409
Mainz	1477
Marburg	1527 (Europe's first Protestant university)
Prague	1348
Rostock ^{rs}	1419
Tübingen	1477
Vienna	1365
Wittenberg	1502
Würzburg	1582

and the following were formed shortly afterwards:

<i>town</i>	<i>university founded</i>
Altdorf	1622
Bamberg	1648
Duisburg	1655
Halle	1694
Kiel	1665
Salzburg	1623

The intellectual decline of the older cities was thus hastened in most cases by the consistent founding of universities elsewhere, with the exception of Cologne. Similarly, those towns that had established universities by the end of the eighteenth century were able to boost their titles ratings. By this time,⁸⁴ the following universities had been opened or were still open:

⁸⁴ François uses the year 1806 as her final arbiter, *Ibid.*, 96.

<i>town:</i>	<i>university founded:</i>
Breslau	1728
Erlangen	moved from Bayreuth in 1743, founded in Bayreuth in 1742
Giessen	[1607]
Halle	[1637]
Heidelberg	[1386]
Jena	[1548 academy, raised to university status 1577]
Kiel	[1665]
Leipzig	[1409]
Mainz	[1477]
Prague	[1348]
Rostock	[1419]
Salzburg	[1623]
Tübingen	[1477]
Vienna	[1365]
Wittenberg	[1502]

The following growth rates must therefore be seen also within the intellectual context:

Table 1.25

Absolute and Relative Growth in Population, 1600-1800.

average growth = 73%

[relative growth italicised]

<i>Old Reichsstädte</i>	<i>%growth</i>	<i>New Residenzstädte</i>	<i>%growth</i>
Augsburg	-42%, -115%		
Nuremberg	-32%, -105%	Munich	+70%, -3%
Regensburg	[no data]		
Augsburg	-42%, -115%	Stuttgart	+55%, -18%
Aachen	+50%, -23%	Düsseldorf	+75%, +2%
Cologne	+5%, -68%	Kassel	+66%, -7%
Bremen	+25%, -48%	Hanover	+59%, -14%
Lübeck	0%, -73%		
Frankfurt/M	+49%, -24%	Mainz	+10%, -63%
		Mannheim	+55%, -18%

Thus, for these inland *Reichsstädte* where data is available, the average relative growth rate is -55% whereas for the newer *Residenzstädte* it is -17%. The trend whereby the newer towns are consistently able to expand at a rate much closer to the *German* urban norm is all the more pronounced in the titles index:

Table 1.26

Absolute and Relative Growth in 10 Yearly Numbers of Book Titles Published, 1600-1800.

average growth = 92%			
[relative growth italicised, university towns italicised]			
[entries given in smaller pitch are estimated ⁸⁵]			
<i>Old Reichsstädte</i>	%growth	<i>New Residenzstädte</i>	%growth
Augsburg	+10%, -82%		
Nuremberg	+271%, +179%	Munich	+275%, +183%
Regensburg	[too low in both indices]		
Augsburg	+10%, -82%	Stuttgart ⁸⁶	+517%, +444%
Aachen	[too low in both indices]	Düsseldorf	[too low in both indices]
<i>Cologne</i> ⁸⁷	-87%, -160%	<i>Kassel</i> ⁸⁸	[too low in both indices]
Bremen	+51%, -41%	Hanover ⁸⁹	+660%, +568%
Lübeck	[too low in both indices]		
Frankfurt/M	-37%, -129%	Mainz	[too low in second index]
		Mannheim ⁹⁰	+512%, +420%

Here the average relative growth for the older towns is -33% and the average relative growth for the newer towns is +403%⁹¹. The magnitude of cultural growth over this period in these repositioned central places is well over the *German* urban norm. Thus it seems that as a rule the *Residenzstädte* were able to expand their cultural lives at a rate far in excess of their demographic growth. If we look at the figures for music growth over this same period, the model is more than upheld:

⁸⁵ Estimates are made on the basis of one of the two indices. The missing data from the other index is taken as the lowest entry at least. Thus the small pitch declines and expansions are conservative estimates. Their inclusion is for information only.

⁸⁶ Less than 42 titles on first index.

⁸⁷ Less than 178 titles on second index.

⁸⁸ Sagarra, *A Social History of Germany, 1648-1914*, 81. Kassel's university was a flop, managing to stay open for only nineteen years after 1633.

⁸⁹ Less than 42 on first index with 319 on second.

⁹⁰ Less than 42 on first index with 239 on second.

⁹¹ The estimates have also been used for these calculations.

Table 1.27

*Absolute and Relative Growth in 50 yearly Numbers of Music Industry Participants,
1600-1800.*

average growth = 93%

[*relative growth italicised, university towns italicised*]

[smaller pitch entries represent data which are probably too low to be taken seriously]

<i>Old Reichsstädte</i>	<i>%growth</i>	<i>New Residenzstädte</i>	<i>%growth</i>
Augsburg	-40%, -133%		
Nuremberg	-38%, -131%	Munich	0%, -93%
Regensburg	+50%, -43%		
Augsburg	-40%, -133%	Stuttgart	+600%, +507%
Aachen	[no data]	Düsseldorf ⁹²	[data too low]
Cologne	0%, -93%	Kassel	+200%, +107%
Bremen	+200%, +107%	Hanover	+600%, +507%
Lübeck	+500%, +407%		
Frankfurt/M	-43% -146%	Mainz	+400%, +307%
		Mannheim	+700%, +507%

Obviously the very low levels of data here make any meaningful comparisons difficult.

Therefore in the following table, the time period is expanded to include the fifty year period 1800-1850. 1600-1850 is now our growth period, and we see that the later fifty year period accentuates the *Reichsstädte/Residenzstädte* division:

⁹² 1600-1650 - 0; 1750-1800 - 1. This low data tells us very little other than that Düsseldorf did not establish for itself a music-publishing culture.

Table 1.28

Absolute and Relative Growth in 50 Yearly Numbers of Music Industry Participants, 1600-1850.

average growth = 164%

[*relative growth italicised, university towns italicised*]

[smaller pitch entries represent data which are probably too low to be taken seriously]

<i>Old Reichsstädte</i>	%growth	<i>New Residenzstädte</i>	%growth
Augsburg	-29%, -193%		
Nuremberg	-77%, -241%	Munich	+1,300%, +1,136%
Regensburg	+100%, -64%		
Augsburg	-29%, -193%	Stuttgart	+1,900%, +1,736%
Aachen	[no data]	Düsseldorf ⁹³	+300%, +136%
Cologne ⁹⁴	+300% +136%	Kassel	+250%, +86%
Bremen	+200% +36%	Hanover	+700%, +536%
Lübeck	+100% -64%		
Frankfurt/M	-57% -221%	Mainz ⁹⁵	+300%, +136%
		Mannheim ⁹⁶	+0% -164%

The Napoleonic Factor

The demonstration of cultural bi-polarity above shows a consistent move towards centralised mechanisms of cultural dissemination in the latter half of the eighteenth century. The political landscape did not necessarily comply with this centralisation until Napoleon forced the issue: political institutions are always much slower to respond to new paradigms than cultural indices. The Napoleonic occupation of the German lands, the so-called *Fremdenherrschaft*, consisted in two distinct phases: the first was less concerned with the imposition of a new centralised order based on the enlightened French model than with the consolidation of land; the second phase concerned itself much more with the imposition of a new order and the legal disenfranchisement of the old guild order.

⁹³ Düsseldorf's participation rates were consistently low, rising from 0 in 1600-1650, to 3 in 1800-1850. The data is thus disproportionate.

⁹⁴ The consistently low levels of participation make these figures seem disproportionately large: for 1600-1650, Cologne had only 2 participants and for 1800-1850, only 8.

⁹⁵ 1600-1650 - 1; 1800-1850 - 4.

⁹⁶ 1600-1650 - 1; 1800-1850 - 1.

Prussian self interest or *Staatsvernunft*⁹⁷ played no small part in preparing the way for the break up of the Old Reich: in the first phase, Napoleon was able to exploit the differences of Prussia and Austria and played them off against each other, paying astute attention to Prussia's tendency to favour its own interests over that of the Reich. Between 1795 and 1803, the years that might be said to circumscribe the first phase of Napoleonic occupation, it was Germany, and in particular Prussia, that abandoned the Reich, settling the separate Peace of Basle with France. Thus, while one part of the Reich, Habsburg Austria, continued to fight France, Prussia and other parts of Germany developed good trade relationships with its ascendant neighbour. The formation of the *imperium in imperio* in the North German territories with Prussia as the central axis power seemed an act of betrayal to the Austrians. This collapse of imperial co-operation, a process that had long since been underway with Prussia's ascendancy, spelt the political death of the Reich.

In the second phase, Napoleon's bureaucrats extended French structures of government to many enlarged middle-sized territories, doing away with many of the more complex cameralist varieties of government including the ecclesiastical territories. One such Napoleonic territory, exemplary in its new French structure, was the newly-created kingdom of Westphalia. Napoleon awarded the seat of king to his younger brother Jerome. The rhetoric, and in certain limited instances the practice, of state policy was distinctly 'enlightened'. The people were promised a new prosperity free from the encumbrances of the old German *Herrschaft* and education became much more widely available to the masses. In reality, however, the kingdom was merely a satellite to Napoleon's empire, subservient to its military aspirations and the system of taxes under the old *Herrschaft* regime was merely replaced with a centralised cash-collection, more burdensome in real terms than the previous system. As Napoleon's defeat neared, the centralisation of taxes intensified in these territories and the rhetoric of enlightened government seemed more and more strained.

Without wishing to reiterate the complex string of treaties that led up to the

⁹⁷ literally 'Reason of State'.

restoration of German autonomy, we see, with the collapse of Napoleon's military aspirations, the emergence of Prussia as the new axis power. In this period immediately after the Napoleonic wars and before the 1848 revolutions, the emergence in Germany of a neo-conservative, anti-reformist majority is clear. The backlash against the humiliations of the Napoleonic occupations and the subsequent disenchantment with French intellectual ideas became the hallmarks of a neurotically house-centred *bourgeois* culture, *Biedermeier*.

The above analysis of some of the available demographic data from this period, then, would seem to suggest that the emergent post-cameral musical culture of early nineteenth-century Germany was essentially a *national* one. Well before Germany was ready to construct a national *political* infrastructure strong enough to coerce its peoples into territorial wars for the new second Reich, she indulged in a distinctly national culture which functioned as a driving force in the mobilisation of the German people under the Prussian expansionist autocracy.

Thus the decline of the smaller cultural regions in favour of ever larger regions centred around newly defined monarchical centres represents a decline of the older functionalist corporatist cultures in favour of a newer commoditised culture. This process runs parallel to the decline of cameralism and the emergence of the *Kulturnation*. In the following chapter, the parity of this process with the decline of the *Cartesian* world view is placed in the context of the emergence of a universal discourse of the senses, aesthetics.

Chapter Two:

The New Ontology

The emergence of the score as commodity, as emanating from specialised centres of distribution, was part of a broader cultural shift. In particular, the emergence of a *Musikwissenschaft* or 'science' of music history, relied on the accurate reproduction and efficient dissemination of its object of scrutiny, the score, and it was the commodity equivalence paradigm which therefore proved the incubator that was to germinate this later science.

So far, the commodity equivalence paradigm has been shown to comply with certain demographic and economic patterns. Yet these patterns did not spring self-determined from the cameralist economies of late monarchical absolutism and corporatism. Certainly, the demographic shift of the vital revolution and the emergent specialisms of urban centres were both significant factors in the emergence of the new paradigm and yet, as merely external factors, measurable and visible, they demand an epistemological grounding. In short they demand the emergence of the belief in the possibility of 'thinking that'¹ and this is addressed in particular by two axiomatic disciplines of discourse: the empirical and the metaphysical. The crisis of epistemology in German science at the outset of the nineteenth century is well documented.² This crisis can be summarised broadly not merely as magical transformations of the scientist's field of vision, as the transformation of 'ducks to rabbits' as Kuhn wittily puts it,³ but as a shift in the significance of the scientific discourse itself. Science finds it can

¹ Michel Foucault, *The Order of Things*, New York, 1974, v.

² See in particular: H. N. Jahnke and Michael Otte, *Epistemological and Social Problems of the Sciences in the Early Nineteenth Century*, Universität Bielefeld: Institut für Didaktik der Mathematik, 1981.

³ Thomas Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*, University of Chicago Press, 1970, 111. Kuhn writes: 'What were ducks in the scientist's world before the revolution are rabbits afterwards. The man who first saw the exterior of the box from above later sees its interior from below.'

do *different* things, that its purpose is changed, its fields of research mutated such that the happy security of a particular mode of finding or retrieving truth is fundamentally undermined and thereafter reinstated in a radically altered form.

In philosophy, the shift is clearly similar. Here, too, the quest for truth leads the metaphysicist along a radically altered route, to a kind of truth that undermines and supersedes the older truth. The crisis, then, leads to the emergence of a new set of tools, of new methodologies, of new conceptions of reasonable, given, or permissible logic.

The new paradigm, furthermore, was based upon both an empirical and metaphysical transformation of humankind itself. As we have seen, the cultural nation emerged well before the political state, which would seem to suggest the primacy of essentially cultural determinants in the new paradigm. Indeed, one of the most striking features of the new order was the fundamental *cogency* of its epistemological infrastructure. If the cameralist world vision saw in civil reality a unity that consisted in the full sum of its parts, an *encyclopaedic* unity, the new, expanded monarchical centralisms of Prussia, Austria and, to a lesser extent, Bavaria, represented a profound limit to civic pluralism and thus a fundamental challenge to imperial order. The Prussian state, in particular, emerged in its resplendent totality not as a nomenclature or as an encyclopaedic amalgam but as an organism: the organic state conveyed citizenship according to a notion of functional membership that demanded differentiation according to certain specialised services required by the centre. This first premise of statehood has been termed by Foucault *function*.⁴ The citizen's recognised *function* thus becomes more a matter of allocation or prescription than hitherto. As Foucault points out, this notion of *function* represents not merely a new order of government, but also a profound shift in the relationship of signs and signifiers to nature and labour. If *function* is thus a basic epistemological as well as economic category of the new order, then we should look to find it embedded into the operations of the two primary disciplines of empiricism and metaphysics.

⁴ Foucault, *Order*, 227-30.

Despite Foucault's antagonism to nineteenth-century discourses, there is, in his account of the new *episteme*, a brilliant clarity, as if his wilful alienation from normative discourse provides an objective distance from which to view it in its 'raw' state, so to speak. For this reason, Foucault is able to provide profound insight into the epistemological structures of the commodity equivalence paradigm. In an attempt to demonstrate paradigm cogency, Foucault is able to apply *function* to the three spheres of discourse: language, nature and labour. In a brilliant exposition of this paradigm cogency, Foucault looks first to labour for evidence of *function*.

As we have already seen, the citizen of the nascent state is allocated a labour *function*. In contrast to the blood lineage of the guild structures, a kind of caste system by another name, the new defining element of labour is an irreducible unit of value:

Wealth no longer establishes the internal order of its equivalence by a comparison of the objects to be exchanged, or by an appraisal of the power peculiar of each to represent an object of need...; it is broken down according to the units of labour that have in reality produced it. Wealth is always a functioning representative element: but in the end, what it represents is no longer the object of desire; it is labour.⁵

What is interesting in this analysis is the constant magnetism of the recess: wealth, in itself, the Cartesian index of trade, is merely a visible trace of a deeper order. The irreducible presence of labour is the 'underside', so to speak, of wealth. In other words, labour attains a degree of autonomy or non-reducibility which is buried beneath the surface and is only accessible to specialised scrutiny; it has to be decoded, discovered, prised away from the deceitful forms of the visible world, the forms of Cartesian rationality.

The epistemological consequences of this apparent retreat of reality into the darker recesses or undersides of phenomena are clear. Reason has to become more sensual, to 'get closer' to its object of scrutiny, to *touch*, to *feel*, to enter into the very essence of the object. Labour has thus to be touched by a reason no longer indifferent

⁵ Foucault, *Order*, 223.

to invisible functions. Clearly, Cartesian notions of visible clarity, termed here *visible conspicuity*,⁶ are profoundly at odds with post-Cartesian notions of *function*.

Similarly in natural history, the organic structure emerges to supersede Cartesian tables of similarity in favour of characterisation according to essential (for example, reproductive) functions. The 'character' of a species is defined much less by visible conspicuity than by internal hidden relationships. Thus character becomes:

...a visible sign directing us towards a buried depth; but what it indicates is not a secret text, a muffled word, or a resemblance too precious to be revealed; it is the coherent totality of an organic structure that it weaves back into the unique fabric of its sovereignty both the visible and the invisible.⁷

In Schelling's *Philosophie der Kunst*, we shall see how the organic structure of living things as perceived in the new paradigm is taken on as a powerful structural metaphor for the philosophical discourses. The most significant element of this shift is the retreat of conspicuity, of clearly interpretable elements of reality into the heart of the object of scrutiny. This Foucault terms the 'deeper cause':

To classify...will mean...to relate the visible to the invisible, to its deeper cause, as it were, then to rise upwards once more from that hidden architecture towards the obvious signs displayed on the surfaces of bodies.⁸

Not only is this 'deeper cause' a matter of *function*, of the sexual reproductive organs of Lamarck's *La Flore française* (1778) but also of the centrality of *essence*, represented in the German notion of *Wesen*. There is in this drive inwards a penetrative urge to discover the epistemological possibility of an ontological science:

...living beings...possess characters which language can scan and define because they have a structure that is, in a way, the dark, concave, inner side of their visibility: it is on the clear discursive surface of this secret but sovereign mass that characters emerge, a sort of storehouse exterior to the periphery of organisms now bound in on themselves.⁹

⁶ I have devised this term in order to try to capture the characteristic use of sight as a metaphor in much Cartesian discourse. Through a process of comparisons of the visible surfaces of the world, its structures become obvious, hence *visible conspicuity*.

⁷ Foucault, *Order*, 229

⁸ *Ibid.*, 239.

⁹ *Ibid.*, 237-8.

The 'clear discursive surface' of this mass suggests a model of meaning, of a semantics, in crisis. Reason must now push beyond the confines of Cartesian order and seek a kind of immanent fusion of objectivity with *function* and *essence*.

In particular, the most profound consequences of the new ontology are to be discovered in the epistemological model of the commodity. Clearly, the notion of a meaning 'trapped' inside of the object of scrutiny, carried along with it, is the semantic framework for the possibility of commodity. A compact, meaning-rich, value-laden object, distilled into objective form and somehow limited distinctly for the market is an essential epistemological basis for the commodity equivalence paradigm. In this sense, Foucault's labour-nature-language trio recognises this point. In particular, Adam Smith's *The Wealth of Nations* (1776) which proposes the unit of labour-hours as a fundamental, arbitrary, and therefore absolute unit, makes the possibility of commodity, as a central category of trade, real:

As men experience things...what they are exchanging is what is 'indispensable, commodious or pleasurable' to them, but for the economist, what is actually circulating in the form of things is labour - not objects of need representing one another, but time and toil, transformed, concealed, forgotten.¹⁰

In the nascent 'science' of *Musikwissenschaft*, as yet unnamed, an object was soon to emerge which complied with the commodity-equivalence epistemology. This object was not some rediscovered entity, or an element of the older practices of the Cartesian epistemology, transformed or renewed, but was, in effect, a deliberately constructed object. This object of scrutiny required an ever more specialised discourse to decode its secrets and was, to all extent and purposes, actually *distilled from* musical practice, be this composition, performance or reception. This was the *score*, a kind of neutral level, closing in on itself, burying its *zugrunde liegende Idee* below the visible surface. It emerges, then, as commodity, as cipher of the *external* process of exegesis, removed and objectified. It becomes both the atomised residue of a 'universal' culture, its natural and exchangeable 'unit' and the object of scrutiny for a newly specialised elite of emergent *Musikwissenschaftler*. Further to this, the score is born as

¹⁰ Foucault, *Order*, 224-5.

an organism, guarding its inner treasures on the 'clear and discursive surface' of its 'secret but sovereign mass.'

Discernible in the period circumscribed by the years 1780 and 1830, then, is a profound shift from a unified Cartesian view of the world to a fragmented, compartmentalised reality served by an impulse to ontologise. Language is wrenched from the surface of the objective world and turns inwards in meditation. The meditative essentialising ecstasy of Wackenroder, Tieck and Hoffmann is thus a symptom of the ontological impulse - since objective reality is atomised and partially obscured, language becomes isolated and scurries like a frightened rat across the surface of the referent. This deep shift in the relationship of signifier to signified is as evident in theoretical and philosophical writings on music as in the specialised metaphysics of Hegel, Schopenhauer or Schelling. For once, music theory is not dragged kicking and screaming into the new configuration, but blazes its own path into the new paradigm unimpeded by its own innocence.

The Significance of Music: *Mimesis* versus *Poiesis* - from Gottsched to Forkel

The nature of the relationship between theory and the epistemological framework of the commodity equivalence paradigm is complex. In an analysis of the numerous treatises and philosophical texts on the question of music's purpose and meaning, the question must be asked to what extent such texts, the introspective discourses of the literate classes, prejudice our understanding of the aesthetic landscape of this period. The appeal to a myth of *universality*, to the notion of an *overriding authenticity* in the bourgeois literate experience and to a putative culture of mutually exchangeable atomised constituents as necessitated by the paradigm's claims to early capitalist democracy, are all deeply embedded in the operations of many such texts after 1750. Indeed, the drive of much theory at this time was towards the establishment of unassailable models of musical propriety against which a universal culture could measure the fruits of its labour. Whilst the project was never convincingly realised, the urge to subscribe to a central thesis as to music's proper internal order was strong. This drive for a kind of musical ontology inevitably favoured

musics of the literate culture to the detriment of orally-transmitted musics. Such 'artefacts' as aesthetic treatises should not be seen, therefore, as the self-evident, self-governing expressions of the 'spirit of the age' but as symptoms of the ontological impulses of an, as yet, still isolated *Gelehrtenstand*. Misgivings as to the overriding authenticity of the bourgeois experience aside, the elitist texts of aesthetic theory can help to articulate some of the operations of the dominant discourses of the putative experience: to represent an internal dialogue within the self-conscious discourses of literate privilege.

In the mid-eighteenth century, Germany was proving receptive to certain French theories of musical propriety. Yet these French theories, springing from the home-grown Cartesian tradition of clarity, propriety and simplicity, sat uneasily alongside a very different German tradition. The mid-seventeenth century Cartesian 'revolution' in philosophy, whilst having borne the hybrids cameralism and the *Affektenlehre*, had little effect on the quasi-feudal infrastructure of the German-speaking lands. As Braudel has written, the traditional citizen was still:

...an unconscious prisoner of the frontier marking the inflexible boundaries between the possible and the impossible. Before the eighteenth century, his sphere of action was tightly circumscribed, largely limited to what he could achieve.¹¹

This was particularly true of Germany; even until the late eighteenth century. This rigid circumscription of reality, deeply symptomatic of the restrictive monarcho-corporatist order, might properly have been challenged by the mimetic theories of the Cartesian rationalists. Yet the fatalism of the German baroque world vision which, in the form of the cameralist administration in particular, certainly reaches as far as the beginning of the revolutionary period, was fuelled and sustained by the stubborn persistence of the 'older' conservative vested interests of the monarcho-corporatist order. The mimesis paradigm in Germany represented much more a part of this intransigent order insofar as it was imbued with a profound sense of the impenetrable materiality of social order.

¹¹ F. Braudel, *Capitalism and Material Life*, New York, 1973, xiv. Quoted in Sheehan, *German History 1770-1866*, Oxford, 1989, 79.

Indeed, whilst the rationalism of French theory, characterised by a vision of music as properly a mirror of nature and a place for a naturalist mimesis of human passionate utterances, belonged to a broader drive for the clarification and radical reordering of the external world in France, the German reception of such ideas allowed to a far lesser extent for such an alignment of mimesis and radicalism. The conservative readings of mimesis theory in Germany engendered a sense of the impenetrable, bleak stasis of the external order. Such a material reality, furthermore, remained material only as long as the mischievous, impish hand of theory restrained from anything other than its salutation. At this point cameralism and German mimesis overlap: both are characterised by a pervasive, almost crippling, pragmatism.

In France, Jean-Phillipe Rameau, the contemporary of the German baroque mimesis theorists Mattheson and Mizler had, by 1722, produced his startling *Traité de l'harmonie reduite à ses principes naturels*¹² which attempted to furnish a deductive Cartesian interpretation of harmony, based upon a system which reduced the seemingly endless number of chords to a number of triads and inversions. The dominance of text in French mimetic theory had meant an overriding emphasis on melody and its 'proper' reflection of the passions; now a self-referential system of harmony, of tonal meaning according to *function* within that closed system could undermine melody's primacy in France. In trying to provide a system of ordering harmony based on Cartesian notions of clarity and intelligibility, Rameau had, to some extent, undermined quite fundamentally the basic tenets of mimetic theory. With Rameau's *Traité*, music begins to turn inwards on itself away from external reality and representation.

One can see how the Cartesian world vision destroyed itself from within: the will to encompass everything within the domain of the intelligible took mankind into the centre of the object and there lost all sense of the visible. In Rameau, following from Mersenne's *mathesis* of the *Harmonie universelle* (1636) the turn inwards came from the burning curiosity of Cartesian science. Rameau's system - a profoundly

¹² *L'harmonie* referred not simply to harmony in terms of the simultaneous sounding of more than one note, but also to counterpoint.

reductive and yet ontological methodology - instigated in part this loss of the 'visible' in music theory. It was now legitimate to attempt to find out how the 'system' of music not only represented nature as understood by the baroque Cartesian élite, but also to question how its 'internal' physical properties related to those of nature. The notion of *semiological fixity* and separateness¹³ in this question began to necessitate ever greater levels of ontological analysis before the nature of the relationship could become clear.

It is easy after the event to see the profound significance of the triadic system in Rameau's *Traité*, but mimesis persisted in France alongside such works and proved largely impervious to such covert attacks until much later. Indeed, the ideas of the 'emotionalist' Jean Baptiste Dubos (1670-1742) continued to retain considerable currency: the beauty of music derives from its ability to imitate the human voice and in particular its ability to represent the voice in a stylised manner that was acceptable to French notions of truth or *verisimilité*.¹⁴ Whilst appealing to what seem now like more authentically nineteenth-century watchwords 'genius' and 'mastery', mimetic propriety remains the overriding category. The opposition of 'truth' to 'scholarly music' is telling in these texts: French theory had profound mistrust for music that was highly *constructed* or contrived or that demonstrated a high degree of complexity¹⁵ for such music was deemed to trespass into the meaning of the text. Similarly the later theorist Charles Batteux (1713-80), even more influential on German theory than his predecessor,¹⁶ held that music could, and should at all costs, imitate nature, even if this nature was a reductionist, highly stylised image of nature. This view was also shared by

¹³ These terms are discussed at length shortly. For the moment, semiological fixity is the consequence of representation. For one element to represent another, they must be separate, and this separateness is premised in the Cartesian semiology by a fixed, obviated relationship between sign and referent.

¹⁴ Dubos, *Réflexions critiques sur la poesie et sur la peinture*. Paris 1719. See also Gottsched's *Versuch einer kritischen Dichtkunst*, 1730. Fourth enlarged edition, Leipzig 1752.

¹⁵ Hence Rousseau's critique of harmony as 'gothic' or 'barbaric' in his *Dictionnaire de Musique*. Paris 1768.

¹⁶ Examples of explicit recognition of Batteux' *Les beaux arts réduits à un même principe*, Paris 1746 are almost too numerous to list here. Gottsched's *Auszug aus des Herrn Batteux Schönen Künsten aus dem einzigen Grundsatz der Nachahmung hergeleitet* etc, Leipzig, 1754, Scheibe's *Der critische Musicus*, a periodical which ran from 1738 -1740, Hamburg, and Ramler's 'Auszug aus der Einleitung in die schönen Wissenschaften, nach dem Französischen des Herrn Batteux mit Zusätzen vermehret' in *Historische-Kritische Beyträge* 5, 1798-9 are but a few examples.

many German contemporaries, Friedrich Wilhelm Marpurg (1718-1795) among them.¹⁷

Batteux' name, then, occupies a central position in many authoritative German mimetic writings of the mid-eighteenth century and his writings seem to have informed much of the debate on music's mirror-propriety in Germany. And yet, despite the apparent prevalence of Batteux' thoughts in German theory, its richness at this time stems ostensibly from the internal schizophrenia of its practice: on the one hand, the cultural presence of French thought and theory was strong; on the other hand, the reception of that theory was tailored to the economic reality of a backward and fragmented Germany, providing a painful reminder of the otherness of the exotic foreign culture. Particularly characteristic of the extremes of the rationalist side of the German debate was the work of Johann Christian Gottsched, professor of poetry at Leipzig university whose *Versuch einer critischen Dichtkunst* of 1730 was taken by other mimesists as a battle cry against the 'barbarism' of music that had become too complex.

As representative of the rationalist extreme, then, Gottsched's deliberations on *Nachahmung*¹⁸ in art served as a powerful constraint on the emergence of an aesthetic of instrumental music. In the fourth *Hauptstück* of the *Versuch*,¹⁹ Gottsched identifies three modes [*Gattungen*] of imitation in which art may properly participate. The 'lowest' of these modes is the most severe:

Die erste ist eine bloße Beschreibung, oder sehr *lebhaft* *Schilderey* von einer natürlichen Sache, die man nach allen ihren Eigenschaften, Schönheiten oder Fehlern, Vollkommenheiten oder Unvollkommenheiten seinen Lesern klar und deutlich vor die Augen malet, und gleichsam mit lebendigen Farben entwirft: so daß es fast eben so viel ist, als ob sie wirklich zugegen wäre.²⁰

¹⁷ See in particular *Der critische Musicus an der Spree*, Berlin 1749-50.

¹⁸ Literally, 'imitation'.

¹⁹ Fourth edition, Leipzig, 1751, 142ff.

²⁰ Ibid., 142. References are from the unaltered modern photo-mechanical edition of the Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, Darmstadt, 1962. This text, therefore, is in the original German type face and emphasis is added by **boldening** them. When such emphases are used in any of the given extracts, they are represented by italics.

The *first* is a simple description, or a very vivid depiction of a natural thing, which one paints in the eyes of the reader, taking into account all its particularities, its beauties or flaws, its perfections or imperfections, at the same time drafting it in vivid colours: so that it almost seems as if it were really present.²¹

This last sentence holds the key: art must humble itself before the complexity of the visual surface of the thing. This object of depiction, a closed and finite thing bearing all its essentials to the empirical eye is *le mot juste* of Cartesian rationale. The semiology of the Cartesian object in Gottsched is fundamentally depictive in tone and yet reductive in its order. The apparently simple representations of this system belie a profound schism that is necessitated in the notion of *Nachahmung* itself. On the one hand, there are the things that, in themselves, motivate classification according to apparently obviated²² visual similarities, a kind of given order of similarities that somehow *require* visual connection. On the other hand, there is the as yet unquestioned viability of an accurate depiction of these similar things within the system of signs: indeed, the very notion of representation or imitation requires this fundamental separation between 'thing' and 'sign' for resemblance must take place across separate entities. In this sense, art is not merely a discovering of *a priori* signs, but, at first glance, an aligning of its signs to an *a priori* visual realm of natural things. It is a profound dilemma of rationalist thought that universal reason or the discourse of categories, in its late Cartesian mutation to become empirical science, required for itself a certain distance from natural things in order to constrain and tame them. Art, then, as a fundamental element of the neo-Aristotelean science forced itself onto nature, subsumed it and yet played the humble servant. The apparent humility of art in this regard is an essential part of separation - a certain separateness must also mean a certain unfamiliarity or even fear of the 'thing'. This dichotomy is particularly clear in Gottsched's writings where the urge to exalt nature must be mediated by the restraint

²¹ As far as I am aware, no English translations of this text are available. The translations provided are my own.

²² The relationship in English between 'obvious' and 'obviated' is no mere accident of usage. If something is seen as 'obvious' then it can, effectively, be dispensed with in the critical discourse. Indeed, these mimetic paradigms, the *Affekten*, obviate any justification in the Cartesian discourses.

of the prudent artist who does not wish to 'overload' his prose with countless descriptive details:

Wie viele Dichter haben nicht bey uns wider diese Regeln verstoßen; die uns wohl gar ganze Bücher voller Beschreibungen und gekünstelter Schildereyen aufgedrungen haben? ...Noch lächerlicher sind diejenigen, die uns ganze Lehrbücher von den Beschreibungen geschrieben. Sie machen eine Sache, die doch kein Hauptwerk des Dichters ist, ohne Noth schwer, und verdunkeln durch ihre unendlichen Abtheilungen und Zergliederungen dasjenige, was ein muntre Kopf ohne alle Regeln weit besser trifft.²³

How many poets amongst us have contravened these rules, have forced upon us whole books full of descriptions and contrived depictions? ...Even more laughable are those who have written for us whole text books on such descriptions. They make something which is not the poet's main concern unnecessarily difficult, and obscure with their endless categorisations and divisions, something an alert person can comprehend much better without all the rules.

The almost naturalistic consequences of the Cartesian mimesis aesthetic, then, with the possibility of endless and meaningless metonyms, are fundamentally curtailed by notions of *order*. Art's signification of nature is thus also a filtering out of the unwieldy multiplicity of nature in favour of a clear, skeletal depiction. This filtering is a covert recognition of the improbability of total representation, an implicit problematisation of signs as *natural* and a fundamental separation of signification from the natural realm. In filtering nature, then, art proceeds to a paradoxical function of both demonstrating subservience to the objective realm and undertaking its improvement:

Virgil wird deswegen gelobt, weil er in Beschreibungen so bescheiden gewesen. Er hat wohl zehnmal Gelegenheit gehabt, den Regenbogen abzumahlen: und was würde uns da ein poetischer Maler von Profession, nicht mit seinem Farben gequält haben! Aber der bescheidene Virgil sagt nichts mehr, als: 'Mille trahens varios adverso sole colores.'²⁴

Virgil is thus praised since he was restrained in his use of description. He had countless opportunities to paint the rainbow: how the professional poetic painter would have tortured us with his colours! But, restrained by modesty, Virgil says nothing more than 'Mille trahens varios adverso sol colores.'

Whilst the contradictions of the natural versus the signifying are implicit in this aesthetic, it is true to say, also, that what now appears as contradiction was then seen

²³ *Versuch*, 144.

²⁴ *Versuch*, 144. Notice the characteristic omission of the finite part of the past tense *ist gewesen*. Such omissions seem to abound in this text. It is a characteristic of Gottsched's style.

as proper and necessary separation. Furthermore, the separation itself was often deliberately minimised as in Gottsched's maxim 'als ob sie wirklich zugegen wäre.' Thus the separation is so conflated as to suggest a nature *in praesentia*. The representational gesture of Gottsched's lowest mode of *Nachahmung* was thus characterised by a notion of art as *showing* nature, of an art hiding itself in favour of the emergence of nature *as nature*. This, as we shall see, was to be vilified by Schelling and others as *das Naïve in der Poesie*.²⁵

The declared agenda, at least, of the lowest form of representation/imitation, then, was the sensible presentation of nature through the *medium* of art. In this form, art is at its least ontological and at its most perfunctory. In the second mode, however, art steps forward from its feigned modesty and allows its tendency to filter the natural to play a much more obviously determining role:

Die andre Art der Nachahmung geschieht, wenn der Poet selbst die Person eines andern spielt, oder einem, der sie spielen soll, solche Worte, Gebärden und Handlungen vorschreibt und an die Hand giebt, die sich in gewissen Umständen für ihn schicken.²⁶

The other type of imitation occurs when the poet himself plays the character of another or prescribes and makes available to another attempting to play the character such words, gestures or actions as befit that character in particular circumstances.

In this type of *Nachahmung*, then, the devices of the art form are more actively significant or signifying. Here art strives to present, in somewhat stylised form, the outer 'signs' of emotion such as gesture, inflection or intonation. Each art form is thus better at representing a particular element of the visible signifiers of an emotional state. Painting can capture gesture or facial expression, drama word inflection, or gesture, poetry inward thought and verbal nuance and music the 'raw' inflections and rhythms of the voice or a general 'mood'. The 'devices' of each art can thus determine which outward signifiers of the *Affekt* art can depict. An essential element of this form of *Nachahmung* is the necessity of a unified emotional state: a work of art must not

²⁵ F. W. J. Schelling, *Philosophie der Kunst*, 1802-3, first published Eßlingen 1859. Available in unaltered reprographic print from the Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, Darmstadt, 1980, 114-6.

²⁶ *Versuch*, 144-5. 'an die Hand giebt' is probably an odd form of 'an die Hand gibt.'

confuse the listener/reader/audience by attempting to show more than one *Affekt*. This unanimity of *Affekt* is premised both in Athanasius Kircher's *Musurgia universalis, sive Ars magna consoni et dissoni* (Rome, 1650) and Descartes' *Les passions de l'âme* (1647) and *Musicae compendium* (Utrecht, 1650) in which the notion of a passion (or an *Affekt*) is predicated by a reductive notion of the emotions to a number of unified, unchanging, states such that one *Affekt* not only represents its own presence but the absence of the others. The *Affekten*, then, are static, non-mutating moods. To attempt to represent more than one of these states at any one time, or to change wildly from one to another, is thus fundamentally to undermine the reductive model: the mechanistic doctrine of the affects sustains its viability of each mood as isolated, categorised and closed from the others. Non-unanimity in this case is synonymous with a lack of clarity:

Die Klaggedichte, die Raniz und Besser, auf ihre Gemahlinnen gemacht, werden sonst als besondere Muster schön ausgedruckter Affekten angesehen. Man kann sie auch gar wohl unter dieser Art der Nachahmung rechnen, ob sie gleich ihren eignen Schmerz, und nicht einen fremden vorstellen wollen: denn so viel ist gewiß, daß ein Dichter zum wenigsten dann, wann er die Verse macht, die volle Stärke der Leidenschaft nicht empfinden kann. Diese würde ihm nicht Zeit lassen, eine Zeile aufzusetzen, sondern ihn nöthigen, alle seine Gedanken auf die Größe seines Verlusts und Unglücks zu richten.²⁷

The *Klaggedichte*, which Raniz and Besser wrote to their consorts, are otherwise seen as special examples of the beautifully expressed affects. One can include them in this type of imitation if they attempt to represent their own pain and not that of others: since this much is certain: the poet can feel the full strength of the suffering least of all when he is composing his verses. This would not leave him any time to put down the lines [of the verse] but would necessitate his turning all his thoughts to the enormity of his loss and misfortune.

This assertion that the poet (and, by analogy, the artist or the composer) is naturally unable to fully feel the intensity of another's suffering is premised by a sense of art as an intervention in the natural process of feeling. Art crystallises and distils the unwieldy emotion into a generalised or stylised form. To this end:

²⁷ *Versuch*, 145.

Der Affekt muß schon ziemlich gestillet seyn, wenn man die Feder zur Hand nehmen, und alle seine Klagen in einem ordentlichen Zusammenhange vorstellen will.²⁸

The affect must be somewhat stilled if one wishes to take the quill in the hand and depict all one's complaints in a coherent order.

This idea, of a 'stilled' *Affekt*, expressed in an ordered form, is the most significant element of this mode of *Nachahmung* and to some extent follows from the previous notion of unanimity within a single emotional state. The simple division of the world into signs and things is made somewhat more complex here and yet this subsequent complexity is, in itself, the corollary of that division: for the bipartite world to function viably, the sign should not remain a mere *sign*, a mere closed thing in itself without referent, but must also demonstrate the manner in which it will connect itself with that referent, before the act of signification. It must be *latent* and must, so to speak, show not merely itself, but the process by which it exists as sign. Without such an immanent marker, the sign would be impotent, merely 'meaningless' and, in fact, would exist merely as referent or isolated object. By the very nature of its existence, the sign could only emerge as an element of a nature recast, in short, that is, already received. The received nature of the Cartesian order is discursive in so far as it arrives signified at the gates of conception. The *Affekt* is just such a self-reflective sign, perhaps the most obvious of such signs. Art signifies what it has already received: nature parcelled into unified elements, the emotions categorised and marked according to mechanical reductive states. Indeed, it is the unanimity of the *Affekt* that constitutes this received element, the representation of representation itself. Gottsched therefore makes the necessity of a singular unified emotional state clear in the following passage:

Ob ich nun wohl nicht läugne, daß diese trefflichen Stücke des berühmten Amthors Klagen, in gleichem Falle, weit vorzuziehen sind: so könnte doch ein scharfes Auge, auch in diesem zweyen Meisterstücken, noch manchen gar zu gekünstelten Gedanken, und gezwungenen Ausdruck, entdecken; den gewiß ein wahrer Schmerz nimmermehr würde hervorgebracht oder gelitten haben. Was hier von dem Schmerze gilt, das muß von allen Affekten verstanden werden.²⁹

²⁸ *Versuch*, 145-6.

²⁹ *Versuch*, 146.

Whether or not I feel that these excellent *Klagen* by the famous Amthor are to be preferred in this case, the sharp-eyed could still discover, even in these two masterpieces, some far too contrived thoughts and a forced expression, which was never produced by nor suffering [under] true pain. What is true here for pain must be understood for all the affects.

These two modes of representation, the descriptive and the reductive are still not problematised by the bipartite order of signs and objects. Despite the contradictions of mimesis versus prescription implicit in this aesthetic, the general tenor of the prose points towards an underlying acceptance of these contradictions as an inevitable consequence of good analysis. Analysis, in the sense presented in Gottsched, is always proactive to the extent that it orders or reconstructs the objective realm as a mechanical perfection. In this manner, mimetic art sets out to select and codify the external in terms of a quasi-moral order. The moral propriety of the rationalist world is premised, therefore, by notions of nature as somehow didactic. Indeed the morality of this aesthetic is built on the firm foundations of an unspoken and fixed semiology where separateness is conflated to mere relation. Like the Copernican sun in a fixed constellation, signs and objects spread across the semantic heavens in fixed array.

This semiological fixity is the fundamental basis on which Gottsched's third and highest mode of *Nachahmung* is constructed. This third mode Gottsched terms 'plot' [*die Fabel*]. Like fixed points in the dynamic of a classical tale of the archetypal elements or gods, the characters of a narrative are to be strictly delineated according to the given Cartesian principles of unanimous reduction: they are shown to be alive by assigning to each an archetypal quality which is then tested in a set of interactions and finally distilled to its most unified element. Already in his exposition of the second reductive mode, Gottsched recognises the necessity of semiological fixity:

Auf dieser Kunst nun beruhet fast die ganze theatralische Poesie: was nämlich die Charactere einzelner Personen, ihre Reden in einzelnen Scenen, und ihre Handlungen anlanget. Denn hier muß ein Poet alles, was von dem auftretenden Helden, oder wer es sonst ist, wirklich und der Natur gemäß hätte geschehen können, so genau nachahmen, daß man nichts unwahrscheinliches dabey wahrnehmen könne.³⁰

³⁰ *Versuch*, 146.

This art is the basis of almost all dramatic poesy: that is, the characters of single people, their speeches in single scenes and their actions. The poet must imitate everything which could have happened to the hero, or whoever else, realistically and according to nature's laws, in such a way as not to be able to discern anything improbable.

Yet the fixity of the plot, whilst underpinned by Gottsched in his quotation of Aristotle:

Wenn Aristotel sagen will, was die Fabel in einem Gedichte eigentlich sey, so spricht er: '*Es sey die Zusammensetzung oder Verbindung der Sachen.*'³¹

When Aristotle wishes to say what the plot in a poem actually is, he says: '*It is the composition*³² *or connection of things.*'

is still problematised by separation. On the one hand there are the elements of simple separation such as the representation of nature in the lowest form of *Nachahmung* and the filtering processes of the mechanisms of the *Affekt* in the second form, whilst, on the other hand, there is the self-contained constellation of the plot, a kind of other world that shows within itself the generalised order of the lesser types of *Nachahmung*. The grid of separations is thus accumulated according to the principles of an ever-widening complexity: the plot, in this sense, as the culmination of this process, represents the external by means of what Foucault terms *mathesis*:

When dealing with the ordering of simple natures, one has recourse to a *mathesis*, of which the universal method is algebra.³³

Nature in the Cartesian theory of art is just such a 'simple nature'. The visibility of all its elements is reduced to the complex moral algebra of *die Fabel*. And yet this algebraic network is somehow cordoned off from complex nature. The mechanisms of Cartesian reduction constantly refine and reorder until visible signs of nature are deliberately subsumed under an ordered moral code. The impotence of the contrived signs of art is thus compensated for by a prejudicial eye such that 'separateness' becomes so ingrained into representation as to appear natural:

³¹ Ibid., 149.

³² Literally, 'putting together'.

³³ Foucault, *Order*, 72.

Ich glaube derowegen, eine Fabel am besten zu beschreiben, wenn ich sage: sie sey die *Erzählung einer unter gewissen Umständen möglichen, aber nicht wirklich vorgefallenen Begebenheit, darunter eine nützliche moralische Wahrheit verborgen liegt*. Philosophisch könnte man sagen, sie sey eine Geschichte aus einer andern Welt.³⁴

I therefore think it is best to describe the plot as the *narration of an event which is possible under certain circumstances, but did not really happen, hidden under which, lies a useful moral truth*. Philosophically, one could say it is a story from another world.³⁵

The three levels of *Nachahmung* recognised by Gottsched, the representative, the reductive and the archetypal or mathesic, are all concerned to articulate a certain relationship between discourses (and in the Cartesian sense, nature can be seen as a discourse), as a fixed constellation of signs and referents in clear, stable and conspicuous relationships.

Gottsched's 1730 *Versuch* was to be followed by numerous critiques and apologias, notably Scheibe's admiring acknowledgement of Gottsched's influence in many of his articles in *Der critische Musikus* (1737-40) and Nicolai's scathing critique in his *Briefe über den itzigen Zustand der schönen Wissenschaften in Deutschland* (1755). As sustained by Leipzig pupils such as the music theorist J. A. Scheibe, then, Gottsched's theories of verisimilitude remained both formative and contentious in the broader German debate on music's function and meaning until the last quarter of the eighteenth century. Musicians felt their beloved music to be under attack by the effeminate theories expounded across the Rhine. It was not really until the publication in 1750 of an extremely contentious treatise on the fine arts that music found a defence other than that of professional indignance.

Alexander Baumgarten's 1750 watershed *Aesthetica* enunciated a distinct movement inwards, away from the immediacy of visible nature. The *perfectio cognitionis sensitivae* represents the freeing of sensual perception from

³⁴ *Versuch*, 150.

³⁵ I have omitted the 'wenn ich sage' ['when I say'] since the sentence in English is difficult to construct without recourse to the rather cumbersome 'I think therefore, it is best to describe a plot when I say...'

instrumentality. Leibniz³⁶ had assigned to perception the role of instrument, a means to truth, a kind of neutral mirror through which to observe truth. For Baumgarten, however, the persistent existence of beauty as an experience, so to speak, represented the unassailable truth that perception was a 'thing in itself'; such an assertion calls implicitly for the emancipation of the sensual from the cold grip of rationalism or at least the emancipation of a 'discipline of perception' from the general Cartesian categories of semiological fixity. In line with the ontological impulse of late eighteenth century science, *Aesthetica* initiated a compartmentalisation of theoretical approaches to music; music theory now splinters into the specialist, almost autonomous disciplines of analysis, aesthetics, philosophy, and history.

For many Germans, the most influential disseminator of Baumgarten's aesthetic theory was Georg Friedrich Meier. Indeed, his *Anfangsgründe der schönen Künste und Wissenschaften* (3 volumes, 1748-50) is often cited as if it were written by Baumgarten himself.³⁷ Meier attempted a cogent argument for a Baumgartian theory of the fine arts: whereas the rationalists lambaste certain of the arts (especially music) for their innumerable contrasts and disunity, Meier praises such contrasts as stimulating *innerliche Wirkung*.³⁸ Thus any 'perfection' in art does not consist in a propriety of imitation, but in variety and diversity, in an internal drama of contrasts which sustain *die Aufmerksamkeit*.³⁹ If *Aufmerksamkeit* is to be sustained, the listener must not be confused by a chaotic plethora of diffuse elements. Within Baumgartian diversity there must be a unity such that levels of surprise and contrast are managed and controlled so as never to lose the *Aufmerksamkeit*. Contrast and surprise must thus be mediated by 'direction' or some sense of structural integrity.

Thus Baumgarten, as we have said, articulated an inward movement, a retreat from the external world of visible nature into a sensuality of art. Aesthetics thus

³⁶ Gottfried Wilhelm von Leibniz, *Epistolae ad diversos* (1712) in *Philosophische Werke*, II ed. Cassirer, Leipzig, 1906, 132.

³⁷ Bellamy Hosler, *Changing Aesthetic Views of Instrumental Music in Eighteenth-Century Germany*, U M I Press, Ann Arbor, 1981, 89ff.

³⁸ Literally 'inner effect'.

³⁹ Literally 'the attention'.

attempts to find immanent value within the artwork itself and although it rarely manages to free itself from a morality of music, its language is not primarily moral. The value of a piece of music, by analogy, thus lies in its mechanisms of construction, in the quality and competence of its 'internal' discourse.

The Lutheran tradition of music making in Germany proved a fruitful basis on which to build a Baumgartian aesthetic: whilst keen to stress music's use as a past-time, as a harmless secular recreation, Luther himself had stressed the 'out-of-world' quality of music: its ability to suspend time and aid meditation.⁴⁰ Thus the German tradition was historically quite open to the 'post-rationalist' theories of Baumgarten and Meier. The Lutheran tradition was a significant factor in the formulation of the new aesthetic theory.

What Meier terms *Verwunderung*⁴¹ becomes an axiom of the new theory: this term, loosely translated as 'bewonderment', evokes a quasi-spiritual state in which the subject, enchanted by the unexpected and the wonderful, reaches a heightened level of perception where the sensual and the sentient merge to make truth tangible.

In the wake of the new theory there came no sudden abandonment of the mimetic paradigm in Germany. The new sensuality was to some extent subsumed into mimetic theory, the two theories sitting uncomfortably side by side for at least the next thirty years. The theorist Christian Gottfried Krause, for example, is very characteristic of what Hosler terms this 'German critical synthesis'.⁴² Krause's essay of 1753, *Von der musicalischen Poesie*, clearly owes much to Baumgarten. In it he attacks Gottsched in particular, but more significantly attempts to construct a systematic theory of musical form. The parallelisms Krause draws between form and emotion represent an early attempt at a theory of *expression*. Elements of the old rational morality still remain,

⁴⁰ The spiritual quality of music is particularly clearly addressed in Luther's *Lob und Preis der loblichen Kunst Musica* of 1538 where music's otherness from the material world is said to enrich man's soul, to allow him to contemplate the otherness of the spiritual realm.

⁴¹ Georg Friedrich Meier, *Anfangsgründe der Schönen Künste und Wissenschaften*, Halle, 1748-50, volume 3, 298.

⁴² Hosler, *Views*, 97.

however, in his moralistic notion of music as having both 'order and proportion'⁴³, both of which instil the correct moral values in the individual.

Other theorists such as Johann Georg Sulzer⁴⁴ and Karl Ludwig Junker⁴⁵ demonstrate similar syntheses. Both attempted to move beyond the *Affektenlehre* towards a more vague notion of music's self-referentiality. Sulzer, for example, was torn between more 'radical' notions of music as an *Ausgiessung* of *lebhaften Gefühlen* and more conservative notions of music as instilling or representing moral propriety.⁴⁶

In Junker, however, there is a more cogent attempt to bring the *Affektenlehre* 'up to date'. Whereas Sulzer had appealed to music's sublimity as its salvation from the excesses of anti-musical rationalism,⁴⁷ Junker wanted to articulate a more complex vision of the passions and music's relationship to them. He believed that music had the power to articulate those confused states of change from one psychological state to another. This emphasis on *process* is, of course, central also to Baumgartian theory: art is representative of process alone - its content need not represent things outside itself.

In Johann Niklaus Forkel, a theory of musical autonomy emerges: keen to extend the dynamic vision of the passions or affections, Forkel attempted to broaden Krause's dynamic *Affektenlehre* to encapsulate a theory of what he called *musical rhetoric*.⁴⁸ This new theory stresses a dynamism or process of the affections such that all things become subsumed into the movements of the soul.

In the articulation of *rhetoric*, Forkel draws music into a separation from nature that is premised no longer by semiological fixity but by the outer margins of Cartesian representation. Close in many ways to the English scepticism of Hume's A

⁴³ Ibid., 99.

⁴⁴ See his *Allgemeine Theorie der schönen Künste*, first edition Berlin 1771-74, second edition Leipzig, 1792.

⁴⁵ See, for example, *Betrachtungen über Mahlerey, Ton- und Bildhauerkunst*, Basel 1778; *Musikalischer Almanach für das Jahr 1782*, Aléthynople, 1782; *Tonkunst*, Bern 1777; *Ueber den Werth der Tonkunst*, Bayreuth 1786.

⁴⁶ *Allgemeine Theorie*, 423.

⁴⁷ See also Schiller in this regard: *Ueber das Erhabene*, in the Taschenausgabe, 1847, volume 12, 292.

⁴⁸ See in particular, *Allgemeine Geschichte der Musik*, Leipzig 1788, second edition Leipzig 1801.

Treatise of Human Understanding (1739) and Henry Home's (Lord Kames) *Elements of Criticism* (1753), Forkel problematised the unanimity of the *Affekt* in favour of a Junkerian articulation of changing states such that representation, reduction and mathesis are effectively banished. In the *Allgemeine Geschichte der Musik* in particular, Forkel ascribes to music a profoundly *ontological* quality, an essential and autonomous level of signification based around a systematic analysis of musical meaning according to six fundamental categories: *die Phrase* or *Periode*; *der Stil*; *die Gattung*; *Einhalt und Charakter*; *die Deklamation*; *die Kritik*.⁴⁹

In the first of these categories, period, Forkel foreshadows the musical aesthetics of German Idealism, most notably the Schellingian-Hegelian primacy of cadence. It is significant that Forkel names rhythm as the first sub category of period. In Schelling, we shall see how rhythm functions as a kind of self-significatory level within music and Forkel's account is close to that of the idealists. As a kind of internal account of time, rhythm is further articulated by the 'higher' categories of *Logik*, *Homophonie*, and *Polyphonie*. It would seem that 'logic' represents the articulation of rhythm within pulse, the strong-weak pulse of bars and the periodic cessation of pulse at cadences.

Further to the rhythm-logic elements, Forkel gives an account of *Homophonie* as the harmonic counterpart of rhythm and *Polyphonie* as that of *Logik*. Homophony, then, is the simple simultaneous sounding of pitches, the basic form of harmony and polyphony is an articulated harmony, a higher or more complex manifestation of the forms of logic.⁵⁰

In *Stil*, Forkel makes an essentially sociological, rather than historical, distinction between the various *Schreibarten*⁵¹ according to function. These distinctions are complemented by a set of quasi-Cartesian distinctions according to

⁴⁹ These can be translated thus: phrase or period, style, genre, content and character, declamation, criticism.

⁵⁰ Note, in particular, the organic model of layers of signification: each layer retains a degree of autonomy, separateness from the others and yet, each is, in some way, a reflection on the others. See in this regard chapter 4 on Schelling's organicism.

⁵¹ Literally, 'modes of writing'.

Affekten-like definitions. The three social functions are termed *Kirchenmusik*, *Kammermusik* and *Theatermusik*, and it is these that serve as the final arbiters of category: Forkel demonstrates that certain 'functions' are more disposed to certain modes of *Affektendarstellung*. Thus *Kirchenmusik* represents the affects in a manner closest to Cartesian semiological fixity, whereas *Kammermusik* is better suited to that *Schreibart* he terms *erhoben*, *ruhig* or *abgeschlossen*. It is interesting that *Theatermusik* contains elements we would not normally include under that category today. These include not only the Gottschedian plot genres but also, implicitly, a kind of archetypal or generalised plot which we might now subsume under the term 'dramatic musical argument' in its broadest sense. 'Absolute' orchestral music can thus also be included under this category.⁵²

Indeed, under *Gattung* Forkel makes distinctions according not only to the three sociological paradigms but also to texture: thus, under theatre one can envisage drama as encapsulating both narrative genres such as opera and *general narratives* such as symphony or concerto by virtue of both a certain textural orientation and the sociological function of narration, implicit or explicit. Genres emerge, then, both as the products of certain modes of labour and as entities empowered by their own internal mechanisms: they are both functional and ontological.

The ontological consequences of this system are further divided in *Einhalt und Charakter*. These two terms seem indistinct from each other but are both concerned with the relation of internal modes of construction to their reception or *Wirkung*. In this category, music's character can be seen to comply with Foucault's account of post-Cartesian biology:

It will be seen that character is no longer drawn from the visible structure, and without any criterion other than its presence or absence; it is based upon the

⁵² This might result from the rather confused origins of the symphony, springing perhaps from the scenic halt of narrative progress in the *sinfonia* of Italian opera. Its disconnection from drama might thus not yet be fully articulated. Perhaps, on the other hand, this metaphorical use of 'theatre' might signal the final separation in so far as absolute music is thereby seen to have its own internal narrative.

existence of functions essential to the living being, and upon relations of importance that are no longer merely a matter of description.⁵³

As we have seen, the collapse of unanimous reduction inevitably leads to the internalisation and specialisation of unanimity; similarity or repetition of features becomes a by-product of an internal *function*:

Character is not, then, established by relation of the visible to itself; it is nothing in itself but the visible point of a complex and hierarchical organic structure in which function plays an essential governing and determining role. It is not because a character occurs frequently in the structures observed that it is important; it is because it is functionally important that it is often encountered.⁵⁴

The most striking element of this new epistemological schema for music is the conflation of the separate elements of Gottsched's Copernican constellation to a single, amorphous and finite entity. Music now subsumes within itself both the rhetorical or communicative, apparently remnants of seventeenth-century German *Figurenlehre*,⁵⁵ and the 'aesthetic' or formal. Thus apparently external elements of representation are in themselves functions of the music's ontology,

Forkel's dynamism and his appeal to emotional fluidity represent two tendencies of nineteenth century musicology in embryonic form: a spiritualism of music and a functional theory of musical form. After Forkel, the synthesis of emotional dynamism seemed complete: Wackenroder, Tieck, and later Hoffmann, all wrote effusively on the merits of instrumental music, and whilst certain rhetorical remnants of the imitation paradigm remain, they seem little more than mere gestures to the older French theory.

The Challenge to a World of Visible Meanings

Challenges to Cartesian science, then, inevitably bring challenges to mimesis theory, the latter being a hybrid of the former. Alongside the self-orchestrated demise of mimesis arose a new science, which, as we have said, attempted to engage rationally with the notion of a closed essential self-quality in reality. The new science thus

⁵³ Foucault, *Order*, 227-8.

⁵⁴ Ibid., 228.

⁵⁵ See Vincent Duckles, 'Johann Nocolaus Forkel: the beginning of music historiography' in *Eighteenth-century Studies* 1968: volume 1, 277-90.

required a universality of method, an overriding set of references that were closed to questions of value. In short, it required a pragmatism that accepted the truth only of its scientific method, induction.

If it was based initially on the seemingly clear *deductive* modes of argument - beginning, that is, with a considered meditation on the nature of the question and proceeding by a process of continual internal dialogue until the discourse brings the answer - Cartesian thought was highly vulnerable to the new pragmatism of empirical *inductive* methods such as those posited by Sir Isaac Newton (1642-1727) and, in a much earlier 'philosophical' or abstract form, by Sir Francis Bacon (1561-1627). Induction, the methodological antithesis of deduction, proceeds by a method of trial and error, of constant experimentation until some sense or pattern emerges that leads the observer to discover some 'truth'. Whilst not necessarily antithetical to Cartesian tables of visible similarity,⁵⁶ the inductive method had the significant consequence of atomising reality, of splintering it into tiny empiricities. In positing a *universal* scientific model for the retrieval of truth, induction brings about a retreat into ever smaller units of measurable matter, each detail more clearly defined with every fine-tuning of the system. Each new detail seemed to succumb again and again to the new inquisitive eye. This 'universal', 'all-purpose', seemingly infallible, epistemology undermined the cameralist basis of the old corporatist order in that it began to allow for the *proactive* dimension of reason. The loss of the old cohesion and the fundamental undermining of cameral order that induction entailed produced a kind of social rupture: the threat to cohesion at the level of community meant the subsequent reconstruction of community at the level of the *larger* social unit: the nation. Induction can thus be seen to play no small part in the emergence of the myth of universality and the ontological impulse. The tiny empiricities of inductive method begin the process of objectification that so clearly lies at the basis of *function*, *essence* and *the invisible*. The overreaching enquiry of inductive method into nature, its wish to give meaning by

⁵⁶ It is now clear to see how *mimesis* undermines itself. If visibility and induction conspire to create the notion of *essence*, then the sole right of *mimesis* to truth is assailed.

observation, fell foul of nature's 'invisible' elements: to make such elements visible, it had first to leave the world of the visible on a kind of reconnaissance mission and, outside its own visible realm, discovered that the very visibility that had served as an infallible measure of truth now lay open to the ravages of a more sensual post-Cartesian reason. The similarity table proved too coarse a tool with which to measure reality. The paradigm had shown itself to be inadequate.

If inductive method played a part in the emergence of the ontological impulse, then we might expect to find similar moves towards an objectification in musical theory. When the 'absoluteness' or 'infallibility' of the inductive empirical method instigated the collapse of the deductive modes of thinking and posited man's universality, induction became a central sovereign truth which all men recognise and by which they are measured. In this sense, induction was a profoundly democratic phenomenon. The democratic element in music theory can be seen in the emergence of the score as object of inductive scrutiny. It is the emergence of this phenomenon, and its relationship to broader intellectual and cultural developments in the eighteenth century, the path of music theory into the new paradigm that we shall now analyse more closely in the general philosophical schemata of Schelling and Hegel and in the ecstatic soliloquising of Wackenroder.

Chapter Three

Wackenroder: Music beyond Articulation

W. H. Wackenroder's *Phantasien über die Kunst für Freunde der Kunst* (1799) conflates the semiological fixity of Gottsched's mimesis, the separateness of sign and object, by a deliberate problematisation of musical semantics. Written in an inward-looking, meditative style, the fantasies are emotionally charged and tragic. Although works of literature in themselves, the Berglinger essays on music are nonetheless a kind of practical demonstration of Forkelian/Junkerian emotional dynamism. This is a prose purged completely of the Cartesian morality and emotional unanimity. The constellation of Cartesian semantics is cast out in favour of a new *Seelenlehre*, a doctrine of the soul, where the human soul is seen first and foremost as an ever more 'ausgebreites Gewebe von immer feineren Zweigen.'¹

This conflation of separateness emerges a few years later in systematic philosophy as 'organic structure' and yet at this stage music is taken up in a deliberately non-empirical manner resulting in a mystical salutatory tone addressing music as somehow wanton and magical, as *das Dunkle, Unbeschreibliche*.

Each of the four essays in the *Phantasien* deals with a different aspect of music.² Some allegorise the sufferings of the character Berglinger, others are driven by an almost hysterical delight in music and the letters recount his anguish and torture, the 'poison' in his veins and his self-loathing. Always, though, music is shown to be a kind of spiritual other world, a realm above the mundane reality of the objective realm.

¹ *Phantasien*, in Wackenroder, Gustav Kiepenheuer Verlag, Potsdam, 1925, 183.

² There are, in fact, four essays and two fragments from fictitious letters from Berglinger to friends and colleagues.

This 'otherness' is particularly strong in the first essay, 'Ein wunderbares morgenländisches Märchen von einem nackten Heiligen.'³ The hermit or naked saint represents, in allegorical form, the tortured Berglinger. Isolated and driven by an internal frenzy, the hermit finds no rest from his self-imposed purgatory. He lives in a far distant wilderness, somewhere in the Orient, *die Heimat alles Wunderbaren*.⁴ The use of the Orient here is striking: it is a place where signs and things are interwoven, where the old Copernican constellation of natural elements is wholly inappropriate:

Das Morgenland ist die Heimat alles Wunderbaren, in dem Allertume und der Kindheit der dortigen Meinungen findet man auch höchst seltsame Winke und Rätsel, die immer noch dem Verstande, der sich für klüger, aufgegeben werden. So wohnen dort in den Einöden oft seltsame Wesen, die wir wahnsinnig nennen, die aber dort als übernatürliche Wesen verehrt werden.⁵

The Orient is the home of everything wondrous. Amidst the antiquity and childlike simplicity of attitudes there, one also finds very strange signs and puzzles which present a problem to the mind that considers itself to be more clever. Strange beings often dwell in the wilderness there, beings whom we would call insane, who are however worshipped there as supernatural beings.⁶

In this exotic land, Wackenroder is able to construct a semiology that lies wholly outside the Cartesian model. The *Winke* and *Rätsel* of this land represent the overlapping of the Cartesian separate elements of signs and things. Signification remains ambivalent to its signifieds and the clarity of representation is wholly undermined. The unwieldiness of meaning in this fictitious realm imbues obvious visible elements with an antiquarian sense of the supernatural:

Der orientalische Geist betrachtet diese nackten Heiligen als die wunderlichen Behältnisse eines höhern Genius, der aus dem Reiche des Firmaments sich in eine menschliche Gestalt verirrt hat, und sich nun nicht nach Menschenweise zu gebärden weiß.⁷

³ Literally: 'A miraculous oriental tale of a naked saint' in *Phantasien*, 158-163.

⁴ Literally: 'the home of all things miraculous/wonderful/remarkable'.

⁵ *Phantasien*, 158.

⁶ Edward A. Lippman, (ed.), *Musical Aesthetics: A Historical Reader - The Nineteenth Century*, Pendragon Press, 1988, 6. The translation is that by Schubert. See bibliography.

⁷ *Phantasien*, 158.

The oriental mind regards these naked saints as wondrous receptacles of a higher spirit which strayed away from the realm of the firmament into human form and now does not know how to conduct itself in a human manner.⁸

Thus, in those places where Cartesian order would close, confine and distribute meaning according to a table of clear and visible categories, the Orient opens, fragments and disperses meaning across a broad canvass. The apparent 'madness' of the saint in Cartesian eyes is shown in this other world as a higher, more mysterious state. In this sense, the saint is *complex* and it is this complexity, closed to the Cartesian *Verstand*, that imbues the saint with its semantic bounty. In short, the saint, as allegory of the tortured creative genius, is both sign and referent, an immanent semantics of hidden truths, distant from the common *Verstand*.

The saint's closure from the external is also represented in the metaphor of the distant wilderness and the cave by a small river. He is tortured by what he perceives to be the rushing torrential sounds of the turning wheel of time, cannot escape this torment and must constantly turn the wheel of time so that time does not stand still. The Sisyphean grandeur of this tragedy belies a fundamental distinction that will emerge in Schelling between *Laut* and *Klang*:

Wie ein Wasserfall von tausend und abertausend brüllenden Strömen, die vom Himmel herunterstürzten, sich ewig, ewig ohne augenblicklichen Stillstand, ohne die Ruhe einer Sekunde ergossen, so tönte es in seine Ohren, und alle seine Sinne waren mächtig nur darauf hingewandt, seine arbeitende Angst war immer mehr und mehr in den Strudel der wilden Verwirrung ergriffen und hineingerissen, immer ungeheurer verwildeten die einförmigen Töne durcheinander;⁹

Like a waterfall of thousands of roaring torrents which plunged down from the sky, eternally, eternally poured forth without a momentary pause, without a second's peace, thus is sounded in his ears and all his senses were intently focused solely on this. His labouring anguish became more and more caught up and carried away in the whirlpool of this wild confusion; the monstrous sounds grew more and more ferociously wild;¹⁰

This tortuous sound, the unwieldy, unleashed power of *einförmige Töne*, contrasts with the *ätherische Musik* encountered at the end of the tale. The former sound is

⁸ *Aesthetics*, 6.

⁹ *Phantasien*, 159.

¹⁰ *Aesthetics*, 7.

unordered, mundane, profane, even, whereas the latter, as we shall see, is spiritual, creative. For Schelling this distinction between *Laut* and *Klang* is that between an unordered or interrupted sound and a constant, ordered, uninterrupted resonance:¹¹ Furthermore, *Laut* is profane because it is not creative, not formed by the act of creativity whereas *Klang* springs from the individual creativity of genius.

A similar contrast exists between the frenzied turning of the wheel of time which torments the saint and the *kleinlichen irdischen Beschäftigungen* of the pilgrims:

Aber noch viel wilder und gefährlicher wurde seine Raserei, wenn es sich zutrug, daß in seiner Nähe irgendeine körperliche Arbeit vorgenommen wurde, wenn ein Mensch, der ihn nicht kannte, etwa bei seiner Höhle Kräuter sammelte oder Holz fällte. Dann pflegte er wild aufzulachen, daß unter dem gräßlichen Fortrollen der Zeit noch jemand an diese kleinlichen irdischen Beschäftigungen denken konnte...¹²

But his frenzy became much more wild and dangerous whenever it happened that any physical labour was undertaken in his surroundings, for example, whenever a person who didn't know him gathered herbs and felled wood near his cave. Then he tended to burst out laughing hysterically over the fact that someone was still able to think of these trivial earthly concerns amidst the frightful rolling on of time...¹³

The separation of the hermit from the mundane everyday pastimes of the contented pilgrims is an image common to much early Romantic literature. As Schubert points out in his footnotes to the English translation, a notable example is Novalis' *Heinrich von Ofterdingen*. As a *höhere Genius*, the naked saint is to be revered as a figure of legend, an isolated, higher prophet of the supernatural. The tone of the language and the imagery here reminds one of Nietzsche's hermit figure of Zarathustra in *Also sprach Zarathustra* (1883-5). And yet, Wackenroder's *Übermensch* is not the prophet of self-overcoming, of self-betterment through the meditative discipline of the higher creative discourse, of *Selbstüberwindung*, but a tortured, unfulfilled genius denied the

¹¹ 'Ich brauche den Unterschied des Klangs von Schall und Laut nicht weitläufig auseinandersetzen. Schall ist das Generische, Laut ist Schall, der nur unterbrochen; Klang ist Schall, der als Stetigkeit als ein ununterbrochenes Fließen des Schalls aufgefaßt wird.' F. W. J. Schelling, *Philosophie der Kunst*, 133.

¹² *Phantasien*, 160.

¹³ *Aesthetics*, 7.

solitary creativity in which Zarathustra revels. The essential difference here is between a proto-Schopenhauerian vision of life as mere illusion, as driven by the *Wille zum Leben*, and Nietzsche's affirmation of life: 'Das Leben ist ein Born der Lust; aber wo das Gesindel mittrinkt, da sind alle Brunnen vergiftet.'¹⁴ Wackenroder's naked saint, however, is tormented not merely by the poisoning *Gesindel* but by every tortured moment of his existence: a tragic black vision of the objective realm as a living purgatory. His tortures are so extreme that all ability to function as a member of the alien community of pilgrims, to engage in communicative action, is suppressed or suspended:

Er war nicht imstande, seinen Arm irgendeinem Gegenstande auszustrecken, oder etwas mit der Hand zu ergreifen; er konnte keinen Schritt mit den Füßen tun, wie andre Menschen.¹⁵

He was not capable of stretching out his arm toward any object or reaching for anything with his hand; he couldn't take a step with his feet like other people.¹⁶

The despair of the saint, unable to engage in objective existence without pain, is seldom relieved. Only on those moonlit nights where all is still does the saint collapse onto the floor of his cave in momentary relief from his purgatory.

At this point, the difference between the Schellingian *Laut* and *Klang* is compounded. On one such still night, two lovers float past the saint's cave in a small boat and the *ätherische Musik* floats from the boat upwards to the heavens:

Mit dem ersten Tone der Musik und des Gesangs war dem nackten Heiligen das sausende Rad der Zeit verschwunden. Es waren die ersten Töne, die in diese Einöde fielen; die unbekannte Sehnsucht war gestillt, der Zauber gelöst, der verirrt Genius aus seiner irdischen Hülle befreit.¹⁷

At the first sound of this music and singing the roaring Wheel of Time had vanished from the naked saint. These were the first harmonies which had drifted into the desolate place; the unfamiliar longing was stilled, the spell broken, the lost spirit released from its earthly shell.¹⁸

¹⁴ Friedrich Nietzsche, *Also Sprach Zarathustra*, in *Nietzsche Werke*, publ. Walter de Gruyter and Co. Berlin 1968, 120.

¹⁵ *Phantasien*, 160-1.

¹⁶ *Aesthetics*, 8.

¹⁷ *Phantasien*, 163.

¹⁸ *Aesthetics*, 9.

The ordered *Klang* of this music, then, releases the saint from the tortured existence and the phantom that remains floats into the heavens. Music, then, born from a natural uncontrived joy, is a release, an other-world which transforms the objective realm. This music is no mere escapism, it is a metaphysical element of the world, one which resonates as an abstracted, mystical, construction. In this sense, the old Cartesian fixity is exorcised from music and a new dark and mysterious autonomy emerges. Notice, first of all, how the effects of music are articulated in such a highly metaphorical language, as if mere descriptive, fixative, words profane the complexity of this mysterious phenomenon.

These wonders, stemming ostensibly from the apparent semantic indeterminacy of created music are further analysed in 'die Wunder der Tonkunst', the second essay of the *Phantasien*.¹⁹ Berglinger begins in rapturous account of his response:

Wenn ich es so recht innig genieße, wie der leeren Stille sich auf einmal, aus freier Willkür, ein schöner Zug von Tönen entwindet, und als ein Opferrauch emporsteigt, sich in Luft en wiegt, und wieder still zur Erde herabsinkt; - da entspringen und drängen sich so viele neue, schöne Bilder in meinem Herzen, daß ich vor Wonne mich nicht zu lassen weiß.²⁰

Whenever I so fervently enjoy how a beautiful strain of sounds suddenly, in free spontaneity, extricates itself from the empty stillness and rises up like a sacrificial incense, floats gently on the breezes, and then silently sinks down to earth again; - then so many new, beautiful images spout forth and flock together in my heart that I cannot control myself out of rapture.²¹

There are two essential elements in this opening declamation. First, that music somehow springs from the stillness, self-determined, *aus freier Willkür*, as if it is somehow self-animated, free from the bodies which are agitated to produce it. Second, that such a creature as this self-animated music speaks directly to the individual - Berglinger - in such a potent, debilitating manner that he/she somehow loses a sense of self, is so intoxicated by the overwhelming rush of sentiments that the rational ego is momentarily suspended, giving way to the unleashed confusion of the id.

¹⁹ *Phantasien*, 164ff.

²⁰ *Phantasien*, 164.

²¹ *Aesthetics*, 10.

This twofold character of music - as autonomous, self-animated and as ego-negating narcotic - is then spread across a broad arc of metaphorical indulgence from absolute self-animation to absolute perfection. Wackenroder takes this broad sweep through several stages. He begins with the imagery of the phoenix:

Bald kommt Musik mir vor wie ein Vogel Phönix, der sich leicht und kühn zu eigener Freude erhebt, zu eignem Behagen stolzierend hinaufschwebt, und Götter und Menschen durch seinen Flügelschwung erfreut.²²

Sometimes music appears to me like a phoenix, which lightly and boldly raises itself for its own pleasure, floats upwards triumphantly for its own gratification, and pleases gods and men by the flapping of its wings.²³

This notion of self-activation, of a birth through self-will is a fundamental element of Wackenroder's notion of autonomy. That the phoenix emerges *zu eignem Behagen*, relating to the initial declamation on music as emerging *aus freier Willkür*, suggests a music which plays for itself, that speaks to its own internal organs, that moves itself in some kind of internal self-signifying dialogue. The phoenix, as an image of resurrection, a life out of objective non-animacy, is also a release, an escape from the mortality of the mundane objective realm. The emotive symbolism of a dead child serves to extend this notion of music as a kind of spiritual resurrection:

Bald dünkt es mich, Musik sei wie ein Kind, das tot im Grabe lag - ein rötlicher Sonnenstrahl vom Himmel entnimmt ihm die Seele sanft, und es genießt, in himmlischen Äther versetzt, goldne Tropfen der Ewigkeit, und umarmt die Urbilder der allerschönsten menschlichen Träume.²⁴

At other times it seems to me as if music were like a child lying dead in the grave; - one reddish sunbeam from heaven gently draws its soul away and, transplanted into the heavenly aether, it enjoys golden drops of eternity and embraces the original images of the most beautiful human dreams.²⁵

Thus music draws a mortal life into a higher form of spiritual life, a higher consciousness. The suspension of the finitude of life and the positing of the eternal is thus fundamental here. Music is an abstraction or 'fundamental representation' of

²² *Phantasien*, 164.

²³ *Aesthetics*, 10.

²⁴ *Phantasien*, 164.

²⁵ *Aesthetics*, 10. The translation of *Urbilder* as 'original pictures' is inept: a better alternative is 'archetypes' since this ties in with Schelling's reading of this passage in *Philosophie*.

certain eternal truths, certain *Urbilder* or fundamental signs/images. Music therefore transcends the mere separation of sign and thing given in Gottsched's semiology and proposes a much 'deeper' fundamental unity of music and 'the spiritual' as a utopian realm standing in opposition to the rational, the real, the objective. Hence, music *represents* only in the most archetypal manner. Wackenroder thus gives music the function of a kind of 'cosmic model' for the fleeting of life into death:

Und bald - welche herrliche Fülle der Bilder! - bald ist die Tonkunst mir ganz ein Bild unsers Lebens: eine rührend kurze Freude, die aus dem Nichts entsteht und ins Nichts vergeht - die anhebt und versinkt, man weiß nicht warum: - eine kleine, fröhliche, grüne Insel, mit Sonnenschein mit Gang und Klang - die auf dem dunkeln unergründlichen Ozean schwimmt.²⁶

And sometimes, - what a magnificent fullness of images! - sometimes music is for me entirely a picture of our life: - a touchingly brief joy, which arises out of the void and vanishes into the void, - which commences and passes away, why one does not know: a little merry green island, with sunshine, with singing and rejoicing, - which floats upon the dark, unfathomable ocean.²⁷

Again, Wackenroder resorts to images of self-animation, emergence and submergence via some unfathomable force, *man weiß nicht warum*. This fleeting beauty of the utopian island, a metaphor for the painfully transitory nature of life's joys, underlines the volatility of music as an art form. Music can only provide fleeting - mortal - glimpses into the perfect world of infinite abstraction. The broad metaphorical sweep of music from autonomous self-animation through resurrection, the abstract representation of archetypes, to visions of utopian well-being is so painfully brief as to heighten the beauty of music, to make it a tragic beauty.

The transitory nature of music, its very brevity, leaves the analytical imperative of semiological fixity bereft of any mechanism to engage with music on any but the most superficial levels. In this sense, it is the wilful materiality of music, its unwieldy opaque mechanisms of signification that are the fundamental principles of the post-Cartesian aesthetic. Wackenroder's deliberate use of almost Nietzschean hysteria points to a deliberate conflation of metaphor and experience. This development of an

²⁶ *Phantasien*, 164.

²⁷ *Aesthetics*, 10.

aesthetics premised by metaphor as almost tangible experience is significant. Only through such a creative-poetic indictment of music's materiality could Wackenroder construct such an aesthetic, and it is to this metaphorical end that he lambastes analytical language:²⁸

Oh, so schließ' ich mein Auge zu vor all dem Kriege der Welt - und ziehe mich still in das Land der Musik, als in das Land des Glaubens, zurück, wo alle unsre Zweifel und unsre Leiden sich in ein tönendes Meer verlieren - wo wir alles Gekrächze der Menschen vergessen, wo kein Wort- und Sprachengeschnatter, kein Gewirr von Buchstaben und monströser Hieroglyphenschrift ins schwindlig macht, sondern alle Angst unsers Herzens durch leise Berührung auf einmal geheilt wird.²⁹

O, then I close my eyes to all the strife in the world - and withdraw quietly into the land of music, as into the *land of belief*, where all our doubts and our sufferings are lost in a resounding sea, - where we forget all the croaking of human beings, where no chattering of words and languages, no confusion of letters and monstrous hieroglyphics makes us dizzy but, instead, all the anxiety of our hearts is suddenly healed by the gentle touch.³⁰

The casting out of the sign is, as we have seen, an essential element of the process via Forkelian isomorphism, of ontologising music. The retreat from the *monströser Hieroglyphenschrift* into a discourse of objective self-quality and impenetrable otherness is the first stage of this process. The drive for the internal essence, the ontological impulse, is thus, at first, a deliberate *forgetting* of meaning for notions of a semantic determinacy are premised by the admission of an external, non-essential, element. In the Wackenroderian sense, the 'meaning' of music is *abstract inarticulability* which can only be traversed by a self-conscious language of metaphor:

"...Werden hier Fragen uns beantwortet? Werden Geheimnisse uns offenbart?" - Ach nein! aber statt aller Antwort und Offenbarung werden uns lustige, schöne Wolkengestalten gezeigt, deren Anblick uns beruhigt, wir wissen nicht wie; ...

²⁸ The simple use of the term metaphor here is not meant to deliberately undermine some of the profoundly contiguous relationships at work in Wackenroder's rich prose style. The nexus of metaphors and metonymies constructs, rather, a fable of allegorical unity where both metaphor and metonymy are constrained by the intensity and inarticulability of the aesthetic experience. To this end, one might say, Wackenroder uses a language which precludes its own fixity and undermines the determinacy of its signified. Indeed, one might ask after Barthes, what is it in this tearful old monk that poses for me the question of the signifier? (See *Image-Music-Text*, Fontana, 1982, 56. Barthes refers to a 'tearful old woman'.)

²⁹ *Phantasien*, 165.

³⁰ *Aesthetics*, 11.

- wir begrüßen und umarmen fremde Geisterwesen, die wir nicht kennen, als Freunde, und alle die Unbegreiflichkeiten, die unser Gemüt bestürmen, und die die Krankheit des Menschengeschlechtes sind, verschwinden von unsern Sinnen, und unser Geist wird gesund durch das Anschauen von Wundern, die noch *weit unbegreiflicher* und erhabener sind.³¹

Are questions answered for us here? Are secrets revealed to us? -O no! but, in the place of all answers and revelations, airy, beautiful cloud formations are shown to us, the sight of which calms us, we do not know how; - we greet and embrace as friends strange spiritual beings whom we do not know, and all the incomprehensibilities which besiege our souls and which are the disease of the human race disappear before our senses, and our minds become healthy through the contemplation of marvels which are *far more incomprehensible* and exalted.³²

The proto-Nietzschean quality of the metaphorical language impresses itself here.

Other similarities are also to be found. References to notions of the 'superhuman' [*das Übermenschliche*] abound. The manner in which music portrays human feelings *auf eine übermenschliche Art*³³ and the imagery of the isolated, higher genius, complete in his higher inarticulate knowledge, are strikingly Nietzschean:

Wohl dem, der, wann der irdische Boden untreu unter seinen Füßen wankt, mit heitern Sinnen auf lustige Töne sich retten kann, und nachgebend mit ihnen bald sanft sich wiegt, bald mutig dahertanz, und mit solchem lieblichen Spiele seine Leiden vergißt!³⁴

Happy the one who, when the earthly soil shakes unfaithfully under his feet, can rescue himself serenely on airy tones and, yielding to them, now rocks himself gently, now dances away courageously and forgets his sorrows with such pleasing diversion!³⁵

Compare this with Zarathustra's teachings in 'Vom höheren Menschen':

Wie Vieles ist noch möglich! So lernt doch über euch hinweg lachen! Erhebt eure Herzen, ihr guten Tänzer, hoch, höher! Und vergesst mir auch das gute Lachen nicht!³⁶

How much is still possible! So *learn* to laugh beyond yourselves! Lift up your hearts, you fine dancers, high! higher! and do not forget to laugh well!³⁷

³¹ *Phantasien*, 165-6.

³² *Aesthetics*, 11.

³³ *Phantasien*, 168.

³⁴ *Phantasien*, 166.

³⁵ *Aesthetics*, 11.

³⁶ Part IV of *Also Sprach Zarathustra*, in *Nietzsche Werke*, publ. Walter de Gruyter and Co., Berlin 1968, 363.

³⁷ R. J. Hollingdale, (trans.) *Thus Spake Zarathustra*, Penguin 1969, 306.

The proto-Nietzschean tone of the isolated individual, the heavy metaphorical discourse of the anti-rational, are all the more remarkable in that they were conceived at the end of a century terrified by the consequences of an unfettered subjectivism. And yet, despite numerous other striking similarities with Nietzsche³⁸, the fundamental differences are telling. Berglinger's tortures are the result of a kind of problematised subjectivity, a heightened spiritual sensitivity, of an oppression of the over-sensitive individual by the overwhelming tragedy of beauty. Zarathustra, on the other hand, emerges from the turmoil of his trials to attain highest enlightenment, the supreme synthesis of ego and id, a life-affirming gesture which stands the nihilism of the *Frühromantiker* on its head. In Wackenroder, the creative genius is tormented, laden down by the mundane monotony of life whereas the *Übermensch* transcends these mundanities and surmounts the *Gesindel* in heroic isolation.

This fundamental alignment of music and tragedy is clear. Although music evokes 'height' and lofty isolation:

Die Musik aber halte ich für die wunderbarsten dieser Erfindungen, weil sie menschliche Gefühle auf eine übermenschliche Art schildert, weil sie uns alle Bewegungen unsers Gemüts unkörperlich, in goldne Wolken lustiger Harmonien eingekleidet, über unserm Haupte zeigt...³⁹

But I consider music to be the most marvelous of these inventions, because it portrays human feelings in a superhuman way, because it shows us all the emotions of our soul above our heads in incorporeal form, clothed in golden clouds of airy harmonies,⁴⁰

these joys are mere contrivances and we deceive ourselves in such artificial exultation of our own creativity:

Wenn aber die Engel des Himmels auf dieses ganze liebliche Spielwerk herabsehen, das wir die Kunst nennen, - so müssen sie wehmütig lächeln über das Kindergeschlecht auf der Erde, und lächeln über die unschuldige Erzwungenheit in dieser Kunst der Töne, wodurch das sterbliche Wesen sich zu ihnen erheben will.⁴¹

³⁸ Compare, for example, 'Das Nachtwandler-Lied', Part IV of *Zarathustra*, with Wackenroder's 'Morgenländisches Märchen'.

³⁹ *Phantasien*, 168.

⁴⁰ *Aesthetics*, 13.

⁴¹ *Phantasien*, 170.

But when the angels of heaven look down upon this entire delightful playing which we call art, - then they must smile in tender sadness over the race of children on earth and over the innocent artificiality in this art of sounds, through which the mortal creature wants to elevate himself to them.⁴²

Beyond the tragedy of the proto-Nietzschean genius emerges music, a contrived construct, a manufactured metaphor for the fleeting joys of a tormented life. This metaphorical construct, then, relates in a complex way to reality. No longer is there a simple fixity of sign and thing; music consists of a quasi-natural construction *in itself*. Its internal contrived mechanisms are so complex, so *unfathomable*, that they take on a kind of self-life, like the phoenix rising *zu eignem Behagen* from the stillness.

That music is shown here as a *metaphorical* construct is significant. The sad arrogance of genius is mitigated by the closeness music brings man to 'the angels' and it achieves this by metaphor: only through such a pitifully contrived device can man construct for himself a reflection of the external, of non-man. The impossibility of literal reflection and a move towards the emergence of more metaphorical modes of representation begins the process of the recognition of *device* as a bearer of the integrity of the endeavour. The beauty of music is thus to be assessed not according to the manner in which it *represents accurately* but according to the manner in which it 'takes flight', so to speak, on the wings of imagination, a process which will involve the construction of *innumerable* pathways to the external. Each endeavour recasts this problem anew: the tragedy here is profoundly existential since man's most noble labours are *merely contrived*. Since each endeavour requires a new forging of a route from conception to meaning, the generic permissiveness of the nineteenth century emerges as a microcosm of this semiological specialisation. Each genre emerges as a new response to externality and the modes of signification that are recast in it. To this end, the problems of signification are internalised and, more significantly, particularised. In short, the collapse of the 'semantic pathway' from music to meaning so clearly constructed in the Cartesian mimesis aesthetic led to the fragmentation of fixity in favour of an overwhelming semantic pragmatism. The genre itself became

⁴² *Aesthetics*, 14.

bearer of the external or the non-musical and each work seemed more and more to encompass a newly recast pathway to the external in itself.

The 'wonders' of music are perceived as relative to the absolute inconsequentiality of man in the face of an overwhelming cosmos. These innumerable 'wonders' are real only in so far as they are in sharp relief to the mundane - subsistential - pastimes of man. Each recast pathway to the external, then, represents a rejection of a normative mode of signification. We have already seen the separation of the objective realm of subsistence from the noble realm of spiritual striving in the tale of the naked saint. The saint is overwhelmed by the unbearable multiplicity of the noises of the wheel of time, confused by its unfathomable relentless raging and incapable of the normative communicative modes demonstrated by the pilgrims. His isolation from the normative is, in the first instance, tragic and oppressive. Through a new pathway to the other, that offered by the lovers' music, the saint frees himself from the torment of the subsistential and the normative and floats rejoicing into the void.

Internalised in this new pragmatic semiology is the *mathesis* of archetypal plot. Whereas in Gottsched, the third mode of *Nachahmung* represented a dialogue of external archetypes, each marked according to simple reductive characteristics such as manner, *Affekt* and appearance, the new dynamic is so internalised, so removed from the normative externality of mechanistic reduction as to cast out all but the most archetypal forms. In Schelling, we shall see a crystallisation of the new *mathesis* in the notion of *Begrenzung*, the limitation of each internal element of the dynamic according to specific characteristics and yet, leaving room for each element to 'take up' the archetypal structure of the whole, as a kind of microcosm of it.

The deliberate complexity, the organic unity of characteristic autonomy, reminiscent of the second Gottschedian mode of *Nachahmung* and its participation in 'the totality' is the metaphysical expression of the Baumgartean maxim 'unity in diversity, diversity in unity.' Wackenroder's avoidance of such systems has as much to do with his unfamiliarity with philosophical rigour as with his disdain for systematic theory.

The parallels here, however, are significant. Schelling and Wackenroder arrive at strikingly similar conclusions. In Wackenroder's aesthetic, music has the ability to abstract and regroup reality in a fleeting perfection. It is, as we have said, a kind of 'cosmic model'. Thus, by the very nature of its autonomy, its abstraction, music constructs for itself a deep sympathy with the totality of the universe. Meaning is evoked, then, by a cosmic parallelism where music functions as a structural recollection of the cosmos. This structural recollection thereby evokes not only the generalities of the universe in archetypal form, but also represents a kind of *showing* of the particularities of human expression:

Wenn mir ein Bruder gestorben ist, und ich bei solcher Begebenheit des Lebens eine tiefe Traurigkeit gehörig anbringe, weinend im engen Winkel sitze, und alle Sterne frage, wer je betrübter gewesen als ich, - dann, - indes hinter meinem Rücken schon die spottende Zukunft steht, und über den schnell vergänglichen Schmerz des Menschen lacht, - dann steht der Tonmeister vor mir, und wird von all dem jemmervollen Händeringen so bewegt, daß er den schönen Schmerz daheim auf seinen Tönen nachgebärdet, und mit Luft und Liebe die menschliche Betrübniß verschönert und ausschmückt, und so ein Werk hervorbringt, das aller Welt zur tiefsten Rührung gereicht.⁴³

When a brother of mine has died and, at such an event of life, I appropriately display deep sorrow, sit weeping in a narrow corner, and ask all the stars who has ever been more grieved than I, - then, - while the mocking future already stands behind my back and laughs about the quickly fleeting pain of the human being, - then the virtuoso stands before me and becomes so moved by all this woeful wringing of the hands, that he recreates this beautiful pain on his instrument at home and beautifies and adorns the human grief with desire and love. Thus, he produces a work which arouses in all the world the deepest compassion.⁴⁴

The genesis of the Schellingian system is clear here. Music recalls the cosmos in totality, Schelling's *das Absolute*, and such a totality requires all notions of particularity to be subsumed within it to comply with properly complete totality. Thus, the particularisation of Gottsched's *Fabel*, is subsumed into the totalising constructs of post-Cartesian music such that in the *Nachgebärdung* of a single moment of 'beautiful pain' the totality of the cosmos is evoked in harmonious totality. This notion of each element of particularity 'taking up' the whole or representing, in particularised form,

⁴³ *Phantasien*, 169-70.

⁴⁴ *Aesthetics*, 13-14.

the structural complexity of the whole, is an essential element of the Schellingian system where:

...z. B. verschiedene Gestalten jede ein dienendes Glied des Ganzen und doch bei der vollkommenen Ausbildung des Werkes wieder in sich absolut ist.⁴⁵

...for example, each of various elements or forms is a part subservient to the whole and yet from the perspective of the overall construction of the work is absolute in itself.⁴⁶

Where Schelling evokes cosmic totality, Wackenroder evokes, in more poetic terms, a sense of Baumgarten *Verwunderung* at the magnificent comprehension of the inarticulate which is sometimes also evoked as an 'all-encompassing love':

Ich aber, wenn ich längst das angstvolle Händerringen um meinen toten Bruder verlernt habe, und dann einmal das Werk seiner Betrübniß höre, - dann freu' ich mich kindlich über mein eignes, so glorreich verherrlichtes Herz, und nähre und bereichere mein Gemüt an der wunderbaren Schöpfung.⁴⁷

But I, after I have long forgotten the anxious wringing of the hands for my dead brother, and then happen to hear the product of his sorrow, - then I exalt like a child over my own so magnificently glorified heart and nourish and enrich my soul with the wonderful creation.⁴⁸

This sense of the particular as elemental participation in totality is similarly evoked in the next essay, 'Von den verschiedenen Gattungen in jeder Kunst und insbesondere von verschiedenen Arten der Kirchenmusik.'⁴⁹ Wackenroder here evokes a proto-Schellingian notion of *false particularity*, a dividing of the totality of the cosmos that leads to falsehoods:

Es kommt mir allemal seltsam vor, wenn Leute, welche die Kunst zu lieben vorgeben, in der Poesie, der Musik, oder in irgendeiner andern Kunst sich beständig nur an Werke von *einer* Gattung, *einer* Farbe halten, und ihr Auge von allen andern Arten wegwenden....so kann ich doch nicht begreifen, wie eine *wahre* Liebe der Kunst nicht alle ihre Gärten durchwandern, und an allen Quellen sich freuen sollte.⁵⁰

It always seems strange to me when people who profess to love art constantly restrict themselves in literature, in music, or in any other art, to works of one genre, one

⁴⁵ F. W. J. Schelling, *Philosophie*, 11.

⁴⁶ Douglas W. Stott (tran) *The Philosophy of Art*, Minneapolis, 1989, 15.

⁴⁷ *Phantasien*, 170.

⁴⁸ *Aesthetics*, 14.

⁴⁹ *Phantasien*, 171ff.

⁵⁰ *Phantasien*, 171.

coloration, and turn their eyes away from all other types.....I cannot understand why a true love of art should not wander through all its gardens and enjoy all wellsprings.⁵¹

The falsehood of deliberate selectivity, an admiration of the putative supremacy of one element of the cosmos to the detriment of the others in art is a sign of spiritual poverty:

Es wird ja doch niemand mit halber Seele geboren! - Aber freilich - wiewohl ich es kaum über das Herz bringen kann, die allgütige Natur so zu schmähen -, es scheinen viele der heutigen Menschen mit so sparsamen Funken der Liebe begabt zu sein, daß sie dieselbe nur auf Werke von einer Art aufwenden können.⁵²

No one is born with only half a soul! - But, to be sure, - although I scarcely have the heart to defame all-bountiful Nature in this way, - many of today's people seem to be so parsimoniously endowed with sparks of love that they can expend these only upon works of one type.⁵³

The consequences of genre promiscuity, an ever more particularised specialism, are thus explicitly criticised here. The complexity of Wackenroder's vision begins now to emerge. Predating Schelling's *Philosophie der Kunst* by five years,⁵⁴ Wackenroder's *Phantasien* represent a profound contribution to the German Idealist aesthetic. They are aptly named: as small fantasies on the fundamental role of music in the cosmos, as a poetic rather than philosophical account of a new internalised post-Cartesian *mathesis*, they represent a coming together of the essential features of the debate at the end of the eighteenth century. Their complexity lies in the interplay of metaphor and quasi-system, of poetic vision and aesthetic mission.

In the preceding essays, Wackenroder has so far announced the main features of his ontology: the emphasis on the mysterious complexity of the exotic in 'Morgenländisches Märchen'; music as a release from the torments of mundane subsistential existence; music as self-animated; music as resurrection; music as 'cosmic model'; music as utopia. The interplay of these elements in the Wackenroderian realm of metaphor is, perhaps, the most essential aspect of this aesthetic. Music, when

⁵¹ *Aesthetics*, 14.

⁵² *Phantasien*, 171.

⁵³ *Aesthetics*, 14.

⁵⁴ Schelling is reputed to have completed the lecture course later published as *Philosophie* by 1805. See 'Vorwort zum Nachdruck' in the Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft edition, Darmstadt 1959, v.

separated, divided, is a music which subscribes only to one part of the soul. The totality of music, a metaphor of cosmic totality in harmonious unity, is *indivisible*. Its complexity is a fundamental premise of its richness. Only in the innocent embracing of this total complexity can one enrich and nourish [*nähren*] the soul:

Und so, dünkt mich, - denn die Herrlichkeit der Kunst hat mich zu einem kühnen Gleichnisbilde verleitet, - so wollte auch derjenige beschaffen sein, welcher mit aufrichtigem Herzen vor der Kunst niederknien, und ihr die Huldigung einer ewigen und unbegrenzten Liebe darbringen wollte.⁵⁵

And thus it seems to me, - for the glory of art has reduced me into a bold simile; - thus should he also be constituted, who would like to kneel down before art with an upright heart and offer to it the homage of an eternal and boundless love.⁵⁶

The particular in the totality has the following functions, then: first, for music to be total it must evoke the cosmos in its totality; second, this totality must be comprehensive and as such evoke particularity; third, the evocation of particularity must constantly show itself as a microcosm of the totality. According to this organic structure, the various discrete elements of a system of genres each has a significant degree of autonomy in that it shows itself to be a totality in itself and, by analogy, this microcosmic totality thereby reflects or demonstrates the totality of the cosmos, as a model of it.

Thus, Wackenroder evokes three particularities of the *Kirchenmusik* to demonstrate that each discrete pathway to immanent signification can, in itself, evoke totality:

Allein auch diese heilige Muse redet von den Dingen des Himmels nicht beständig auf einerlei Art, sondern hat vielmehr ihre Freude daran, Gott auf ganz verschiedene Weise zu loben, - und ich finde, daß jegliche Art, wenn man deren wahre Bedeutung recht versteht, ein Balsam für das menschliche Herz ist.⁵⁷

But this holy music does not speak of the [three] things of heaven continually in one manner alone, but rather derives her pleasure from praising God in highly varied ways,

⁵⁵ *Phantasien*, 173.

⁵⁶ *Aesthetics*, 15.

⁵⁷ *Phantasien*, 174.

- and I find that each way is a balsam for the human heart, if one understands its true significance correctly.⁵⁸

The first of the three examples given is characterised by a simple, childlike joy in the majesty of God. The metaphor of a child reading a speech to their father on his birthday evokes this notion of an innocent, naïve man straining for the grace of God:

....und lobt Gott nicht anders, als Kinder tun, welche vor ihrem guten Vater an seinem Geburtstage eine Rede oder einen dramatischen Aktus halten, da sich denn jener wohl gefallen läßt, wenn sie ihm ihren Dank mit kindlicher, unbefangener Munterkeit beweisen, und im Danken zugleich eine kleine Probe ihrer Geschicklichkeiten und erlangten Künste ablegen.⁵⁹

...and praises God in the manner of children who deliver a speech or a dramatic presentation before their good father on his birthday, for the latter is very pleased when they demonstrate to him their gratitude with childlike, unconstrained liveliness and, in the course of thinking, simultaneously give a little sample of their skills and acquired arts.⁶⁰

In this sense music represents a broadly reflective or non-mediatory mode of representation. The child holds music up like a mirror to its beloved father. The deft passing from internal musical structures to the broad externality of God the father is simply an expression of a corporatist mode of simple *Nachahmung*: the representation of God in music such that God emerges *as God*. Similarly, Schelling's potency of the naïve⁶¹ is the antiquarian art which holds a mirror to nature such that nature emerges *as nature*.⁶² The positing outwards from such a particularity to the oneness of God is thus motivated by a naïve acceptance of a *generalised* joy as a joy *in God's love*:

Sie kennen keine andre Erhebung der Seele als eine fröhliche und zierliche; sie wissen in ihrer Unschuld für ihn keine andere und bessere Sprache des Lobes und der Verehrung, als die sie gegen einen edlen menschlichen Wohltäter gebrauchen, und sie sind nicht verlegen, von den kleinsten Freuden und Genüssen des Lebens mit leichter Fertigkeit zu dem Gedanken an den Vater des Weltalls überzugehen.⁶³

⁵⁸ *Aesthetics*, 16.

⁵⁹ *Phantasien*, 174-5.

⁶⁰ *Aesthetics*, 16.

⁶¹ Schelling's term is *Potenz*, meaning one side of a higher order: the naïve therefore represents one side of the productive-creative order known as *Poesie*, the other side of which is the sentimental. Note the bipolarity of the system, splitting into ever more detailed pairs of opposites. See later in this chapter for further discussion or chapter 4 for a more detailed discussion.

⁶² See Schelling, *Philosophie*, 111.

⁶³ *Phantasien*, 175.

They know no other elevation of the soul then a gay and graceful one; in their naïveté they know no other and better language for the praise and worship of Him than the one they use toward a noble, mortal benefactor; and they are not embarrassed to pass with light agility from the smallest joys and pleasures of life to the thought of the Father of the universe.⁶⁴

If the first type was fundamentally mimetic in nature, the second type attempts to essentialise God as a broad construct; this mode is fundamentally ontological:

Im freien Taumel des Entzückens glauben sie das Wesen und die Herrlichkeit Gottes bis ins Innerste begriffen zu haben;⁶⁵

In the unconstrained delirium of ecstasy they believe that they have comprehended the being and the magnificence of god to the core;⁶⁶

This mode, then, comes closest to the notions evoked in 'Die Wunder der Tonkunst' of music as a 'cosmic model'. By proceeding to a structural recounting of God in terms of the broad gestural sweeps of supernatural grandeur, music retains a greater degree of its autonomy. As a secular construct of divinity it remains secular and yet evokes the divine through a structural sympathy with God's magnificence:

Sie achten es unwürdig, den Ruhm des Schöpfers auf den kleinen flatternden Schmetterlingsflügeln kindlicher Fröhlichkeit zu tragen, sondern schlagen die Luft mit breiten, mächtigen Adlersschwingen.⁶⁷

They consider it unworthy to carry the glory of the Creator on the small, fluttering butterfly-wings of childlike gaiety, but to beat the air with the wide, powerful pinions of eagles.⁶⁸

The grandeur of this gesture suggests a very particular relationship with Schiller's notion of the sublime [*das Erhabene*]. In *Ueber das Erhabene*⁶⁹ Schiller posited the following elements as essential to the current notions of the sublime: first, man stands overawed by the colossal *Unbegreiflichkeit* of the natural realm; second, unable to grasp this colossal objectivity, he posits a false order or abstract framework, a spirituality or mysticism, such that the incomprehensible is mutated into a kind of

⁶⁴ *Aesthetics*, 17.

⁶⁵ *Phantasien*, 176.

⁶⁶ *Aesthetics*, 17.

⁶⁷ *Phantasien*, 175-6.

⁶⁸ *Aesthetics*, 17.

⁶⁹ Taschenausgabe, Bd.12, 1847.

metaphorical divinity; third, the final subsumption of the incomprehensible results in a notion of 'the incomprehensible itself as a principle of judgement.'⁷⁰ Wackenroder's second mode of divine particularity, then, deliberately overcomes its frailty in the face of the sublime and reinvents the divine in music itself:

Die Musik ist jenen Geistern ähnlich, welche von dem allmächtigen Gedanken an Gott so ganz über alle Maße erfüllt sind, daß sie die Schwäche des sterblichen Geschlechtes darüber ganz vergessen, und dreist genug sind, mit lauter, stolzer Trompetenstimme die Größe des Höchsten der Erde zu verkündigen.⁷¹

This music resembles those minds which are so filled beyond all measure with the almighty thought of God that they thereby totally forget the frailty of the human race and are audacious enough to announce to the earth in a loud, proud, trumpetlike voice the greatness of the Highest One.⁷²

This ontological gesture, then, is an arrogant and harsh one. The bravura of these *ausgewählten Geistern* whilst cruel in its brilliance is also capable of bringing less fortunate souls to the exalted comprehension of God's grandeur:

Die Musik schreitet in starken, langsamen, stolzen Tönen einher, und versetzt dadurch unsre Seele in die erweiterte Spannung, welche von erhabenen Gedenken in uns erzeugt wird, und solche wieder erzeugt.⁷³

This music moves along in powerful, slow, proud strains and thereby transports our souls to that intensified state of excitement which is generated by exalted thoughts within us and generates such thoughts in return.⁷⁴

Thus, our relationship to this music is as one to the sublime, where the incomprehensibility of the grand gesture is sublimated to a point where it emerges transformed as an image of the divine.

Wackenroder's third mode of divine particularity stands in vehement opposition to such creative arrogance as shown in the second and repositions the creative genius as one who *receives* sublimity rather than as one who creates it:

⁷⁰ 'Das Unbegreifliche selbst zum Standpunkt der Beurtheilung', *ibid* 292.

⁷¹ *Phantasien*, 176.

⁷² *Aesthetics*, 17.

⁷³ *Phantasien*, 176.

⁷⁴ *Aesthetics*, 17.

Aber es gibt noch einige stille, demütige, allzeit büßende Seelen, denen es unheilig scheint, zu Gott in der Melodie irdischer Fröhlichkeit zu reden, *denen es frech und verwegen vorkommt, seine ganze Erhabenheit kühn in ihr menschliches Wesen aufzunehmen.*⁷⁵

But there are also some quiet humble constantly penitent souls to whom it seems a sacrilege to address God in the melody of earthly gaiety, *to whom it seems rash and presumptuous to absorb His entire sublimity boldly into their mortal beings.*⁷⁶

The humility of this music before the sublimity of God is an attitude deeply embedded in Berglinger himself. It is this mode of particularity with which he feels most sympathy and, indeed, the intensification of the metaphorical language here underlines the potency of the third type:

Diese liegen mit stets gefalteten Händen und gesenktem Blick betend auf den Knien, und loben Gott bloß dadurch, daß sie mit der beständigen Vorstellung ihrer Schwäche und Entfernung von ihm, und mit der wehmütigen Sehnsucht nach den Gütern der reinen Engel ihren Geist erfüllen and nähren. - Diesen gehört jene alte, choralmäßige Kirchenmusik an, die wie ein ewiges "Miserere mei Domine" klingt, und deren langsame, tiefe Töne gleich sündenbeladene Pilgrimen in tiefen Tälern dahinschleichen.⁷⁷

These people remain on their knees continuously, with hands folded and eyes lowered, and praise God merely in that they fill and nourish their minds with the constant idea of their frailty and distance from Him and with melancholy longing for the music which sounds like an eternal "Miserere mei Domine" the slow, deep chords of which creep along in deep valleys like pilgrims laden with sin.⁷⁸

Each of these three modes of divine particularity, then, represents the cosmos in microcosm. The first, a naïve mimetic representation pleases God in its simplicity; the second, the exultant edification of the sublime, praises God in his magnificence and represents the grandeur of his divinity in a similarly grand, ontological, music; the third, the humble piety of the quiet soul raises no mirror to God, makes no strains to proclaim God to the world but tells of man's sins and thereby evokes God as a separate, higher sublime being beyond man's comprehension. In terms of a broad ontology of music, however, each of these elements, the non-mediatory, the expansive/archetypal and the humbly demonstrative are subsumed in a higher order by

⁷⁵ *Phantasien*, 176. Emphasis added.

⁷⁶ *Aesthetics*, 17.

⁷⁷ *Phantasien*, 176-7.

⁷⁸ *Aesthetics*, 17-18.

virtue of music's semantic ambivalence. This ambivalence, born out of musical complexity, its mysteries of significance, pose a profound challenge to explicit mimesis. Hence, in 'Das eigentümliche innere Wesen der Tonkunst und die Seelenlehre der heutigen Instrumentalmusik', the mimetic consequences of the first divine particularity are deliberately internalised. Almost in the manner of a Foucauldian discourse, Wackenroder heaps metaphor upon metaphor to affect and comprehensive semantic multiplicity thereby internalising the external into the fabric of music itself. As we have already seen, Foucault articulates the epistemological schism as just such a movement:

To classify...will mean... to relate the visible to the invisible, to its deeper cause, as it were, then to rise upwards once more from that hidden architecture towards the obvious signs displayed on the surfaces of bodies.⁷⁹

Such an internal mode of signification is posited by Wackenroder in several ways. First, music acts as a kind of 'receptacle' that carries within itself some external quality. And yet, conversely, this externality is, in itself, subsumed into the very ontological core of music. Hence, an image of meaning as immanent in music emerges:

Die sinnliche Kraft, welche der Ton von seinem Ursprunge her in sich führt, hat sich durch dieses gelehnte System eine verfeinerte Mannigfaltigkeit erworben. Das Dunkle und Unbeschreibliche aber, welches in der Wirkung des Tons verborgen liegt, und welches bei keiner andern Kunst zu finden ist, hat durch das System eine wunderbare Bedeutsamkeit gewonnen.⁸⁰

The sensual power which the tone has carried within itself from its origin has, through this learned system, acquired a refined diversity. The dark and indescribable element, however, which lies hidden in the effect of the tone and which is to be found in no other art, has gained a wonderful significance through the system.⁸¹

The 'system' to which Wackenroder refers here is based on certain notions of music as beholden to 'proportion' and 'number' which were brought from *Orakelhöhlen* by certain *weise Männer*:

Aus diesen geheimnisreichen Grüften brachten sie die neue Lehre, in tiefsinnigen Zahlen geschrieben, ans Tagelicht, und setzten hiernach eine feste,

⁷⁹ Michel Foucault, *The Order of Things*, 239.

⁸⁰ *Phantasien*, 183.

⁸¹ *Aesthetics*, 21.

weisheitsvolle Ordnung von vielfachen einzelnen Tönen zusammen, welche die reiche Quelle ist, aus der die Meister die mannigfaltigsten Tonarten schöpfen.⁸²

Out of these secret vaults they brought to light of day the new theory, written in profound numbers. In accordance with this, they constructed a fixed, knowledgeable order of multitudinous individual notes, which is the plentiful fountainhead from which the masters draw the most varies tonal combinations.⁸³

This metaphor is difficult to decode. If we read this as proto-Schellingian, the notion of 'number' seems significant. As we shall see, the parallels Schelling draws between music and consciousness of self are based around his readings of Pythagoras' notions of soul as 'number':

Die Musik ist ein reales Selbstzählen der Seele - schon Pythagoras hat die Seele einer Zahl verglichen...⁸⁴

Soul recounts itself, therefore, in a linear accumulation of unitary pulses, divided by the hierarchies of *Takt*, *Periode*, and *Teil*.⁸⁵ Rhythm in Schelling's conception, is a positing of multiplicity in the unitary. This ability of rhythm to diversify itself within a unitary construct is a form of internal signification. Wackenroder's notion of numbers might thus be likened to the Pythagorean-Leibnizian notion of music as *an accumulative numbering of the soul*.⁸⁶

Also, this 'rhythmic' notion of number as linear accumulation can be contrasted with notions of musical pitch as proportion. Certainly, if these *weise Männer* are likened to Sauveur or Mersenne, then the harmonic series, based again on Pythagorean divisions of the octave, might represent 'the system.' And yet, the ambivalence of Wackenroder's style to notions of system might imbue this rather patriarchal notion of music's emergence from the 'darkness' of pre-rational cultures with some irony. Certainly Wackenroder's later critiques of systematisers of musical theory would seem to make this final reading the most appropriate:

⁸² *Phantasien*, 183.

⁸³ *Aesthetics*, 21. The translation of *Quelle* as 'fountainhead' is too figurative. 'Source' is preferable.

⁸⁴ Schelling, *Philosophie der Kunst*, 135. Full reference and translation given in next chapter.

⁸⁵ Literally, 'bar, period and section.' See *Philosophie*, 137, 138 and 139 respectively.

⁸⁶ Gottfried Wilhelm von Leibnitz, *Epistolae ad diversos* (1712) in *Philosophische Werke II*, ed. Cassirer, Leipzig 1906.

Durch diese gelehrten Männer ist das innere Maschinenwerk der Musik, gleich einem künstlichen Weberstuhle für gewirkte Zeuge, zu einer erstaunenswürdigen Vollkommenheit gebracht worden; ihre einzelnen Kunststücke aber sind oftmals nicht anders als in der Malerei vortreffliche anatomische Studien und schwere akademischen Stellungen zu betrachten.⁸⁷

The inner machinery of music, like an ingenious weaver's loom for woven cloth, has been developed to a level of perfection worthy of astonishment by these learned men; their individual works of art, however, are often to be regarded no differently from excellent anatomical studies and difficult academic postures in the art of painting.⁸⁸

The tone of the prose would certainly seem to indicate a profound disdain for the pedagogy of some eighteenth-century composition. And yet this disdain is not a disdain for the system in itself. Wackenroder takes great pains to acknowledge the place of such a system at the heart of music's ontology:

Es hat sich zwischen den einzelnen mathematischen Tonverhältnissen und den einzelnen Fibern des menschlichen Herzens eine unerklärliche Sympathie offenbart, wodurch die Tonkunst ein reichhaltiges und bildsames Maschinenwerk zur Abschilderung menschlicher Empfindungen geworden ist.⁸⁹

Between the individual, mathematical, tonal relationships and the individual fibres of the human heart an inexplicable sympathy has revealed itself through which the musical art has become a comprehensive and flexible mechanism for the portrayal of human emotions.⁹⁰

Therefore, the ontological consequences of a music as, first and foremost, *a system*, are attenuated by earlier notions propounded in 'Die Wunder der Tonkunst' of music as a kind of 'cosmic model'. Just as Schelling posits the various types of art as particularities each of which evokes the totality by its structural sympathy with it, so Wackenroder explains music's inner nature, *das innere Wesen der Tonkunst*, and its powers to move the heart, to 'express' the complexity of the soul, by nature of its structural sympathy with the soul.

Taking these arguments back, for a moment, to the divine particularities, we can see that both 'the soul' and 'God' can be read as pre-Schellingian absolutes. If man is made in God's image, then the soul of man relates to God by virtue of its imagery of

⁸⁷ *Phantasien*, 184.

⁸⁸ *Aesthetics*, 23.

⁸⁹ *Phantasien*, 183.

⁹⁰ *Aesthetics*, 21.

the divine: 'image' in the Wackenroderian sense, then, refers not to some kind of covert mimesis, but to a notion of *structural sympathy* or a recounting of the larger form, God, in the smaller, the soul. Similarly, music 'depicts' by this same process and because of the structural sympathy of 'soul' and 'God', music attains a depiction of God and soul by the same structural means. Hence, the notion of music as 'cosmic model' accounts for all three divine particularities: the first, beholden to a simple mimetic response, is internalised; the second, the ontological expression of divinity, is an elemental *structural sympathy*; the third, the structural presentation of man's soul in its relationship to God, therefore evokes God through comparison with man's, the soul's, weakness and proposes the organic unity of music-soul-God as hierarchical particularities of the third category, the absolute.

The ontological cogency of this argument, however, is beholden to a basic internal division. Music has one essence and yet consists in two apparently distinct functions:

So hat sich das eigentümliche Wesen der heutigen Musik...gebildet. Keine andre vermag diese Eigenschaften der Tiefsinnigkeit, der sinnlichen Kraft der dunkeln, phantastischen Bedeutsamkeit auf eine so rätselhafte Weise zu verschmelzen.⁹¹

Thus has the characteristic inner nature of today's music developed...No other is capable of fusing these qualities of profundity, of sensual power, and of dark, visionary significance in such an enigmatical way.⁹²

This division, however, does not evoke an ontological schism. The very distinction between the sensual and the semantic is already confused by the pairing with these two categories [*sinnliche Kraft* and *Bedeutsamkeit*] of the terms *Tiefsinnigkeit* and *dunkeln, phantastischen* respectively. Sensuality is not *mere* sensuality, but a sensuality imbued with deep profundity and music's significance is not *mere* significance but one imbued with dark mystery. Hence these extra terms, functioning as predicates, impart elements of the opposite core term to its own substantive.

⁹¹ *Phantasien*, 183.

⁹² *Aesthetics*, 21.

Nonetheless, the division remains. To understand the division, one needs to sustain the ontological unity of music and to see the two categories *sensuality* and *meaning* as proto-Schellingian *Potenzen*. The 'potences' in Schelling's system of philosophy are opposite terms each of which represents one side of a two-sided single totality, which, in turn, is one of two sides of a higher single entity and so on forever upwards towards the final unity, the absolute. If the potences emerge in Schelling as a result of certain modes of determination [*Bestimmungsarten*] or manners of signifying the given totality, then the absolute is the final unity of vision, belief and unanimity of thought. To liken Wackenroder's God with the Schellingian absolute is to recognise organicism in the *Phantasien*. Hence the apparent divisions represented in *sinnliche Kraft - Bedeutsamkeit* are forms of proto-Schellingian modes of *Bestimmung*.

As if to underline the ontological unity of music and the purely intellectual role of the apparent division of meaning and sensuality, Wackenroder makes the following point directly after his recognition of this apparent division:

Diese merkwürdige, enge Vereinigung so widerstrebend-scheinende Eigenschaften macht den ganzen Stolz ihrer [music's] Vorzüglichkeit aus; wiewohl eben dieselbe auch viele seltsame Verwirrungen in der Ausübung und im Genusse dieser Kunst, und viel törichten Streit unter Gemüthern, welche sich niemals verstehen können, hervorgebracht hat.⁹³

This remarkable close fusion of such apparently contradictory qualities constitutes the whole pride of its superiority; although precisely this same thing has produced many strange confusions in the exercise and in the enjoyment of this art and many a foolish argument between mentalities which can never understand each other.⁹⁴

There is, however a fundamental difference between Schelling's potences and Wackenroder's division. Whereas Schelling evokes the potences in order to systematise difference in a broad ontological schema, Wackenroder deliberately bypasses such involved schematisation in favour of emotive metaphor and a deliberate evocation of anti-rational non-system: 'Keine andre [Kunst] vermag die Eigenschaften...auf eine so räthelhafte weise zu verschmelzen.'⁹⁵ Rather than attempting to demonstrate the unity

⁹³ *Phantasien*, 183-4.

⁹⁴ *Aesthetics*, 21.

⁹⁵ *Phantasien*, 183.

of the sensual and meaning, to devise a third point of completion, Wackenroder deliberately sustains the division with ever greater vehemence:

Eine ewige feindselige Kluft ist zwischen dem fühlenden Herzen und den Untersuchungen des Forschens befestigt, und jenes ist ein selbständiges verschlossenes göttliches Wesen, das von der Vernunft nicht aufgeschlossen und gelöst werden kann.⁹⁶

An eternally hostile chasm is entrenched between the feeling heart and the investigations of research, and the former is an independent, tightly sealed, divine entity, which cannot be unlocked and opened up by reason.⁹⁷

The unitary gesture in *das rätselhafte Verschmelzen* is thus a deliberately anti-intellectual gesture. There is no systematic clear perceptible unification but a dark and mysterious one. Music unifies, therefore, when 'meaning' and 'sensuality' imperceptibly merge, when the intellectual, literal meanings of the intellectual/scientific discourses are 'cast out.' Explicit critiques of the 'rational' approach to music abound:

Was wollen sie, die zaghaften und zweifelnden Vernünftler, die jedes der hundert und hundert Tonstücke in Worten erklärt verlangen, und sich nicht darin finden können, daß nicht jedes eine nennbare Bedeutung hat wie ein Gemälde?⁹⁸

What do they want, the faint-hearted and doubting reasoners, who require each of the hundreds and hundreds of musical pieces explained in words, and who cannot understand that not every piece has an expressible meaning like a painting?⁹⁹

So, whereas music magically unifies the semantic and the sensual in itself as an immanent and closed ontology, the descriptive sciences want clarity and conspicuity.

The critique here of a Gottschedian fixity is implicit:

Streben sie [die Vernünftler] die reichere Sprache nach der ärmeren abzumessen, und in Worte aufzulösen, was Worte verachtet? Oder haben sie nie ohne Worte empfunden? Haben sie ihr hohles Herz nur mit Beschreibungen von Gefühlen ausgefüllt? Haben sie niemals im Inneren wahrgenommen das stumme Singen, den verummten Tanz der unsichtbaren Geister?¹⁰⁰

⁹⁶ *Phantasien*, 186.

⁹⁷ *Aesthetics*, 23.

⁹⁸ *Phantasien*, 187-8.

⁹⁹ *Aesthetics*, 24

¹⁰⁰ *Phantasien*, 188.

Are they trying to measure the richer language with the poorer and to resolve into words that which disdains words? Or have they never felt without words? Have they filled up their hollow hearts merely with descriptions of feelings? Have they never perceived within themselves the mute singing, the masked dance of invisible spirits?¹⁰¹

That music confounds these *Vernünftler* is a fundamental element of its magnificence, a magnificence born ostensibly out of semantic obscurity. The enigmatic unity of the semantic and the sensual demonstrates a particular mode of ontological operation not wholly synonymous with the Schellingian method. As we have seen in 'Die Wunder der Tonkunst' Wackenroder's ontology is a deliberate forgetting of literal meaning. All his notions of meaning are so ingrained into the ontological fibres of music as to lose all sense of their 'communication' of 'signification.' The *Bedeutsamkeit* of Wackenroder's *Seelenlehre*, therefore, is a significance that is bound in on itself and closed from the external in all but the most general, structurally sympathetic manners.

The obscurantism of this non-system, riddled with metaphorical confusion and semantic ambivalence, is the central feature of the ontology. From the release of the saint, the self-animation of the *Klang*, the resurrection of dead stillness, through the cosmic model, the organic wholeness of the souls and God to the enigmatic fusion of meaning and the sensual, music's 'otherness,' its *Unbegreiflichkeit* is what the *Frühromantiker* were most intrigued by.

A discourse which attempts to quantify, penetrate, order and categorise the essential, concrete meanings of music, therefore, violates the very *autonomy* on which music's essence is constructed. As we have seen, then, the language of music criticism must slip carefully from metaphor to rapture, from clarity to allegorical *Märchen* without evoking stable unified elements of musical significance. This is the *Seelenlehre* with which Wackenroder attempts to oust the old *Affektenlehre*. From *Les passions de l'âme* to *Phantasien über die Kunst*, from conspicuous clarity to the dark ontology of the soul, this is the fundamental shift represented in Wackenroder from the Cartesian to the Romantic *Weltanschauung*.

¹⁰¹ *Aesthetics*, 24.

Chapter Four

F. W. J. Schelling: Music as Potence

Schelling's contribution to the emergence of an ontological discourse on music is significant. His *Philosophie der Kunst* consists of a metaphysical argument which leads from the establishment of a set of fundamentals through the various forms of art to an eventual amalgamation of these specifics into the general system of the arts. First published in 1859 by Schelling's son Karl F. A. Schelling, the work is constructed from several sets of lectures given by Schelling in Jena and Würzburg, at the respective universities in 1802, 1802/3 and 1804/5. The latter set was given at Würzburg and constitutes a reworking and expansion of the earlier lectures given in 1802/3 at Jena. K. F. A. Schelling's edition takes from all three sets and remains now the standard. Most modern editions, however, also attempt to incorporate the *Ergänzungen* into the main text, as do most modern English translations because the 1859 edition placed those extracts duplicated elsewhere in the *Sämtliche Werke* in appendices. These *Ergänzungen* include the following: *Ergänzung 1* - from the *Vorlesungen über die Methode des akademischen Studiums* given in 1803, the '14. Vorlesung: Über Wissenschaft der Kunst, in Bezug auf das akademische Studium'¹; *Ergänzung 2* - from the 'Achte Vorlesung: Über die historische Konstruktion des Christentums'² from the same set of lectures; extracts from the *Kritischer Journal der Philosophie* including the treatise [*Abhandlung*] on the relationship between the philosophy of nature and transcendental (general) philosophy - 'Abhandlung über das Verhältnis der Naturphilosophie zur Philosophie überhaupt.'³ Other *Ergänzungen* are not so useful

¹ Included in volume V of the *Sämtliche Werke*, Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, Darmstadt, 1980, 344-352.

² Included in volume V of the *Sämtliche Werke*, 287ff.

³ Included in volume V of the *Sämtliche Werke*, 121ff.

for our purpose here.⁴ Of the modern translations available, Douglas W. Stott's translation seems to be reliable.

The *Philosophie der Kunst* is a consistent attempt to break the deadlock of Kant's noumenon/phenomenon separation and Fichte's all-encompassing ego. As we have said, the Idealists after Kant sought to define the absolute limits of reason without confining it to its own impotent vacuum where, as in Kant, it can know nothing other than itself. In Schelling, his urge to unleash reason, to set it free into the world of matter, magnetism and objectivity, involved a yearning for a third, higher order than either the subjective or objective worlds. The same yearning, as we shall see, had fundamentally different consequences for Hegel. For the moment, however, we confine ourselves to Schelling's solution. This third order Schelling defined as 'the absolute'.

The unfolding of philosophy is the unfolding of this absolute into its varied forms - its particularities [*Besonderheiten*] and generalities [*Allgemeinheiten*], its unities and divisions, its universals and its specifics. The philosophy of art, then, is an undertaking which seeks to find art's place in this absolute; how does this 'higher term' manifest itself in art? How is it possible for the absolute to have various forms? Before proceeding to Schelling's solution to this question, it will be necessary to discover exactly *what* this absolute really is.

The absolute exists for Schelling as a fundamental necessity of philosophy. It is the one overriding entity in which all things and all ideas dwell. So far, Schelling seems to posit the absolute as a kind of encyclopaedic amalgam that contains all things regardless of compatibility with that whole. This potential reading of 'the absolute' is made impossible very early in *Philosophie der Kunst*:

Es ist wahrhaft und an sich nur Ein Wesen, Ein absolutes Reales, und dieses Wesen als absolutes ist untheilbar so daß es nicht durch Theilung oder Trennung in verschiedene Wesen übergehen kann.⁵

⁴ These include an extract from the *Kritischer Journal der Philosophie*, 'Ueber Dante in philosophischer Beziehung,' and 'Ueber das Verhältniß der Naturphilosophie zur Philosophie überhaupt,' available in the *Sämliche Werke*, volume V, 152-163 and 106-108 respectively.

⁵ *Philosophie der Kunst*, henceforward, *Philosophie*, 10. Notice the emphatic use of capitals for *Ein*.

There is truly and essentially only *one* essence, *one* absolute reality, and this essence, as absolute, is indivisible such that it cannot change over into other essences by means of division or separation.⁶

There is, then, only one essence, one absolute reality and this absolute is totally one, completely indivisible. This unity is fundamentally at odds with that of the cameralists for whom a unity is a stable state equalling merely the totality of its many parts, and consisting in their sum, a mere amalgam of the objective realm. To even think of 'parts' of the absolute, to attempt to split or divide it is an attempt to alter it fundamentally, to make it what it is not. Schelling continues, however:

...da es untheilbar ist, so ist Verschiedenheit der Dinge überhaupt nur möglich, insofern es als das Ganze und Ungetheilte unter verschiedenen Bestimmungen gesetzt wird.⁷

Since it is indivisible, diversity among things is only possible to the extent that it is posited under various determinations as the indivisible whole.⁸

Apparent disunity, or diversity of things, then, comes about as a result of the perspective in which the things are posited, from the approach brought to bear on 'the absolute.' The very notion of separateness is only possible *because* the whole and the undivided appear in a manifestation that is *brought about* by a certain mode of determination [*Bestimmung*]. These modes are termed by Schelling the 'potences':⁹ '...diese Bestimmungen nenne ich Potenzen'.¹⁰ The real difference between the cameralist and Schellingian unities comes, however, in the manner in which these potences relate to the Absolute. The Absolute is all-encompassing, total, completely unified. Yet, to be the *total* unity, surely it must contain, somehow subsumed within itself, the notion of difference, of disunity, of separateness. And, indeed, this is what Schelling says:

⁶ Translation by Douglas W. Stott, *The Philosophy of Art*, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1989. Henceforward, *Philosophy*. Translation modified.

⁷ *Philosophie*, 10.

⁸ *Philosophy*, 14. Translation modified.

⁹ Schueller translates Schelling's *Potenzen* as 'potencies' in his paper 'Schelling's theory of the metaphysics of music.' in *The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism*, vol. XV no. 4, June 1957, but I prefer the more abstract 'potence' which Stott opts for in his translation: *Philosophy of Art*, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1989.

¹⁰ *Philosophie*, 10.

Sie [die Potenzen] verändern schlechthin nichts am Wesen, dieses bleibt immer und nothwendig dasselbe...¹¹

They change absolutely nothing in the one essence. It always and necessarily remains the same;¹²

So, to be whole, the Absolute must contain within itself the notion of incompleteness, for without it, it would not be complete. This 'incompleteness' within completeness is what causes the Absolute to manifest itself in the potences. These potences, moreover, are thereby present in *each other* as the Absolute is indivisible. But, how can these potences be present in each other? Is this some form of dialectical reasoning?

Certainly, Schueller seems to think that the dialectic is at the root of Schelling's notion of art:

But art has a real side and an ideal side; it is a dialectical movement toward the synthesis of both.¹³

Certainly, art, as we shall see, has both sides of the Absolute, the real and the ideal, but Schueller is wrong to use the term 'dialectic' so indiscriminately here. Simply because there are two terms which *seem* to be yearning for a third, this does not mean that process in the form of dialectic is at work here. In particular, the dialectic always aims for a third term which is immanent in the two opposites whereas in Schelling, the one third term is the absolute. In Hegel, for example, immanence results in a critical subsumption of previous syntheses in favour of an ascendant one. There is no such linearity in Schelling's system. Art already contains both potences, the real and the ideal, and encompasses them as an Absolute in itself. In other words, art represents a kind of cosmic model, similar to that posited by Wackenroder. Process is merely the changing from one potency to another, the changing from one mode of determination or perception to another. It is thus, to a certain extent, *outside* of art - it is *historical* and not *essential*. Schelling's approach to history, that driving force of the Hegelian dialectic is fundamentally different from Hegel's. For Schelling, the *Weltgeist* is always

¹¹ *Philosophie*, 10.

¹² *Philosophy*, 14. Translation modified.

¹³ 'Schelling's theory of the metaphysics of music.' in *The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism*, volume XV no. 4, June 1957, 467.

present, always in and around everything, it never changes; only through the false consciousness of history, the socio-cultural baggage of a non-essential discourse, can the *Weltgeist* be seen to alter or change itself at all. Such changes, *historical* changes, are imposed on the Absolute by the naïve empiricism of lesser minds. The following passage from early in *Philosophie* demonstrates clearly this disdain for historical thought:

In den Zeitaltern der blühenden Kunst ist es die Nothwendigkeit des allgemein herrschenden Geistes, das Glück und gleichsam der Frühling der Zeit, der unter den großen Meistern mehr oder weniger die allgemeine Uebereinstimmung hervorbringt, so daß, wie dieß auch die Geschichte der Kunst zeigt, die großen Werke gedrängt aufeinander, fast zu gleicher Zeit, wie von einem gemeinschaftlichen Hauch und unter einer gemeinsamen Sonne, entstehen und reifen.... Wenn ein solches Zeitalter des Glücks und der reinen Produktion vorbei ist, so tritt die Reflexion und mit ihr die allgemeine Entzweiung ein; was dort lebendiger Geist war, wird hier Ueberlieferung.¹⁴

In periods in which art flourishes, the necessity of the generally dominant spirit of the time, fortunate circumstances, and what one might call the springtime of the age generate more or less a common, fundamental agreement among the great masters. As the history of art shows, this causes the great works of art to arise and mature virtually on one another's heels, almost simultaneously, as if animated by a common breath of life beneath a common sun...When such a fortunate age of pure production has passed, reflection enters, and with it an element of estrangement. What was earlier living spirit is now tradition.¹⁵

If everything simply *is*, if all the disparities and varieties of reality are to be explained away as merely false apparitions of naïve minds or as automatically parts of the whole, how can Schelling be said to escape charges of encyclopaedism? What makes life dynamic if the essential whole never changes? This apparent lack of dynamism is addressed in Schelling's notion of *organic unity*. If Schelling's potences are one and the same, viewed from different sides, what, then, motivates this division, what causes the diversity of modes of determination? This motivation Schelling calls 'difference' [*Differenz*], the motivation to divide, and is therefore the opposite of 'indifference' [*Indifferenz*], the opposing motivation to unify.¹⁶

¹⁴ *Philosophie*, 4.

¹⁵ *Philosophy*, 10. Translation modified.

¹⁶ The term 'motivation' is probably misleading. These potences can also refer to states of variety or unity.

A further set of potences that Schelling refers to is the antithesis of *the real and the ideal series*. The term *series* [*die Reihe*] suggests an order that incorporates lower differences and constructs a system of absolute difference, the confrontation of the *real* and the *ideal*. The apparent simplicity of these terms is deceptive; they are not merely synonyms for object and subject, or nature and mind. They refer, rather, to a further mode of determination, the highest mode, that of *intuiting* [*das Anschauen*]. The real series constitutes, therefore, the *intuiting* of the infinite into the finite and the ideal is the intuiting of the finite into the infinite. They both represent process, in the manner of the potency-shifts we have already discussed, but here, process is aligned to a stable potency rather than a shift from one to another. This is the final completion of the absolute, the 'taking up' [*das Aufnehmen*] of process, that 'externality' of history, into the absolute itself. Without such externality, how could the absolute be whole? In this sense, then, how can difference/indifference be a different potency pair to real/ideal? On the level of the absolute, they are, of course, identical although Schelling seems to utilise 'difference/indifference' for the highest, most general structures, and the second two for *particulars* or more detailed analyses.

This represents a fundamental schism with the encyclopaedism of the rationalist/empirical paradigm. If a unity can contain within itself both difference and indifference, dynamism and stability, then that unity is surely an organic one, driven by Foucault's 'secret but sovereign'¹⁷ internality:

§17. In der idealen Welt verhält sich die Philosophie ebenso zur Kunst, wie in der realen die Vernunft zum Organismus...

§18. Das organische Werk der Natur stellt dieselbe Indifferenz noch ungetrennt dar, welche das Kunstwerk nach der Trennung, aber wieder als Indifferenz darstellt.¹⁸

§17. In the ideal world, philosophy is related to art just as in the real world reason is related to the organism.

§18. The organic work of nature represents the same indifference in an unseparated state that the work of art represents after separation yet as indifference.¹⁹

¹⁷ Foucault, *The Order of Things*, 1970. 237-8

¹⁸ *Philosophie*, 27-8.

¹⁹ *Philosophy*, 30.

and also, from the *Einleitung*:

Dieß ist eben jene Verbindung des Besonderen und Allgemeinen, die wir in jedem organischen Wesen, so wie in jedem poetischen Werk, wiederfinden, in welchem z. B. verschiedene Gestalten jede ein dienendes Glied des Ganzen und doch bei der vollkommenen Ausbildung des Werks wieder in sich absolut ist.²⁰

This is precisely that union of the particular and the universal we find in every organic being as well as in every poetic work. In the latter, for example, each of the various elements or forms is a part subservient to the whole and yet from the perspective of the consummate construction of the work is absolute in itself.²¹

In this organic work of nature, then, there exists a pulsating vibrancy, born out of the difference of its internality, its subsumption of opposites into a set of hierarchical potences, each level referring absolutely to the next, each part unified in its own autonomy, equal, yet different as in Goethe's *Urpflanze*²² where an archetypical plant is conjured up by Goethe to represent organic structure such that each part of the plant is also a miniature representation of the whole.

Not only does Schelling's system represent a stylistic change from the language of rationalism/empiricism, but also a fundamental shift in content, and, more significantly, a wholly new approach to *form*, an elemental distillation of the paradigm after Kant, secreted into the heart of systematic thought. Indeed, very early in *Philosophie*, in his *Einleitung*, Schelling separates himself from the Kantian paradigm:

Sollte zuvörderst der Philosoph, dessen intellektuelle Anschauung allein auf die, sinnlichen Augen verborgene und unerreichbare, nur dem Geiste zugängliche Wahrheit gerichtet seyn soll, sich mit der Wissenschaft der Kunst befassen, welche nur die Hervorbringung der schönen Scheins zur Absicht hat, und entweder bloß die täuschenden Nachbilder von jener zeigt, oder ganz sinnlich ist, wie sie der größte Theil der Menschen begreift, der sie als Sinninreiz, als Erholung, Abspannung des durch ernstere Geschäfte ermüdeten Geistes ansieht, als angenehme Erregung, die vor jeder andern nur das voraus hat, daß sie durch ein zarteres Medium geschieht, wodurch sie aber für das Urtheil des Philosophischen, außerdem daß er sie als eine Wirkung des sinnlichen Triebes betrachten muß, nur das noch verwerfliche Gepräge der Verderbniß und der Civilisation erhalten kann. Nach dieser Vorstellung derselben könnte Philosophie sich von der schlaffen Sinnlichkeit, welche die Kunst sich wegen

²⁰ *Philosophie*, 11.

²¹ *Philosophy*, 15. Translation modified.

²² See Erich Heller, *The Disinherited Mind*, 1971.

dieser Beziehung gefallen läßt, nur durch absolute Verdammung derselben unterscheiden.²³

In the first place, should the philosopher, whose intellectual intuition should be directed only toward that particular truth that is concealed to sensual eyes, unattainable and accessible only to the spirit itself - should that philosopher concern himself with the science of art? For the latter intends only the production of beautiful appearances, and either shows merely the deceiving, reflecting images of the same or is totally sensual. This is how the majority of people understand art, viewing it as sensual stimulation, as recreation, as relaxation for a spirit fatigued by more serious matters and as a pleasant stimulant, one with the advantage of occurring through a more delicate medium. For the judgment of the philosopher, however, who in addition must review it as an effect of sensual impulse or desire, it thereby acquires the even more objectionable imprint of corruption and civilization. According to this view, only through absolute condemnation might philosophy distinguish itself from the flaccid sensuality art tolerates in this respect.²⁴

This common-place approach to art, the classic Cartesian disdain of the sensual, is immediately refuted:

Ich rede von einer heiligeren Kunst, derjenigen, welche, nach den Ausdrücken der Alten, ein Werkzeug der Götter, eine Verkündigerin göttlicher Geheimnisse, die Enthüllerin der Ideen ist, von der ungeborenen Schönheit, deren unentzweihter Strahl nur reine Seelen inwohnend erleuchtet, und deren Gestalt dem sinnlichen Auge ebenso verborgen und unzugänglich ist als die der gleichen Wahrheit.²⁵

I am speaking of a more sacred art, one that in the words of antiquity is a tool of the gods, a proclaimer of divine mysteries, the unveiler of the ideas; that unborn beauty whose undesecrated radiance only dwells in and illuminates purer souls, and whose form is just as concealed and inaccessible to the sensual eye as is the truth corresponding to it.²⁶

Art, hidden from the sensual eye, its secrets turned in on itself, is no longer open to the cold glare of Cartesian reason, its ontology is to be sought in an altogether different discourse - the philosophy of art. For such a philosopher, art must be seen as a 'flowing out' of the absolute into concrete form:

sie ist...eine nothwendige, aus dem Absoluten unmittelbar ausfließende Erscheinung...²⁷

It is a necessary phenomenon emanating directly from the absolute...²⁸

²³ *Philosophie*, 384.

²⁴ *Philosophy*, 4.

²⁵ *Philosophie*, 384.

²⁶ *Philosophy*, 4. Translation modified.

²⁷ *Philosophie*, 384.

²⁸ *Philosophy*, 4.

The significance of the discourse is demonstrated by Schelling in his discussion of the relationship between philosophy and art: where, in answer to this question:

Kann man das unter Gesetze bringen und bestimmen wollen, dessen Wesen es ist, kein Gesetz als sich selbst anzuerkennen?²⁹

Can one claim to subsume and to determine according to laws that whose essence is precisely to recognize no law other than itself?³⁰

he responds:

So könnte man ein gewisser Enthusiasmus reden, der die Kunst nur in ihren Wirkungen aufgefaßt hätte, und weder sie selbst wahrhaft noch die Stelle kannte, welche der Philosophie im Universum angewiesen ist. Denn auch angenommen, daß die Kunst aus nichts Höherem begreiflich sey, so ist doch so durchgreifend, so allwaltend das Gesetz des Universum, daß alles, was in ihm begriffen ist, in einem andern sein Vorbild oder Gegenbild habe, so absolut die Form der allgemeinen Entgegenstellung des Realen und Idealen, daß auch der letzten Grenze des Unendlichen, da wo die Gegensätze der Erscheinung in die reinste Absolutheit verschwinden, dasselbe Verhältniß seine Rechte behauptet und in der letzten Potenz wiederkehrt. Dieses Verhältniß ist das der Philosophie und der Kunst....

...Beide begegnen sich also auf dem letzten Gipfel und sind sich, eben kraft der gemeinschaftlichen Absolutheit, Vorbild und Gegenbild.³¹

Such could speak a certain enthusiasm that has comprehended art only in its effects, and which was genuinely acquainted neither with art itself nor with the position given to philosophy in the universe. Even assuming that art is not comprehensible from any higher perspective, that law of the universe which decrees that everything encompassed by it have its prototype or reflex in something else is so pervasive and so omnipotent, and the form of the universal juxtaposition of the real and the ideal is so absolute, that even at the ultimate boundaries of the infinite and the finite, where the contradictions of phenomenal appearance disappear into the purest absoluteness, the same relationship asserts its rights and recure in the final potence. This is the relationship between philosophy and art...

...Hence, both encounter one another on the final pinnacle, and precisely by virtue of that common absoluteness are for one another both prototype and reflex.³²

Indeed, as art presents the absolute in a reflected image [*Gegenbild*], so philosophy presents it as an archetype [*Vorbild*]. This means, then, that the philosophy of art represents a *Wissenschaft des All in der Form oder Potenz der Kunst*.³³ We can now construct the set of potences where the philosophy of nature represents the *real* series,

²⁹ *Philosophie*, 386.

³⁰ *Philosophy*, 5.

³¹ *Philosophie*, 387.

³² *Philosophy*, 5-6.

³³ *Philosophie*, 12.

in which art functions as a kind of given object of scrutiny, the transcendental philosophy represents the *ideal* series, and the philosophy of art represents the *indifference* of these two potences. Thus, as *indifference*, the philosophy of art is a high form of discourse.

In so far as the absolute contains both the *real* and the *ideal*, all potences contain in turn each of these antitheses, in the manner of the organic structure already discussed. It is of no surprise, therefore, to find in Schelling that art has both a real and an ideal side, and that each side contains the other within it. Schelling divides the arts according to this premise:

Jeder dieser Formen, insofern sie entweder in der realen oder idealen Einheit begriffen sind, entspricht eine besondere Form der Kunst, der realen, sofern in der realen, entspricht die Musik, der idealen die Malerei, der welche innerhalb der realen wieder beide Einheiten in-eins-gebildet darstellt, die Plastik. Dasselbe ist der Fall in Ansehung der idealen Einheit, welche wieder die drei Formen der lyrischen, epischen und dramatischen Dichtkunst in sich begreift. Lyrik = Einbildung des Unendlichen ins Endliche = Besonderem. Epos = Darstellung (Subsumtion) des Endlichen im Unendlichen = Allgemeinem. Drama = Synthese des Allgemeinen und Besonderen. Nach diesen Grundformen ist also die gesamte Kunst sowohl in ihrer realen als idealen Erscheinung zu construiren.³⁴

A particular form of art corresponds to each of these forms to the extent that they are encompassed within the real or ideal unity. *Music*, corresponds to the real form within the real series. *Painting* corresponds to the ideal form within the real series. The *Plastic arts* correspond to that form within the real series that represents the confluence of the previous two unities. The same holds true as regards the ideal unity, which in its own turn encompasses within itself the three forms of lyric, epic, and dramatic poetry. Lyric poetry = the informing of the infinite into the finite = the particular. The epic = the representation (subsumption) of the finite within the infinite = the universal. Drama = the synthesis of the universal and the particular. Hence, the entire world of art is to be construed according to these basic forms both in its real and ideal manifestation.³⁵

The series of the arts, then, is divided into the two potences and within each of these the two potences are both present, such that each of the art forms can be posited as an indifference in itself and yet can also be posited as demonstrating certain ontological *differences* such as the tendency we shall later see in music towards the real side.

There are thus six basic categories - music, painting, plastic arts, lyric, epic and drama.

³⁴ *Philosophie*, 15.

³⁵ *Philosophy*, 18.

It is interesting, then, that there is thus no place for a hierarchy of all the forms of art insofar as each contains the whole 'taken up' [*aufgenommen*] into itself.³⁶ Thus music is not the somewhat de-emphasised art form we see in Hegel's *Vorlesungen* but represents the 'real within the real'. To understand exactly what this means, and how music takes the whole up into itself, careful account of the first three chapters of the *Philosophie* must be given before proceeding to those passages on music in the massive Chapter 4 of K. F. A. Schelling's edition.³⁷

K. F. A. Schelling separated his father's lectures on art into two halves, the first³⁸ consists of the first three, relatively short, chapters - 'Konstruktion der Kunst überhaupt und im Allgemeinen,' 'Konstruktion des Stoffs der Kunst,' and 'Konstruktion des besonderen oder der Form der Kunst.' The second half consists of the more detailed analyses of the various potences of art and is littered with numerous examples and comparisons.³⁹ Note that each of these is concerned with a *Konstruktion*. This should not be seen as necessarily equivalent to its usage in modern German nor the English near equivalence of 'construction'. Here, it means more a close rehearsal of the argument, a stream of consciousness, which seeks to delineate a framework of proportions, relationships and interconnections that underlie art; this 'relationism' is most clearly demonstrated in Schelling's discussion of the Platonic Socrates and Pythagoras, and, in particular, the parallel properties of number and proportion in music and in Pythagoras' theory of the music of the spheres:

Sokrates bei Platon sagt: Derjenige ist der Musiker, der von den sinnlich vernommenen Harmonien fortschreitend zu den unsinnlichen, intelligibeln und ihren Proportionen.⁴⁰

In Plato, Socrates says: That person is a musician who progresses beyond physically perceived harmonies to the suprasensible, cerebral harmonies and *their* proportions.⁴¹

³⁶ To be strictly fair, however, there is a tendency in Schelling to favour those art forms of which he has a more specialist knowledge: literature. This is not unusual in philosophy from this time, though, and does not detract from the original point.

³⁷ 'Besondere Theil der Philosophie der Kunst: Konstruktion der Kunstformen in der Entgegensetzung der realen und idealen Reihe.', 132ff.

³⁸ 'Allgemeine Theil der Philosophie der Kunst.'

³⁹ As we shall see, however, this is not the case for those passages on music.

⁴⁰ *Philosophie*, 147.

Pythagoras' theorem can clearly be disputed on empirical grounds, but Schelling reinstates it on *metaphysical*, that is relational or proportional, grounds. Thus, *Konstruktion* refers to an engagement with a set of metaphysical principles, of the intuiting of the Absolute into division, division into reality and reality back into the Absolute.

The *Konstruktion* of the first chapter is that of the general metaphysical profile of art to find the essential relationship between philosophy, art and nature. It contains some fascinating passages on the so-called organic product, a fundamental category not only of Schelling's work but of much aesthetic theory of this time. The chapter opens with a startling claim:

§1. Das Absolute oder Gott ist dasjenig, in Ansehung dessen das Seyn oder die Realität *unmittelbar*, d.h. kraft des bloßen Gesetzes der Identität aus der Idee folgt, oder: Gott ist unmittelbare Affirmation von sich selbst.⁴²

§1. The absolute or God is that with regard to being or reality follows *immediately* from the idea, that is, by virtue of the simple law of identity, or God is the immediate affirmation of himself.⁴³

The notion that God affirms himself and constantly completes his unity in objective being seems initially bizarre. Yet this first declaration gives its own conclusion - *kraft des bloßen Gesetzes der Identität*. This notion of identity is one on which Hegel was to pour scorn. It is, in fact, the very basis on which difference and indifference can be one and the same. Identity in the Schellingian sense is that *other* way of seeing that which has been divided in the potences. *Identität* is thus the opposite potency of *Potenz*.⁴⁴ Sections 2 to 13 all rehearse this notion of God's identity both to the absolute and to being in its objective sense.⁴⁵ Only in §13 do we encounter art for the first time:

Wissen und Handeln indifferenzirn sich also nothwendig in einem Dritten, welches als das Affirmirende beider die dritte Potenz ist. In *diesen* Punkt fällt nun die *Kunst*,⁴⁶

⁴¹ *Philosophy*, 117.

⁴² *Philosophie*, 17.

⁴³ *Philosophy*, 23.

⁴⁴ See also page 10 of *Philosophie*: 'Ich nenne dieses Princip eben deswegen, weil es keiner besonderen Potenz gleich ist, und doch alle begreift, den *absoluten Identitätspunkt der Philosophie*.'

⁴⁵ Henceforward Schelling's paragraph symbol - § - will be used to denote his sections.

⁴⁶ *Philosophie*, 24.

Knowledge and action therefore necessarily integrate themselves in indifference within a third element, which as the element affirming both is the third potency. *Here we find art*,⁴⁷

and, at the outset of the next section:

§14. Die Indifferenz des Idealen in Realen als Indifferenz stellt sich in der idealen Welt durch die Kunst dar.⁴⁸

§14. The indifference of the ideal in the real *as* indifference manifests itself in the ideal world through art.⁴⁹

On one level, then, art is an indifference in itself, it is the highest potency of the real world whereas philosophy is its counterpart in the ideal world. It seems, then, that art is given some magical ability to transcend difference and yet remain in objective form, remain, therefore, as *Potenz*. This is what Schelling means by 'highest potency' of the real world. It is the absolute intuiting of the infinite into the finite, represented in concrete form.

Out of this conflatory quality of art, Schelling constructs a metaphysical proof of the necessity of beauty:

Schönheit ist da gesetzt, wo das Besondere (Reale) seinem Begriff so angemessen ist, daß dieser selbst, als Unendliches, eintritt in das Endliche und *in concreto* angeschaut wird.⁵⁰

Beauty is posited wherever the particular (real) is so commensurate with its concept that the latter itself, as infinite, enters into the finite and is intuited *in concreto*.⁵¹

So art's conflatory nature is proven in its informing of beauty by its ability to make rational 'simultaneously phenomenal or sensual'.⁵² A more thorough discussion of beauty's 'finitude' vis-à-vis the Schillerian sublime is given in the second *Konstruktion*, which is dealt with shortly.⁵³ For the moment, suffice it to say that beauty allows a perfect matching of the real and ideal as expressed in a concrete form - the product of art.

⁴⁷ *Philosophy*, 28.

⁴⁸ *Philosophie*, 24.

⁴⁹ *Philosophy*, 28. Translation modified.

⁵⁰ *Philosophie*, 26.

⁵¹ *Philosophy*, 29.

⁵² *Philosophie*, 26: 'Das Rationale wird als Rationales zugleich ein Erscheinendes, Sinnliches.'

⁵³ *Philosophie*, 40ff.

Further to art's significance, Schelling stresses the conflatory qualities of art in terms of *freedom* [*Freiheit*] and *necessity* [*Nothwendigkeit*], the one representing the chaotic or unordered, the other the ordered and symmetrical. They are, as Schelling says, related to the unconscious and the conscious:

§19. Nothwendigkeit und Freiheit verhalten sich wie Bewußtloses und Bewußtes. Kunst beruht daher auf der Identität der bewußten und der bewußtlosen Thätigkeit.⁵⁴

§19. Necessity and freedom are related as the unconscious and the conscious. Art, therefore, is based on the identity of conscious and unconscious activity.⁵⁵

We see, now, that the notion of art as conflation is only part of the Schellingian mission of art. It is not so much that art can bring about a Fichtian suspension of the objective world or that it affords a Hegelian cadence of the objective and the subjective into the total where art is seen as a kind of cosmic therapy. It is, rather, the *very identity* of necessity and freedom, of the conscious and the subconscious:

Die Vollkommenheit des Kunstwerks als solchen steigt in dem Verhältniß, in welchem es diese Identität in sich ausgedrückt enthält, oder in welchem Absicht und Nothwendigkeit sich in ihm durchdrungen haben.⁵⁶

The perfection of a work of art as such increases to the degree it expresses this identity within itself, or to the degree purpose and necessity interpenetrate one another within it.⁵⁷

The notion of a kind of *immanent* identity, the *Identität in sich ausgedrückt* which the artwork 'contains' [*enthält*] within itself is, for our purposes, one of the most significant elements of the Schellingian aesthetic, and one which will emerge again and again throughout this work. To the extent that a work of art expresses within itself this absolute identity, and *only* to that extent, so is the artwork correspondingly perfect. Thus, artistic perfection is synonymous with *immanence*, or the ability to 'express' [*ausdrücken*] the indifference or identity of unleashed fantasy of purpose [*Absicht*], unfettered creativity, and the objective concreteness of necessity [*Nothwendigkeit*],

⁵⁴ *Philosophie*, 28.

⁵⁵ *Philosophy*, 30.

⁵⁶ *Philosophie*, 28.

⁵⁷ *Philosophy*, 30-1.

Foucault's 'formidable materiality'.⁵⁸ Stott wisely avoids the difficulties of translation here and ignores the problems caused by *enthält* altogether - 'to the degree it expresses this identity within itself' - although even this does not solve the placing of 'in itself'/'within itself'. Whereas the rendering 'in itself' is closer to the German *an sich*, it would seem that the combination of *in sich* and *enthält* points to some kind of immanent relationship between identity and containment. Thus the ambiguity actually underlines the quality of immanence, internal containment of self-identity. An alternative rendering might be 'The perfection of an artwork increases [proportionately] to the extent that it contains this identity [of necessity and freedom, the unconscious and the conscious] internally.' This demonstrates Schelling's careful construction of a blanket immanence such that *in sich* expresses immanence *across* the relationship as both an attributive and an adverb. It is this apparent ambiguity that actually *clarifies* and *emphasises* the notion of a metaphysical autonomy of art. As an object, a concrete form, it nonetheless contains the metaphysical truth of identity within itself as immanence.

Schelling continues to elaborate on this identity and constructs a new pair of differences or potences, *truth* and *beauty*:

§20. Schönheit und Wahrheit sind an sich oder der Idee nach eins. - Denn die Wahrheit der Idee nach ist ebenso wie die Schönheit Identität des Subjektiven und Objektiven, nur jene subjektiv oder vorbildlich angeschaut, wie die Schönheit gegenbildlich oder objektiv.⁵⁹

§20. Beauty and truth are essentially or ideally one, for truth, just as beauty, is *ideally* the identity of the subjective and the objective. For truth, however, this identity is intuited subjectively or prototypically, whereas for beauty it is intuited objectively or in a reflected image.⁶⁰

⁵⁸ The immanence of this identity is particularly clearly expressed in the ambiguity of *in sich* in the original German. Meaning 'in (inside) itself', one would normally expect it to be placed in a subordinate clause such as this (after 'in which' [*in welchem*]) before the finite verb *enthält*. Unfortunately, the clarity that such a placing would provide, in that it would suggest the rendering 'contains within itself' is undermined by the placing of *ausgedrückt* (literally, 'expressed') which thoroughly clouds the meaning. Certainly, 'in itself' could belong to 'identity' or to 'contains' thus giving the possible senses: ...to the extent that it contains within itself this identity, expressed...; ...to the extent that it contains, expressed, the identity within itself...; ...to the extent that it contains the identity expressed in itself...; ...to the extent that it contains the identity expressed within itself...'

⁵⁹ *Philosophie*, 28.

⁶⁰ *Philosophy*, 31.

This is a clear indictment for Schelling of the mimesis paradigm. Whereas truth is a kind of archetypal or prototypical vision of the identity of subjective and objective, beauty represents the opposite intuition into the objective or concrete manifestation. Thus, those that speak of 'truth' or *verisimilité* in art speak of an inadequate truth:

Die Wahrheit, die nicht Schönheit ist, ist auch nicht absolute Wahrheit, und umgekehrt. - Der sehr gemeine Gegensatz von Wahrheit und Schönheit in der Kunst beruht darauf, daß unter Wahrheit die trügerische, nur das Endliche erreichende Wahrheit verstanden wird.⁶¹

Truth that is not beauty is also not absolute truth, and vice versa. The extremely crass antithesis between truth and beauty in art rests on understanding truth as that deceptive truth that extends only as far as the finite.⁶²

and here is the crux of the critique:

Aus der Nachahmung dieser Wahrheit entstehen jene Kunstwerke, an welchen wir nur die Künstlichkeit bewundern, mit der das Natürliche an ihr erreicht ist, ohne es mit dem Göttlichen zu verbinden. Diese Art der Wahrheit aber ist noch nicht Schönheit in der Kunst, und nur absolute Schönheit in der Kunst ist auch die rechte und eigentliche Wahrheit.⁶³

From the imitation of this truth arise those works of art in which we admire only the artificiality with which the artist has captured the natural without combining it with the divine. *This* kind of truth, however, is not yet beauty in art, and only absolute beauty in art is genuine and actual truth.⁶⁴

If beauty, then, is the intuiting of objective and subjective as identity into concrete form, then it follows that a *mimetic* aesthetic such as Scheibe's or Gottsched's is a false aesthetic: reality for Schelling already contains the ideal within it archetypically rather than literally, or *visibly*. The notion of nature in the Cartesian aesthetic is thus inadequate as is its assumed relationship with art. The false 'objective truth' of mimesis is that of empirico-rationalism in which the 'purely natural' is achieved without recourse to any spiritual or divine element. In other words, the pretence of 'natural givenness' or 'visible conspicuity' of empirico-rationalism is a presumption that allows for no God.

⁶¹ *Philosophie*, 29.

⁶² *Philosophy*, 31. Translation modified.

⁶³ *Philosophie*, 29.

⁶⁴ *Philosophy*, 31. Translation modified.

In this sense, God is the general creativity of Schelling's universe, or rather the creative archetype without which reality is a meaningless vortex of 'accidental beauty' or beauty without the absolute, a merely corporeal beauty that resides in a 'crass synthesis' [*gemeine Gegenwart*] of nature and art where autonomy must give in to mere reflection. Visible conspicuity, then, undermines Schelling's notion of the organic in which, as we have seen:

...verschiedene Gestalten jede ein dienendes Glied des Ganzen und doch bei der vollkommenen Ausbildung des Werks wieder in sich absolut ist.⁶⁵

...each of the various elements of forms is a part subservient to the whole and yet from the perspective of the consummate construction of the work is absolute in itself.⁶⁶

In order for a structure to be truly 'organic' the parts must each be somehow universes in themselves; that is, they must express the highest order of the universe in their immanence and therefore demonstrate a profound *autonomy*. In the introduction, Schelling provides a clue as to the laws of autonomy in a passage on genius:

...welche nicht allein selbst autonomisch ist, sondern auch zum Princip aller Autonomie vordringt.⁶⁷

It is not only itself autonomous but also penetrates through the principle of all autonomy.⁶⁸

Thus autonomy as an attribute must also be an autonomy in general reflected in the particular. Thus an art which is lamely hitched to the externality of nature is an art that retreats into mere sensuality and becomes a vessel for nature's expression. Art's expressive quality is to be somehow aimed, for Schelling, at the forms of 'things in themselves' and such autonomous things demonstrate microcosms of absoluteness that a wholly instrumental thing cannot:

§24 Die wahre Konstruktion der Kunst ist Darstellung ihrer Formen als Formen der Dinge, wie sie an sich, oder wie sie im Absoluten sind,⁶⁹

⁶⁵ *Philosophie*, 11.

⁶⁶ *Philosophy*, 15. Translation modified.

⁶⁷ *Philosophie*, 388.

⁶⁸ *Philosophy*, 6.

⁶⁹ *Philosophie*, 30.

§24. The true construction of art is a presentation of its forms as forms of things as those things in themselves, or as they are within the absolute,⁷⁰

and later:

Die Kunst ist nämlich dargethan als reale Darstellung der Formen der Dinge, wie sie an sich sind - der Formen als Urbilder also.⁷¹

Art has been designated as the *real* representation of the forms of things as they are in themselves, and hence of the forms as archetypes.⁷²

Thus the crass antithesis of art and nature is predicated by the assumption that nature in itself, that is *pure externality*, is the archetype. This nature without the ideal is inadequate to the absolute and its general aesthetic ramifications are thus falsehoods.

Chapter two of *Philosophie*, 'Konstruktion des Stoffs der Kunst', attempts not merely an analysis of the 'material' of art but goes further to analyse art's relationship with its own material manifestations.⁷³ Schelling begins with a question:

In §24 is bewiesen worden: die Formen der Kunst müssen die Formen der Dinge seyn, wie sie im Absoluten oder *an sich* sind. Demnach wird vorausgesetzt, diese *besonderen Formen*, wodurch eben das Schöne in einzelnen realen und wirklichen Dingen dargestellt wird, seyen besondere Formen, die im Absoluten selbst sind. Die Frage ist, wie dieß möglich sey.⁷⁴

In §24 we proved that the forms of art must be the forms of things as they are within the absolute or *in themselves*. Accordingly we are presupposing that these *particular forms* - precisely by those means of which beauty is represented in individual, real, actual things - *are* particular forms within the absolute. The question is how this is possible.⁷⁵

How is it possible that beauty is represented in individual, real, actual things? How can there be *particular forms* in the absolute? This is a fundamental question for Schelling: how can diversity exist within unity? How can the absolute contain non-unity or non-identity? It is no surprise to see Schelling's answer to this question constantly invoking the organic structure in order to resolve the apparent dichotomy. In §25 Schelling provides the first of a number of metaphysical elucidations of this problem. These *particular forms* are *pure*; this means they are forms-in-themselves in so far as they are

⁷⁰ *Philosophy*, 32.

⁷¹ *Philosophie*, 31.

⁷² *Philosophy*, 32. Translation modified.

⁷³ *Philosophie*, 32ff.

⁷⁴ *Philosophie*, 32.

⁷⁵ *Philosophy*, 33.

without essence [*ohne Wesenheit*]. As we have already seen, Schelling is driven by the urge to dig as deep as possible, right into the objective and ideal realities to discover their fundamental qualities. So what does he mean here when he says that the *pure* forms are without essence? If the one essence pervades all things, then how can these forms be *without* essence? This problem is addressed by the notion of potences:

...es können also im *wahren* Universum keine besonderen Dinge seyn, als inwiefern sie das ganze ungetheilte Universum in sich aufnehmen, also selbst Universa sind.⁷⁶

...hence, there can be no particular things within the *true* universe except to the extent that they take up the entire undivided universe into themselves, and are thus themselves universes.⁷⁷

The potences of autonomy and integration are fundamental to this proposition. For *particularity* to exist (as autonomy) it must 'take up' the essence into itself as a concrete form. Thus objectivity is both autonomy and integration. How far this is from Kant's rational impotence. So, although the essence of the absolute is non-division, it takes objectivity, difference, into itself as a potency such that each particularity, each objective fragmented entity, contains within *itself* the ideal and the absolute:

§26. Im Absoluten sind alle besonderen Dinge nur dadurch wahrhaft geschieden und wahrhaft eins, daß jedes für sich das Universum, jedes das absolute Ganze ist.⁷⁸

§26. Within the absolute all particular things are truly separated and truly only one to the extent that each is the universe for itself, and each is the absolute whole.⁷⁹

The delineation of the potences continues in §27 with an analysis of the real and the ideal. The 'particular' things Schelling equates here with the so-called 'ideas' [*Ideen*] - the universe in the form of the particular. Schelling is concerned with both the ideal and real series and equates ideal particularity with the urge to inform the finite into the infinite. This urge, we can see, is somehow buried within objectivity and releases itself when seen from the ideal potency. Objectivity within the real potency, on the other

⁷⁶ *Philosophie*, 32-3.

⁷⁷ *Philosophy*, 33.

⁷⁸ *Philosophie*, 33.

⁷⁹ *Philosophy*, 34. Translation modified.

hand, is the end of the opposite urge, to intuit the infinite into the finite. Thus, 'the real is always the universe.'⁸⁰ There is a sense here, then, that objective reality seen from the real potency, is the universe as an amalgam, it is whole by means of encyclopaedic conspicuity. The empirical urges of the cameralist are thus represented here as one side of the equation: the cameralist real-as-such, the final result of the real urge is only absolute insofar as its opposite, the urge to abstract, to make each object a universe, to intuit into the object the infinite, is present *within it*.

Things are 'without essence', then, if they are *seen* as such. To stop at this visible conspicuity or self-evidence of the thing, is to deny the absolute or the 'one essence'. This absolute comes about only as a result of its completion within the thing itself, thus making of it the whole in and for itself. Particularity exists within beauty as a concrete necessity of beauty. The various particularities or pure forms of beauty are the encyclopaedic parts of its whole. Beauty thus belongs to the real series.

So the real series, then, is fundamentally characterised by its *result*, the reality of the objective world when seen as a 'given' amalgam of its various parts. The reality of this series, then, is quite different to that of the opposite potency, the ideal series. This opposition is underlined in the 'two unities' of the ideas:

Jede Idee hat zwei Einheiten, die eine, wodurch sie *in sich selbst* und *absolut* ist, die also, wodurch das Absolute in ihr Besonderes gebildet ist, und die, wodurch sie als Besonderes in das Absolute als ihr Centrum aufgenommen wird.⁸¹

Every idea has two unities: the one through which it exists *within itself* and is *absolute* - hence the one through which the absolute is formed into its particularity - and the one through which it is taken up as a particular into the absolute as its own centre.⁸²

This duality whereby an 'idea' is both absolute in itself and 'takes up' the absolute into its own centre is the fundamental dualism of all things:

Diese gedoppelte Einheit jeder Idee ist eigentlich das Geheimniß, wodurch das Besondere im Absoluten, und gleichwohl wieder als Besonderes begriffen werden kann.⁸³

⁸⁰ *Philosophie*, 34: 'Das Reale ist immer nur das Universum.' *Philosophy*, 35.

⁸¹ *Philosophie*, 34.

⁸² *Philosophy*, 35. Translation modified.

This double unity of every idea is actually the mystery by which the particular can be comprehended both within the absolute and, in spite of this, also as a particular.⁸⁴

Ideas, then, are concrete syntheses, particular *In-eins-bildungen* of the real and the ideal. Schelling continues in §28 to assert that such ideas when viewed from the two different potences are either images of the divine [*Bilder des Göttlichen*] or the gods [*Götter*]. The antithesis of these potences, the ideal and real, is the antithesis of the divine, or the general creativity of God (the ideal), and creativity in the archetypal forms of the gods of antiquity (the real). This antithesis is one which Schelling sees as fundamental for a philosophy of art: the one is an ideal archetype whereas the other is a *particular or real* archetype. This introduction of the gods of antiquity as particular archetypes begins a protracted discussion of archetypal particularity, that is, the infinite *in the form of the finite*, the basis on which art makes its presence felt:

Die Idee der Götter ist nothwendig für die Kunst. Die wissenschaftliche Konstruktion derselben führt uns eben dahin zurück, wohin der Instinkt die Poesie in ihrem ersten Beginn schon geführt hat. Was für die Philosophie Ideen sind, sind für die Kunst Götter, und umgekehrt.⁸⁵

The idea of the gods is necessary for art. Our systematic construction of art leads us back precisely to the point to which instinct first led poesy at its inception. What ideas are for philosophy, the gods are for art and vice versa.⁸⁶

These archetypal particularities are governed by two rules, the duality of which comes now as no surprise. On the one hand, the gods are limited in the purest sense, that is, they are completely particular whereas, on the other hand, they represent, as an amalgam, the completeness of the absolute. This is the encyclopaedic unity we have come to expect in the real series, and, as Schelling puts it, the gods, for the ancient Greeks, were 'more real than any other reality.'⁸⁷ The fundamental *realness* of this amalgamic unity was precisely that same means by which art was able to divide itself into different forms. Each of the individual gods is separated from the others by strict limitation such that each archetype was strictly particular, each containing specific

⁸³ *Philosophie*, 34.

⁸⁴ *Philosophy*, 35.

⁸⁵ *Philosophie*, 35.

⁸⁶ *Philosophy*, 35.

⁸⁷ *Philosophie*, 35: 'reeller als jedes andere Reelle.'

characteristics setting it apart from the others. And yet, all the gods, as an amalgam, represented divinity as such:

Nur dadurch *erstens*, daß sie streng begrenzt, daß also sich wechselseitig einschränkende Eigenschaften in einer und derselben Gottheit sich ausschließen und absolut getrennt sind, und daß gleichwohl innerhalb dieser Begrenzung jede Form die ganze Göttlichkeit in sich empfängt, liegt eigentlich das Geheimniß ihres Reizes und ihrer Fähigkeit für Kunstdarstellungen. Dadurch erhält die Kunst gesonderte, beschlossene Gestalten, und in jeder doch die Totalität, die ganze Göttlichkeit.⁸⁸

The mystery of their charm and their suitability for artistic portrayal actually lies, *first of all*, in the fact that they are strictly limited; hence, mutually limiting characteristics exclude one another within the same deity and are absolutely separated from one another. Nonetheless, within this limitation every form receives into itself the entire divinity.⁸⁹

The rather understated *Reiz* holds the key here to a significant point for art: art's charm lies in its particularity. This précis of the latter part of the protracted *Anmerkung* to §30 is based around a remark Schelling makes regarding particularity: 'Only in particularity is there life.'⁹⁰ Vitality, multiplicity, life, are all elements of the particular and it is they that give existence its charm. Without such particularities, life is void:

Das Absolute an und für sich bietet keine Mannichfaltigkeit dar, es ist insofern für den Verstand eine absolute, bodenlose Leere.⁹¹

The absolute in and for itself offers no multiplicity or variety whatever, and to the extent that it is for the understanding an absolute, bottomless emptiness.⁹²

This interesting comment suggests a kind of ultimate unattainability for the absolute, a point of absolute reconciliation or non-dividedness that is ultimately beyond reason. This point is again taken up in much more detail in Chapter 3,⁹³ but for the moment it is a chasm that Schelling is unwilling to cross. This unattainability is something that is immediately mediated here by the claim that the creative imagination and fantasy are

⁸⁸ *Philosophie*, 36.

⁸⁹ *Philosophy*, 36.

⁹⁰ *Philosophie*, 37: 'Nur im Besonderen ist Leben.'

⁹¹ *Philosophie*, 37.

⁹² *Philosophy*, 36.

⁹³ *Philosophie*, 109ff.

the means by which the unwieldy can be subsumed into charming form, that is, concrete form; remember, beauty exists as the absolute *in concreto*, it is the material from of the inarticulable. Art, as seen from the real series, is thus a road to a kind of comprehension that falls outside classical reason.

Divine imagination is defined in §31 as 'that in which the productions of art are received and formed.'⁹⁴ If this imagination is divine, that is, it is the creativity or imagination of God, then it is, as we have already seen, a kind of general creativity or imagination. Schelling's use here of the non-German *Imagination* instead of the more usual *Einbildungskraft* would seem to underline the apparent abstraction of the term. *Göttliche Imagination*, then, is that process which receives existing forms and through the divine (general) filter of the imagination casts new ones. But the new forms that ensue exist still only *internally*, within that general creativity. Only through the second process, that of *fantasy* [*Phantasie*] are these forms cast out into particularity:

Im Verhältniß zur Phantasie bestimme ich Einbildungskraft als das, worin die Produktionen der Kunst empfangen und ausgebildet werden, Phantasie, was sie äußerlich anschaut, sie aus sich hinauswirft gleichsam, insofern auch darstellt.⁹⁵

I define creative imagination in relation to fantasy as that in which the productions of art are received and formed, fantasy as that which intuits them externally, casts them out from within itself and to that extent also portrays them.⁹⁶

and, as we see, it also 'represents' these forms. *Phantasie*, than, resides over the representation of the forms intuited by the divine imagination. Divine imagination is general creativity, the community of creative beings in God, and *Phantasie* is *particular* creativity.

Fantasy leads to concrete representation and thus to beauty:

§33. Das Grundgesetz aller Götterbildungen ist das Gesetz der Schönheit. - Denn Schönheit ist das *real* angeschaute Absolute.⁹⁷

§33. The basic law of all portrayals of the gods is the law of beauty, for beauty is the absolute intuited in *reality*.⁹⁸

⁹⁴ *Philosophie*, 39: 'das, worin die Produktionen der Kunst empfangen und ausgebildet werden.'

⁹⁵ *Philosophie*, 39.

⁹⁶ *Philosophy*, 38. Translation modified.

⁹⁷ *Philosophie*, 41-2.

We return, once again, to the notion of beauty as the absolute intuited into particularity. Indeed, as Schelling continues:

Man könnte dagegen einwerfen: eben deßwegen, weil mit Begrenzung, seyen die Götterbildungen nicht absolut schön. Allein ich kehre as vielmehr um, daß nämlich das Absolute nur in der Begrenzung, nämlich im Besonderen, angeschaut überhaupt schön ist.⁹⁹

One might object that precisely because the gods are limited, they are not absolutely beautiful. I, however, would rather assert the reverse, namely, that the absolute cannot be beautiful at all except as intuited within limitation, that is, within the particular.¹⁰⁰

Limitation [*Begrenzung*] in the form of various characteristics of the gods of antiquity, then, is, as Schelling has already said, absolutely necessary for art. The gods represent the archetypes of particularity, the variety of an earlier divinity, now lost in God. As we shall see, Schelling's critique of Christian society as *allegorical* is based on the necessity of particularity or limitation to beauty. If the real series is the intuiting of the infinite into the finite, this latter term now easily subsumed into our notion of particularity, then the gods are ultimately real, that is, their existence is fully synonymous with unity. Thus, based on this premise of encyclopaedic unity in the real series, Schelling is able now to assert:

§34 Die Götter bilden nothwendig unter sich wieder eine Totalität, eine Welt...ein organisches Ganzes.¹⁰¹

§34. The gods taken together necessarily constitute a totality, a world...an organic whole...¹⁰²

These archetypes, then, are amalgamated by the ideal series into *divinity in general* by means of the sum of their differences or characteristics. This separation of the parts, subsumed only within an organic whole in the ideal series becomes the basis for particularity in art. On the one hand, the various forms of art are art as a totality, that is, they necessarily make up art in an encyclopaedic unity, and, on the other hand, the various forms or particularities relate according to a careful separation of identity

⁹⁸ *Philosophy*, 40.

⁹⁹ *Philosophie*, 42.

¹⁰⁰ *Philosophy*, 40.

¹⁰¹ *Philosophie*, 43.

¹⁰² *Philosophy*, 41.

and separation as represented by the organic unity itself. This separation, or autonomy¹⁰³ is addressed by Schelling in his notion of an independent poetic existence:

§35. Einzig, indem die Götter unter sich eine Welt bilden, erlangen sie eine unabhängige Existenz für die Phantasie oder eine unabhängige poetische Existenz.¹⁰⁴

§35. Only by collectively constituting a world in this way do the gods acquire independent existence for fantasy or an independent poetic existence.¹⁰⁵

In a sense, it is as if each of the gods or archetypes is an empty vessel, ready to entangle itself with the other gods in ever new ways:

Nachdem einmal diese eigentliche Welt der Phantasie erschaffen ist, ist der Einbildung keine weitere Grenze gesetzt, eben deßwegen, weil innerhalb derselben alles Mögliche unmittelbar wirklich ist.¹⁰⁶

After this genuine world of fantasy has been created there are no other limitations to what can be conceived within it; this is true precisely because within it, all possibility is also immediately real.¹⁰⁷

This absolute possibility is premised by the notion of autonomy. Returning once again to organicism, the separateness of the parts is fundamental to a higher unity. Thus the emptiness of each archetype, its absolute divinity in itself, gives it an objectivity which is only mediated by the narrative of mythology:

§37. Das Ganze der Götterdichtungen indem sie zur vollkommenen Objektivität oder unabhängigen poetischen Existenz gelangen, ist die Mythologie.¹⁰⁸

§37. The entirety of the poetic renderings of the gods, by acquiring complete objectivity or independent poetic existence, is mythology.¹⁰⁹

and immediately following this:

§38. Mythologie ist die nothwendige Bedingung und der erste Stoff aller Kunst.¹¹⁰

§38. Mythology is the necessary condition and first content of all art.¹¹¹

¹⁰³ *Philosophie*, 388ff.

¹⁰⁴ *Philosophie*, 43.

¹⁰⁵ *Philosophy*, 41.

¹⁰⁶ *Philosophie*, 44.

¹⁰⁷ *Philosophy*, 41.

¹⁰⁸ *Philosophie*, 49.

¹⁰⁹ *Philosophy*, 45

¹¹⁰ *Philosophie*, 49.

This is a difficult point to grasp. It is not that all art necessarily engages with the tales of antiquity's gods, but, rather, art demonstrates relationships between its various forms identical to those demonstrated between the ancient gods. The forms, in themselves, are empty vessels, mere archetypes without particularity, but become particular in comparison with other forms, via limitation and characterisation and ever new inter-relationships with the past and the present, between genres. Independent poetic existence is only possible via an understanding and strict delineation of each form's limits, its objectivity, which, in turn, can only be grasped via an understanding of the whole.

It is not that Schelling uses the gods as an allegory for the necessary structures of art in particularity and universality, but, rather, that the gods represent a basic ordering principle - the organic unity of encyclopaedic and organic unities within the higher organic whole:

Inwiefern Poesie das Bildende des Stoffes, wie Kunst im engeren Sinn der Form ist, so ist die Mythologie die absolute Poesie, gleichsam die Poesie *en Masse*. Sie ist die ewige Materie, aus der alle Formen so wundervoll, mannichfaltig hervorgehen.¹¹²

Insofar as poetry is the formative element of material, just as art in the narrower sense is the formative element of form, so is mythology the absolute poesy, as it were the poesy *en masse*. It is eternal matter from which all forms issue so wondrously and variously.¹¹³

On Representation

We have seen how the absolute divides itself by means of mythology, that is, the characterisation or limitation of parts according to the generality of the whole. Schelling now proceeds (§39ff.) to a detailed analysis of the three basic modes of depiction or representation [*Darstellung*] in which art participates, and its relationship with its 'material' - *Mythologie*. These three basic forms are the *symbolic*, the *schematic*, and the *allegorical*.

¹¹¹ *Philosophy*, 45.

¹¹² *Philosophie*, 50.

¹¹³ *Philosophy*, 45.

Darstellung is a form of intuiting, a mode of ontological reflection such that one potency contains immanently within itself the other. In philosophy representation strives towards:

Darstellung des Absoluten mit absoluter Indifferenz des Allgemeinen und Besonderen *im Allgemeinen*.

Representation of the absolute with absolute indifference of the universal and particular *within the universal*...

whereas art strives for:

Darstellung des Absoluten mit absoluter Indifferenz des Allgemeinen und Besonderen *im Besonderen*.¹¹⁴

Representation of the absolute with absolute indifference of the universal and the particular *within the particular*...¹¹⁵

Such intuiting, such striving for the representation of absolute indifference is not a striving for a perfect representation in objective form of some other objective entity. There is no place for a simplistic Cartesian mimesis in the Schellingian system. This striving must aim for a representation that shows the opposite within itself; thus representation means here the immanent containment of things outside itself, outside the confines of its own entity. This is not a mere mimicking of externality but a deep ontological participation of the particular in the universal and vice versa. This perfect mode of representation, Schelling terms the *symbolic*; in order to clarify his use of this term, Schelling first gives a short definition of the two lower potences of representation of which the *symbolic* is the indifference:

Diejenige Darstellung, in welcher das Allgemeine das Besondere bedeutet, oder in welcher das Besondere durch das Allgemeine angeschaut wird, ist *Schematismus*.¹¹⁶

That representation in which the universal means the particular or in which the particular is intuited through the universal is *schematism*.¹¹⁷

and then the second potency:

¹¹⁴ Both references: *Philosophie*, 50. Emphasis added.

¹¹⁵ Both references: *Philosophy*, 45.

¹¹⁶ *Philosophie*, 51.

¹¹⁷ *Philosophy*, 46.

Diejenige Darstellung aber, in welcher das Besondere das Allgemeine bedeutet, oder in welcher das Allgemeine durch das Besondere angeschaut wird, ist *allegorisch*.¹¹⁸

That representation, however, in which the particular means the universal or in which the universal is intuited through the particular is *allegory*.¹¹⁹

and, finally the synthesis:

Die Synthesis dieser beiden, wo weder das Allgemeine das Besondere, noch das Besondere das Allgemeine bedeutet, sondern wo beide absolut eins sind, ist das *Symbolische*.¹²⁰

The synthesis of these two, where neither the universal means the particular nor the particular the universal, but rather both are absolutely one, is the *symbolic*.¹²¹

As a potency of the symbolic mode, the schematic mode, then, strains for the particular. This is because it is inherently abstract and must complete itself in the particular. Thus, by means of formalised, stylised modes of representation, the particular is intuited. In Schelling's system, both painting and the formative arts and epic in the verbal arts represent this tendency. In painting, the most mimetic of the arts, colours and forms attempt a representation of the particularity of visible externality, whereas in epic, stylised characterisation, archetypal drama unfolds to uncover the particularity of the narrative.¹²²

The other potency of the symbolic is the allegorical. This potency of representation strives always for the universal or the general. This striving is informed by its deep particularity and this striving attempts constantly to complete itself in universality. Therefore, in Schelling's system, the allegorical art form in the formal arts is music and, in the verbal arts, lyric. Music, deeply material, based in the concrete element of sound, strives fundamentally for the representation of the universal, the spiritual, the ideal. As allegory, the forms of music are highly particularised, highly objective, almost void of any kind of *general* content. Similarly in lyric, a particularity

¹¹⁸ *Philosophie*, 51.

¹¹⁹ *Philosophy*, 46.

¹²⁰ *Philosophie*, 51.

¹²¹ *Philosophy*, 46.

¹²² As we shall see, however, the verbal arts belong to a higher *ideal* potency, hence the apparent abstraction or idealism of epic narrative.

of refined semantic multiplicity of inscrutably indeterminate objectivity strives for absolute idealism, spirituality and the inward reflection of the lonely spirit.

Notice, then, how the allegorical arts seem the most *autonomous* of the arts. On the one hand, the objectivity of these two arts is formidable; there seems to be an overwhelming infinity of meaning, meanings that fail to stabilise concretely the objectivity of their material. On the other hand, this almost chaotic multiplicity strives for absolute form, absolute idea, absolute spirit. Objective freedom from determinate meaning, absolute materiality, the concrete *in concreto*, are all synonyms for a fundamental *autonomy*. Only in this absolute multiplicity of meaning can art find an absolute freedom from externality.

The synthesis of these two, as we have said, is the symbolic mode. The use of this term, I suggest, is not literal in the sense of one thing representing in mere mimetic manner some other external thing. For Schelling, symbolism is the absolute indifference of real and ideal: he claims that the requirement of absolute artistic representation is:

...Darstellung mit *völliger Indifferenz*, so nämlich, daß das Allgemeine ganz das Besondere, das Besondere zugleich das ganze Allgemeine *ist*, nicht es bedeutet.¹²³

...representation with *complete indifference* such that the universal *is* completely the particular and simultaneously the particular is the entire universal, and does not merely mean or signify it.¹²⁴

It is not a matter of one *meaning* the other, then, but of one actually *being* the other, a true, absolute, indifference. This apparent suspension of the basic laws of physics is a deliberate and wilful use of a kind of super-charged metaphor, a metaphor beyond mere literary metaphor: *symbol* is a metaphor not for sympathetic meaning but for absolute identity; this absolute identity is, in turn a metaphor for immanence, for a deep-seated drive in Schelling to enclose a fundamental resonance of the 'external other' deep *within* the object:

<u>process</u>	<u>state</u>	<u>potence</u>	<u>representation</u>
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¹²³ *Philosophie*, 55.

¹²⁴ *Philosophy*, 49. Translation modified.

reflection	[a: matter]	= <u>real</u>	> <i>allegory</i>
subsumption	[b: light]	= <u>ideal</u>	> <i>schema</i>
reason	[c: organism]	= <u>indifference</u>	> <i>symbol</i>

It is as if the notion of immanent meaning, of internalised signification had been taken one step further to the point of almost total closure such that externality is so deeply embedded within the object that it is part of its essence, a kind of internal cipher, signified by the structural context of its position, so much a part of the object that externality is almost forgotten. This is explained in detail in a fascinating passage incorporating this representational element into the previous argument for mythology. Following the previous extract:

Diese Forderung ist poetisch gelöst in der Mythologie. Denn jede Gestalt in ihr ist zu nehmen als das, was sie ist, denn eben dadurch wird sie auch genommen als das was sie bedeutet. Die Bedeutung ist hier zugleich das Seyn selbst, übergegangen in den Gegenstand, mit ihm eins. Sobald wir diese Wesen etwas *bedeuten* lassen, sind sie selbst *nichts* mehr. Allein die Realität ist bei ihnen mit der Idealität eins (§29), d. h. auch ihre *Idee*, ihr Begriff, wird zerstört, wofern sie nicht als *wirklich* gedacht werden. Ihr höchster Reiz beruht eben darauf, daß sie, indem sie bloß *sind* ohne alle Beziehung - in sich selbst absolut - , doch zugleich immer die Bedeutung durchschimmern lassen. Wir begnügen uns allerdings nicht mit dem bloßen *bedeutungslosen Seyn*, dergleichen z. B. das bloße Bild gibt, aber ebensowenig mit der bloßen Bedeutung, sondern wir wollen, was Gegenstand der absoluten Kunstdarstellung seyn soll, so concret, nur sich selbst gleich wie das Bild, und doch so allgemein und sinnvoll wie der Begriff, daher die deutsche Sprache Symbol vortrefflich als Sinnbild wiedergibt.¹²⁵

The requirement is poetically resolved in mythology, since each figure is to be taken as that which it is, for precisely in this way is each also taken as that which it means or signifies. Meaning here is simultaneously being itself, passed over into the object itself and one with it. As soon as we allow these beings to *mean* or *signify* something, they themselves are no longer *anything*. Their reality is one with their ideality (§29); that is, their *idea*, their concept is also destroyed to the extent that they are not conceived as actual. Their ultimate charm resides precisely in the fact that they, by simply *being* as they are without any reference to anything else - absolute within themselves - simultaneously always allow the meaning itself to be dimly visible. I emphasize that we are not satisfied with *meaningless being*, such as that given by a mere image. Just as little are we satisfied with mere meaning. Rather whatever is to be the object of absolute artistic representation should be as concrete and self-identical as the image,

¹²⁵ *Philosophie*, 55-6.

and yet as universal and significant as the concept. Hence the German language renders the word *symbol* excellently with the term *Sinnbild*.¹²⁶

Perhaps the most fascinating element of this extract is the notion of what might be termed *absolute autonomy* and yet, conversely, the possibility of allowing *meaning* to be dimly visible [*die Bedeutung durchschimmern lassen*]. This 'dim visibility' or 'shining through' of meaning from the autonomous object is, perhaps, a recognition of the bleakness of a world of purely immanent meaning. If meaning were truly and strictly immanent, then meaning, as a notion of some internal semantic resonance straining outwards beyond the object itself, becomes highly problematic. This world would be value-free, purely objective and empty of meaning. At all points in the Schellingian system, even such extremities as this, there is always present some element of other potences. Thus, autonomy is imbued with a kind of faint skeletal meaning, a meaning which lies hidden, deep from the eye and yet which enriches the object such that it contains beauty: remember, the concrete is the final stage of beauty. So the semantic multiplicity of the object in itself is always *limited*, that is its absolute objectivity can only exist by means of its completion with immanent meaning, the inclusion of something other than itself within itself, in turn informing the very essence of that object.

Autonomy in Schelling's view, then, can exist only to the extent that it is not merely pure meaningless existence [*bloßen bedeutungslosen Seyn*] but subsumes into this apparent autonomy the essence of its opposite, the possibility of 'formulating ever new relationships' from within. Returning again to mythology, Schelling makes the following point:

§40. Der Charakter der wahren Mythologie ist der der Universalität, der Unendlichkeit...¹²⁷

§40. The character of true mythology is that of universality and infinity...¹²⁸

¹²⁶ *Philosophy*, 49. Stott gives the translation of *Sinnbild* as 'sense meaning/image' which is probably as accurate as we can get without giving a clumsy rendering. The German term *Sinn* can be rendered as 'sense' or 'meaning' and *Bild* as 'image' or 'picture.' I would therefore have placed the slash between *sense* and *meaning* thus: 'sense/meaning image.'

¹²⁷ *Philosophie*, 57.

¹²⁸ *Philosophy*, 50.

If autonomy is to be seen as absolute objectivity, materiality beyond finite reason, a kind of absolute finitude, then infinity, the opposite potency, must be seen in its *autonomy* as absolute ideality, absolute subjectivity such that the division of the absolute *into* these two potencies polarises the characteristics by limitation:

Diese Unendlichkeit muß sich gegenüber von dem Verstand dadurch ausdrücken, daß kein Verstand fähig ist sie ganz zu entwickeln, daß in ihm selbst eine unendliche Möglichkeit liegt, immer neue Beziehungen zu bilden.¹²⁹

As far as understanding is concerned, this infinity must express itself such that no understanding is capable of developing it entirely, and such that in it there resides the infinite possibility to formulate ever new relationships.¹³⁰

In both extremities, then, there exists on the one hand the possibility to formulate a multiplicity of relationships and meanings, and yet, on the other, there is always the 'dim visibility' of something *meaningful*, a kind of dark inner essence that can only be uncovered by a specialised scrutiny. Regarding the question of autonomy and meaning, Schelling continues:

...die Dichtungen der Mythologie sind zugleich bedeutend und bedeutungslos, - bedeutend, weil ein Allgemeines im Besondere, bedeutungslos, weil beides wieder mit absoluter Indifferenz, so daß das, worin indifferenziert, wieder absolut, um seiner selbst willen ist.¹³¹

...the poetic renderings of mythology are simultaneously meaningful and meaningless - meaningful because they represent a universal in the particular, meaningless because they represent both with absolute indifference, such that the element in which they are indifferent is itself nonetheless absolute and has integrity in and for itself.¹³²

Mythology, then, the fundamental discourse of archetypal intuition is both meaningful and meaningless. By this Schelling brings about an absolute point of identity, an equality of opposites in the element of mythology rendered in poesy. This objectivity of poesy, the early artistic expression of synthesis *in concreto*, remains an absolute point of truth for Schelling. The best art strives for its own integrity, on its own terms, and in and for itself. It is, to this extent at least, *autonomous*.

¹²⁹ *Philosophie*, 58.

¹³⁰ *Philosophy* 50. Translation modified.

¹³¹ *Philosophie*, 58.

¹³² *Philosophy*, 51.

A clear definition of Schellingian autonomy in art is now emerging. Autonomy exists where there is extremity, severity of objectivity, but, conversely, where that objectivity, that 'materiality' is the *form* of an absolute point of identity, of the indifference of the finite and the infinite. The extremity of this objectivity, the absolute immanence of the products of art, is mediated by a meaning *in autonomy*. The autonomy is not violated by the dim semantic resonance of the internal essence. This is Schelling's profoundly ontological programme - the quest for internality, the quest for that which is *beyond* external form.

As if to begin this quest, Schelling attempts to make some basic observations on the content of art:

§43. Im Stoff der Kunst ist kein Gegensatz denkbar als ein formeller. Dem Wesen nach ist nämlich jener immer und ewig eins, immer und nothwendig absolute Identität des Allgemeinen und des Besonderen. Wenn also überhaupt ein Gegensatz in Ansehung des Stoffs stattfindet, so ist er bloß formell, und als solcher muß er auch objektiv sich ausdrücken als bloßer Gegensatz in der Zeit.¹³³

§43. In the material of art the only conceivable antithesis is a formal one. Essentially that material is always and eternally *one*, always and necessarily absolute identity of the universal and the particular. If, therefore, any antithesis at all occurs as regards that material itself, it must be merely formal and as such it must also manifest itself objectively as a mere temporal antithesis.¹³⁴

Antithesis, then, is formal, it exists outside of the content of art which is the identity of the finite and the infinite. The formal antithesis can also be demonstrated more clearly in the apparent outer forms of the material of art. Such forms can appear to be products of nature on the one hand and products of freedom on the other. This is the antithesis of necessity and freedom, the political potences. From §43 onwards, Schelling builds a critique of historicism based around these two political axioms.

The first potency, necessity, is described as 'the unity of the universe with the finite' [*Einheit des Universums mit dem Endlichen*]. Necessity is thus the indivisible 'unity' of the general and the particular, a proposition that, as we shall see, has profound ramifications for the metaphysics of the individual. This absolute identity is

¹³³ *Philosophie*, 95

¹³⁴ *Philosophy*, 78. Translation modified.

contrasted with the potency of freedom, the 'unity' of the finite with the infinite (the result being infinitude, not concrete form as in necessity) and is thus the free-play of the empirical moment as pointing to something beyond the objective.

Necessity is thus roughly synonymous with immanent immanence, a secret fusion of object and essence, and freedom is the semantic indeterminacy, the meaning by virtue of a relation to something else:

Im ersten Fall ist das Endliche zugleich das Unendliche selbst, nicht bloß es bedeutend, eben darum etwas für sich, auch unabhängig von seiner Bedeutung. Im andern Falle ist es für sich selbst nichts, nur in der Beziehung aufs Unendliche.¹³⁵

In the first case the finite is simultaneously the infinite itself, and does not merely signify it. Hence, it is also something in and for itself even independently of its meaning. In the second case it is actually nothing for itself, only in its relationship to the infinite.¹³⁶

Necessity, then, sets up a relationship whereby the finite is a symbol of the infinite, they are identical, indivisible. In freedom, however, the finite strains for the infinite, it is empty in itself, devoid of self-quality and is an allegory of the infinite. If mythology is an expression of necessity, the absolute unity of infinite and finite, then freedom finds its expression in *religion*, and its necessary corollary, history:

§47. In der Mythologie der ersten Art wird das Universum angeschaut als Natur, in der andern als Welt der Vorsehung oder als Geschichte.¹³⁷

§47. In the mythology of the first kind the universe is intuited as nature, in the second kind as a world of providence or as history.¹³⁸

So whereas universality is objective in the first type of mythology, in the second, universality is experienced *in time*:

§50. Dort wird Polytheismus durch Naturbegrenzung (von dem hergenommen, was in den Raum fällt), hier nur durch Begrenzung in der Zeit möglich seyn. Folgt von selbst. Alle Anschauung Gottes nur in der Geschichte.¹³⁹

¹³⁵ *Philosophie*, 97.

¹³⁶ *Philosophy*, 79. Translation modified.

¹³⁷ *Philosophie*, 97.

¹³⁸ *Philosophy*, 79.

¹³⁹ *Philosophie*, 98.

§50. In the former case polytheism will be possible by means of natural limitation (acquired from that which exists within the parameters of space); in the latter it will be possible only by means of limitation in time. This follows of itself. All intuition of God is possible only in history.¹⁴⁰

This temporal element can be explained by our Christian notion of life as somehow false, a prelude to the real existence in the kingdom of Christ. In mythology, the gods are present, within reach, they are real *now* and they symbolise the relations of characteristics that govern man; indeed they are one and the same. Hence *space* and *limitation* are fundamental. In Christianity, however, this spirituality is separated from material existence and upheld as the final reward for pious persistence in the material realm; hence the profound significance of *time*. Regarding the poesies of these two types, Schelling gives a profound insight into the respective cultural function of the individual:

§48. In der poetischen Welt der ersten Art wird die Gattung sich zum Individuum oder Besondern ausbilden, in der andern das Individuum für sich das Allgemeine auszudrücken streben.¹⁴¹

§48. In the poetic world of the first sort the collective will develop into the individual or particular, in the second case the individual will strive by itself to express the universal.¹⁴²

This is not surprising, for if nature is the realm of the gods, then finitude is synonymous with spirituality. Therefore the strain for the particular, as the perfect form of the universal is clear in mythology. In this sense, individuality as a *single person*, is not what Schelling means here, for such absolute individuality is impossible in the indifference of mythology. By *das Individuum* Schelling means a *particularity in collectivity*.

In the latter mode, the individual allegorises the universal, it is a *representation* of the universal and thereby exists only by virtue of the universal. Mythology, in this sense, then, is a world system that seems almost to function free from instrumental cognition; for Christianity to acquire such independence, such self-conspicuity, it must seek its natural form in time:

¹⁴⁰ *Philosophy*, 80.

¹⁴¹ *Philosophie*, 97.

¹⁴² *Philosophy*, 80. Translation modified.

Zusatz 3. Die Ideen dieser Religion an und für sich selbst konnten nicht mythologisch seyn. Denn sie sind durchaus unsinnlich. Beweis an der Dreieinigkeit, den Eugeln u.s.w.

Zusatz 4. Nur in der Historie konnte eine solche Religion mythologischer Stoff werden. Denn nur darin erlangen sie [die Ideen] eine Unabhängigkeit von ihrer Bedeutung.¹⁴³

Addendum 3. The ideas of this religion in and for themselves were not capable of becoming mythological, since they are completely nonsensual. This proof could be demonstrated using the examples of the Trinity, angels, and so on.

Addendum 4. Only in historical material could such a religion become mythological material, since only thereby do the ideas acquire independence from their meaning.¹⁴⁴

We can now see how antiquity's mythology represents for Schelling a fundamental paradigm. Art, as a concrete manifestation of the indifference of ideal and real, participates in that division of itself by which mythology is shown to operate. The symbolic mode of representation, the fundamental identity of signifier and signified is the centre of Schelling's autonomy aesthetic: the signifier is bearer of the meaning or is somehow moulded to that meaning it wishes to convey. In Christianity, this natural harmony is somehow disturbed. The individual becomes a concrete representation of the universal and exists only *by virtue of this relationship*. In other words, meaning is *present* in the objective realm, undifferentiated from it in mythology, whereas the notion of 'man' in Christian culture represents the separation of meaning from the objective realm. Man is, in this sense, the articulation of a relationship between the purely divine and the purely material. This mediation might exist as a semiological construct, as Foucault has suggested, or as an agent in the broader dynamic of particular and general.

It is interesting that Schelling makes this division between the individual as *allegory* and autonomy as *symbolic unity*. Clearly, the deeper message, the subtext, of Schelling's metaphysics lies in the absolute authenticity of the essence, the absolute and concrete unity of real and ideal in the work of art, and in the ontology of the object of scrutiny *per se*. The individual is somehow secondary to this authenticity.

¹⁴³ *Philosophie*, 99.

¹⁴⁴ *Philosophy*, 81.

On Ontology

The third chapter of part 1, 'Konstruktion der Besonderen oder der Form der Kunst' constructs the *particular* in art. As we have already seen, the commodity of art is the concrete embodiment of a perfect unity; Schelling now proceeds to delineate the particular of this objective appearance. It is not surprising, therefore, that, as an analysis of the objective characteristics of commodity autonomy, this chapter is the most empirically inclined so far. It begins, once again, with a question:

Wie geht jener allgemeine Stoff über in die besondere Form und wird Materie des besonderen Kunstwerks?¹⁴⁵

How does the universal content make the transition into particular form and become the material of a particular work of art?¹⁴⁶

Having implicitly criticised Christianity, it seems strange that Schelling should find his answer in monotheism:

§62. Das unmittelbar Hervorbringende des Kunstwerks oder des einzelnen wirklichen Dings, durch welches in der idealen Welt das Absolute real-objektiv wird, ist der ewige Begriff oder die Idee des Menschen in Gott, der mit der Seele selbst eins und mit ihr verbunden ist...Dieser ist aus §23 zu führen, nach welchem die formale oder absolute Ursache aller Kunst Gott ist.¹⁴⁷

§62. The immediately productive element of the work of art or of the individual, real thing through which the absolute becomes real-objective in the ideal world, is the eternal concept or idea of man in God, a concept that is one with the soul itself and is bound to it....The proof is to be provided on the basis of §23 according to which the formal or absolute cause of all art is God.¹⁴⁸

This apparent contradiction cannot be ignored. The notion of *time* as the essential dimension of Christianity and the cultural primacy of historical thought in Christian thought are both products of the central *allegorical* modes of representation in Christianity. This striving for the spiritual, a direct result of the *deep particularity* of the real series, is also a striving for the extreme universality, a singularity, an end to the multiplicity of particular existence. This need is supplied by the construct 'God'.

¹⁴⁵ *Philosophie*, 102.

¹⁴⁶ *Philosophy*, 83. Translation modified.

¹⁴⁷ *Philosophie*, 102-3.

¹⁴⁸ *Philosophy*, 83. Translation modified.

However, it seems Schelling is unwilling to shed his Christian beliefs in the interest of the consistency of his system. He takes the Christian 'God' and uses it as a kind of equivalence to the Absolute. The universality of God is in turn the absolute in all forms:

Gott producirt aus sich nichts, als worin wieder sein ganzes Wesen ausgedrückt ist, nichts also, das nicht wieder producirt, wieder Universum wäre...

Das Produciren Gottes ist ein ewiger, d.h. überhaupt kein Verhältniß zur Zeit habender Akt der Selbstaffirmation, worin eine reale und ideale Seite. In jener gebiert er seine Unendlichkeit in die Endlichkeit und ist Natur, in dieser nimmt er die Endlichkeit wieder zurück in seine Unendlichkeit.¹⁴⁹

God produces nothing from within himself that does not in its own turn contain and express his entire essence, and hence nothing that is not productive in its own turn and is itself a universe...

The productiveness of God is an eternal act of self-affirmation having absolutely no relationship to time, and itself contains both a real and ideal side. In the former he begets his own infinitude into finitude and is *nature*; in the latter he takes finitude back again into his infinitude.¹⁵⁰

It is this apparent contradiction, the *allegorical* function of Christian culture, and the *absolute* function of the Christian God as general creativity that Schelling bases his philosophy of art. Allowing God, general creativity, to slip into absolute equivalence places creativity itself at the very heart of Schelling's cosmology. As early as §24, God was given as the immediate cause of art. Further to that, Schelling now asserts that God produces particularity from himself only as a mediator. He is the embodiment, easy in its relative finitude as symbol, of the *process* of *Hervorbringung*. In this sense, God is *becoming*. God's objectivity, that is the objectivity of general creativity, comes about only through this process *called* God. In other words, the essence, the process and the objective result all exist as God:

Nun producirt aber Gott unmittelbar und aus sich selbst nur die Idee der Dinge, wirkliche und besondere Dinge aber nur mittelbar in der reflektirten Welt.

Inwiefern also das Princip der göttlichen Ineinsbildung, d. h. Gott selbst, durch besondere Dinge objektiv wird, insofern ist nicht *Gott* unmittelbar und an sich selbst betrachtet, sondern nur Gott als das Wesen eines Besonderen und in der Beziehung auf ein Besonderes das, was die besonderen Dinge producirt.¹⁵¹

¹⁴⁹ *Philosophie*, 104.

¹⁵⁰ *Philosophy*, 84-5.

¹⁵¹ *Philosophie*, 103.

God, however, produces directly and from within himself only the ideas of things, and produces real or particular things only mediately in the reflected world. Hence, to the extent that this principle of divine informing, that is, God himself, becomes objective through particular things, *God* directly and viewed in himself is not that which actually produces particular things, but rather only God as the essence of a particular and in relationship to a particular thing.¹⁵²

In this sense, art, as a finite product of *Hervorbringung* is an essential element of the cosmos, it is the central commodity of the God-centred world. This general creativity is given mediation by *particular* creativity in man:

§63. Dieser ewige Begriff des Menschen in Gott als der unmittelbaren Ursache seiner Produktionen ist das, was man *Genie*, gleichsam den Genius, das inwohnende Göttliche des Menschen, nennt. Er ist so zu sagen ein Stück aus der Absolutheit Gottes.¹⁵³

§63. This eternal concept of man in God as the immediate cause of his productions is that which one calls *genius*, as it were the *daemon*, the indwelling divinity of man. It is, so to speak, a piece of the absoluteness of God.¹⁵⁴

Thus, the genius, the creative in the *particular*, mediates God's creativity and produces concrete symbols (in the Schellingian sense) of perfect absoluteness - the work of art.¹⁵⁵ The separation of the individual genius from general creativity rests in an organic ordering of all creativity in the absolute:

Jeder Künstler kann daher auch nur so viel produciren, als mit dem ewigen Begriff seines eignen Wesen in Gott verbunden ist. Je mehr nun in diesem für sich schon das Universum angeschaut wird, je organischer er ist, je mehr er die Endlichkeit der Unendlichkeit verknüpft, desto produktiver.¹⁵⁶

Each artist can thus produce only as much as is bound to the eternal concept of his own essence in God. The more within that essence in and for itself the universe is intuited, the more organic he is, the more he links his finitude to infinitude, the more productive he will be.¹⁵⁷

The inviolate necessity of the individual is thus elucidated in terms of *genius*, that is the *creative individual* who necessarily expresses the universal. This universality of the individual, a rather abstracted expression of early classical liberalism, is a metaphysical

¹⁵² *Philosophy*, 84. Translation modified.

¹⁵³ *Philosophie*, 104.

¹⁵⁴ *Philosophy*, 84. Translation modified.

¹⁵⁵ The 'symbol' in Schelling's system is a concrete product of the perfect unity of the *real* and the *ideal*, or the *particular* and the *general*.

¹⁵⁶ *Philosophie*, 104.

¹⁵⁷ *Philosophy*, 84. Translation modified.

synonym for the democratic notions of free equivalence. Individuals, free to exchange commodity, free to produce, fundamentally violate both Cartesian mechanic reductionism and cameralist notions of a fixed community centred around a *general servicing* point. The centralisation of specialist servicing, cutting across the more introverted older communities constitutes, as we have seen, a kind of preparation for nationhood. The metaphysical 'individual' in Schelling can thus be seen to represent an argument for the inviolate necessity of some kind of universal, standardised representation, a kind of metaphysical universal suffrage. In this sense, *universality*, as the goal of the creative individual, is the metaphysical expression of the economic notion of *equivalence*.

This reading of the apparent politics of the Schellingian method is not merely metaphorical. The profound cogency of this period centres around the structural alignment of all discourses around the product of ontology. This essentialising urge is a partial *forgetting*, a driving of some element of the signification of the objective world into obscurity. Ontology, in this sense, relies on a basic bottom line beyond which speculation or faith must take over. In Schelling's metaphysical expression of economic equivalence, there is a recognition of essence as a central category, but a constant *forgetting* in the account of the intuition of these particular essences from the one absolute essence. The metaphysics of the Schellingian commodity are not merely literal, then. In §64, Schelling draws a sharp distinction between individual creativity and individual productivity in itself:

§64... Die reale Seite des Genies oder diejenige Einheit, welche Einbildung des Unendlichen ins Endliche ist, kann im engern Sinn die *Poesie*, die ideale Seite oder diejenige Einheit, welche Einbildung des Endlichen ins Unendliche ist, kann die *Kunst* in der Kunst heißen.¹⁵⁸

§64... The real side of genius, or that unity that constitutes the informing of the infinite into the finite, can be called *poesy* in the narrower sense; the ideal side, of that unity that constitutes the informing of the finite into the infinite, can be called *art* within art.¹⁵⁹

¹⁵⁸ *Philosophie*, 105.

¹⁵⁹ *Philosophy*, 85.

Implicit in this distinction is a critique of the Cartesian aesthetic of clarity and craftsmanship:

Unter Poesie im engeren Sinne wird, wenn wir uns auch bloß an die Sprachbedeutung halten, das unmittelbare Hervorbringen oder Schaffen eines Realen verstanden, die Invention an und für sich selbst. Alles unmittelbare Hervorbringen oder Schaffen ist aber immer und nothwendig Darstellung eines Unendlichen, eines Begriffs in einem Endlichen oder Realen.¹⁶⁰

By poesy in the narrower sense - if we stay close to the original meaning of the word - we understand the immediate production or creation of something *real*, or *invention* in and for itself. All immediate production or creation, however, is always and necessarily the representation of something infinite, a concept within something finite or real.¹⁶¹

Poesie, then, refers to a kind of general productivity in itself - a general drive for the particular - which in itself has to extend itself into infinity to symbolise a perfect unity.

Compare this with 'art' [*Kunst*]:

Die Idee der Kunst beziehen wir alle auf die entgegengesetzte Einheit, die der Einbildung des Besonderen ins Allgemeine.¹⁶²

Most of us refer the idea of art more to the opposite unity, that of the informing of a particular into the universal.¹⁶³

*Art*¹⁶⁴ by contrast is a production [*Hervorbringen*] which aims beyond its mere objectivity. It is not a menial craftsmanship but an *intuiting*, a projection of the individual's essence, of the absolute into concrete form, and thus raises the concrete beyond objectivity, finitude into the infinite. In another sense, art strains for the universal as does the individual¹⁶⁵ and in so straining provides a secular discourse beyond materiality which expresses a metaphysical mode of *equivalence*. Man is the equivalent of God on earth, he is the resolution of God's divinity, his absolute presence, into finite form. The organic notion of man as a microcosm of the structures of general divinity, God, are discussed later. For the moment, the main feature that is of import is the notion of a structural sympathy across parts of the general structure.

¹⁶⁰ *Philosophie*, 105.

¹⁶¹ *Philosophy*, 85. Translation modified.

¹⁶² *Philosophie*, 105.

¹⁶³ *Philosophy*, 85.

¹⁶⁴ To distinguish between *Kunst an (und für) sich* and *Kunst* as its potency, the opposite of *Poesie*, I use *Art* as the general, *Kunst* as the potency.

¹⁶⁵ See *Philosophie*, 97ff.

As a 'part' of God, man nonetheless represents the general by means of *equivalence* or resemblance.¹⁶⁶

From §65 onwards, Schelling devotes his attention to a close analysis of this *intuiting* of the universal. The two potences of this process are 'the sublime' [*die Erhabenheit*] and 'beauty' [*Schönheit*]. The former is described in the following terms:

Die Meinung ist eigentlich diese: wo die Aufnahme des Unendlichen ins Endliche als solche, das Unendliche also im Endlichen unterschieden wird, urtheilen wir, daß der Gegenstand, worin dieß der Fall ist, erhaben sey... Die Anschauung des Erhabenen tritt dann ein, wenn die sinnliche Anschauung für die Größe des sinnlichen Gegenstandes unangemessen gefunden wird, und nun das wahre Unendliche hervortritt, für welches jenes bloß sinnliche Unendliche zum Symbol wird.¹⁶⁷

The point is actually this: wherever we encounter the infinite being taken up into the finite as such - whenever we distinguish the infinite within the finite - we judge that the object in which this takes place is sublime... The intuition of the sublime enters only when the sensual, concrete intuition is seen to be inadequate for the greatness¹⁶⁸ of the concrete object, and then the truly infinite appears for which the merely concretely infinite is the symbol.¹⁶⁹

Turning to Schiller, Schelling evokes a kind of nature spiritualism; the sublime in this sense is a belittling of *particular* comprehension [*Fassungskraft*] in the light of a broader, overwhelming materiality. Thus, the inadequacy of sensual intuition in the face of awesome objectivity brings about a kind of positing outwards of nature, a substitution of magic or mystery where finitude is severe. But this positing is not the positing of finitude into the infinite. In one sense, it is the opposite urge, the *real* urge

¹⁶⁶ This is not synonymous with the notions ingrained in Schelling's system of *identity*. Identity is evoked across structures of equal stature, and stems from the use of the *Bestimmungsarten* as modes of perception, allowing an equal and opposite reinterpretation of the original assumption. This point clearly emerges in *Philosophie*, 148: 'Hiernach bestimmt sich nun auch die Stelle, welche die Musik in dem allgemeinen System der Künste einnimmt. - Wie sich der allgemeine Weltbau ganz unabhängig verhält von den andern Potenzen der Natur, und je nachdem er von der einer Seite betrachtet wird, das Höchste und allgemeinste ist, worin sich unmittelbar in die reinste Vernunft auflöst, was im Concreten sich noch verwirrt, von der andern Seite aber auch die tiefste Potenz ist: so auch die Musik, welche, von der einen Seite betrachtet, die allgemeinste unter den realen Künsten und der Auflösung in Rede und Vernunft am nächsten ist, obgleich von der andern nur die erste Potenz ist.'

¹⁶⁷ *Philosophie*, 106.

¹⁶⁸ One might better translate *Größe*, in the light of Schelling and Schiller's notion of the sublime as a response to the hugeness or magnificent complexity of nature, as 'enormity' or 'immensity' since 'greatness' can suggest a sense of grandeur which is not necessarily present in the broader argument.

¹⁶⁹ *Philosophy*, 85-6.

to intuit infinity into finitude, with finitude as the final result, or, put another way, to imbue infinity with finitude. The extremity of the sublime's objectivity is somehow replaced by a kind of false infinity in the guise of incomprehensibility. Faced with a formidable materiality, the *particular* creativity, the individual, superimposes or presupposes a spirituality a magnificence beyond objectivity which he or she then re-informs into the finite:

Diese Anschauung der Erhabenen ist ihrer Verwandschaft mit dem Ideellen und Sittlichen unerachtet eine ästhetische Anschauung, um hier einmal dieses Wort zu gebrauchen. Das Unendliche ist das Herrschende, aber es herrscht doch nur, inwiefern es in dem sinnlich-Unendlichen, das insofern wieder ein Endliches ist, angeschaut wird.¹⁷⁰

This intuition of the sublime, in spite of its kinship with the element of the ideal and the ethical, is an aesthetic intuition, to use this word here finally. The infinite is the predominate element, yet it predominates only to the extent that it is intuited within the sensually infinite, which to that extent is itself finite.¹⁷¹

So, although infinity reigns absolute, it does so only in the realm of the finite, a realm it can never leave in the sublime. In this sense, the sublime offers a kind of release, a way of creating something outside of the mundane, a self-constructed other-world free from suffering:

Wie der tapfere Mann in dem Moment, wo alle Kräfte der Natur und des Verhängnisses auf ihn zugleich feindlich eindringen, in dem Moment selbst des höchsten Leidens zur höchsten Befreiung und zu einer überirdischen Luft übergeht, die alle Schranken des Leidens abgelegt hat, so geht dem, der das Anlitz der furchtbaren und zerstörenden Natur erträgt, das höchste Aufgebot ihrer verderbenden Kräfte selbst, die absolute Anschauung auf, welche der Sonne gleicht, die aus den Gewitterwolken bricht.¹⁷²

At the very moment when all the hostile forces of nature and of fate simultaneously close in upon a person, at the moment of highest suffering itself, the courageous person is able to make the transition to the ultimate liberation and otherworldly pleasure transcending all the limitations of suffering. Similarly, the person who bears the countenance of nature in all its terror and destruction, nature's ultimate offering of its own destructive forces, is granted that absolute vision that is like the sun itself that finally breaks through dark storm clouds.¹⁷³

¹⁷⁰ *Philosophie*, 107.

¹⁷¹ *Philosophy*, 86. Translation modified.

¹⁷² *Philosophie*, 108.

¹⁷³ *Philosophy*, 87.

And yet, it can do this *within* the finite realm. We might say, then, that the sublime is the bringing of finitude to infinity, the final objectification of infinity in the materiality of the colossal, overwhelming realm of nature; it thus belongs to the *real* series. The notion of immenseness is essential to the sublime, and, by its extremity, informs a passing over into infinity:

Die Form ist, wie immer, so auch hier das Endliche, nur ist die Bestimmung hinzugefügt worden, daß es hier als relativ unendlich, und in der Beziehung auf sinnliche Anschauung als absolut groß erscheinen müsse. Es ist aber eben dadurch von dem Endlichen die Form negiert, und wir begreifen hierdurch, wie es eben das Formlose ist, welches für uns am unmittelbarsten *erhaben* d. h. Symbol des Unendlichen als solchen wird.¹⁷⁴

Here, too, form, as always, is the finite element, except that here the condition has been added that it must appear relatively infinite, and from the physical perspective must appear absolutely colossal. This, however, negates the *form* of the finite, and we now see how it is precisely formlessness that most immediately acquires the character of *sublimity* for us, that is, that most immediately becomes the symbol of the infinite as such.¹⁷⁵

This notion of formlessness is perhaps the most interesting element of this passage. If we recall Schelling's argument for the absolute as *eine absolute, bodenlose Leere*,¹⁷⁶ there is always a sense of something unwieldy outside our grasp, something beyond mere understanding. In the sublime, this tendency to sublimate or 'cast out' into a magical realm those things which confuse or frustrate reason is at its most severe.

This 'casting out' or mystification of the colossal realm of nature can be seen also in Schiller. Indeed, Schelling makes constant reference to the seminal *Ueber das Erhabene* by Schiller. Of particular note is the notion they both share of *das Unbegreifliche selbst zum Standpunkt der Beurtheilung*:¹⁷⁷

Durch die Anschauung des Chaos, möchte ich sagen, geht der Verstand zu aller Erkenntniß des Absoluten, es sey in der Kunst oder in der Wissenschaft, über. Das gemeine Wissen, wenn es, nach vergeblichem Bestreben das Chaos von Erscheinungen in der Natur und der Geschichte mit dem Verstand

¹⁷⁴ *Philosophie*, 108.

¹⁷⁵ *Philosophy*, 87.

¹⁷⁶ *Philosophie*, 37.

¹⁷⁷ *Philosophie*, 110. Schiller reference: *Ueber das Erhabene*, Taschenausgabe, 1847 Bd. 12, 292. Literally, 'The incomprehensible itself as a principle of judgement'. *Philosophy*, 88.

auszuschöpfen, zu dem Entschluß übergeht, "das Unbegreifliche selbst, wie Schiller sagt, zum Standpunkt der Beurtheilung."¹⁷⁸

What I would like to say is that through this vision of chaos, the understanding passes over to the perception of the absolute, be it in art or in science. After unsuccessful attempts to exhaust the chaos of the phenomena in nature and in history by means of the understanding, ordinary perception or knowledge resolves to take "the incomprehensibility itself," as Schiller says, "as a principle of judgement."¹⁷⁹

If formlessness is the highest form then it follows that chaos is always present in the absolute. For 'chaos' in this context we might read a certain distinction or separation from Cartesian rationality, a distancing from tables of visible conspicuity and a movement towards a more fragmented, compartmentalised, less universal reason. In this sense, chaos is a symbol of the autonomy of the objective world, its independence, in part at least, from reason. It is of no surprise that notions of artistic and intellectual autonomy should accompany the collapse of the Cartesian paradigm. With this reaction against the clarity or sterility of enlightenment thought came the need for a certain element of 'otherness', a means of allowing reason to participate in reality rather than impose itself *upon* it. Thus, Schelling uses Chaos as a metaphor for this alien, strange, magical element that is outside reason:

Die Natur ist allerdings nicht nur in ihrer unserer Fassungskraft unerreichbaren Größe oder in ihrer unserer physischen Gewalt unbefiegbaren Macht erhaben, sie ist es auch allgemein in dem Chaos oder, wie Schiller sie ausgedrückt, in der Verwirrung ihrer Erscheinungen überhaupt.¹⁸⁰

Nature is sublime not only in its greatness to the extent that it is inaccessible to our powers of comprehension, and not only in its power to the extent that it remains absolutely impervious to our own physical strength. It is also sublime in a general fashion within chaos, or, as Schiller puts it, in the *confusion* of its own appearances at large.¹⁸¹

In this way, reason can exist alongside other elements of the objective world. It becomes one of many discourses, one of many means of participating in the objective realm. It thus acquires a certain autonomy from other matters and turns inwards on itself, and finally, as we have said, fragments into tiny empirical operations.

¹⁷⁸ *Philosophie*, 110.

¹⁷⁹ *Philosophy*, 88.

¹⁸⁰ *Philosophie*, 109.

¹⁸¹ *Philosophy*, 88.

For the moment, however, this fragmentation can be held off. Philosophy carves for itself a universal discourse and allows itself to wield remarkable power over other discourses. Art, too, in its even greater ability to engage with chaos, wields a mighty and powerful hold over early nineteenth-century discourses. And for Schelling, this 'beauty' and 'the sublime' of creative production is the key to bridging the gap between rational impulse and objective inviolate separation. The sublime, then, affects its power in terms of a reconstructed *Ersatz*-absolute.

In beauty, there is no such *Ersatz*. If the sublime is the confrontation of the finite and the infinite in concrete form, then the beautiful is the perfect harmony of the finite and the infinite in the same concrete form. If the sublime yearned outwards, away from limitation, but remaining still in the objective realm, hence tending towards the chaotic, beauty is inward-moving from the infinite to the finite, an imbuing of the infinite with the finite. In concrete form, beauty is a kind of synthesis of concrete limitation and infinity. The beautiful thus seals into itself that which is outside of itself. It carries beneath its surfaces that which cannot possibly be limited, infinity, *in limited form*. This antithesis-immanence in the form of a kind of 'shining through' of infinity¹⁸² in finitude is a fundamental premise of the art commodity in Schelling. As if to underline the immanent commodity status of art, Schelling continues in §69 to seek for the potences the sublime and beauty in art itself and not, as up to now, in the more general terms of finitude and infinity:

§69. Der Gegensatz der beiden Einheiten in der Kunst für sich betrachtet kann sich nur als Styl and Manier ausdrücken.¹⁸³

§69. This contrast of the two unities within art viewed in and for itself can express itself only as style and mannersim.¹⁸⁴

In *Poesie* this same unity is expressed as the *naïve* and the *sentimental*¹⁸⁵ where the naïve allows nature or externality to appear and somehow shame art. This overwhelming of the creative urge leads to a kind of basic reflective redistribution of

¹⁸² See *Philosophie*, 55-6, in particular the notion of *das durchschimmern Lassen*.

¹⁸³ *Philosophie*, 118.

¹⁸⁴ *Philosophy*, 94.

¹⁸⁵ *Philosophie*, 114-7.

nature through art, but remaining nonetheless as pure nature. The sentimental, on the other hand, is the relentless subjectivity of the individual as the reflex for all he sees and reproduces. In this sense, the naïve is the primitive or antiquarian impulse whereas the sentimental is the 'modern' impulse:¹⁸⁶

Es erhellt schon aus Schillers Abhandlung, daß der Grundcharakter der Modernen im Gegensatz gegen die Alten als der sentimentale ausgedrückt werden kann.¹⁸⁷

It is clear from Schiller's essay that the basic character of modernity in contrast to antiquity can be expressed as sentimentality.¹⁸⁸

This antithesis in *Poesie* or particularised creative production is, in *Kunst*, the antithesis of *Styl* and *Manier*.

This distinction has the same critical edge as that in poesy. Style is the perfect unity, the resulting of an intuiting in concrete form, thus informing an immanent objectivity, richly laden with the chaotic consequences of its opposite, infinity. Thus, for art, as the real *par excellence*, synthesis takes place in the realm of the objective. Mannerism, then, like sentimentality, is somehow imbued with a sense of incompleteness. It strains outwards beyond the objective and yet its result has to be objective:

Allgemein können wir nun die Manier im verwerflichen Sinne, demnach die *Manierirtheit*, erklären als ein Geltendmachen der besonderen Form statt der allgemeinen. Da dem Künstler überhaupt nur die Form zu Gebot steht, so daß er allein durch diese das Wesen erreicht, dem Wesen aber nur die absolute Form adäquat ist, so löst sich mit der Manier in diesem Sinne unmittelbar auch das Wesen der Kunst selbst auf. Am meisten zeigt sich Manierirtheit in einem Bestreben nach oberflächlicher, nur ungeübte Augen blendender Eleganz und schwächerer Schönheit, in dem Geleckten, Verwachsenen mancher Werke, deren einziges oder Hauptverdienst wenigstens das Saubere ist.¹⁸⁹

In general we can now accordingly explain mannerism in the objectionable sense, and accordingly as *affectation*, as an assertion of the particular form instead of the

¹⁸⁶ The usage of the term 'modern' here is less weighted with eager progressivist cries of 'forward, forward' than with expressions of dismay at the loss of a former glorious art. Having said this, the critical edge here is not to be likened with the dogmatic atavism of a Möser in the *Osnabrückische Geschichte*.

¹⁸⁷ *Philosophie*, 116.

¹⁸⁸ *Philosophy*, 93.

¹⁸⁹ *Philosophie*, 120-1.

universal one. Since in general the artist only has as his disposal, such that he expresses or achieves the essence only through form, and since only absolute form itself fully corresponds to that essence, mannerism in this sense directly suspends the very essence of art itself as well. Affectation manifests itself most often as a striving for superficial elegance that bedazzles only unpractised eyes, and toward insipid beauty, and in the pale, washed-over element of some works whose only or main virtue is at least cleanliness.¹⁹⁰

This implicit critique, once again, of Cartesian notions of visible conspicuity and semantic clarity centres around the notion of *particular form*. If affectation or mannerism is mesmerised by *form in itself*, as a particular that strives only for objectivity, which, like sentimentality, it raises to the false heights of absoluteness and then thinks itself to have 'returned', all the wiser, to objectivity, then it too is incomplete. Instead, this time, of the creative urge feeling overwhelmed by the colossal objectivity of nature, the inventive/productive urge (= poesy) is overwhelmed by the fragmented particularity of form. In this sense, Schelling's apparent call for autonomy in art is always mediated by an unwillingness to give in completely to absolute immanence. This, in Schelling's system, would be to recognise the absolute impervious 'given' of the cameralist encyclopaedic order. If absolute immanence is always mediated by the internally resonating semantics of the organic order, then autonomy exists only as a posited norm around which Schelling's potences oscillate, returning never to rest, never to absolute autonomy and yet recognising implicitly in each other the 'centre' from which it is constantly displaced.

Taking this metaphor further, it becomes clear that autonomy never exists absolutely: such a positing would mean the dreadful consequence of no dynamism and absolute inertia: if one potency is a displacement from its centre, autonomy, then its antithesis represents an equal but opposite displacement:

Diese Gegensätze gehören alle zu einer und derselben Familie und gehen sämtlich aus dem ersten Verhältniß der Kunst als absoluter Form zu der besondern Form hervor, die durch die Individuen gesetzt ist, durch welche sie sich äußert.¹⁹¹

¹⁹⁰ *Philosophy*, 95-6.

¹⁹¹ *Philosophie*, 122.

These antitheses all belong to one and the same family and arise from that initial relationship of art, as absolute form, to the particular form posited by the individuals through which it expresses itself.¹⁹²

Thus antithesis is also identity in so far as displacement from the absolute meaninglessness of autonomy has the same *value* as its antithesis and, simultaneously, is always negative to its opposite's positive. This is the unity of antithesis and identity and constitutes the 'absolute point of identity'.

In art, divided into the potences *Kunst* and *Poesie*, the displaced antitheses are all within the real series and yet, because they are antitheses within that series, they contain both the real and the ideal. This distinction is, as we have already seen, is made between the 'formative' [*bildende*] and 'verbal' [*redende*] arts.

On Antithesis

So far, the antitheses we have encountered appear to be levels of perception, approaches which, in themselves, choose to evoke the absolute from different perspectives without abandoning the absolute in and for itself. These displacements or modes of determination are reflected in ever more specialist layers of particularised antitheses. In art we have the initial given of art as a part of the real series; within this series, all elements of the absolute result finally in concrete form. Thus the real series is inherently *productive*, resulting in a product that has objective inviolate presence. It might prove useful here to retrace the steps this argument has taken us through and, in particular, to analyse more closely the relationships between the various antitheses or potences.

The first antithesis in art in and for itself is that between poesy and art, the latter being best represented by the original German *Kunst* so as not to confuse it with absolute art:

Productive Modes:

1.Kunst an sich

<i>Poesie</i>	<i>Kunst</i>
naïve sentimental	style mannerism

¹⁹² *Philosophy*, 96.

These antitheses represent two fundamental modes of production. *Poesie*, a general productiveness resulting in a highly *specific* materiality is characterised by a largely Cartesian mode of production, striving for clarity, craftsmanship and self-evident transparent meaning. In historical terms, this mode is close to notions of functionality or art as *instrumental* in communication of something external to it. The normative problematic of mimesis is thus a good example of poesitic production.

Kunst, on the other hand, whilst resulting again in a product, attempts to strain beyond the particular into the universal. This mode of production is characterised by a post-Cartesian approach to creation that imbues the objective with a kind of immanent universal or infinite significance. In this case, art is not *instrumental* in nor a *function* of some type of message outside of art. *Kunst* constitutes in itself a unity of self and that very unity against which poesy is upheld in contrast and comparison. Whereas poesy constructs a false externality in the guise of the Cartesian reductive nature, *Kunst* takes this externality into itself as part of itself and transforms it.

The antitheses beauty and sublimity are not modes of production but rather modes of intuiting or perceiving the products of poesy and *Kunst*:

Aesthetico-Productive Modes:

1. Kunst an sich

sublime beautiful.

In other words, the sublime and the beautiful are to be intuited in the object as a result both of its productive mode and of an external mode of evaluative determination that is brought to bear upon the product. In the sublime, the determining individual is, as shown previously, overwhelmed by the colossal objectivity of the product. Confronted with such magnitude, the individual 'casts' the product out and posits a pseudo-spirituality or other-worldliness to replace the terrifying objectivity. This mystification is the result of a struggle between finitude and infinity where they are in constant revolt against each other. In musical terms, this might be likened to the new Italian music that

strives for 'wonderful' and 'magical' effects, a Baumgartian sustaining of the *Aufmerksamkeit* through the management of contrasts.

In the beautiful, however, the identity of production and perception results in the invocation of the aesthetic category of unity. The finite and the infinite are perfectly balanced in the product such that no struggle, no mystification occurs. Rather than a deification of the object, beauty results in the perfect objective form and thus a kind of general insight or showing of a formal truth, the antithesis of mystification. There is no fear of colossal objectivity, no false casting out into the other-world here. The beautiful in this sense seems more fitted to the German canon of Mozart, Haydn and possibly Beethoven which much German aesthetic theory was subsequently to praise for its discursive unity, its perfect coincidence of form and expressive means.¹⁹³

So far the two modes of determination have been shown to constitute the productive modes constituting poesy and *Kunst* and the aesthetico-productive modes constituting *the sublime* and *beauty*. Within each of these modes there are further antitheses. As we have seen, for example, the antithesis of the *naïve* and the *sentimental* are internal antitheses or potences of the potency *poesy*. As a division of a quasi-Cartesian poesy, the naïve and the sentimental are falsehoods or *partial* modes of determination.

The naïve, clearly shown as an 'antiquarian' or, for our purposes, corporatist mode of operation is, as we have seen, a mode of production that makes nature speak *as nature* in art. There is no mediation, no will to expression, no will to autonomy, but an overriding strain for mimesis in its purest sense, absolute instrumentality. This comes close to Gottsched's first and lowest mode of *Nachahmung*. The natural, redistributed through art, is primary. It is easy to see parallels between the naïve and the sublime and, indeed, they are both the most *partial* of the antitheses. As its closest division, the sublime is nonetheless not an exact match for naïveté. Whereas the former creates an 'outward striving' by mystifying the overwhelming elements of nature, the

¹⁹³ Schelling makes very little reference to specific examples in the section on music in Chapter 4, *Philosophie*, 132-150, and no reference here.

latter cannot 'cast out' for no such alienation has taken place. In this sense the sublime and the naïve are separated not only by differing modes of determination, the one representing a mode of the aesthetico-productive mode, the other a secondary antithesis of the objectively productive mode; they are also separated by history, naïveté belonging fundamentally to antiquarian art and the sublime representing a kind of 'sickness' of modernity.

The 'opposite' of the naïve, the sentimental, is the antithesis that evokes a kind of overblown subjectivity and yet, strangely, within the *productive* mode. As productive subjectivity, sentimentality seeks to constantly bridge the gap between the chaste ego and the product. In this sense, it is a thoroughly modern mode of determination in so far as it seeks to place the ego and its sensory palate at the centre of production, violating the unity of finite and infinite. The infinite microcosm of the ego places itself in the foreground as a reflexive unanimity of one and subsumes objectivity into itself, begetting its final *object* as nonetheless a *loathing* of objectivity. The sentimental is thus characterised by intoxication, a giving up of art to the sensory response, to the colossal world of the alienated individual and its almost existential realm. Rather than 'bridging' the gap between objectivity and ego, then, the sentimental sets up subjectivity in opposition to objectivity; just as the finite and the infinite are in a constant state of war in the sublime, so subjectivity revolts against the objective, turning inwards, away from nature and externality in general.

In poesy or general productivity, then, there is a tendency towards either a wholesale negation of self, a giving up of oneself to the inviolate necessity of nature or, conversely, a wholesale negation of objectivity such that the self marginalises non-self in a constant refinement of its own isolated impotence. The negativity of the general productivity is thus clear to see - in neither the naïve nor the sentimental is there a unity of finite and infinite; poesy is a potency which sets its internal elements against each other.

The contrasting *balance* of *Kunst* is most clearly demonstrated in its lower potency *style* [*Styl*]. Of the divisions discussed thus far, style is perhaps the most

complex. The seeming contradictions of Schelling's prose with regard to *Styl* are best seen in terms of style's absoluteness. It is for Schelling a *system* of art in so far as it represents the objective results of an artist's efforts in amalgam, or rather the salient characteristics of a reasonably comprehensive output:

Der Styl, welchen sich der individuelle Künstler bildet, ist für ihn, was ein Denksystem für den Philosophen im Wissen, oder für den Menschen im Handeln ist..¹⁹⁴

The particular style an individual artist cultivates for himself is for him that which a system of thought is for the philosopher within the realm of knowledge, or what action is for an individual person.¹⁹⁵

The absolute balance of style is, in essence, the continuum of characteristics either in an individual output or, as a more general style, in a specific historical movement. Style contains particularity, then, both in terms of the individual and in terms of the epoch. As a systematic production, or, rather, the result of systematic creativity, style represents art in its absolute creativity. From the particularity of the individual or of time, style posits a general characteristic but, conversely, returns to or throws into relief the very particularity from which it springs.

By contrast, the antithesis of style, mannerism [*die Maniertheit, die Manier*], is imbalanced or incomplete. Like the sublime and the sentimental, there is implicit to mannerism a construction of a false externality. This manufactured externality is this time a kind of cold mirror-like clarity through which a subsumed nature, shackled to visible conspicuity, strains to speak. The so-called 'cleanliness' [*das Saubere*] of this mechanistic reduction is facilitated via the formulaic reduction of externality to a set of general principles. This mode can be likened to Gottsched's second lowest form of *Nachahmung* from which Scheibe constructs his polemic for *Affektenlehre*. The products of the *Affektenlehre* are thus highly *manierirt* in so far as they generalise the inviolate multiplicity of nature according to the false principle of an overriding, single, unified and absolute reason. As we have seen, reason in Schelling participated in reality

¹⁹⁴ *Philosophie*, 121

¹⁹⁵ *Philosophy*, 96.

as an element if it, not as some umbrella mode of determination that is indivisible. This fragmentation and specialisation of reason is achieved largely in this case by the introduction of chaos or semantic indeterminacy into the equation. Mannerism is thus a falsehood in so far as it mistakes the machinations of mimesis for the essence of artistic endeavour, creating a false *instrumentality* for art.

To the extent that all these antitheses are present in each other, there are no absolute divisions but, rather, an array of attitudes to the product and the process of the production of art. In *poesy*, production becomes the primary motive whereas in *Kunst*, the productive and the creative are unified. It is, however, too easy to see these divisions as mere equivalencies of each other within different modes of determination. Every level or mode of determination is characterised both by generality or equivalence across the modes and by an inviolate particularity. In this sense, Schelling's philosophy of art is wholly organic or complex in so far as each 'part' oscillates constantly between absolute isolation or autonomy and absolute giving up of its particularity to the indivisible whole. Thus, to return to the metaphor of the antiquarian gods, there exists in each division both limitation by characteristics and absolute divinity:

In jeder der beiden Urformen der Kunst kehren nothwendig alle Einheiten, die reale, die ideale, und die, worin beide gleich sind, zurück - Denn jede der beiden Urformen ist an sich absolut, jede die ganze Idee.¹⁹⁶

§75. In each of the two primal forms of art all unities necessarily recur, the real, the ideal, and the one in which the two are equal, for each of the two primal forms is *in itself* absolute; each is the entire idea.¹⁹⁷

The final set of modes of determination is that of *Darstellung* or 'representation' as shown in *allegory*, *schema*, and *symbol*, where *symbol*, as we have said, evokes a unity of the infinite and the finite in concrete form. These lead on to the various genres of art, which Schelling recognises in the following order:

¹⁹⁶ *Philosophie*, 130-1.

¹⁹⁷ *Philosophy*, 103.

possibility of the universal and, ultimately, the indifferent, as an organic remnant of the larger structure. In Schelling's organicism, the partial conflation of antitheses is motivated by an unwillingness to accept the totality of any extreme and, on the other hand, the refusal to deflate such extremities in the interest of a neat classical system of ordered visible conspicuity.

It is clear from chapter 4, the second part of the *Philosophie*,¹⁹⁸ that of all the arts Schelling is least comfortable with music. And for this reason, little or no mention is given of any specific examples. This does not violate the expressed intention of this work - to find a metaphysical basis for the signification of art. A profound understanding of this point is demonstrated in the title of Schueller's article, 'Schelling's theory of the metaphysics of music'.¹⁹⁹

How does Schelling construct a metaphysical argument for music? If metaphysics is that 'discourse' which seeks to create inviolate absolutes or universal 'givens' for its objects of scrutiny, then the attempt here would seem to be to attain the very essence of music and to fix it so that all musical truths can be judged by this fundamental centre. This ontological drive, fundamentally at odds with Kant's rather epistemological urges, excludes any detailed analysis of genres or styles. Although Schelling gives numerous examples of works of art in his discussions of painting, sculpture, poetry and drama, he gives none here. Even though this section is termed the 'particular part' particularities are limited in music to purely metaphysical detail; the more detailed accounts of the other arts merely suggest that Schelling is more comfortable with the figurative or verbal art forms, a condition not uncommon amongst philosophers.

In seeking for music's essence, Schelling is forced to give account of the 'scientific' or physical properties of music and to attempt to account for these in his broader transcendental system. He begins with the following proposition:

¹⁹⁸ 'Besonderer Theil der Philosophie der Kunst.' 132ff.

¹⁹⁹ In *The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism*, XV/4: June 1957.

§76. Die Indifferenz der Einbildung des Unendlichen ins Endliche rein als Indifferenz aufgenommen ist *Klang*. Oder: In der Einbildung des Unendlichen ins Endliche kann die Indifferenz, als Indifferenz, nur als Klang hervortreten.²⁰⁰

§76. The indifference of the informing of the infinite into the finite, taken purely as indifference, is *sonority*. Or, within the informing of the infinite into the finite, indifference can emerge only as *sonority*.²⁰¹

In the real series (infinite into finite) then, the final result is *the finite*, which, in art, is represented by the product. Yet, within this potency, the real, there is a kind of indifference possible. This comes as no surprise if all potences contain each other subsumed within:

In dem zunächst vorhergehenden Satz ist bewiesen, daß sich jede der beiden Urformen in sich aufs neue und zwar in alle Formen differenziert. Anders ausgedrückt: jede der beiden Urformen nimmt alle andern Formen oder Einheiten als Potenz auf und machen sie zu ihrem Symbol oder Besondern.²⁰²

The immediately preceding proposition proved that each of the two primal forms *in itself* differentiates ever anew into all other forms. Expressed in another way: each of the two primal forms takes up all other forms or unities as potency and makes them into its symbol or particular.²⁰³

Thus, if these potences can be 'taken up' by each other, then there exists the possibility of an internal or partial indifference, an inference of indifference so to speak, that, within the real series, is termed 'sonority' by Schelling. He explains this in the following manner. If the real series *results* in a product, it *results* in matter; matter is, so to speak, an expression of the real series. And yet, this result, the seeming indifference of real and ideal in concrete form, is too material, too corporeal, to encompass any indifference gesture that is 'indifference as indifference' or a point of identity between the two elements finitude and infinitude. If the real series represents an act of implantation of infinitude *into* finitude, mere matter is insufficient as indifference within the real. Schelling solves this problem with an outrageous claim. First, insofar as indifference is a perfect form, it expresses itself in corporeality as magnetism. By this, Schelling means that the forces of magnetism encompass all the qualities of abstraction

²⁰⁰ *Philosophie*, 132.

²⁰¹ *Philosophy*, 107.

²⁰² *Philosophie*, 132.

²⁰³ *Philosophy*, 107.

and the ephemeral that indifference seems to require. And yet, this indifference in corporeality is again insufficient insofar as it is 'bound to the particular body'; it is too closely associated with *pure corporeality*. Regarding indifference, Schelling makes the following point:

Rein als solche und als Indifferenz ist er [der Akt der Einpflanzung]²⁰⁴ sie nur, inwiefern er von dem Körper abgesondert, als Form für sich ist, als absolute Form.²⁰⁵

It is pure as such and is *indifference* only to the extent that it is separated from the body and is a form unto itself, as an absolute form.²⁰⁶

This is the claim that calls Schelling's up to now reasonably coherent system into question. If indifference is the identity of two antitheses, then the indifference must contain both corporeality and ideality. If it is separated [*abgesondert*] from the body, then it can no longer participate in indifference. The de-emphasis of corporeality might even suggest that Schelling's system of even-handed indifferences is a complete sham. Yet the solution that Schelling gives to his apparent inconsistency is brilliant:

Diese ist nur im Klang, denn dieser ist einerseits lebendig - für sich -, andererseits eine bloße Dimension in der Zeit, nicht aber im Raume.²⁰⁷

The latter is found only in sonority, for sonority is on the one hand living and active - in and for itself - and on the other hand a mere dimension in time, though not in space.²⁰⁸

Sonority²⁰⁹ can work as an indifference in so far as it is the result of an agitation or excitement of the corporeal body, the result of a wholly corporeal movement. The result of a resonance or oscillation leaps from the body and takes on a kind of temporal autonomy which is nonetheless linked fundamentally to the corporeal.

²⁰⁴ The 'er' here refers to the preceding remarks regarding the 'act of implantation of the infinite into the finite.' See *Philosophie*, 132, *Philosophy*, 107.

²⁰⁵ *Philosophie*, 133.

²⁰⁶ *Philosophy*, 108.

²⁰⁷ *Philosophie*, 133.

²⁰⁸ *Philosophy*, 108.

²⁰⁹ *Klang* is difficult to translate exactly. Stott's 'sonority' is probably as close as we can get in English. Of most importance is the notion embedded in the German term of *constant* resonance, as we shall see.

For one thing, the ability of a body to initiate sonority, its resonance, is inextricably premised by its *coherence*. Thus a coherent body will spring readily into agitation/oscillation and cast out sonority in a pure unfettered form. If this unfettered form is the basis on which it acquires indifference status, then coherence empowers indifference in the corporeal realm. If magnetism is a kind of fettered indifference, then sonority represents magnetism in its abstracted essence, that is, as free:

In der Cohärenz oder dem Magnetismus an und für sich war aber das ideelle Princip ganz übergangen ins Körperliche. Die Forderung aber war, daß die Einbildung der Einheit in die Vielheit rein als solche, als Form für sich erscheine.²¹⁰

In coherence or magnetism in and for themselves, however, the ideal principle passed over completely into the corporeal. The demand, however, was that the informing of unity into multiplicity appear purely as such, as form in and for itself.²¹¹

Thus, in sonority, magnetism is freed and set adrift in its own abstraction as its own essence:

Dieß aber geschieht nur im Klang, den dieser = Magnetismus, aber von der Körperlichkeit abgesondert, gleichsam das An-sich des Magnetismus selbst, die Substanz.²¹²

This occurs only in sonority, for sonority = magnetism, though detached from corporeality, as it were the essential nature itself of magnetism, the substance.²¹³

Schelling now draws on the harmonic series to demonstrate the credentials of the indifference of sonority. Sonority, first of all, is to be differentiated from *Schall* and *Laut*, rendered as 'resonance' and 'sound' respectively by Stott. In Schelling's use, confusing more normative distinctions between the two terms, *Schall* is the generic term. This being the case, *Laut* is therefore a kind of incomplete sub-category of *Schall*, interrupted, dissonant. *Klang*, on the other hand, also a sub-category of *Schall*, should be seen as continuous resonance which is constant and uninterrupted. Thus, *Klang* is the higher of the two sub categories insofar as each tone in *Klang* represents

²¹⁰ *Philosophie*, 133.

²¹¹ *Philosophy*, 108.

²¹² *Philosophie*, 133.

²¹³ *Philosophy*, 108.

the perfect balance of a number of simultaneously sounding tones, our 'fundamental' and 'overtones':

Wir hören nämlich in dem Klang nicht bloß den einfachen Ton, sondern eingehüllt gleichsam oder eingeboren in diesen eine Menge von Tönen, und zwar so, daß die consonirenden überwiegen, anstatt daß dort die dissonirenden. ...Die Vielheit, welche in der Cohärenz als solcher mit der Einheit verbunden ist, wird also in dem Klang eine lebendige Vielheit, eine sich selbst affirmirende Vielheit.²¹⁴

Within sonority we do not merely hear the simple tone itself. Rather, we hear clothed, as it were, or imbedded in it a whole array of tones, and we hear them such that the consonant ones predominate, instead of the dissonant ones, as in the other case... The multiplicity that is combined in the coherence as such with the unity thus becomes a living multiplicity within sonority, a multiplicity that affirms itself.²¹⁵

The multiplicity of the consonant tone is thus a significant feature of sonority's indifference. The coherence of the body initiates a resonance that is consonant, a hierarchy of harmonics which constitute a set of proportions. Conversely, when a body is agitated, it resounds sonorously in order to return to a state of rest, striving for its most perfect state of coherence, as absolute material. We can say, therefore, that sonority as a hierarchy is indifference, and yet as an agitation it is a striving for indifference. It is both process and result:

Bedingung des Schalls ist daher, daß der Körper aus der Indifferenz gesetzt werde, welches durch Berührung eines anderen geschieht.²¹⁶

The prerequisite of resonance is thus that the body be posited outside of indifference. This occurs through contact with another body.²¹⁷

Sonority, then, is both indifference and striving. It thus represents a complex phenomenon within the real series. This 'complexity' is based around the presence of extremes within a coherent framework oscillating between autonomy and instrumentality within the absolute. This is the organic model we have already discussed as applied to music. This organicism, based around Schelling's perceived structure of the organic world, strives for a dynamic model that has both self-

²¹⁴ *Philosophie*, 133-4.

²¹⁵ *Philosophy*, 108.

²¹⁶ *Philosophie*, 134.

²¹⁷ *Philosophy*, 108.

awareness and yet still participates in larger structures. Sonority, on one level, is a complex organic phenomenon that fundamentally problematises Cartesian conspicuity and thus has a kind of richness.²¹⁸ As if to underline the metaphorical use of the term 'organic' in his system, Schelling proceeds now to admit that in reality sonority, as organic indifference, is only partial. It is, for one thing, merely *inorganic*, it is not *animated* in itself:

Wir müssen unmittelbar mit dieser Ansicht des Klangs die des *Gehörs* verbinden. - Die Wurzel des Gehörsinns liegt schon in der anorganischen Natur, im Magnetismus. Das Gehörorgan selbst ist nur der zur organischen Vollkommenheit entwickelte Magnetismus.²¹⁹

We must add to this view of sonority that of the *sense of hearing*. The root of the sense of hearing resides within anorganic nature, within magnetism. The hearing organ is merely magnetism that has developed to organic perfection.²²⁰

Thus as a metaphorically organic or complex phenomenon, sonority attains perfection only in the aesthetico-productive mode where sonority is perceived in its multiplicity by the hearing organ. Music, therefore, the product of controlled agitation of numerous bodies, gains organic complexity upon perception. And yet, because this *perception* is somehow implicit in *the product*, the product itself takes on a kind of self-fulfilling function. Of course, music is created in order to be heard, but this assumption is made *at the outset*, built into the creative process such that the very material of music, sonority or essential magnetism demands perception. But, having said this, because the 'eventual' perception of the work is *implicit* to music, the music itself somehow exists

²¹⁸ This 'richness' is captured by Schelling with his term *Reiz* meaning literally 'charm'.

²¹⁹ *Philosophie*, 134.

²²⁰ *Philosophy*, 109.

beyond real perception as *idealised perception*. Whilst Schelling never asserts the above overtly, this position is implicit here. It is as if sonority and the sense of hearing are united before any agitation of bodies begins. Probably for this reason music seems to be the most material of all art forms:

§77. Die Kunstform, in welcher die reale Einheit rein als solche zur Potenz, zum Symbol wird, ist *Musik*.²²¹

§77. The art form in which the real unity as such becomes potency and symbol is *music*.²²²

The unity of the sense of hearing and sonority is thus an indifference of the inorganic and the organic and as such belongs fundamentally in the realm of the real. In this sense it might be said to be the most autonomous of the arts in that its internal antitheses are always beholden to corporeality at some level. Thus music creates indifference in concrete form completely at the level of the real. Thus Schelling is able to assert that it is the only art form that presents the real series as a symbol of itself; it is the only art form that creates a meaningful complexity *within* the material realm.

The next fundamental element of music that must be addressed for Schelling is its *form*. As generalised or essentialised magnetism, sonority cannot participate in mere spatiality. It must participate in the universal dimension of time. This Schelling terms the necessary form of music, *die Succession*. With each passing moment, a possibility either dissipates into nothing or becomes an event. Time is thus the eternal passing of infinity into finitude. In this sense, it is the real dimension *par excellence*.

This real dimension, then, is the lattice against which the real series moves towards result. But time in the musical sense is not time *in actuality* but merely a proportional representation of actual linear time. Thus musical time is linear time as form, somehow abstracted from reality and presented in its formal essence. The apparent suitability of music for 'stirring the soul' can be seen to stem from its use of abstracted or essential time for consciousness of linear time bears striking resemblance to abstract musical time. Both are concerned with linearity, with the passing of one

²²¹ *Philosophie*, 135.

²²² *Philosophy*, 109.

moment into the next, but neither consciousness of time nor musical time are, in reality, accurate demonstrations of time in actuality. On the one hand, consciousness of time involves no real universal unit to measure the passing of time - clocks may provide a check, but actual consciousness of time's passing is a constant process of estimation - and, on the other hand, musical time is subject to all the inaccuracies of performance, the non-universality of speed between performances and the inevitable shifts in the relationship between such musical units as bars and the 'actual' passing of time as real linearity.

The profound set of parallels between time consciousness and musical time leads Schelling to invoke the age old Pythagorean notions of music as proportion and, its corollary, the notion of soul as number:

Die Musik ist ein reales Selbstzählen der Seele - schon Pythagoras hat die Seele einer Zahl verglichen - aber eben deßwegen wieder ein bewußtloses, sich selbst wieder vergessendes Zählen.²²³

Music is the real self-numbering of the soul - Pythagoras already compared the soul to a number - yet for precisely that reason it is also an unconscious, self-forgetting numbering or counting.²²⁴

Furthermore, insofar as rhythm is the basic element of music that divides the continuum at various periods, we can see rhythm as an emphasising or outlining of abstract musical time. In so far as musical periods are for Schelling regular, then rhythm is the periodic subdivision of the homogeneity of abstract musical time:

Denn, um mich jetzt zum Behuf des Beweises nur des allgemeinsten Begriffs von Rhythmus zu bedienen, so ist er in diesem Sinn nichts anderes als eine *periodische Eintheilung des Gleichartigen*, wodurch das Einförmige desselben mit Mannichfaltigkeit, die Einheit also mit Vielheit verbunden wird.²²⁵

If for the sake of truth I may employ the most general concept of rhythm, then rhythm in this sense is nothing more than the periodic subdivision of homogeneity whereby the uniformity of the latter is combined with variety and thus unity with multiplicity.²²⁶

²²³ *Philosophie*, 135.

²²⁴ *Philosophy*, 109.

²²⁵ *Philosophie*, 136. Emphasis added.

²²⁶ *Philosophy*, 110.

If we take Stott's translation of *der Gleichartige* as 'homogeneity' to be appropriate, then rhythm is a type of multiplicity, a basic reordering or breaking up of homogeneity around periodical cessations of unity. This basic type of rhythm, of single points equally spaced out, is seen by Schelling as the lowest form, or the most imperfect kind of rhythm. A higher form emerges when periodicity emerges within those equally spaced points, with the use of weak and strong:

Eine höhere Art der Einheit in der Mannichfaltigkeit ist zunächst dadurch erreichbar, daß die einzelnen Töne oder Schläge nicht gleich stark, sondern abwechselnd nach einer gewissen Regel, starke und schwache angegeben werden. Hiermit tritt als nothwendiges Element in den Rhythmus der *Takt* ein, der auch überall gesucht wird, wo ein Identisches verschieden, mannichfaltig werden soll, und der nun wieder einer Menge von Veränderungen fähig ist, wodurch in die Einförmigkeit der Aufeinanderfolge eine noch größere Abwechslung kommt.²²⁷

A higher kind of unity within multiplicity is acquired first of all if the individual tones or beats are not sounded with equal strength, but rather alternate according to a certain regularity as strong and weak ones. With this the necessary element of *tact*²²⁸ enters into rhythm. This, too, is sought wherever something identical is to become different or varied, and it is capable of numerous variations itself whereby an even greater variety enters into the uniformity of the sequence.²²⁹

The relationship of rhythm to time is thus a rather complex one. In the lower form of rhythm, time is uniformly interrupted, dissipated, by a set of points or beats that impose upon it regulation that moulds our consciousness of it. In this sense, this base mode of rhythm, mere equidistant divisions, provide consciousness with a framework against which to place less unitary or regular events. Beyond this crude regulation we acquire through the systematic cycles of strong or weak beats the so-called bar. At this point, regulation becomes broader and each cycle consists of smaller unitary points, each equidistant, but differentiated by a kind of periodic grammar. Each beat has a higher function within the bar cycle.

This second, higher, ordering of time, this second mode of rhythm, is significant in that it not only regulates but it *signifies*:

²²⁷ *Philosophie*, 137.

²²⁸ 'Bar'.

²²⁹ *Philosophy*, 111.

Allgemein nun angesehen ist Rhythmus überhaupt Verwandlung der an sich bedeutungslosen Succession in eine bedeutende. Die Succession rein als solche hat den Charakter der Zufälligkeit. Verwandlung des Zufälligen der Succession in Nothwendigkeit = Rhythmus, wodurch das Ganze nicht mehr der Zeit unterworfen ist, sondern sie *in sich selbst* hat.²³⁰

In general, rhythm is viewed as the transformation of an essentially meaningless succession into a meaningful one. Succession or sequence purely as such possesses the character of chance. The transformation of the accidental nature of a sequence into necessity = rhythm, whereby the whole is no longer subjected to time but rather possesses time *within itself*.²³¹

This transformation or metamorphosis [*Verwandlung*] of the 'meaningless' into the meaningful involves a sequence, via cyclical repetition, of a small unit, the bar, acquiring or taking time up into itself as abstract. This 'time', as we have said, does not constitute the passing of real time. Signification, then, involves here a kind of absorption of time into the fabric of the sequence such that time has immanent presence within music:

Artikulation der Musik ist Bildung in eine Reihe von Gliedern, so daß mehrere Töne zusammen wieder ein Glied ausmachen, welches nicht zufällig oder willkürlich von andern unterschieden ist.²³²

Articulation within music is the forming of units into a series such that several tones together constitute yet another unit, one that is not accidentally or arbitrarily separated from others.²³³

This is the beginning of the sketching of a system of musical signification based on ever increasing levels of rhythmic complexity, a hierarchy of mutually related, organic, pulses. From the single regularity of the beat to the bar cycle of two or more such beats is the first *Anschauung* or *Hervorbringung* of the system. From there, Schelling posits upwards in typical organicist style:

Dieser noch immer bloß *einfache* Rhythmus, der darin besteht, daß die Folge der Töne in gleich lange Glieder eingetheilt wird, wovon jedes durch etwas Empfindbares unterschieden von dem andern, hat dennoch schon sehr vielerlei Arten, z. B. er kann gerad oder ungerad seyn u. s. w. Aber mehrere Takte zusammen können wieder zu Gliedern vereinigt werden, welches eine höhere

²³⁰ *Philosophie*, 137.

²³¹ *Philosophy*, 111.

²³² *Philosophie*, 137.

²³³ *Philosophy*, 111.

Potenz des Rhythmus - zusammengesetzter Rhythmus ist (in der Poesie das Distichon).²³⁴

This as yet merely *simple* rhythm - consisting of a tonal sequence divided into units of equal length, each of which is distinguished perceptibly from the other - can nonetheless display a wide variety of types. For example, it can be even or uneven, and so on. Yet several tacts [bars] together can be further combined into units that then constitute a higher potency of rhythm - complex rhythm (in poesy: the couplet).²³⁵

The positing of the phrase as the next level of ordering is then propounded across even larger regulatory units:

Endlich können auch aus diesen schon zusammengesetzten Gliedern wieder größere (Perioden) gemacht werden (in der Poesie die Strophe) u. s. f. bis zu dem Punkt, wo diese ganze Ordnung und Zusammensetzung für den inneren Sinn noch übersehbar bleibt.²³⁶

Finally, larger units (phrases) can be made from these complex units (in poesy: the stanza), and so on until this entire structure and composition still remains comprehensible to the inner poetic sense.²³⁷

The organic credentials of this system of ever larger units, each referring to both its smaller member units and the larger unit to which it belongs, are clearly demonstrated here. In the manner of Goethe's *Urpflanze* or Wackenroder's *Orakelhöhlen*, there lies in Schelling's organic model a hidden depth, a kind of *Gestalt* structure. The mature language of the so-called classical style emerged as a complex, organic language that seemed to draw the listener into it, sustaining the Baumgartian *Aufmerksamkeit* by the careful control of contrast and unity. The cadence-articulated phrase, consisting of its smaller units, the bars, making up, in turn, the larger sections seemed to afford a plausible unity of expressive means and semantic content. The signifier itself seemed at last capable of carrying an immanent signified within it. This is the most significant claim of Schelling's system for music so far.

Immanent signification, through the workings of the bar-phrase-stanza-section hierarchy, represents a fundamental challenge to functionalist aesthetics of music. Such aesthetics, including the mimesis aesthetic, had already been implicitly challenged by

²³⁴ *Philosophie*, 138.

²³⁵ *Philosophy*, 111.

²³⁶ *Philosophie*, 138.

²³⁷ *Philosophy*, 111.

the German instrumental music of the late eighteenth century. Despite the metaphysical nature of Schelling's argument, its closeness to the Baumgartian debate is clear.

Aufmerksamkeit is now sustained not merely by contrasts, but by the organic interplay of homogeneity and its periodic cessation. Thus, Schelling now claims rhythm as prime element of music.

Der Rhythmus ist die Musik in der Musik - Denn die Besonderheit der Musik ist eben darauf gegründet, daß sie Einbildung der Einheit in die Vielheit ist. Da nun nach §79 der Rhythmus nichts anderes ist als diese Einbildung selbst *in* der Musik, so ist er die Musik in der Musik, und also der Natur dieser Kunst gemäß das Herrschende in ihr.²³⁸

Rhythm is the music within music, for the particularity of music is based precisely on its character as the informing of unity into multiplicity. Since according to §79 rhythm is nothing more than its informing *within* music itself, it is thus the music within music, and, according to the nature of this art form, is the predominating feature within it.²³⁹

As a 'music within music,' then, rhythm constitutes the most primal of music's elements. It is that element which most closely participates in organic structure:

...keine Erfindung scheint den Menschen unmittelbarer durch die Natur selbst inspirirt zu seyn.²⁴⁰

...no human invention appears to be more immediately or directly inspired by nature.²⁴¹

This inspiration by nature is not some obscure form of mimesis. Nature's proportions, her structures or forms directly inspire the organicism of the late eighteenth century musical language only in so far as these structures serve as a parallel. Music does not participate in mere *Nachahmung* but aspires to a parallel complexity and thus to an organic autonomy, to the complex ability to sustain the Baumgartian *Aufmerksamkeit*.

The music within music, then, brings an internal time, a multiplicity and a unity and, finally, a hierarchy of unitary levels resonating across the total musical structure. Immanence is served then by an increased complexity of conception, a striving for internal structural integrity and organic unity; only when these organic requirements

²³⁸ *Philosophie*, 138.

²³⁹ *Philosophy*, 111.

²⁴⁰ *Philosophie*, 136.

²⁴¹ *Philosophy*, 110.

are fulfilled can the signifier and the signified unite such that the signifier itself bears the message, bears the external as an integral element of the internal.

In Schelling's emergent semiology of music we see, not surprisingly, significant parallels with his pronouncements on language in chapter three. He seeks to align language, in some kind of abstraction, with the ideal (hence the 'idealism' of the verbal arts):

§73. Die Ideale Einheit als Auflösung des Besondern ins Allgemeine, des Concreten in Begriff, wird objektiv in *Rede* oder *Sprache*...²⁴²

§73. The ideal unity, as the resolution of the particular into the universal, of the concrete into the concept, becomes objective in *speech* or *language*...²⁴³

Thus, the ideal process from the concrete to concept, as resolved into objective form, is language. Forgetting the 'objective form' for the moment, language in abstract can be seen as roughly equivalent to the notion of the *signifier*. Therefore, the objective resolution of the Schellingian signifier into 'concrete form' can be likened to the more Saussurean signifier, although it is clearly not wholly synonymous. Therefore, where language *signifies* or gives meaning is where the transformation of the Schellingian signifier into signified occurs, it does so in order, finally, to reach the ultimately objective, the referent. Thus, as an objective form itself, language too can represent a referent for itself, referred to by a signifier from within itself. Hence, the Saussurean closure of language into a self-contained system is not an equivalent of the Schellingian semiology. In particular, Schelling's notion of an 'externality' within, of the referent somehow deposited into the heart of the signifying agent, is at odds with Saussure's semiology.

Where the Schellingian signifier and the signified unite in music, where the 'ideality' of the musical language and the reality of the musical *signified*²⁴⁴ unite such that the one is inseparable from the other, music remains stubbornly self-referential,

²⁴² *Philosophie*, 126.

²⁴³ *Philosophy*, 99.

²⁴⁴ And here there is the emergence, after Gottsched's apparently simple division, of layers of mediation between sign and thing. Hence Schelling's embryonic semiology strains for the middle ground represented in the later Saussurean *sign*, *signifier*, *signified* where 'sign' can represent both a relatively 'material' element and also a somewhat 'ideal' or conceptual element.

excelling at recreating in sound those propensities of language for self reflection. In a sense, the referent of music is the music itself, and itself *only*. The objective status of music in Schelling's system, as the 'most real of the real arts,' can be explained, then, in terms of the absence of an *overt* referent. Indeed, the so-called unity of real and ideal consists in music of a one-sided unity, a unity within the real series since the internal referent precludes a general or ideal result to the process of *Anschauung*: if music is internally significant, then it can never abstract, never generalise or aspire beyond its corporeal realm, never reach beyond the real series.

This materiality of musical rhythmic matter is close to the Schopenhauerian suggestion that rhythm expresses in archetypal form the *Wille zum Leben*. As the black, inviolate force of life, the sibling that torments human existence, Schopenhauer's *Wille* or 'will' can be shown in music's primal element, rhythm. Whilst Schelling's metaphysic is free from this kind of melancholy, there is a kind of ultra-materiality, a profound absence of verbal or figurative resonance in both models.

In contrast to the material element of rhythm, Schelling now turns to the second element or potency of music, that of 'modulation'. This is defined thus:

...In dieser Beziehung ist nun Modulation die Kunst, die Identität des Tons, welcher in dem Ganzen eines musikalischen Werks der herrschende ist, in der *qualitativen* Differenz ebenso zu erhalten, wie durch den Rhythmus dieselbe Identität in der quantitativen Differenz beobachtet wird.²⁴⁵

In this respect modulation is the art of maintaining the identity of the one tone that is the predominating one within the whole of the musical work, to maintain it in the *qualitative* difference just as through rhythm itself the same identity is observed in the quantitative difference.²⁴⁶

If rhythm is quantitative difference, then, modulation is *qualitative* difference. Each tone requires its 'quality' in terms of the general framework of *modulation*. Clearly this does not mean 'modulation' merely in the sense of movement from one to another tonal area but means everything from an essentially ontological notion of notes or tones as having quality or character in themselves through to broader notions of tonal functions

²⁴⁵ *Philosophie*, 139.

²⁴⁶ *Philosophy*, 111.

within a relative-function order to the broadest notions of tonal function and large-scale hierarchy. In general, then, we can see modulation to mean the intuition and maintenance of a tonal hierarchy sustaining the dominance of the tonic. Indeed, Schelling de-emphasises the 'modern' sense of modulation in the next sentence, preferring a static, and, as we have said, ontological model for pitch functions:

Ich muß mich in dieser Allgemeinheit ausdrücken, weil Modulation in der Kunstsprache so verschiedene Bedeutungen hat, und damit nicht etwas von der Bedeutung sich einmische, die sie nur in der modernen Musik hat. Jene künstliche Art, durch die sogenannten Ausweichungen und Schlüsse Gesang und Harmonie durch mehrere Töne hindurchzuführen, zuletzt aber wieder auf den ersten Haupten zu kommen, gehört schon ganz der modernen Kunst an.²⁴⁷

I must express myself in generalities here because modulation has so many different meanings in the language of art, and I do not want any of that particular meaning that modulation possesses only within modern music to suggest itself here. That artificial method of guiding song and harmony through several tones by means of so-called modulation and cadences, and of finally returning to the main tone, belongs to the modern art of music.²⁴⁸

This strange comment would seem to suggest that Schelling's organicist musical aesthetic is confined to rhythm, or rather that his organicist notions of harmony are not as far reaching as those of rhythm. His insistence on the ontological function of the tonic, his disdain for complex tonal structures and his dismay at the propensity of so-called 'modern' music for ever more frequent and distant movements away from the tonic suggest a fundamental conservatism.

This might be explained by the distortive significance musicology places on the Mozart-Haydn-Beethoven canon for this period. Although Haydn and Mozart had composed some fine examples of the mature classical style by 1804, the year Schelling completed *Philosophie*, the Mozart-Haydn legacy seemed almost to have faded into obscurity. The so-called *galant* style of such lesser known symphonists as Anton Koz'eluh, Jan Kr'ititel Van'hal, Franz Anton Hoffmeister and Franz Kramár' seemed in Vienna, for example, to momentarily overshadow the likes of Mozart and Haydn completely. The comparatively successful commercial careers of these *galant*

²⁴⁷ *Philosophie*, 139.

²⁴⁸ *Philosophy*, 112

composers as compared with Mozart is attested to in Gerber.²⁴⁹ Also at this time, Beethoven had, admittedly, produced his first symphonies including the *Eroica* which did not receive performance until 1807 in Leipzig. It is extremely difficult to know exactly how much of this music was accessible in Jena and Würzburg, where Schelling wrote *Philosophie*. The small town of Jena, in particular, was probably somewhat removed from the mainstream musical culture of the big centres.²⁵⁰ Similarly, it is unlikely that much if any Beethoven was played in Jena, although chamber recitals are, of course, not out of the question.

Certainly, from the remarks Schelling has made so far, he would seem to be very unsympathetic to middle period Beethoven with its use of alternative dominants, its extended, meandering development sections and its juxtaposition of ever remoter tonal areas. The apparent conservatism of Schelling's music aesthetic in this regard is extremely difficult to understand. If, as we have already suggested, Schelling's dislike of more 'modern' tonality is due merely to his unfamiliarity with the new music due to its non-availability in the small towns of Prussian Jena and Bavarian Würzburg, then we can ignore it as merely a quirky part of his system that has little bearing on the major structures. But, on the other hand, if Schelling's apparent conservatism is real and founded on a systematic exclusion of modernism from his system, we must question the extent to which he represents the radical culture of the *Frühromantiker* accurately. In the context of his radical immanent model for musical rhythm and his insistent avoidance of concrete examples, however, Schelling's contribution to the emergence of a discourse on art as self-regarding, remains significant. Indeed, whilst those places in *Philosophie* where Schelling makes overt empirical critique of specific examples are often excruciatingly amateur, his general system is highly useful in its

²⁴⁹ Gerber, Ernst Ludwig, *Historisch-biographisches Lexikon der Tonkünstler*, modern edition in 4 volumes, publ. Othmar Wessely, Graz 1966-9. Gerber (1746-1819) is interesting in that he undertook one of the most extensive surveys of musicians in the early nineteenth century.

²⁵⁰ My analysis of the Eitner index, for example, places Jena at rank 26 for 1750-1800 and rank 19 for 1800-1850. This suggests a somewhat small scale participation in the commercial dissemination of sheet music.

delineation of general metaphysical principles of the musical culture of the *Gelehrtenstand* at this time.

Indeed, as if to counter the apparent conservatism of Schelling's notions of *Modulation*, Schelling proceeds to his notion of melody. It comes as no surprise that Schelling sees *melody* as the indifference of *rhythm* and *modulation*. On the one hand, melody arches between cadences, and is thus profoundly connected with periodicity and, in the final analysis, rhythm, and on the other hand it is fundamentally concerned with the succession of tones, each imbuing a qualitative character to the melodic line.

The fundamental, primal significance of rhythm which Schelling likens to 'music within music' is to be contrasted with modulation which Schelling likens to 'painting within music'. Rhythm provides a vehicle for self-consciousness whereas modulation is a vehicle for feeling and judgement. The indifference of these two internal potences is 'intuition' or 'imagination' as shown below:

Man kann also sagen: der Rhythmus = erster Dimension, Modulation = zweiter, Melodie = dritter. Durch den ersten ist die Musik für die Reflexion und das Selbstbewußtseyn, durch die zweite für die Empfindung und das Urtheil, durch die dritte für Anschauung und Einbildungskraft bestimmt.²⁵¹

One can thus say: rhythm = first dimension, modulation = second, melody = third. The first determines or qualifies music for reflection and self-consciousness, the second for feeling and judgement, and the third for intuition and the power of imagination.²⁵²

If the two potences rhythm/modulation are music and painting within music, then melody as *Anschauung und Einbildungskraft* is the plastic element in music. To juxtapose these two elements within the potences of the real and the ideal gives a clear indication of the organic unity of music's three elements. This juxtaposition begins with an historical point already made in Chapter 3:

Inwiefern nun das Ganze der Musik, demnach Rhythmus, Modulation und Melodie, gemeinschaftlich wieder dem Rhythmus untergeordnet, insofern ist rhythmische Musik. Eine solche war die Musik der Alten.²⁵³

²⁵¹ *Philosophie*, 140.

²⁵² *Philosophy*, 112.

²⁵³ *Philosophie*, 140.

Insofar as the entirety of music - hence rhythm, modulation and melody - might be subordinated collectively to rhythm, we have rhythmic music. Such was the music of antiquity.²⁵⁴

As we have already seen in Schelling's proto-romantic or *frühromantische* analysis of antiquity, there is a kind of naïve acceptance of nature *as nature* such that art and mythology are somehow non-proactive responses to antiquarian naïveté. Thus, in such moments, the real persists to such an extent that religious abstractions are practically impossible. The real worship of antiquity was the anthropomorphism of the natural elements in a communal divinity of individually character-limited archetypes. This is *mythology*. In such a culture, it stands to reason in Schelling's system, that music should be beholden to the *real* principle:

Es muß jedem auffallen, wie genau in dieser Konstruktion alle Verhältnisse eintreffen, und daß auch hier wieder der Rhythmus als Einbildung des Unendlichen ins Endliche sich auf die Seite des Antiken stellt, indeß die entgegengesetzte Einheit, wie wir finden werden, auch hier das Herrschende des Modernen ist.²⁵⁵

Virtually anyone can see how precisely in this construction all relationships and qualifications recur, and that here, too, rhythm as the informing of the infinite into the finite resides on the side of antiquity, whereas the opposite unity, as we will see, is the predominating element of modernity.²⁵⁶

Thus, whereas antiquity achieved a kind of indifference of finitude and infinitude in concrete form, a kind of naïve beauty, contemporary art of Schelling's day seemed to have forsaken the 'music within music' of rhythm as its primary element and sought instead to posit outwards into infinity, to subordinate the three elements rhythm, modulation and melody under an indifference more akin to *allegory*, that of *harmony*:

Die einzige obgleich höchst verstellte Spur der alten Musik ist noch in dem Choral übrig. Zwar hatte, wie Rousseau sagt, zu der Zeit, als die Christen anfangen in eignen Kirchen Hymnen und Psalmen zu singen, die Musik schon fast allen ihren Nachdruck verloren. Die Christen nahmen sie, wie sie dieselbe fanden, und beraubten sie noch ihrer größten Kraft, des Zeitmaßes und des

²⁵⁴ *Philosophy*, 112.

²⁵⁵ *Philosophie*, 140.

²⁵⁶ *Philosophy*, 112-3.

Rhythmus, aber doch blieb der Choral in den alten Zeiten immer einstimmig, und dieß ist es eigentlich, was *Canto Firmo* heißt.²⁵⁷

The only trace - and a highly distorted one at that - of the music of antiquity still resides in the *chorale*. It is true, as Rousseau says, that by the time the Christians began to sing hymns and psalms in their own churches, music had already lost virtually all its emphasis. The Christians took it as they found it, and in addition robbed it of its most powerful energy: tempo and rhythm. Yet in those early times the chorale always remained monophonic, and this is actually what *Canto Firmo* means.²⁵⁸

This element of ancient music left to us in these ancient hymns and psalms is now somehow subsumed under the Christian world-vision, subordinated to the *allegorical* mode of representation. If allegory is, for Schelling, a straining outwards, a yearning for the infinite, but resulting in ever greater particularisation/concretisation, then the Christian culture's distorted discourse of abstraction and yearning *beyond* the particular for the ideal is somehow a delusion. In the sense that Christianity is seen here as a kind of 'filtering out' of the particular in favour of ever greater abstraction it is the denial of the absolute for, without the real, the absolute is not *absolute as such*.

The distinction between the allegorical and the symbolic, as demonstrated here, is that fundamental distinction Schelling makes between *Religion* and *Mythologie* in chapter 2.²⁵⁹ In mythology, as we have seen, finitude or the objective realm is a *symbol* of the infinite in that no distinction is drawn between the two. There is thus in music from this time a predominance of the rhythmic: rhythm is the real in music and is at one with the infinitude of harmony. Thus the naïve presentation of nature *as nature* was not problematic. The ideal was always present in concrete form. The gods as collective divinity were both particular and divine.

In religion, however, we have seen the negation of the naïve community of natural elements in the collective divinity and the allegorisation of nature into a single abstract God:

§46. Im ersten Fall ist das Endliche als Symbol, im andern als Allegorie das Unendlichen gesetzt.²⁶⁰

²⁵⁷ *Philosophie*, 141.

²⁵⁸ *Philosophy*, 113.

²⁵⁹ *Philosophie*, 50-101.

²⁶⁰ *Philosophie*, 96.

§46. In the first instance the finite is posited as a symbol of the infinite, in the other as an allegory of the infinite.²⁶¹

The 'unlimited' God of Christian monotheism is a violation, then, of limitation, of *Beauty*. Thus Christian culture is left with the sickly striving of the sublime.²⁶² In this sense the musical antithesis of melody and harmony is a formal antithesis which represents, in turn, an allegory of the higher antitheses of real and ideal:

§82. Der Melodie, welche die Unterordnung der drei Einheiten der Musik unter die erste ist, steht die Harmonie als die Unterordnung der drei Einheiten unter die andere entgegen.²⁶³

§82. Melody, which is the subordination of the three unities to the first unity, can be juxtaposed to its opposite: harmony as the subordination of the three unities to the other.²⁶⁴

If melody is the synthesis of allegorical rhythm and schematic modulation under symbolic indifference, then harmony is a similar indifference, but seen from the ideal side:

Nur ist dabei im Auge zu behalten, daß Harmonie, inwiefern sie der Melodie entgegengesetzt, wieder für sich das *Ganze* ist, also die *Eine* der beiden Einheiten bloß, inwiefern allein auf die *Form* reflektiert wird, nicht aber inwiefern auf das *Wesen*, denn insofern ist sie wieder die Identität an sich, also die Identität der drei Einheiten, aber ausgedrückt in der idealen.²⁶⁵

It is important to remember here that harmony, to the extent that it is juxtaposed to melody, is in its own turn the *whole*, and it is thus the *one* of the two unities insofar as one reflects only the *form*, but not insofar as one reflects on the *essence*. In the latter case harmony is itself identity *in itself* and thus the identity of all three unities, yet expressed here in ideal form.²⁶⁶

If melody is real, then it must be an informing of the infinite into the finite. It does this by relying more on rhythm and its internalised layers of articulation than on allegorical modulation. Thus harmony is the informing of finitude into infinity by relying more on the qualitative differences of the tones and their complex juxtaposition according to the

²⁶¹ *Philosophy*, 79.

²⁶² See *Philosophie*, 98 and 108.

²⁶³ *Philosophie*, 142.

²⁶⁴ *Philosophy*, 113.

²⁶⁵ *Philosophie*, 143.

²⁶⁶ *Philosophy*, 114.

laws of the triad, dissonance and resolution. In the final instance, Schelling draws a powerful analogy with rhythm's internal semantic resonance:

Diese selbige Vielheit in der Einheit nun angewendet auf die größeren Momente eines ganzen Tonstücks, so besteht Harmonie darin, daß in jedem dieser Momente differente Tonverhältnisse dennoch wieder zur Einheit im Ganzen gebracht seyen, sowie dieselbe in Ansehung des ganzen Tonstücks wiederum die Resumtion aller möglichen besonderen Einheiten und aller - nicht dem Rhythmus, sondern der Modulation nach verschiedenen - Verwicklungen der Töne in die absoluten Einheit des Ganzen bedeutet.²⁶⁷

If we now apply this same concept of multiplicity within unity to the larger units of an entire musical piece, then harmony consists of different tonal relationships within each of these units nonetheless being brought into a unity within the whole. Similarly, that same unity as regards the tonal piece as a whole means the resumption of all possible particular unities and of all complexities of tones - not different as regards rhythm, but as regards modulation - into the absolute unity of the whole.²⁶⁸

This analogy draws on the organic resonance of small scale to large scale resemblance across a composition already posited in the realm of the rhythm. The same small to large scale resemblances are at work for Schelling in the realm of harmony, beginning from the initial premise of the harmonic series. The simultaneous sounding of a fundamental and its harmonics in a single tone functions for Schelling as a proof of multiplicity within an apparent unity. The basic law of modulation, then, is most prominent in harmony, whereas the rhythmic is most prominent in melody. As two potences in formal opposition within music, the rhythmic and the modulatory can thus be subsumed into the two higher potences of melody and harmony.

Aus diesem allgemeinem Begriff geht schon zur Genüge hervor, daß sich Harmonie zu Rhythmus und insofern auch zu Melodie, da Melodie nichts anderes als der integrierte Rhythmus ist, daß sich, sage ich, Harmonie zu Melodie wieder wie die ideale Einheit zur realen oder wie die Einbildung der Vielheit in die Einheit zu der entgegengesetzten der Einheit in die Vielheit verhalte, welches eben zu beweisen war.²⁶⁹

This general concept shows us adequately that harmony is related to rhythm and to that extent also to melody, since melody is nothing but integrated rhythm - I repeat: harmony is related to melody just as the ideal unity is to the real or as the informing of

²⁶⁷ *Philosophie*, 142-3.

²⁶⁸ *Philosophy*, 114.

²⁶⁹ *Philosophie*, 143.

multiplicity into unity is to the opposite informing of unity into multiplicity - which was what we wanted to prove.²⁷⁰

Thus, we return to the notion of antithesis as a result of a kind of formal separation, an ordering into extremes based around two deliberately constructed contrasted *modes of determination*. This is demonstrated in the extract from page 143 given previously.²⁷¹ Perhaps most significant here is the ontological posturing evident in the term *Wesen*. The *essence* of music is a fundamental identity, *in beauty*, of the 'three unities' rhythm, modulation and melody or harmony (depending on which side the indifference is seen from), an identity that is invalidated by the very naming of the antitheses rhythm/modulation. In a sense, modes of determination create formal antitheses wholly alien to *Wesen* insofar as *Wesen* is a point of identity, an absolute indifference. To articulate is thus to violate absolutely, to evade essence in favour of abstracted form. This form/essence dichotomy resides deep within the Schellingian system. It is as if essence, a kind of absolute in microcosm, retains something for itself, a kind of discursive autonomy. Thus notions such as melody/harmony, historically grounded in the great debate on whether music should aspire to a kind of inarticulate spirituality or, conversely, spring naturally from the natural intonations of a passionate human utterance, are products of a particular mode of thinking, a particular epistemological configuration. Schelling acknowledges implicitly the impossibility of their separation in the culture of antiquity and bemoans their absolute conflict in the Christian culture of the sublime and *allegory*.

This argument, despite the recognition of certain historical determinants is extremely close to the Wackenroderian suggestion given in 'Das eigentümliche innere Wesen der Tonkunst' in *Phantasien*²⁷² that language or articulation somehow defiles art:

Wenn alle die inneren Schwimmungen unsrer Herzensfibern - die zitternden der Freude, die stürmenden des Entzückens, die hochklopfenden Pulse verzehrender Andeutung -, wenn alle die Sprache und Worte, als Grab der inneren Herzenswut, mit einem Ausruf zersprengen: dann gehen sie unter

²⁷⁰ *Philosophy*, 114.

²⁷¹ 'Nur ist dabei.....in der idealen.'

²⁷² Gustav Kiepenheuer Verlag, Potsdam 1925, 182ff.

fremden Himmel, in den Schwingungen holseliger Harfensaiten, wie in einem jenseitigen Leben in verklärter Schönheit hervor, und feiern als Engelgestalten ihre Auferstehung.²⁷³

Whenever all the inner vibrations of our heartstrings - the trembling ones of joy, the tempestuous ones of delight, the rapidly beating pulse of all-consuming adoration, - when all these burst apart with one outcry the language of words, as the grave of the inner frenzy of the heart: then they go forth under a strange sky, amidst the vibrations of blessed harpstrings, in transfigured beauty as if in another life beyond this one, and celebrate as angelic figures their resurrection.²⁷⁴

Further to the Wackenroderian tone, Schelling inverts the mimetic roles of melody and harmony. Whereas the rhythmic nature of melody made it a medium for accurate representation of the affects or passionate utterances in rationalist mimesis theories, the rhythmic element makes it for Schelling the most *real*. Real, in this sense as we have seen is not to be conflated with realistic. Although the real arts have their basis in corporeality, they are not primarily mimetic. Indeed, to take music as the *most real of the arts* suggests that the real series is a series which is characterised by 'internal signification' by a sense of meaning or 'externality' given by the internal modes of construction. Thus, Schelling differentiates harmony and rhythm in the following manner:

Angewendet auf den vorliegenden Fall, so stellt sich die rhythmische Musik überhaupt als eine Expansion des Unendlichen im Endlichen dar, wo also dieses (das Endliche) etwas für sich selbst gilt, anstatt daß in der harmonischen die Endlichkeit oder Differenz nur als eine Allegorie des Unendlichen oder der Einheit erscheint.²⁷⁵

Applied to the case at hand, rhythmic music in general presents itself as an expansion of the infinite within the finite such that the latter (the finite) counts only for something by itself, whereas in harmonic music finitude or difference appears only as an allegory of the infinite or of the unity.²⁷⁶

This point leads Schelling to a further Wackenroderian suggestion:

²⁷³ *ibid.*, 187. See also the following paragraph, given in chapter three, where Wackenroder asks: 'Was wollen sie, die zaghaften und zweifelnden Vernünftler, die jedes der hundert und hundert Tonstücke in Worten erklärt verlangen, und sich nicht darin finden können, daß nicht jedes eine nennbare Bedeutung hat wie ein Gemälde' 187-8.

²⁷⁴ Translation given in Edward A. Lippman (ed.), *Musical Aesthetics: A Historical Reader - The Nineteenth Century*, 1988, 24. Original source: M. H. Schubert, University Park, Pennsylvania, 1971, 174-194.

²⁷⁵ *Philosophie*, 143-4.

²⁷⁶ *Philosophy*, 115.

§83. Die Formen der Musik sind Formen der ewigen Dinge, inwiefern sie von der realen Seite betrachtet werden...²⁷⁷

§83. The forms of music are the forms of the eternal things insofar as they are viewed from the real perspective...²⁷⁸

Just as, for Wackenroder, music stood as a kind of proto-organic model of the cosmos in all its divisions and profound mysteries, so, for Schelling, music responds to its environs by abstracting them into pure form, as models of the 'eternal things' themselves. These eternal things function here either as ideal entities created in the systematic philosophical discourses, abstractions in themselves, or as objective things given in the world of phenomena, transformed and reunited with the absolute in the realm of music:

Allgemein geht die Philosophie, wie die Kunst, nicht auf die Dinge selbst, sondern nur auf ihre Formen oder ewigen Wesenheiten...Die Kunst bestrebt sich z. B. in ihren plastischen Werken nicht, mit den ähnlichen Hervorbringungen der Natur, was das Reelle betrifft, zu wetteisern. Sie sucht die bloße Form, das Ideale, von welchem aber das Ding selbst doch wieder nur die andere Ansicht ist. Dieß angewendet auf den vorliegenden Fall, so bringt die Musik die Form der Bewegungen der Welkörper, die reine, von dem Gegenstand oder Stoff befreite *Form* in dem Rhythmus und der Harmonie als solche zur Anschauung.²⁷⁹

In general, philosophy, like art, is not concerned with things themselves, but rather only with their forms or eternal essence...In its plastic works, for example, art does not strive to compete with similar products of nature as regards actual concrete elements. It seeks rather the pure form, the ideal, of which the thing itself, of course, is simply the other perspective. Applied to the case at hand, in rhythm and harmony music portrays the form of the movements of the cosmic bodies, the pure *form* as such, liberated from the object or from matter.²⁸⁰

and, more specifically:

Hiernach bestimmt sich nun auch die Stelle, welche die Musik in dem allgemeinen System der Künste einnimmt. - Wie sich der allgemeine Weltbau ganz unabhängig verhält von den andern Potenzen der Natur, und je nachdem er von der einer Seite betrachtet wird, das Höchste und allgemeinste ist, worin sich unmittelbar in die reinste Vernunft auflöst, was im Concreten sich noch verwirrt, von der andern Seite aber auch die tiefste Potenz ist: so auch die Musik, welche, von der einen Seite betrachtet, die allgemeinste unter den realen

²⁷⁷ *Philosophie*, 145.

²⁷⁸ *Philosophy*, 115.

²⁷⁹ *Philosophie*, 145-6

²⁸⁰ *Philosophy*, 116.

Künsten und der Auflösung in Rede und Vernunft am nächsten ist, obgleich von der andern nur die erste Potenz derselben.²⁸¹

The position of music within the general system of arts is also determined according to this evidence. The general world structure operates completely independently from the other potences of nature. Depending on the perspective, it can be the highest and most universal element, the sphere in which the confusion of concrete reality directly suspends or dissolves itself into purest reason. Or it is also the deepest potency. So also music, which viewed from the one perspective is the most universal or general of the real arts and closest to that dissolution into language and reason, even though from the other perspective it is merely the first potency of the real arts.²⁸²

Music, for Schelling, cannot be hierarchised, as we shall see it in Hegel's system, as the modes of determination invert its significance. Hence the ontological confusion of significance is moulded into the philosophical system as a fundamental category of it; it manifests itself, as in Wackenroder's, admittedly less systematic, deliberate confusion of meaning and sensuality in 'Das eigentümliche innere Wesen der Tonkunst' in the *Phantasien*²⁸³, as complete invertibility such that the juxtaposition of essential elements of determination leaves the entity's *Wesen* completely intact. Music, in this regard, is a profoundly ontological construct, indebted to its internality for its profundity. In terms of their insight into the romantic epistemology and the general epistemological configuration of musical meaning in the early romantic paradigm, the lectures of *Philosophie der Kunst* are invaluable. The neglect by music aestheticians may stem from the relatively small part of the lectures set aside specifically for music.

Schelling's contribution to the emergence of an ontological discipline of musical semantics is a high-point of the post-Schillerian aesthetic. In his precise analysis of the relationship between art and non-art (the external), Schiller demonstrated the possibility of conflating the apparent duality of sign and thing in a profoundly critical tirade against the Cartesian fixity. In its demonstration of the organic unity of form or shape and content, Schelling's *Philosophie* started from this Schillerian premise of an ontological order of meaning and attempted to demonstrate the internal relations of art and non-art within the art-work itself. This striking resolution of the problems of the

²⁸¹ *Philosophie*, 148.

²⁸² *Philosophy*, 118.

²⁸³ Kiepenheuer Verlag, 182ff. Full references given above and in previous chapter, three.

new diversity of the 'new Italian music' recognised in Gottsched and dismissed by him as mere *Geräusch*, at last furnished the musician with a metaphysical apologia for the caprice of merely instrumental music. Indeed, this was no mere apologia; it was a fundamental argument *for* a music free of the false externalities of the Cartesian discipline.

In the problem of the sublime, however, both Schelling and Schiller take pains to integrate the material/corporeal into a broad schema of mutually dependent epistemes - artefacts of the post-Cartesian epistemology. This endeavour is characterised in general by a profound urge to suspend the sensual-intellectual dilemma and to raise the Cartesian process of *Verstand* to a higher, autonomous process of *Begreifen*. The category *das Begreifliche* emerges, then, as a cipher of intent, a brutally forced synthesis of the stubbornness of Kant's separate realms. If the sublime represents this synthesis at its most problematised, we can read the sublime, with some irony, as a metaphor of the problems inherent in the notion of a unified epistemology of the *Frühromantik*. If sublimity casts out incomprehensible externality and redefines it as a mystical enigma, then the positing in Schelling of a higher unity of external and internal in *das Absolute*, the wilful construction of a new unattainable in the form of utopian non-difference is a process of positing outwards not too indistinct from the false generals of the Schillerian sublime.

Both Schelling and Wackenroder define the sublime as a metaphysical deferral of literal or concrete meaning in favour of a deliberately constructed negation of objectivity. The false intuition of such a construct involves a particular, posited as a mysterious general, being raised upwards and outwards from its initial objectivity and reinstated beyond the *Vernunft* as a kind of reified objectivity, which nonetheless hides its materiality. The deeply corporeal origins of the sublime, therefore, are suspended in a spirituality incurred purely in the act of aesthetic intuition [*Anschauung*]. As a general aesthetic category, then, intuition is the central to the romantic epistemology and initiates a process of modification brought to bear on a wilful reality. The distinction between Wackenroder and Schelling, however, resides fundamentally at the

level of semantics. In Wackenroder, the central aporias of the romantic epistemology are inserted at the centre of the art-work, buried there as ciphers of the new world vision. So, whereas for Schelling, the intuition of the sublime:

...tritt dann ein, wenn die sinnliche Anschauung für die Größe des sinnlichen Gegenstands unangemessen gefunden wird, und nun das wahre Unendliche hervortritt, für welches jenes bloß sinnliche Unendliche zum Symbol wird.²⁸⁴

...enters only when the sensual, concrete intuition is seen to be adequate for the greatness of the concrete object, and then the truly infinite appears for which the merely concretely infinite is the symbol.²⁸⁵

the sublime evokes in Wackenroder a deeply ontological dilemma, residing at the heart of the art-work:

So hat sich das eigentümliche Wesen der heutigen Musik...gebildet. Keine andre vermag diese Eigenschaften der Tiefsinnigkeit, der sinnlichen Kraft und der dunkeln, phantastischen Bedeutsamkeit auf eine so rätselhafte Weise zu verschmelzen.²⁸⁶

Thus has the characteristic inner nature of today's music developed...No other is capable of fusing these qualities of profundity, of sensual power, and of dark, visionary significance in such an enigmatical way.²⁸⁷

In short, then, the sublime enters in Wackenroder at the moment of concrete manifestation, as a product of that process of exegesis, as essential to it. This complex ontology, a dynamic self-destructive mode of criticism, sets aesthetic production at odds with cognition. To produce, in this sense, is to gloriously problematise, to show the two sides at odds, to *demonstrate* or *emphasise* this struggle. That Schelling deliberately separates *das Schöne* and *die Erhabenheit* is testament to the dilemma itself and the inadequacy of Schelling's system in dealing with it. Beauty evokes the utopian harmonious manifestation *in concreto* of the two sides, the finite and the infinite, whereas the sublime evokes the finite in revolt against the infinite. The critique that could be levelled at Schelling, then, is precisely the opposite of that to be levelled at Wackenroder. Schelling's system is, in this regard at least, an inversion of the

²⁸⁴ F. W. J. Schelling, *Philosophie der Kunst*, 106.

²⁸⁵ *Philosophy*, 85-6.

²⁸⁶ W. H. Wackenroder, *Phantasien über die Kunst*, 183.

²⁸⁷ *Aesthetics*, 21.

Wackenroderian sublime imperative. The revolt in Wackenroder leads to the ultimate deification of complexity and dynamism whereas Schelling's system, sublime as it may appear in its operation, strives for a state of rest, a unity of utopian grandeur beyond the unhappy schism of self and object.

Chapter Five

Hegel: Music as Mediation

Introduction: Art in the Hegelian Trichotomy

For Hegel, the pinnacle of our triangle, the sense of the aesthetic imperative evoked in Wackenroder and Schelling¹ is mere barbarism dressed in a kind of pseudo-rationalist language.² For him, the properties of art, apparently characterised by a general ability to mediate between the sensual and the intellectual are more 'steps' on the way to the totality of the system than beautiful ends in themselves. Art is thereby not the even-handed sister of Reason, as in Baumgarten, nor is it the reflex of concrete indifference, the symbol of the absolute. The aesthetic is thus de-emphasised in Hegel lying below both religion and the final perfection of philosophy. This is not to say, however, that art for Hegel is mere trifle or pleasant diversion. Its place in the system stems from a deep desire to account for the experience-system dilemma as a microcosm of the sensual-intellectual paradox, thereby evoking a broad meta-theory, one which springs from the dilemma and integrates the problem as a point of origin, as an essential process of the system itself. Art is thus integrated into the system at a lower point than in Schelling's intuitive system as a result of a clear meta-theoretical agenda, striving for conclusion beyond the merely corporeal/spiritual divide.

This profound element of art's purpose is demonstrated not least by the seriousness with which Hegel attempts to engage with its particularities in the massive

¹ Whilst Schelling avoids the sublimational consequences of the early romantic aesthetic, there is no doubt that the category of 'intuition' so fundamental to his system, is a profoundly *aesthetic* process. That the world is a kind of creative outpouring of the absolute, that God, as a form of the absolute, created the world like a work of art and that both differentiation and indifferentiation consist in responses to the bodily reception of the pleasure of creation: all these contribute to the argument for Schelling as, first and foremost, aesthete.

² This point is, of course more appropriate for Schelling than for Wackenroder. Hegel, in fact, makes no specific comment on Wackenroder whereas references to his friend and rival abound. See, particularly volume I of the *Vorlesungen*.

Vorlesungen über die Ästhetik. A collection of lectures given at the university of Berlin in 1823, 1826 and 1828-9, the *Vorlesungen* were constructed for publication from Hegel's own notes by H. G. Hotho. This first edition of 1835 was closely followed by a corrected and expanded second edition in 1842 and this latter edition has remained the standard text.³ That the *Vorlesungen* were conceived as a set of lectures, each building on the last and culminating in the perfection of poetry as the highest art form, is shown in Hotho's reconstruction. The linearity of the argument and the clear organisation of the material is testament to Hotho's ingenuity. Whilst some have attempted to reconstruct a more 'authentically Hegelian' volume,⁴ Hotho's 2nd edition remains, in itself, an important historical document. For these reasons we shall henceforward refer to the Hotho 2nd edition of 1842.⁵

Whilst we are more concerned here with the specific role of music in the Hegelian system, some of his general remarks at the opening of the first volume provide some insight into the general system of the arts. The trichotomy of art as propounded both in volume one and in more detail in volume two of the Hotho second edition is clear to see: the so-called 'symbolic arts' such as parable, proverb, icon, image, metaphor, simile and epigram are those arts which represent a kind of 'naive totality' in microcosm. Social life and art are undifferentiated such that communicative action constitutes both language and art as a single entity.

This argument can be seen to progress through Hegel's trichotomy of *Idee-Gestalt-Kunst*. The *Idee* or idea in its basic or primal form represents the naive unity of thought and action, of abstraction and particularity such that 'pure thought' and 'pure action' are seen as *identical*:

³ Other editions in German are: H. Glockner (ed.), *Jubildumsausgabe der Werke Hegels*, volumes 12-14, Stuttgart 1927 ff.; K. M. Michel and E. Moldenhauer (eds.), *Theorie-Werkausgabe*, volumes 13-15, Frankfurt am Main, 1970 ff.; F. Bassenge (ed.), *Ästhetik*, with a foreword by G. Lukács, Berlin 1955, reprint Frankfurt am Main, 1966.; H. Bartsch (ed.), *Register zu Hegels Vorlesungen über die Ästhetik*, 1844, reprint Stuttgart 1966.; W. Henckmann (ed.), *Einleitung in die Ästhetik*, Munich, 1967.

⁴ G. Lasson (ed.), *Vorlesungen über die Ästhetik*, a reworking of the original sources, Leipzig, 1931. Lasson's *Vorlesungen*.. contains only volume one of the Hotho edition and draws mainly from the 1836 lectures with a few sections from the 1823 lectures. It is thus incomplete.

⁵ For more on the problems of the authentic text, see Knox's Preface to his translation of the lectures: *Hegel's Aesthetics: Lectures on Fine Art*, 1975, v-xiv.

Denn er ist an sich schon seiner eigenen Natur nach diese Identität und erzeugt deshalb aus sich selbst die Realität als die seinige, in welcher er daher, indem sie seine Selbstentwicklung ist, nichts von sich aufgibt, sondern darin nur sich selbst, den Begriff, realisiert und darum mit sich in seiner Objektivität in Einheit bleibt. Solche Einheit des Begriffs und der Realität ist die abstrakte Definition der Idee.⁶

For, in accordance with its own nature, it is this identity already, and therefore generates reality out of itself as its own; therefore, since this reality is its own self-development, it gives up nothing of itself in it, but therein simply realises itself, the Concept, and therefore remains one with itself in its objectivity. This unity of Concept and Reality is the abstract definition of the idea.⁷

At this initial stage, what some might call the *thesis* stage, the *identity* of Concept and Reality is a simple, given identity. Art participates in life as a constitutive part of it, as *identical* to it. The relationship between the conceptual and the real, therefore, allows for art to function as the ritualistic expression of everyday life, as integrated into the communicative actions of such cultures. Given, however, that the dialectical movement of Spirit springs from a necessity for movement, from some inadequacy in the interaction of the two realms of Spirit and objectivity, Concept and Reality, this simple identity of the two sides is evoked in art as something *inadequate* [*unangemessen*]. Indeed, the relationship between the external shapes of Reality and the internal abstraction of the Idea is premised on the fact that it still seeks 'genuine expression in art' but is somehow over-stretched by the particularity of those external forms. As we have seen, this is encapsulated in Hegel's notion of the inadequacy of the two realms:

Denn sie kann sie nur willkürlich ergreifen und kommt deshalb statt zu einer vollkommenen Identifikation nur zu einem Anklang und selbst noch abstrakten Zusammenstimmen von Bedeutung und Gestalt, welche in dieser weder vollbrachten noch zu vollbringenden Ineinanderbildung neben ihrer

⁶ G. W. F. Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Ästhetik*, Reclam, Ditzingen 1971, 173. This edition is useful for the first two parts of the *Vorlesungen* in that it follows Hotho's second edition. For the latter part of the *Vorlesungen*, however, we use the Suhrkamp edition: *Theorie Werkausgabe*, Bd. 15, Suhrkamp Verlag, Frankfurt am Main, 1970. Unlike the Reclam edition, the Suhrkamp edition contains most of Hotho's 2nd edition. The Reclam edition contains only selections of the third part.

⁷ Knox, T. M. (trans.), *Hegel's Aesthetics: Lectures on Fine Art* (henceforward, *Lectures*), Oxford 1975, 106. Translation modified.

Verwandtschaft ebensosehr ihre wechselseitige Äußerlichkeit, Fremdheit und Unangemessenheit hervorkehren.⁸

This is because it can grasp them only arbitrarily, and therefore, instead of coming to a complete identification, it comes only to an accord, and even to a still abstract harmony between meaning and shape which, in this neither completed nor completing mutual formation, present equally their mutual externality, foreignness, and incompatibility.⁹

This notion of *Anklang* or 'accord' evokes the notion of 'resonance' which, as we have seen, can be understood as a synonym of structural resemblance in the organic structure. It is as if the *wechselseitige Fremdheit* and *Unangemessenheit* force a resonance across the schism. As in Schelling's notion of *Mythologie* where the forms of the ideal are posited as *present*, as *actual*, Hegel's *Idee* stage could be seen as referring largely to pre-literate and pre-antiquarian attitudes to art. This part of the dialectic, therefore, refers to those cultures which have a ritualistic or functionalist notion of art. In such pre-literate cultures, art participates in life as a kind of 'marking' of certain essential tasks of subsistence, and it is this happy involvement of art in reality which Hegel appears to be invoking.

The *Verwandtschaft* of the external and the internal in this mode of art is thus a state of affairs characterised by a paradoxical sense of adequacy [*Angemessenheit*] in inadequacy [*Unangemessenheit*]. This point can best be summarised not as a crude conflation of opposites but, rather, as an historically determined expression of the 'otherness' of such cultures. Since Hegel seeks, from his Now, to articulate such structures that are past, the apparent tardiness of his conflation is to be explained in the fact that the dialectic is posited in *time*.¹⁰ As we shall see later, time is no mere external framework for Hegel, but is a *Becoming*, the very process through which we come to apprehend the fullness of the Absolute. If the dialectic is to be grasped from its point of completion then it stands to reason that the previous moments of that movement should seem less coherent than its completion point. Hence, the apparent conflation of *Angemessenheit* and *Unangemessenheit* are expressions of the absolute necessity of

⁸ *Vorlesungen* (Reclam), 420.

⁹ *Lectures*, 300. Translation modified.

¹⁰ See McTaggart, John and Ellis, *Studies in the Hegelian Dialectic*, Cambridge, 1896, 2-3 and 16-17; Gadamer, Hans-Georg, *Hegel's Dialectic: Five Hermeneutical Studies*, London, 1976, 75-99.

movement away from this state of affairs. It is as if the cultures of the *Idee* stage were somehow unaware of this apparent inadequacy in the correlation between the external and the internal and, since that mode of reasoning saw no such inadequacy, then this 'otherness' must somehow be expressed in the incommensurate structures of Hegel's thought.

It is, however, in the emergence of an awareness of this inadequacy, in the inviolate necessity of the movement away from that inadequacy, that the second stage of art is born. Hence, the happy unity of the *Idee* moves to a differentiation of itself. It 'becomes aware' so to speak of its own inadequacy. The naive *Anklang* of internal and external in this stage is thus thrown into question. As *Idee* progresses through a differentiation of itself, it loses its essence and becomes mere objectivity in the form of *Gestalt* - usefully likened to the Hegelian stage of *antithesis*. The primacy in *Gestalt* of the 'concrete arts' such as sculpture underlines the profound objectivity of *Gestalt* in Hegel's system. Thus, matter - the objective world - is spiritualised in art:

Denn die Außengestalt ist als äußere überhaupt bestimmte, besondere Gestalt und vermag zu vollendeter Verschmelzung selber nur wieder einen bestimmten und deshalb beschränkten Inhalt in sich darzustellen, während auch der in sich selbst besondere Geist allein vollkommen in eine äußere Erscheinung aufgehen und sich mit ihr zu einer trennungslosen Einheit verbinden kann.¹¹

This is because the external shape, determined as external, is a particular shape, and for complete fusion [with a content] it can only present again in itself a determined and therefore restricted content, while too it is only the inwardly particular spirit which can appear perfectly in an external manifestation and be bound up with that in an inseparable unity.¹²

Hegel terms this stage of the arts the 'classical' stage. Whilst these stages of the dialectic are not strictly historical and certainly do not evoke clearly determined epochs of 'style', they are historical in a more general sense. In sculpture, Hegel appears to be intimating a *tendency* rather than a strictly delineated labour. In the tendency towards more external and, by implication, mimetic forms, it is tempting to recognise certain traits of Cartesianism. Whilst it would certainly be a crude generalisation to see in this

¹¹ *Vorlesungen* (Reclam), 420.

¹² *Lectures*, 301. The parentheses are Knox's. Translation modified.

'classical' stage a synonym of the Cartesian mimetic paradigm, there is little doubt that they share certain significant features in common.

The *Angemessenheit* of Spirit to matter, expressed as such in external forms, is close enough to Gottsched's semiological fixity to sustain this comparison. We might therefore recognise in this stage the cultures of agrarian feudalism and proto-industrial monarchical absolutism. That such cultures invested qualities of divinity in the mortal deities of monarchy, that such mortal figures were seen as absolute expressions of divinity, suggests a profound parallel between the practices of a culture and their political/demographic institutions. This, admittedly somewhat coded, sociological premise is perhaps one of the most striking features of the *Vorlesungen*.

In this stage, then, Spirit finds expression in matter, since its cultural and political forces demand such an expression. Hegel terms Spirit here *der in sich selbst besondere Geist* and this captures the sense of circumscription of the two realms Concept and Reality at the heart of the 'classical' arts: the conceptual is circumscribed by its own particularity because, as such, it is abstract, lending itself readily to external mimicry in the proportions of matter. The *beschränkter Inhalt* of external forms, therefore, expresses a mutual poverty across both realms. Thus, Spirit finds adequate expression in a similarly circumscribed external realm of spatial juxtaposition. Their mutual poverty or circumscription is what allows for their mutual *Angemessenheit*. Matter thus emerges as a material manifestation of Spirit, adequate to it in a general sense, as abstracted forms.¹³ The representation of Spirit in abstracted material form is thus an expression of Spirit's own *inadequacy* to itself.

The Romantic Art Form

The third stage of the arts is characterised by what Hegel terms the 'romantic arts', poetry, music and painting:

¹³ To separate the strictly Hegelian *Spirit* [*Geist*] from mere spirit in the sense of a 'spirit of the age,' I have always used it with an initial upper case. Some translators prefer *Mind* to Spirit, but neither captures the complexity of the term. In general, the Hegelian Spirit represents a collective consciousness and a removed sphere of generalised subjectivity which could conceivably be compared with God or a generally external construct of internal subjective feelings, thoughts or ideas. It also exists in the Hegelian world view as a driving force, as an instigator of change, as the prime causal agent in history.

Erfaßt sich nun aber *drittens* die Idee des Schönen als der *absolute* und dadurch - als Geist - für sich selber freie Geist, so findet sie sich in der Äußerlichkeit nicht mehr vollständig realisiert, indem sie ihr wahres Dasein nur in sich als Geist hat. Sie löst daher jene klassische Vereinigung der Innerlichkeit und äußeren Erscheinung auf und flieht aus derselben in sich selber zurück. Dies gibt den Grundtypus für die *romantische* Kunstform ab, für welche, indem ihr Gehalt seiner freien Geistigkeit wegen mehr fordert, als die Darstellung im Äußerlichen und Leiblichen zu bieten vermag, die Gestalt zu einer *gleichgültigeren* Äußerlichkeit wird, so daß die romantische Kunst also die Trennung des Inhalts und der Form von der entgegengesetzten Seite als das Symbolische von neuem hereinbringt.¹⁴

But, thirdly, when the Idea of the beautiful is comprehended as absolute spirit, and therefore as the spirit which is free for itself, it finds itself no longer completely realised in the external, since its true determinate being it has only in itself as spirit. It therefore dissolves that classical unification of inwardness and external manifestation and takes flight out of externality back into itself. This provides the fundamental typification of the *romantic* art-form; the content of this form, on account of its free spirituality, demands more than what representation in the free external world and the bodily can supply; in romantic art the shape is externally more or less indifferent, so that art introduces, in an opposite way from the symbolic, the separation of content from form.¹⁵

If, in the 'classical' stage, there was an adequacy of Spirit to the content of the material realm, if, in short, Spirit and matter conflate their mutually impoverished forms as content, then in the romantic stage the two realms find anew a self-sufficiency, a satisfaction in themselves. In other words, both Spirit and externality are 'free' or able to satisfy themselves in themselves. Initially, this self-satisfaction, evoked in Spirit as *für sich selber freier Geist*, might seem to suggest an even greater circumscription of the two realms, as if their finite withdrawal from each other expressed some deep-seated dualism. Yet this initial dualism must be mediated by the notion of self-satisfaction as *self-knowing*. Spirit's final awareness of itself, therefore, is an expression, in another form, of *interiority*. The *Innerlichkeit* of Spirit suggests, as in Schelling's notion of a 'taking up' [*das Aufnehmen*] by self-subsistent forms of the external into their centre, an immanence of Spirit, a Spirit which is self-satisfied due to its internalised awareness of the other *within itself*. This somewhat arcane point can be usefully articulated in Hegel's notion of mediation [*Vermittlung*] which will concern us

¹⁴ *Vorlesungen* (Reclam), 421.

¹⁵ *Lectures*, 301-2. Translation modified.

shortly. For the moment, however, it is sufficient to summarise mediation as a process of interaction between two apparently mutually exclusive opposites deposited at the very heart of Spirit or objectivity and as articulating their ontological confines.

At the romantic stage, then, art emerges as a complete comprehension of the beautiful as absolute Spirit. That is to say that art, in this final - syntheses - stage, apprehends completely abstract, self-contained Spirit as the most severe, extreme and thus essentialised form of beauty. Hegel's Idealism thus emerges as a trichotomy with apparently incomplete synthesis: as more an arc arising from and returning to modes of self-determination, self-subsistence. Hegel's system seems on this first reading to account for the role of the material in the romantic art-form in only the most partial manner.

The outer extremes of the trichotomy of the romantic arts are painting, the least 'romantic' for Hegel, and poetry, the height of 'romantic' perfection. Thus music lies at the *centre* of the romantic arts, sitting between the 'spatial sensuousness' of painting and the 'abstract spirituality' of poetry:

Die *zweite* Kunst, durch welche das Romantische sich verwirklicht, ist der Malerei gegenüber die *Musik*. Ihr Material, obschon noch sinnlich, geht zu noch tieferer Subjektivität und Besonderung fort. Das Ideelsetzen des Sinnlichen durch die Musik ist nämlich darin zu suchen, daß sie das gleichgültige Auseinander des Raumes, dessen totalen Schein die Malerei noch bestehen läßt und absichtlich erheuchelt, nun gleichfalls aufhebt und in das individuelle Eins des Punktes idealisiert.¹⁶

The *second* art through which the romantic form is realised is, contrasted with painting, *music*. Its material, though still sensuous, proceeds to still deeper subjectivity and particularisation. Music's positing of the sensuous as ideal is to be sought, that is, in the fact that it sublates,¹⁷ and idealises into the individual singularity of one point, the indifferent self-externality of space, the total appearance of which is accepted in painting and deliberately simulated.¹⁸

This idealisation of the 'self externality of space' into the 'individual singularity of one point' is, for Hegel, a significant quality. In painting, the eye is free to fleet across the

¹⁶ *Vorlesungen* (Reclam), 147-8.

¹⁷ Knox's translation of *aufhebt* - 'cancels' is problematic. As we shall see later, the verb *aufheben* is used by Hegel to express the movement from one qualitative state of the dialectic to the other. A more common, and, perhaps, more useful translation is 'sublates'.

¹⁸ *Lectures*, 87-88. Translation modified.

painting's surface, taking account of form and balance, taking time to take in the spatial sensuousness of its construction. In poetry the eye is drawn through the narrative direction of the exposition, but even here, free to pause, to re-read, to compare and contrast or to follow references between lines and stanzas. In music, however, the particularity of the moment is unavoidable: the ear receives only a momentary fragment of the overall structure thus providing a powerful indictment of the sobering materiality of the sensuous moment. On the other hand, the human mind is well equipped to place such moments into a broader context, to retain the framework of what has passed and to posit a future framework, against which it can measure the proceeding parts of the composition. This dynamic of *Erinnerung* and *Mutmaßung*, *remembering* and *positing*, and the materiality of the moment make music a highly rich and reconciliatory art form:

[In solcher Weise] bildet die Musik, wie die Skulptur als das Zentrum zwischen Architektur und den Künsten der romantischen Subjektivität dasteht, den Mittelpunkt wiederum der romantischen Künste und macht den Durchgangspunkt zwischen der abstrakten räumlichen Sinnlichkeit der Malerei und der abstrakten Geistigkeit der Poesie.¹⁹

...music forms the centre of the romantic arts and makes the point of transition between the abstract spatial sensuousness of painting and the abstract spirituality of poetry just as sculpture forms the centre-point between architecture and the arts of romantic subjectivity.²⁰

That music is the 'middle' of the romantic arts gives it a position at the centre of the romantic pinnacle of the dialectical movement of art. This central function stems, in part, from the relation it demonstrates with the general concept of the romantic. The romantic in art, then, is the perfection of form and content such that the Spirit 'comes to know itself:'

Diese Erhebung des Geistes *zu sich*, durch welche er seine Objektivität, welche er sonst im Äußerlichen und Sinnlichen des Daseins suchen mußte, in sich selber gewinnt und sich in dieser Einigkeit mit sich selber empfindet und weiß, macht das Grundprinzip der romantischen Kunst aus.²¹

¹⁹ *Vorlesungen* (Reclam), 148.

²⁰ *Lectures*, 88. Translation modified.

²¹ *Vorlesungen* (Reclam), 565.

This elevation of spirit *to itself* through which the spirit wins in itself its objectivity, which hitherto it had to seek in the external and sensuousness of existence, and in this unification with itself it senses and knows itself, is the fundamental principle of romantic art.²²

As articulating a return of Spirit to itself, the romantic posits the absolute as a complex state of corporeal negation where Spirit nonetheless carves images of itself in the corporeal. This dilemma, a deliberate attempt at resolving the sensual-meaning dichotomy evokes the notion of self-knowing as an ontological taking up of externality into the centre. As a microcosm of this process, art evokes this same process and hence the immanence of content in this final stage of the Hegelian aesthetic. Yet, unlike in Schelling, the semantic indeterminacy of the romantic art-work stems in Hegel from a suspension of the Real in favour of the Ideal. Even though Spirit's self-knowledge comes about as a result of engagement with the semantic-sensual schism, the truth of Spirit is evoked in the following manner:

...der Inhalt der romantischen Kunst, in betreff auf das Göttliche wenigstens, [ist] sehr *verengt*. Denn erstens ist, wie wir schon oben andeuteten, die Natur entgöttert, Meer, Berg und Tal, Ströme, Quellen, die Zeit und Nacht sowie die allgemeinen Naturprozesse haben ihren Wert in betreff auf die Darstellung und den Gehalt des Absoluten verloren. Die Naturgebilde werden nicht mehr symbolisch erweitert; die Bestimmung, daß ihre Formen und Tätigkeiten fähig wären, Züge einer Göttlichkeit zu sein, ist ihnen geraubt.²³

The subject-matter of romantic art, at least in relation to the Divine, is very circumscribed. For, first, as we have already indicated above, nature is emptied of gods; the sea, mountains, valleys, rivers, springs, time and night, as well as the general processes of nature, have lost their value in relation to the presentation and content of the Absolute. Natural forms are no longer augmented symbolically; they have been robbed of their ability to have forms and activities capable of being traits of a divinity.²⁴

This separation of the Divine from the Corporeal, seems, as we have already seen, to function as a kind of false synthesis of the system which limits the materiality of the work. This can be articulated as a progression from the materiality of sculpture, with its three dimensions, its basis in matter, to the two dimensions of painting, the one dimension (time) of music and the suspension of actual time in favour of a putative

²² *Lectures*, 518. Translation modified.

²³ *Vorlesungen* (Reclam), 574.

²⁴ *Lectures*, 524. Translation modified.

time structure in poetry. And yet, the genius of constructing a stage of synthesis composed of that very sensual-semantic schism emerges as a solution not dissimilar from Wackenroder:

Trennen sich nun diese durch die Skulptur zum erstenmal einander gemäß gemachten Seiten, so steht jetzt die in sich zurückgetretene Geistigkeit nicht nur dem Äußeren überhaupt, der Natur, sowie der eigenen Lieblichkeit des Inneren gegenüber, sondern auch im Bereiche des *Geistigen* selbst ist das Substantielle und Objektive des Geistes, insofern es nicht mehr in einfacher substantieller Individualität gehalten bleibt, von der lebendigen subjektiven Einzelheit als solcher geschieden, und alle diese bisher in eins verschmolzenen Momente werden gegeneinander und für sich selber frei, so daß sie nun auch in dieser Freiheit selbst von der Kunst herauszuarbeiten sind.²⁵

Now, if these two sides, made adequate to one another for the first time by sculpture, are separated, then the spirit which has withdrawn into itself stands opposed not only to externality as such, to nature and also to the inner life's own body but is also cut apart from the living and individual subject in the sphere of the spiritual itself, so far as the substantive and objective aspect of the spirit is no longer confined to simple and substantive individuality. The result is that all these factors hitherto fused into a unity become free from one another and independent, so that now in this very freedom they can be fashioned and worked out by art.²⁶

Wackenroder's deliberate broadening of the divide in 'das eigentümliche innere Wesen der Tonkunst' is, however, thoroughly rejected in the next few sentences:

Worin nun aber beide Seiten den Punkt ihrer Wiedervereinigung finden, ist das Prinzip der *Subjektivität*, welches beiden gemeinsam ist. Das Absolute erscheint deshalb ebenso sehr als lebendiges, wirkliches und somit auch menschliches Subjekt, wie die menschliche und endliche Subjektivität, als geistige, die absolute Substanz und Wahrheit, den göttlichen Geist in sich lebendig und wirklich macht.²⁷

But both sides have their point of re-unification in the principle of subjectivity which is common to both. On this account the Absolute is manifest as a living, actual, and therefore human subject, just as the human and finite subjectivity as spiritual, makes the absolute substance and truth, the divine Spirit, living and actual in itself.²⁸

The ontology of Spirit, then, is founded on its closure from the contingency and negativity of reality. That its content is 'absolute inwardness' and its form is 'spiritual

²⁵ *Vorlesungen*, Suhrkamp Volume 15, *Theorie Werkausgabe*, 11-12. All *Vorlesungen* references in this edition are to Volume 15.

²⁶ *Lectures*, 792-3. Translation modified.

²⁷ *Vorlesungen* (Suhrkamp), 12

²⁸ *Lectures*, 793. Translation modified.

subjectivity'²⁹ informs in it a sense of self so overwhelming that 'other' as determinate negation (Reality) must be transcended. To this extent the truth of Spirit, the self-identity in its most pure form reveals itself only in a manner that does not violate this autonomy. It reveals itself, therefore, in contingent forms that pass away, that fleet and fly past the finite consciousness of man and that emerge in his experience as a perfection to be attained. This yearning beyond the negativity of Reality, therefore, evokes in man a sense of the deep contingency of his own genius, of his sense of the Spirit. Through art, this apparent schism is mediated.³⁰

Mediation

So far, we have left the term *Aufhebung* [and *aufgehoben*, *aufheben* etc.] as if it were some self-explanatory magical cipher of the dialectical process, needing no explanation, revelling in its multiplicity. The apparent ambivalence of this term to any unified entity, process or thought can be best examined in terms of its location, first and foremost, in the movement, the necessitated progression, from one qualitative state of dialectic to another. Translated variously as 'sublation', 'raising up' and 'cancellation', it is best characterised as synonymous with the notion of dialectical *movement* itself. In this sense, then, it is important to grasp dialectic as a process which springs from the matter at hand, as grounded in the necessity *within* the objects of scrutiny of an *Aufhebung* to the next qualitative stage. *Aufhebung* in its sense of 'raising up' captures the notion of progress towards a 'higher' state which is implicit to the dialectic.

In his essay 'Die Idee der Hegelschen Logik' from *Hegels Dialektik: fünf hermeneutische Studien*³¹ Hans Georg Gadamer is keen to reinstate Hegel's *Wissenschaft der Logik* (1812-16) to the centre of Hegel scholarship. His assertion that *Phänomenologie des Geistes* (1807) has too often been raised to the level of a

²⁹ *Lectures*, 519.

³⁰ A useful metaphor for this, already intimated by Hegel in the *Vorlesungen* is that of 'light' where subjectivity is seen to be source of spiritual light. See *Vorlesungen* (Suhrkamp), 1971. See also Abrams, M. H., *The Mirror and the Lamp*, Oxford, 1971 and Blumenberg, Hans, 'Das Licht als Metapher der Wahrheit' in *Studium Generale*, X (1957), pp432-54.

³¹ Tübingen, 1971.

complete account of Hegel's project, resulting in some rather partial accounts of that project, is further upheld in Stanley Rosen's remarkable *G. W. F. Hegel: An Introduction to the Science of Wisdom*. We shall turn to the *Wissenschaft* shortly. First, however, it might be useful to look closely at the earlier text and pay some attention to the remarks made there regarding the notion of mediation.

The comments on 'truth' at the outset of *Phänomenologie* set the groundwork for mediation in that 'truth' itself is posited both as the *result* of philosophical speculation and as the process of such speculation. Expressed as a 'necessity', truth is thus both a certainty and is that certainty's *Becoming*, the process by which it becomes certain:

Die *äußere* Notwendigkeit aber, insofern sie ...auf eine allgemeine Weise gefaßt wird, ist dasselbe, was die *innere* [ist], in der Gestalt nämlich, wie die Zeit das Dasein ihrer Momente vorstellt.³²

...the external necessity, so far as it is grasped in a general way...is the same as the inner, or in other words it lies in the shape in which time sets forth the sequential existence of its moments.³³

Thus, as we have seen, necessity lies in the internalised account of its becoming, of the process by which it is reached, as well as the final result of that process. The true, then, is not merely the substantial, its existence in the abstract, but is also the apprehension of itself. The term *Subject* captures here this sense of truth as grounded in a process of apprehension by the knowing self, the *Subject*. In this sense, truth is the living *Substance*, a state of being which lives by virtue of the fact that it is apprehended:

Es kommt...alles darauf an, das Wahre nicht als *Substanz*, sondern ebensoehr als *Subjekt* aufzufassen and auszudrücken...

Die lebendige Substanz ist ferner das Sein, welches in Wahrheit *Subjekt* oder, was dasselbe heißt, welches in Wahrheit wirklich ist, nur insofern sie die Bewegung des Sichselbstsetzens oder die Vermittlung des Sichanderswerdens mit sich selbst ist...

...nur diese sich *wiederherstellende* Gleichheit oder die Reflexion im Anderssein in sich selbst - nicht eine *ursprüngliche* Einheit als solche oder *unmittelbare* als soche - ist das Wahre. Es ist das Werden seiner selbst, der Kreis, der sein Ende

³² *Phänomenologie des Geistes*, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt an Main, 1970, 14.

³³ *Phenomenology of Mind*, 3.

als seinen Zweck voraussetzt und zum Anfange hat und nur durch die Ausführung und sein Ende wirklich ist.³⁴

...everything turns on grasping and expressing the True, not only as *Substance*, but equally as *Subject*...
 ...the living Substance is being which is in truth *Subject*, or, what is the same, is in truth actual only in so far as it is the movement of positing itself, or is the mediation of its self-othering with itself.
 ...only in this self-restoring sameness, or this reflection in otherness within itself - not an *original* or *immediate* unity as such - is the True. It is the process of its own becoming, the circle that presupposes its end as its goal, having its end as its beginning; and only by being worked out to this end, is it actual.³⁵

The notion of 'movement' embedded at the heart of truth is striking. If the true is not to be reified as a simple given certainty, as, so to speak, a necessity without necessity, it must be coupled to the notion of 'positing itself', a movement of philosophy which sets up, within the true itself, a sense of self-mediation, a sense of somehow 'capturing' within itself that which is external: *process*. If process is given as a 'self-othering' or as a negation of the self of Spirit, then Spirit's return to itself is a kind of *double negation*. Only by proceeding through this double negation, a process of coming-to-be-true, is truth actually true.

We can explain this further in terms of the dialectic. It rests at its final stage only if it can *show* the path to that final stage. In other words, the proof of something as being true lies in being able to articulate how that truth has come about, how that truth has reached its present manifestation. We reach finally now the notion of *mediation*. Given, as we have seen, that Hegel articulates the past as containing the necessity within itself of movement, of articulating, in itself, the manner in which it will change, and given also that Hegel's apprehension of the 'symbolic' and 'classical' stages of art is from his *Now*, then the *Now* of romantic art, the only art which exists for him in the present, must somehow be able to show Hegel the truth of itself, the truth that it contains in the system. Hence, since Hegel is able to apprehend the truth of romantic art, it stands to reason that such art has, to put it bluntly, somehow suggested to Hegel

³⁴ *PdG*, 22-3.

³⁵ *PoM*, 10.

the process by which he is to apprehend it. In other words, romantic art has, *within itself*, traces or residues of the past, evidence of that past within itself.

Mediation, therefore, is the internalised evidence or, rather, the internalised interaction of the forces of the dialectic which proves the 'truth' of the matter at hand. It is a kind of encoding, *within the ontological confines* of a particular truth, of where that truth has 'come from'. This gives a useful model for the romantic art work which Hegel is happy to take up in the *Vorlesungen*. The romantic art work, as the 'truth' of Hegel's dialectical system of the arts, is thus a kind of encoding of the processes by which it comes to be apprehended. The notion of mediation, therefore, captures this sense of an internalised process, of the internal evidence of a certain mode of interaction between self and self-othering within either the object itself or Spirit. Mediation and 'truth' are thus intimately bound together.

Gadamer's assertion that *Phänomenologie* is not to be apprehended as a complete account of the dialectic begs the question as to how far this earlier notion of mediation integrates into the putatively complete project of Hegel's text. The notion of *Phänomenologie* as a lesser, more prototypical work than *Wissenschaft* is true only to the extent that it undertakes to bring to fruition a different project. Whereas *Phänomenologie* is an analysis of Spirit's becoming, articulated in such concerns as ethics, culture, morality and religion, *Wissenschaft* attempts a detailed analysis of the fundamental grammar of cognition and its parallels with the external world of appearances, concerning itself with such 'abstracts' as determinateness, magnitude, measure, essence, appearance, subjectivity and objectivity. To this extent, *Wissenschaft* is a more specialised, detailed analysis of some of the issues raised in *Phänomenologie*.

Particularly useful is the section in *Wissenschaft* on subjectivity, which rehearses some of the concerns already touched on in the preface of *Phänomenologie*:

Der Begriff ist zuerst der *formelle* der Begriff im *Anfang* oder der als *unmittelbarer* ist. - In der unmittelbaren Einheit ist sein Unterschied oder Gesetzsein *zuerst* zunächst selbst einfach und nur *ein Schein*, so daß die

Momente des Unterschiedes unmittelbar die Totalität des Begriffes sind und nur *der Begriff als solcher* sind.³⁶

The Concept is, in the first instance, *formal*, the Concept in its *beginning* or the *immediate Concept*. In the immediate unity, its difference or positedness is itself *at first* simple and only an *illusory being*, so that the moments of the difference are immediately the totality of the Concept and are simply the *Concept as such*.³⁷

This initial remark suggests comparison with the initial unity of the symbolic arts - what some insist on terming *thesis*. If art in this stage participates in an *Ineinanderbildung* of the two sides of meaning and shape,³⁸ premised, as we have seen, on the notion of their having an *Anklang*, then the 'moments of the difference' as 'immediately the totality of the Concept' evoke a similar uniformity of internal and external within a simple Concept.³⁹

Beyond this, the differentiation of the Concept runs parallel to the moment in *Phänomenologie* where the simple, initial, - thetic - truth moves into a connectional state of affairs, premised on notions of an 'adequacy' [*Angemessenheit*] of matter to the external forms of Spirit. These mimetic forms, possibly synonymous with our notion of Cartesian mimesis, can be seen in *Wissenschaft* to spring from the very structures of cognition:

Zweitens aber, weil er die absolute Negativität ist, so dirimiert er sich und setzt sich als *Negative* oder als das *Andere* seiner selbst; und zwar, weil er erst der *unmittelbare* ist, hat dies Setzen oder Unterscheiden die Bestimmung, daß die Momente *gleichgültig gegeneinander* und jedes für sich wird; seine Einheit ist in dieser *Teilung* nur noch äußere *Beziehung*. So als *Beziehung* seiner als *selbständig* und *gleichgültig* gesetzten Momente ist er das *Urteil*.⁴⁰

Secondly, however, because it [the Concept] is absolute negativity, it sunders itself and posits itself as the *negative* or the *other* of itself; and further, because as yet it is only the *immediate* Concept, this positing or differentiation is characterised by the fact that the moments become *indifferent to one another* and each becomes for itself; in this

³⁶ *Wissenschaft der Logik*, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt am Main, 1970, 272.

³⁷ *Science of Logic*, henceforward *Science*, 599. I have replaced the translator's 'Notion' with 'Concept' so as to fall in line with the conventions of the translations of *Vorlesungen* and *Phänomenologie*.

³⁸ *Vorlesungen* (Reclam), 420.

³⁹ 'Concept' [*Begriff*], as used here, might usefully be read as the logical counterpart, within the grammar of cognitive processes, of *das Wahre, die Wahrheit* in *Phänomenologie*. In this sense, the 'logical' or cognitive immediacy of 'moments of difference' and the *Concept as such* runs parallel to the non-mediacy of meaning and shape in the simple 'truth' of the 'symbolic' arts.

⁴⁰ *WdL*, 272.

partition, its unity is still only an external *connexion*. As such *connexion* of its moments, which are posited as *self-subsistent* and *indifferent*, it is *judgement*.⁴¹

This notion of the concept as 'absolute negativity' is particularly obscure. It seems that Hegel likens the concept in this antithetic stage to some unbalanced, incomplete, entity which exists merely by nature of its opposition to something. Since, in the prior thesis stage, the concept was a unified simple entity, it moves into a qualitative stage of dialectic where it opposes itself. To oppose the self is, perhaps, the most extreme form of negativity, hence *absolute Negativität*. Yet it is still somewhat unclear as to why Hegel begins this second part of the proposition with *weil er die absolute Negativität ist*. There is no indication in the first section that 'negativity' is implicit to the thesis concept. It is clear, therefore, that Hegel's use of *weil* in this second section is not a simple sequitur to the previous statement. Indeed, it would seem that a pertinent reading of this apparent leap of faith into the next, antithetic, stage demands a redefined understanding of Hegel's notion of *Negativität*. It would seem that negativity does indeed refer to entities that bear their essence in relation to those things which they oppose; and yet, a more complete reading of this term leads us to go beyond the merely antithetical positing of ontological character. What is striking in Hegel's use of 'negativity' here is the manner in which it captures a sense of an immanent need in something to move to a qualitatively different level of the dialectic. In other words, negativity is a state of being that requires another.

If such forms as those present in the antithesis stage of the dialectical movement of the concept are deposited at the very centre of logic, if, in short, there is an opposition which, at this stage, is conflated to mimesis and which is natural to the movement of Logic, then there is something essentially anthropological about Hegel's parallelism: the 'classical' arts are an outward expression, a *formal* expression, of an innate human process. The necessitated differentiation of meaning and shape springs from man's social and historical evolution - his 'first step' so to speak along the arduous path to truth.

⁴¹ *Science*, 599.

It is at the final -synthetic - stage of Logic, however, that the parallelism is completed:

Drittens, das Urteil enthält wohl die Einheit das in seine selbständigen Momente verlorenen Begriffs, aber sie ist nicht *gesetzt*. Sie wird dies durch die dialektische Bewegung des Urteils, das hierdurch der *Schluß* geworden ist, zum vollständigen gesetzten Begriff, indem im Schluß ebensowohl die Momente desselben als *selbständige* Extreme wie auch deren *vermittelnde Einheit* gesetzt ist.⁴²

Thirdly, though, the judgement does contain the unity of the Concept that has vanished into its self-subsistent moments, yet this unity is not *posited*. It becomes so through the dialectical movement of the judgement, through which it has become the *sylllogism*, the Concept posited in its completeness; for in the syllogism there is posited not only the moments of the Concept as *self-subsistent* extremes, but also their *mediating unity*.⁴³

Clearly, this grounds the sense of Truth as mediated self and self-othering (as taking up within itself residues or traces of its pathway - *Becoming* - to this final result) in the forms of consciousness/cognition innate to man. The anthropological trio completes itself in this *mediating unity*. Romantic art emerges, therefore, as an objectification of the mediated necessity of form and content, meaning and shape, Spirit and objectivity, autonomous Spirit and autonomous matter.

We can construct, now, a model of Hegel's notion of romantic art based on its status as an *objectified syllogism*. The syllogism is defined as existing in three forms, each of which reflects, within this final stage of mediating/mediated unity, the three stages of its *Becoming*: the syllogisms of existence, reflection and necessity. It seems that each of these types of syllogism, whilst encompassing the final synthetic truth of the dialectic, are proof of our proposition that in any final truth there must be some 'proof' of its truth - it must, that is, show the path it has taken to this truth. We need not enter into a detailed analysis of this syllogistic trio here, except to recognise in the structure of each one the functional pivot of a 'midpoint' or 'middle term' [*die Mitte*]:

Dieser Schluß ist *inhaltsvoll*, weil die *abstrakte* Mitte des Schlusses des Daseins sich zum *bestimmten Unterschiede* gesetzt, wie sie als Mitte des Reflexionsschlusses ist, aber dieser Unterschied wieder in die einfache Identität sich reflektiert hat. - Dieser Schluß ist daher Schluß der *Notwendigkeit*, da

⁴² *WdL*, 272.

⁴³ *Science*, 599.

seine Mitte kein sonstiger unmittelbarer Inhalt, sondern die Reflexion der Bestimmtheit der Extreme in sich ist. Diese haben an der Mitte ihrer innere Identität, deren Inhaltsbestimmungen die Formbestimmungen der Extreme sind. - Damit ist das, wodurch sich die Termini unterscheiden, als *äußerliche* und *unwesentliche* Form, und sie als Momente *eines notwendigen Daseins*.⁴⁴

This syllogism is *pregnant with content*, because the *abstract* middle term of the syllogism of existence posited itself as *determinate difference* to become the middle term of the syllogism of reflection, while this difference has reflected itself into simple identity again. This syllogism is therefore the syllogism of *necessity*, for its middle term is not some alien immediate content, but the reflection-into-self of the determinateness of the extremes. These possess in the middle term their inner identity, the determinations of whose content are the form[al] determinations of the extremes. Consequently, that which differentiates the terms appears as an *external* and *unessential* form, and the terms themselves as moments of a *necessary* existence.⁴⁵

This passage is particularly complex but, when grounded in our previous analysis, it should become clearer. The remark that the syllogism of necessity is 'pregnant with content' takes us once again to synthetic truth as a rich account of its own becoming, as somehow showing the manner in which it has come about. As we have seen, each of the three syllogisms is an account of the three stages of the dialectic such that the syllogism of existence [*der Schluß des Daseins*] relates - in synthetic form - to the thesis stage of truth where concept and reality are in simple naive unity. Hence, Hegel refers to the 'determinate difference' of the second antithesis stage, which the syllogism of existence posits in itself and thereby necessarily moves to the next qualitative stage, the 'syllogism of reflection' [*Reflexionsschlusses*]. This syllogism, as the term 'reflection' might suggest, articulates the mimetic modes of truth to be found in the antithesis stage of the dialectic and, despite its belonging to the synthetic stage - as do all of the three syllogisms - it captures within itself the differentiated parallelisms of the antithesis mimetic paradigm, characterised in *Vorlesungen* by the 'classical arts'. The return of the determinate difference of the syllogism of reflection to itself, articulates the movement to the synthetic syllogism of necessity. This final term 'necessity' captures the sense in which neither naive unity nor naive opposition can, in themselves, exist in pure isolated form without recourse to movement to a different qualitative state of being. Hence, the necessity in moving to the final stage is captured in the

⁴⁴ *WdL*, 391-2.

⁴⁵ *Science*, 695-6.

internal grammar of the dialectic. The 'extremes' articulated in the final syllogism are thus mediated by an 'inner identity'. It is essential to grasp the sense of mediation not as some static, obviated, identity but as an internalised *process*; this relates, as we have seen, to the notion of *resultant* truth as *showing* its own *Becoming*, the manner in which has come about.

The 'extremes' at work in the romantic art form can be captured in the terms Spirit and Reality. The process of mediation at work here can best be summed up in this context as a quasi-Schellingian *organic resemblance*. Thus the mediation or resemblance of Spirit and Reality rests on an organic trichotomy of self, other and a 'characteristic' common to both where each term retains autonomy and yet functions as both a 'model' of the larger structure in itself and as a mere part of the whole. In an analysis of Hegels's *romantic art*, therefore, we should look closely at those moments in the *Vorlesungen* which attempt to provide a middle term or a *revealing* of Spirit in the material realm.

The Revealing of Spirit in the Objective Realm

The shapes or forms of the absolute subjectivity of autonomous Spirit are revealed in three manners, each reliant upon and fundamentally consequent upon the mediated autonomy of Spirit. *First*, the absolute knows itself in its autonomy and yet is active in Reality. Its activity is premised on organic resemblances across the schism:

Den ersten Ausgangspunkt müssen wir von dem Absoluten selber nehmen, welches als wirklicher Geist sich ein Dasein gibt, sich weiß und betätigt. Hier wird die menschliche Gestalt so dargestellt, daß sie unmittelbar gewußt wird, als das Göttliche in sich habend. Der Mensch erscheint nicht als Mensch in bloß menschlichem Charakter, beschränkter Leidenschaft, endlichen Zwecken und Ausführungen oder als im bloßen Bewußtsein *von* Gott - sondern als der wissende einzige und allgemeine Gott selber, in dessen Leben und Leiden, Geburt, Sterben und Auferstehen sich nun auch für das endliche Bewußtsein offenbar macht, was Geist, was das Ewige und Unendliche seiner Wahrheit nach sei.⁴⁶

The original starting-point we must take from the Absolute itself which as actual spirit gives itself an existence, knows itself and is active. Here the human form is so represented that it is immediately known as having the Divine in itself. The man [Jesus]

⁴⁶ *Vorlesungen* (Reclam), 569-70.

appears not as man in a purely human character with restricted passions, finite ends and achievements, or as merely conscious *of* God, but as the knowing sole and universal God himself in whose life and suffering, birth, death, and resurrection there reveals itself even to man's finite consciousness what spirit, what the eternal and infinite, is in its truth.⁴⁷

God appears not merely to itself (and we may read God here as a synonym for the Absolute, as in Schelling) nor merely in the guise of Christ but distributes itself, as signs of its own signifieds in a marvellous plethora of signification. Thus by the *action* of self signification, God shows itself:

Denn insofern es Gott, der ebenso in sich Allgemeine, ist, der in dem menschlichem Dasein erscheint, so ist diese Realität nicht auf das einzelne, unmittelbare Dasein in der Gestalt Christi beschränkt, sondern entfaltet sich zur gesamten Menschheit, in welcher der Geist Gottes sich gegenwärtig macht und in dieser Wirklichkeit mit sich selbst in Einheit bleibt.⁴⁸

For because it is God who appears in human existence, for all that he is universal in himself too, this reality is not restricted to individual immediate existence in the form of Christ but is unfolded into the whole of mankind in which the spirit of God makes itself present, and in this reality remains in unity with itself.⁴⁹

This diffusion of autonomous Spirit through the contingency of man, then, stems from what might be termed the unwieldy purity of its form which is so perfect as to reflect itself with unceasing efficacy in the material realm. In other words, Spirit is a construct which is so pure, so completely ideal, so overwhelmingly extreme in its abstraction, that it is somehow unwieldy. This unwieldiness functions in the Hegelian dialectic in a rather similar manner to an electrical charge in a cloud which, after a certain build up, reaches a critical point where it must earth itself as lightening. Spirit, thus requires, or strains for, its opposite, the unwieldy negative, the objective, which promises an uncharged equilibrium. This unwieldy or austere perfection of Spirit thus functions like one of the 'extremes' of the syllogism of necessity. It is as if, by articulating this extremity, Spirit brings itself into a final synthesic syllogism and necessitates its mediation with materiality. Hence the notion which is used here of an unceasing efficacy, of an efficient delineation of pure Spirit (-uality), captures the very *necessity*

⁴⁷ *Lectures*, 521. Translation modified.

⁴⁸ *Vorlesungen* (Reclam), 570.

⁴⁹ *Lectures*, 521. Translation modified.

of the syllogism. It is the efficacy of Spirit's ability to be *extreme* that allows it to participate in the syllogism of necessity. This efficacy is driven by a quasi-Schellingian hankering for organic resemblance:

Die Ausbreitung dieses Selbstanschauens, Insich- und Beisichseins des Geistes ist der Frieden, das Versöhntsein des Geistes mit sich in seiner Objektivität - eine göttliche Welt, ein Reich Gottes, in welchem das Göttliche, das von Hause aus die Versöhnung mit seiner Realität zu seinem Begriff hat, sich in dieser Versöhnung vollführt und dadurch für sich selber ist.⁵⁰

The diffusion of this self-contemplation of spirit, of its inwardness and self-possession, is peace, the reconciliation of spirit with itself in its objectivity - a divine world, a Kingdom of God, in which the Divine, by virtue of the reconciliation of its Reality to its Concept, consummates itself.⁵¹

The perfection or utopian sense of the reconciliation of Spirit to itself, then, is a kind of post-Wackenroderian sublime which can at last find some kind of mediation with the literal forms of contingency, the external forms of the material realm.

The *second* manner of manifestation consequent on the immanent mediation of self and other within self is based on the ontological confines of Spirit itself. That Spirit is limited, that it raises itself back to itself in self-subsistence or self-subsistence is, in itself, an *action*, a *process*. Here Hegel parts company with Schelling on the most fundamental level. We have already intimated that activity or process is a form of mediation and that the efficacy of self-expression in the contingent realm constitutes evidence for Spirit. Yet this very point must surely include the activity of Spirit *on itself*:

Mit dieser Zerreiung umgekehrt ist die Notwendigkeit verbunden, aus der Abgeschiedenheit von sich selbst, innerhalb welcher das Endliche und Natrliche, die Unmittelbarkeit des Daseins, das natrliche Herz als das Negative, ble, Bse bestimmt ist, erst durch berwindung dieser Nichtigkeit in das Reich der Wahrheit und Befriedigung einzugehen.⁵²

With this dismemberment there is bound up, conversely, the necessity of rising out of this state of scission (within which the finite and the natural, the immediacy of existence, the natural heart, are determined as the negative, the evil, and the bad) and

⁵⁰ *Vorlesungen* (Reclam), 570.

⁵¹ *Lectures*, 521-2. Translation modified.

⁵² *Vorlesungen* (Reclam), 570-1.

of entering the realm of truth and satisfaction only through the over-coming of this nullity.⁵³

Thus the 'reconciliation' of the Spirit with the realm of negativity is to be defined in terms of a mediation, a consequence of the activity of Spirit itself. In short, since synthesesic Spirit is a mediation of self and self-othering, since it is a 'truth' in the strict sense postulated in *Phänomenologie*, then it is clear that there is some internal feature of Spirit which is nonetheless *external* to it. Since man, too, is an internal mediation of his own circumscribed subjectivity and contingent objectivity, then he can function as a kind of 'model' of Spirit. Spirit thus represents man's essential qualities in the purest and most extreme form. Therefore, man apprehends God or Spirit as a form beyond contingency and this meta-physical utopia becomes a state for which man yearns. Man thereby attempts to 'elevate himself to God' thereby elevating himself to himself:

Denn wie Gott zunächst die endliche Wirklichkeit von sich ausscheidet, so erhält auch der endliche Mensch, der von sich außerhalb des göttlichen Reiches anfängt, die Aufgabe, sich zu Gott zu erheben, das Endliche von sich loszulösen, die Nichtigkeit abzutun und durch dieses Ertönen seiner unmittelbaren Wirklichkeit das zu werden, was Gott in seiner Erscheinung als Mensch als die wahrhafte Wirklichkeit objektiv gemacht hat.⁵⁴

For, just as God cuts himself off from finite reality, so finite man, who begins of himself outside the Kingdom of God, acquires the task of elevating himself to God, detaching himself from the finite, abolishing his nullity, and through this killing of his immediate reality becoming what God in his appearance as man has made objective as true reality.⁵⁵

The appearance of God in finite human form as Christ, then, leaves for finite man a model of objective spirituality to which he aspires. This objective Spirit, therefore, is a cipher or sign of Spirit returned to itself and thereby evokes in man a yearning not merely for objective Spirit (Christ) but also for absolute, self-subsistent Spirit.

This final point leads to the *third* manifestation of absolute Spirit. That Spirit is self-contained, as we have said, lays for it an ontological boundary which can only be crossed by the sacrifice of particular or finite subjectivity in favour of a collective or 'absolute' subjectivity:

⁵³ *Lectures*, 522. Translation modified.

⁵⁴ *Vorlesungen* (Reclam), 571.

⁵⁵ *Lectures*, 522.

Der unendliche Schmerz dieser Aufopferung der eigensten Subjektivität, Leiden und Tod, welche mehr oder weniger aus der Darstellung der klassischen Kunst ausgeschlossen waren oder mehr nur als natürliches Leiden hervortraten, erhalten erst im Romantischen ihre eigentliche Notwendigkeit.⁵⁶

The infinite pain of this sacrifice of the very heart of subjectivity, suffering and death, which were more or less excluded from the representations of classical art or rather appeared there as natural suffering, acquire their real necessity only in romantic art.⁵⁷

To transcend the particular or contingent negativity of reality is to enter into a closed ontology, Spirit. The apprehension of this *closed* realm, therefore, is strikingly similar to the apprehension of a meaning-rich *real* in the Schellingian sense. The apprehension cannot be intellectual or *ideal* but must be apprehended, first and foremost, through the senses. It stands to reason, that is, that if Spirit is circumscribed, that it is somehow impenetrable or closed to reason, then it is a kind of *object* where its content, as non-literal,⁵⁸ is to be likened to the content of the sensual arts. The self-satisfaction of Spirit, then, results in a double function. On the one hand:

[Einesteils nämlich] ergeht sich der Geist, weil er die Affirmation mit sich gewonnen hat, auf diesem Boden als einem selber berechtigten und befriedigenden Elemente, von welchem er nur diesen positiven Charakter herauskehrt und sich selber in seiner affirmativen Befriedigung und Innigkeit daraus widerscheinen läßt;⁵⁹

...because spirit has won affirmation with itself, it issues on this ground as on an element justified and satisfying in itself, and of this element it presents only the purely positive character it has, out of which its own affirmative satisfaction and deep feeling are reflected;⁶⁰

This 'positive' character must therefore be apprehended as the opposite of the negativity of the contingent, as a profound contrast to the finite reality of man, as we have already said. And yet, on the other hand:

⁵⁶ *Vorlesungen* (Reclam), 571.

⁵⁷ *Lectures*, 522. Translation modified.

⁵⁸ The dialectic of form and content is central to the Hegelian aesthetic. For Hegel, the content represents something similar to Schelling's *Ideale* in that it can be apprehended by the intellect as a more or less simply reducible semantic construct. Hence, for Spirit to have any kind of 'content' in the Hegelian sense, it must somehow strain for a clarity, a simplicity, a coherence. And yet, since Spirit is, in a sense, pure form, it clearly cannot contain a literally semantic content in the most obvious sense. Thus, in order to talk of content at all in Spirit, we must mediate the semantic quality of the term 'content' with the qualifier *non-literal*.

⁵⁹ *Vorlesungen* (Reclam), 573.

⁶⁰ *Lectures*, 524.

[anderteils aber] wird derselbe Inhalt zur bloßen Zufälligkeit herabgesetzt, die keine selbstständige Gültigkeit in Anspruch nehmen darf, da der Geist in ihr nicht sein wahres Dasein findet und deshalb mit sich nur in Einheit kommt, indem er für sich selber dies Endliche des Geistes und der Natur als Endliches und Negatives auflöst.⁶¹

...the same content is degraded to mere contingency which cannot claim any independent validity because in it the spirit does not find its true existence and therefore only comes into unity with itself by explicitly dissolving this finitude of spirit and nature as being something finite and negative.⁶²

The degradation of this content is a consequence of Spirit's action to the extent that in becoming self-subsistent it becomes inconsistent with a 'literal' content. The objectivity of Spirit in its final stage of return to itself, therefore, is consequent upon its apprehension as objectivity by virtue of this indifference (not in the Schellingian sense) to its content. The apparent semantic ambivalence of synthesic Spirit, therefore, can be mediated by the intervention of art as a profound form of apprehension, neither purely sensual nor purely intellectual. Spirit, in the end, can be apprehended through this medium as *object* and yet it thereby does not require that it release itself into the contingent realm of objectivity.

To summarise the points made so far, synthesic Spirit returns to itself as self-subsistent and self-knowing. It thereby affects a schism between itself and objective contingency. This 'negativity' thereby strives for Spirit as a result of the recognition of this otherness in certain contingent ciphers. These ciphers, Christ for example, leave 'evidence' of Spirit in the contingent realm and inform into finite consciousness the will to overcome self in favour of the positivity of Spirit. The action of Spirit on itself, therefore, is also a cipher, in that activity constitutes 'evidence' here. This notion of 'evidence' or 'trace' captures the sense given in *Phänomenologie* of truth as showing its becoming, the pathway it has traversed to arrive at its present position. In the final enclosure of Spirit, man, through the apprehension of the ciphers, becomes aware of Spirit as an ontological phantom, as enclosed within a quasi-objective framework. To use Schelling's terms, the Ideal of the Spirit takes on structural properties akin to a

⁶¹ *Vorlesungen* (Reclam), 573.

⁶² *Lectures*, 524.

Real in that its content is non-literal and is to be apprehended first and foremost through the senses. The self-diremption of its content, the negation of literal forms in a supreme act of self-overcoming, is thereby consequent upon the autonomy of Spirit.

If Spirit is thus autonomous, the protocol of theory is upheld: namely, to find expression in extremes. Hegel's supremely theoretical gesture evokes now a theoretical standpoint that has considerable radical force. As we have seen, this radical theory of mediation first sets out the mechanisms of separation and dynamism that sustain it in its operation. The separation of Spirit and the Real is thus the first stage of the exposition. It allows for the initiation of dynamic, *complex*, models of interaction between these extremes, thereby providing an inroad into the apparent semantic nullity of the objective realm. On the mediatory properties of romantic art in this regard, Hegel is quick to stress the fundamental character of its content first, thereby attenuating the Kantian consequences of the Spirit-World division. This content, as an expression⁶³ of synthesesic Spirit, renounces nature as its primary semantic resource and seeks only to reveal God.⁶⁴ Hence, the denial of contingent content in favour of a content that is imbued with Spirit is, for Hegel, the most essential feature of modern, romantic, art:

Der ganze Inhalt konzentriert sich dadurch auf die Innerlichkeit des Geistes, auf die Empfindung, die Vorstellung, das Gemüt, welches nach der Einigung mit der Wahrheit strebt, das Göttliche im Subjekt zu erzeugen, zu erhalten sucht und ringt und nun nicht sowohl Zwecke und Unternehmungen *in der Welt* der Welt wegen durchführen mag, als vielmehr zur einzig wesentlichen Unternehmung den inneren Kampf des Menschen in sich und die Versöhnung mit Gott hat...⁶⁵

The entire content [of romantic art] is therefore concentrated on the inner life of the spirit, on feeling, ideas, and the mind which strives after union with the truth, seeks and struggles to generate and preserve the Divine in the subject, and now may not carry through aims and undertakings in the world for the sake of the world but rather has for

⁶³ This is not to simplify the relationship between the Real and self-spirit. The resemblance across the schism is not a mere 'expression' (although this term in itself is imbued with some complexity) but is, rather, an equilibrium which, as unattained, imbues life with process. Thus the unattainable equilibrium of the Real and Spirit finds frustrated manifestation in dark and hidden corners, in the structures and contents of apparently semantically indeterminate phenomena. In this sense, expression might better be replaced with the term *resemblance*. This is, however, not to be confused with Foucault's account of the Renaissance notion of 'resemblance' in *The Order of Things*.

⁶⁴ See previous quote from *Vorlesungen* (Reclam), 574 *Lectures*, 524.

⁶⁵ *Vorlesungen* (Reclam), 574.

its sole essential undertaking the inner battle of man in himself and his reconciliation with God;⁶⁶

We return again to the notion of activity or process. If man strives for this Spirit, by recreating the content of Spirit in particular, objective, form then reconciliation is, in itself, merely synonymous with activity. The Ought of the Spirit thus provides a momentum for activity or, more accurately, process (as linear activity) towards this utopian re-unification. This linear activity is likened by Hegel to a kind of 'heroism':

Der Heroismus, der nach dieser Seite hin hervortreten kann, ist kein Heroismus, welcher aus sich selber Gesetze gibt, Einrichtungen festsetzt, Zustände schafft und umbildet, sondern ein Heroismus der Unterwerfung, der schon alles bestimmt und fertig über sich hat und dem daher nur die Aufgabe übrigbleibt, das Zeitliche danach zu regulieren, jenes Höhere, Anundfürsichgültige auf die vorgefundene Welt anzuwenden und im Zeitlichen geltend zu machen.⁶⁷

The heroism which may enter according to this side is no heroism which gives laws from its own resources, establishes organisations, creates and develops situations, but is a heroism of submission which has everything determined and cut and dried and has no task left to it but to regulate the temporal order, to apply what is higher and valid in itself to the world confronting it, and to assert it in the temporal.⁶⁸

The schism residing here is that fundamental sensual-intellectual separation of the *Frühromantik*. The drive to somehow 'capture' the Spirit and keep it in the contingent realm is thus doomed, not least by virtue of the negation of reality that Spirit has affected in order to return to itself. Yet the majesty or highness of the doomed project of the romantic aesthetic consists for Hegel in this very tragedy, a point close to that made by Wackenroder.⁶⁹

Following from this point, there re-emerges the primacy of the subjective as the only receptacle of Spirit in objective form. This term 'receptacle' might appear to contradict the schism, but the manifestation of Spirit in the objective, determinate realm, can be evoked, as we have seen, as a kind of cipher. This model of the cipher captures the Hegelian sense of Spirit as 'truth' or 'meaning' in the broadest sense and the world of contingent forms as mere signifiers. In this sense, the particular

⁶⁶ *Lectures*, 525. Translation modified.

⁶⁷ *Vorlesungen* (Reclam), 574-5

⁶⁸ *Lectures*, 525. Translation modified.

⁶⁹ *Phantasien*, 164ff.

subjectivity of humankind is a kind of microcosm of the broader subjectivity and its relationship with the contingent realm is no less problematic than that of absolute Spirit. The rather proto-Darwinian point that Hegel makes here is premised on a fundamental category of linear activity. By virtue of man's apprehension of Spirit through its various stages of external manifestation, *Idee*, *Gestalt*, and *Kunst* man has drawn ever closer to the essence of Spirit. In this sense, man has become ever more *like* Spirit. When man's subjectivity withdraws ever more into itself, cuts itself free from the contingency of the external and renounces the negativity of his environment, he draws nature into himself as the receptacle of Spirit and not as mere negativity:

Indem nun aber dieser absolute Inhalt in den Punkt des *subjektiven Gemüts* zusammengedrängt erscheint und somit aller Prozeß in das menschliche Innere hineinverlegt wird, so ist dadurch der Kreis des Inhalts auch wieder unendlich *erweitert*.⁷⁰

But since this absolute content appears compressed into the point of the *subjective* heart, so that all process is transported into the inner life of man, the scope of the subject-matter is therefore also infinitely *extended* again.⁷¹

If we stress, once more, the notion of mediation as a kind of internalised process, then we get a sense of how romantic art takes up the external truth into itself in the syllogism of necessity. Thus the internalisation of linearity in the guise of the temporal 'compressed into the subjective heart' is the suspension of one aspect of contingent action and an elevation of it towards the spiritual. Yet this is not a suspension, in the strictest sense, of the nullity of objectivity. It is, rather, an internalised mediation of Spirit and objectivity *within* Spirit. Spirit in this final stage is like 'truth' in *Phänomenologie*. In this sense, romantic art constitutes a step forward:⁷²

Denn obschon jene objektive Geschichte das Substantielle des Gemüts ausmacht, so durchläuft das Subjekt sie doch nach allen Seiten, stellt einzelne Punkte aus ihr dar oder sie selbst in stets neu hinzutretenden, menschlichen Zügen und vermag außerdem noch die ganze Breite der Natur als Umgebung

⁷⁰ *Vorlesungen* (Reclam) 575.

⁷¹ *Lectures*, 525. Translation modified.

⁷² It is not difficult to see how readings of Hegel by the Berlin Revolutionaries furnished notions of history as necessarily *progressive*.

und Lokal des Geistes in sich hineinzuziehen und zu dem einen großen Zwecke zu verwenden.⁷³

For although that objective history constitutes the substantial basis of the heart, the subject yet runs through it in every direction, presents single points drawn from it or presents himself in steadily added new human traits and, over and above this, he can draw into himself the whole breadth of nature as the surroundings and locality of spirit and devote it to the one great end.⁷⁴

This one great end, then, is the mediation of Spirit and the real in terms of a striving or a process, the middle term of the syllogism of necessity. The ultimate goal, as we have said, is no mere peace or free-standing equilibrium. That would be for Hegel a return to the symbolic naive totality, a step back, an anachronism. No, the ultimate goal is one of constant striving, constant yearning and constant movement - in short, of constant *mediation*.

In the quest for the absolute content of art, posited in Hegel as absolute subjectivity, romantic art strives for the dissolution of the dimensions of the objective realm. This is a striving for the extremities of the syllogism. Hence:

Soll nun aber das Innere, wie dies bereits im Prinzip der Malerei der Fall ist, in der Tat als *subjektive* Innerlichkeit sich kundgeben, so darf das wahrhaft entsprechende Material nicht von der Art sein, daß sie noch für sich Bestand hat.⁷⁵

But if the inner life, as is already the case in the principle of painting, is in fact to be manifested as a *subjective* inwardness, the genuinely correspondent material cannot be of such a kind that it *persists* on its own account.⁷⁶

The objective inadequacy of painting's objective *persistence* to the content of Spirit leads to a more intensified drive from the objective, external form in stable manifestation to the withdrawal from objective stability into a form which persists not on its own account but as a process, a movement from one moment to another.

⁷³ *Vorlesungen* (Reclam), 575.

⁷⁴ *Lectures*, 525. Translation modified.

⁷⁵ *Vorlesungen* (Suhrkamp), 133.

⁷⁶ *Lectures*, 889.

Time and Mediation.

As Schelling had stressed succession as the fundamental form of music, so Hegel stresses the temporal as a negation of the mere corporeality of other manifestations of art:

Dies Tilgen nicht nur der *einen* Raumdimension, sondern der totalen *Räumlichkeit* überhaupt, dies völlige Zurückziehen in die Subjektivität nach seiten des Inneren wie der Äußerung, vollbringt die zweite romantische Kunst - die *Musik*.⁷⁷

This obliteration not of *one* dimension only but of the whole of space, purely and simply, this complete withdrawal into subjectivity of both the inner life and its external manifestation brings into complete being the *second* romantic art - music.⁷⁸

Time is defined by Hegel in the *Naturphilosophie* of the *Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften*⁷⁹ as the negativity of space posited in the sphere of self-externality. Space, first of all, is given as 'die abstrakte *Allgemeinheit ihres Außersichseins*...',⁸⁰ or the abstract general framework of objective existence. The following points, therefore, must be understood regarding space - first that space is an ideal side-by-sideness,⁸¹ second, that it is self-externality,⁸² third, that it is void of difference and finally that it is therefore continuous. This continuity is thus violated by the positing of 'points of space' [*Raumpunkten*] which evoke difference or the interruption of continuity. Hence, Hegel terms such points the negation of space:

Von *Raumpunkten* zu sprechen, als ob sie das positive Element des Raums ausmachen, ist unstatthaft, da er um seiner Unterschiedslosigkeit willen nur die Möglichkeit, nicht das *Gesetzsein* des Außereinanderseins und Negativen, daher schlechthin kontinuierlich ist; der Punkt, das Fürsichsein, ist deswegen vielmehr die und zwar in ihm gesetzte *Negation* des Raums.⁸³

⁷⁷ *Vorlesungen* (Suhrkamp), 133

⁷⁸ *Lectures*, 889. Translation modified.

⁷⁹ G. W. F. Hegel, *Werke in 20 Bänden*, Band 9: *Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften II: Die Naturphilosophie*, Theorie Werkausgabe, Suhrkamp Verlag, Frankfurt am Main, 1970. Note that the *Zusätze* originally offered by the editor of the 1847 edition, Karl Ludwig Michelet, are standard inclusions in most editions. They are additional commentaries on Hegel's text apparently compiled from other Hegelian sources.

⁸⁰ *Naturphilosophie*, 41. The quotation translates: 'the abstract universality of Nature's self-externality...'

⁸¹ 'das ganz ideelle Nebeneinander' *Naturphilosophie*, 41.

⁸² 'das Außersichsein' *Naturphilosophie*, 41.

⁸³ *Naturphilosophie*, 42.

It is not permissible to speak of *points of space*, as if they constituted the positive element of space, since space, on account of its lack of difference, is only the possibility and not the actual *positedness* of being-outside-of-one-another and of the negative, and is therefore absolutely continuous; the point, the being-for-self, is consequently rather the *negation* of space, a negation which is posited in space.⁸⁴

Time, on the other hand, represents a negation of a far more complex order:

Die Negativität, die sich als Punkt auf den Raum bezieht und in ihm ihre Bestimmungen als Linie und Fläche entwickelt, ist aber in der Sphäre des Außersichseins ebensowohl *für sich* und ihre Bestimmungen darin, aber zugleich als in der Sphäre des Außersichseins setzend, dabei als gleichgültig gegen das ruhige Nebeneinander erscheinend. So *für sich* gesetzt, ist die *Zeit*.⁸⁵

Negativity which, as point, relates itself to space and develops its determinations as line and plane in space is, however, in the sphere of self-externality, equally *for itself* and so are its determinations; but, at the same time, these determinations are posited in the sphere of self-externality and thus appear as indifferent to the inert side-by-sideness of space. Negativity, thus posited for itself, is time.⁸⁶

Whereas the points in space are internal differences which are affected by the evocation of an Other, non-space, points in time emerge as a real difference posited *within* the continuity of time. This point is made in Michelet's *Zusatz*:

Der Unterschied ist aus dem Raume herausgetreten, heißt: er hört auf, diese Gleichgültigkeit zu sein, er ist für sich in seiner ganzen Unruhe, nicht mehr paralysiert.⁸⁷

Difference has stepped out of space; this means that it has ceased to be this indifference [nonchalance],⁸⁸ it is for itself in all its unrest, is no longer paralysed.⁸⁹

In this sense, time is posited as a pure difference, an abstract self-externality which constantly steps beyond the Now without ever leaving it - hence *self-externality*.

Contained *within* time is both the prison of present-being and the constant creation of the external-to-self - that which is the Un-now, the past and the positing of the future.

The determination of time as abstract self-externality is thus apt, capturing the Hegelian sense of pure negativity suggested here:

⁸⁴ A. V. Miller (trans.), *Hegel's Philosophy of Nature*, henceforward *Nature*, Oxford, 1970, 29.

⁸⁵ *Naturphilosophie*, 47-8.

⁸⁶ *Nature*, 33-4. Translation modified.

⁸⁷ *Naturphilosophie*, 48.

⁸⁸ Knox translates *Gleichgültigkeit* as 'indifference'. In the light of our previous chapter's engagement with Schelling's notion of *Indifferenz*, however, it seems prudent not to confuse the specifically Schellingian notion with this more informal usage.

⁸⁹ *Nature*, 34. Translation modified.

Die Zeit, als die negative Einheit des Außersichseins ist gleichfalls ein schlechthin Abstraktes, Ideelles. - Sie ist das Sein, das, indem es *ist*, *nicht* ist, und indem es *nicht* ist, *ist*; das *angeschaute* Werden, d.i. daß die zwar schlechthin *momentanen*, d.i. unmittelbar sich aufhebenden Unterschiede die als *äußerliche*, d.i. jedoch *sich* selbst äußerliche, bestimmt sind.⁹⁰

Time, as the negative unity of self-externality, is similarly an out-and-out abstract, ideal being. It is that being which, inasmuch as it *is*, is *not*, and inasmuch as it is *not*, *is*: it is *intuited* Becoming; this means that the pure moments, the immediate self-sublating differences, are determined as external, i.e. as external to *themselves*.⁹¹

Furthermore, the externality or abstraction of time's universal negativity⁹² is to be likened, as in Schelling, to the principle of self-knowing or consciousness. Hence, as time evokes the abstract environment of subjectivity, it evokes in general form the principle I = I: 'Die Zeit ist dasselbe Prinzip als das Ich = Ich des reinen Selbstbewußtseins.'⁹³ And yet it is not merely the environment for becoming an abstracted *Ding an sich* but the process of becoming: things do not become in time but time, rather, is the very *becoming* of things. The 'conventional' wisdom of time generally evokes it as a framework or environment in which process takes flight:

*In der Zeit, sagt man, entsteht und vergeht alles; wenn von allem, nämlich der Erfüllung der Zeit, ebenso von der Erfüllung des Raums abstrahiert wird, so bleibt die leere Zeit wie der leere Raum übrig, - d.i. es sind dann diese Abstraktionen der Äußerlichkeit gesetzt und vorgestellt, als ob sie für sich wären.*⁹⁴

Everything, it is said, *comes to be* and *passes away* in time. If abstraction is made from *everything* namely from what fills time, and also from what fills space, then what we have left over is empty time and empty space: in other words, these abstractions of externality are posited and represented as if they were for themselves.⁹⁵

This notion of things coming to be and passing away *within* time is then immediately repudiated by Hegel's formulation of time as pure becoming:

Aber nicht *in der Zeit* entsteht und vergeht alles, sondern die Zeit selbst ist die *Werden*, Entstehen und Vergehen, das *seiende Abstrahieren*, der alles gebärende und seine Geburten zerstörende *Kronos*.⁹⁶

⁹⁰ *Naturphilosophie*, 48

⁹¹ *Nature*, 34. Translation modified.

⁹² As we have already seen, negativity refers to a 'state of being that requires another.' Hence, time represents *pure negativity*, negativity in its most universalised, abstract, austere, form.

⁹³ *Naturphilosophie*, 49.

⁹⁴ *Naturphilosophie*, 49.

⁹⁵ *Nature*, 35.

⁹⁶ *Naturphilosophie*, 49.

But it is not *in* time that everything comes to be and passes away, rather time itself is the *becoming*, this coming-to-be and passing away, the *existent abstraction*, *Chronos*, from whom everything is born and by whom its offspring is destroyed.⁹⁷

The contrast between the first extract's *Abstraktionen der Äußerlichkeit* and the second's *seiende Abstrahieren* is that very contrast between a false concretising ontology of time as kind of *Ding* and a constantly present process, the relationship of *Ich* to *Ich*. In this sense, time is located in the '=' of self-reflexivity. It is, in this sense, the proof, substance and environment of self's becoming aware of self.

The parallel of time to consciousness posited here demands comparison with Schelling's formulation of soul as number. The Pythagorean terms of Schelling's argument, it must be said, are located within a volume concerned first and foremost with the general properties of art. The apparent simplicity of the Schellingian formulation stems from the desire, it would seem, to have done with the more complex metaphysical issues of the project of *Naturphilosophie* since such issues are well-rehearsed elsewhere in Schelling's *oeuvre*.⁹⁸ Yet the differences between Hegel's formulations in the *Naturphilosophie* and those given by Schelling in *Philosophie der Kunst* are not mere pragmatic spin-offs of the respective tasks at hand. Schelling proposes time as an accumulative process of memory, of ever more insightful glimpses into the nature of the relationship between God and his labour. Hence, as a microcosm of God in the Wackenroderian sense, man's awareness of his consciousness, his awareness of his *being aware*, is dependent upon time and is yet *not* located *within* it. It is of no surprise, therefore, that Schelling should stress *die Succession* rather than *die Zeit* as the environment of becoming:

Genug, wir stellen Dinge außer uns vor, tragen aber erst in der Vorstellung auf sie über Raum und Zeit, ferner die Begriffe von Substanz und Accidens, Ursache und Wirkung u.s.w.; so entsteht Succession unserer Vorstellungen in

⁹⁷ *Nature*, 35. I have omitted 'actually' which Miller inserts before 'abstraction', which strikes me as a little fussy.

⁹⁸ See, for example: *Erster Entwurf eines Systems der Naturphilosophie*, 1799; *System des transzendentalen Idealismus*, 1800; *Über den wahren Begriff der Naturphilosophie und die richtige Art, ihre Probleme aufzulösen*, 1801, all available in reprographic edition from the Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, Darmstadt 1970.

uns, und zwar eine nothwendige Succession, und diese selbstgemachte, mit Bewußtseyn erst hervorgebrachte Succession heißt man den Naturlauf.⁹⁹

It is enough that we represent things as external to us. Only in the representation, however, do we first carry space and time over to them, and further, the concepts of substance and accident, cause and effect, and so on. Thus the succession of our ideas arises in us, and indeed a necessary succession; and this self-made succession, first brought forth in consciousness, is called the course of Nature.¹⁰⁰

This last point might seem to negate the apparent separation of *Zeit* and *Succession* because nature appears to be called forth *as* self-made succession. And yet the dualism remains. *Zeit* is brought to bear upon the objective realm as a kind of hermeneutic tape measure whereas *Succession* inheres in nature *as* its very becoming. The latter category, therefore, is the abstraction of an unknown space between two cognitive events, two points in the system of the world, and, as the abstraction of such an unknown, it can be apprehended only as a formal organising principle. *Zeit*, on the other hand, inheres in *Anschauung* or intuition as an element of the fundamental aestheticising of the world in the Schellingian system. It is, so to speak, an external tool, brought to bear upon contingent reality thereby furnishing a hermeneutic framework for engagement with it.

For Hegel, however, time inheres in the objective realm only as *becoming* and has no 'real' or grounded counterpart such as succession. This comparison might seem at first rather arcane, yet it is essential to grasp this subtle difference since the respective aesthetic function of music in the two philosophers' systems divide precisely at this point. If, for Hegel, time is located in the '=' of *Ich = Ich*, then the temporal forms of music are not merely objectified modes of a kind of general hermeneutics but a self-becoming, immanent, self-product. It follows from this that Hegel ascribes 'idealism' or the quality of the ideal to the more 'autonomous' arts whereas Schelling ascribes a kind of objective complexity, a 'thingness' to such arts.

⁹⁹ F. W. J. Schelling, *Ideen zu einer Philosophie der Natur; Einleitung*, 1797, also available in reprographic edition of first (1856) publication, from the Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, Darmstadt 1967, 358.

¹⁰⁰ Errol E. Harris and Peter Heath (trans.), *Schelling's Ideas for a Philosophy of Nature*, Cambridge, 1988, 26.

If time is the *becoming* of the dialectic, the very pathway to syntheses truth, then it follows that time is something fundamentally at the centre of the notion of mediation. Hence, in music, the very temporality of its form evokes mediation in the most profound manner. If truth, to be actual, must show how it has *become*, then it must, somehow, take time into its very being, capture it somehow in the ontological confines of its existence. The self-reflection of final Truth, therefore, means, in the final instance, that it must be posited *in* time and yet must somehow internalise time.

Hegel's idealism of music, therefore, can be seen to centre in his peculiarly idealistic notion of time as a form of mediation or becoming, and, in particular, as a mediation of the dimensions of the *Außersichsein* of space and the autonomy of subjectivity. As metaphor of the inward movement of Spirit, then, music evokes the broad ontological authentication of an, as yet, inadequate content of Spirit - the concrete externality of the three dimensions present in the 'classical' stage. In temporal form, therefore, music finds a medium with which to negate the external, a metaphorical pathway to the interiority of Spirit's self-subsistence:

Sie bildet in dieser Beziehung den eigentlichen Mittelpunkt derjenigen Darstellung, die sich das Subjektive als solches sowohl zum Inhalte als auch zur Form nimmt, indem sie als Kunst zwar das Innere zur Mitteilung bringt, doch in ihrer Objektivität selber *subjektiv* bleibt...¹⁰¹

Thus viewed, it forms the real centre of that presentation which takes the subjective as such for both form and content, because as art it communicates the inner life and yet even in its objectivity remains subjective.¹⁰²

Just as painting negated one of the dimensions of classical art, so music retreats completely into the dimension of time, freeing itself from the shackles of spatial objectivity. Indeed, the very essence of sound as process, as a fleeting coming-into-being and passing-away, is circumscribed by the temporal. Hegel makes a point not dissimilar to Schelling here, that sound springs from the objective realm as a fleeting result of agitation:

¹⁰¹ *Vorlesungen* (Suhrkamp), 133.

¹⁰² *Lectures*, 889.

Die Aufhebung des Räumlichen besteht deshalb hier nun darin, daß ein bestimmtes sinnliches Material sein ruhiges Außereinander aufgibt, in Bewegung gerät, doch *so* in sich erzittert, daß jeder Teil des kohärierenden Körpers seinen Ort nicht nur verändert, sondern auch sich in den vorigen Zustand zurückzusetzen strebt.¹⁰³

The sublation of space therefore consists here only in the fact that a specific sensuous material sacrifices its peaceful separateness, turns to movement, yet so vibrates in itself that every part of the cohering body not only changes its place but also struggles to replace itself in its former position.¹⁰⁴

Yet the explicitly causal connection of sound to the body is not a cipher of its *realness* in the Schellingian sense. Hegel strives to give an account of sound as a step *beyond* the material, as a step closer to Spirit. The 'adequacy' of the content of Spirit in this manifestation is thus premised by a *removal* of Schelling's *Klang* from the sensual *Reale*. Sound is raised here to the level of a 'double negation' [*zweifache Negation* or *gedoppelte Negation*] in that it first negates objectivity in springing free from the oscillation of an object and thence negates itself as the object strives to come to rest. It is thus no mere corporeality but a striving for the ideal content. The final point is also premised by the negation of the corporeal and as a negation of that abstraction, a returning to itself as *regained corporeality*. This return is thus a dissolution of its own ontology, an ontology which in itself is a negation of a prior ontology. Sound destroys itself by returning to itself. The relationship between the action of sound and that of Spirit is thus one of organic resemblance. In its objective action, music evokes the subjective action of synthesic Spirit. This argument is, again, given in more detail in the *Naturphilosophie*:

Die Idealität, die hierin¹⁰⁵ gesetzt ist, ist eine Veränderung, die ein doppeltes Negieren ist. Das Negieren des (außereinander) Betsehens der materiellen Teile wird ebenso negiert als das Wiederherstellen ihres Außereinanderseins und ihrer Kohäsion; sie ist *eine* Idealität als Wechsel der einander aufhebenden Bestimmungen, das innere Erzittern des Körpers in ihm selbst, - *der Klang*.¹⁰⁶

The ideality posited here is an alteration which is a double negating. The negating of the persistence, in asunderness, of the material parts is itself negated as the re-

¹⁰³ *Vorlesungen* (Suhrkamp), 134

¹⁰⁴ *Lectures*, 890. Miller's translation of *Aufhebung* as 'cancellation' is inconsistent and somewhat confusing. Wherever possible, I have used 'sublation' and its other forms 'sublate', 'sublated' etc.

¹⁰⁵ Refers to *Elastizität*. See §§297-299 of the *Naturphilosophie*.

¹⁰⁶ *Naturphilosophie*, 170-1.

establishing of their asunderness and their cohesion; it is a *single* ideality as an alternation of the two mutually sublating determinations, the inner oscillation of the body within itself - *Sound*.¹⁰⁷

The essence of the differences between Schelling's *Succession* and Hegel's *Zeit* emerges now as vital to the characterisation of their music aesthetics: the *Idealität* posited in sound in Hegel's formulation emerges as the double negation of matter, first as the displacement and thence as its return to rest - vibration. Whilst this vibration is linked to cohesion and gravity, it is posited in Hegel as their *negation*.¹⁰⁸ The quality of a *mechanische Seelenhaftigkeit*, a 'mechanical soul-likeness', emerges as a kind of idealised matter. Matter, posited within the two determinacies (Bestimmungen) of specific gravity and cohesion, strains for a third determinacy in the manner of a simple form, one which abstracts the other two into a higher form, a kind of 'middle term' such as that given in the syllogism of necessity. This negation is likened by Hegel to 'das Übergehen der materiellen Räumlichkeit in materielle Zeitlichkeit'¹⁰⁹ where the interior vibration of the body unites the subsistence of the two lower determinacies with their negation and gives this process a formal existence as time. Just as time is the *becoming* and *passing away* of nature, so sound lays itself to rest after the initial agitation of the body. That this process has a beginning, a middle and an end, that it is a *becoming*, demands the assertion that it too is the process of self-becoming in *Ich = Ich*. Hence the notion of sound as a *mechanische Seelenhaftigkeit*: mechanical because of its origins in material asunderness; soul-like because of its existence as *becoming*.

Sound should be grasped, therefore, as a complex embodiment of the sense-Spirit dichotomy where the mechanics of its manifestation, mere external oscillation [*äußere Ortsveränderung*] is to be contrasted with its *Idealität*, its negation of the merely external asunderness of objectivity as *freiwerdende Subjektivität*.

As a double negation of corporeality, then, music has a content which is 'object-free':

¹⁰⁷ *Nature*, 136. Translation modified.

¹⁰⁸ *Naturphilosophie*, 171.

¹⁰⁹ 'The transition of materialised space into materialised time...' *Naturphilosophie*, 171.

Für den Musikausdruck eignet sich deshalb auch nur das ganz objektlose Innere, die abstrakte Subjektivität als solche. Diese ist unser ganz leeres Ich, das Selbst ohne weiteren Inhalt.¹¹⁰

On this account what is alone fitted for expression in music is the object-free inner life, abstract subjectivity as such. This is our entirely empty self, the self without any further content.¹¹¹

Indeed, the content is a subjectivity conscious only of the boundaries which circumscribe it, a subjectivity free of the particularities of literal meaning or objective persistence. In short, it is *das an sich Subjektive*.¹¹²

Having delineated music's place in the general metaphysical scheme, Hegel proceeds to an analysis of the 'general characteristic' [*allgemeine Charakter*] of music.¹¹³ The broader argument is now to be refined according to three operations: a comparison of music with the other arts; an analysis of how music apprehends for itself and portrays a subject-matter; an analysis of the effects [*Wirkungen*] music has on the mind [*das Gemüt*].

Comparison with the Visual and Plastic Arts.

Music's separation from the other arts, in terms of its relationship with the action of Spirit on itself, is not an absolute separation. The autonomy of music in the Hegelian system is defined by virtue of a clear discursive space, the limits of which are articulated according to its relation with the other arts. This point is made, first of all, vis-à-vis architecture: '*Erstens* steht sie [die Musik] zur *Architektur*, obschon sie derselben entgegengesetzt ist, dennoch in einen verwandtschaftlichen Verhältnis.'¹¹⁴ ['First, although it stands in contrast to architecture, it still has an affinity with it.']¹¹⁵ The nature of the relationship is essentially structural rather than ontological, premised on Hegel's notion that both music and architecture are forms of *accompaniment*.

Denn das geistige Innere geht aus der bloßen Konzentration des Gemüts zu Anschauungen und Vorstellungen und deren durch die Phantasie ausgebildeten Formen fort, während die Musik mehr nur das Element der Empfindung

¹¹⁰ *Vorlesungen* (Suhrkamp), 135.

¹¹¹ *Lectures*, 891.

¹¹² 'The subjective in itself.' *Vorlesungen* (Suhrkamp), 136.

¹¹³ *Vorlesungen* (Suhrkamp), 137ff.

¹¹⁴ *Vorlesungen* (Suhrkamp), 138.

¹¹⁵ *Lectures*, 893.

auszudrücken befähigt bleibt und nun die für sich ausgesprochenen Vorstellungen des Geistes mit den melodischen Klängen der Empfindung umzieht, wie die Architektur auf ihrem Gebiet um die Bildsäule des Gottes in freilich starrer Weise die verständigen Formen ihrer Säulen, Mauern und Gebälke umherstellt.¹¹⁶

For the spiritual inner life proceeds from mere concentration of mind to views and ideas and to forms for these developed by imagination; but music remains capable rather of expressing only the element of feeling and it accompanies explicitly enunciated spiritual ideas with the melodious sounds expressive of feeling, just as architecture in its own sphere surrounds the statues of the god, in an admittedly rigid way with the judicious forms of its pillars, walls, and entablatures.¹¹⁷

Embedded in this notion is a sense that 'proper' content is overtly literal or figurative rather than merely proportional or structural:

Wenn nämlich in der Baukunst der Inhalt, der sich in architektonischen Formen ausprägen soll, nicht wie in Werken der Skulptur und Malerei ganz in die Gestalt hereintritt, sondern von ihr als eine äußere Umgebung unterschieden bleibt, so ist auch in der Musik als eigentlich romantischer Kunst die klassische Identität des Inneren und seines äußerlichen Daseins in der ähnlichen, wenn auch umgekehrten Weise aufgelöst...¹¹⁸

If, in architecture the subject-matter to be impressed on architectonic forms does not go wholly into the shape as it does in sculpture and painting but remains distinct from it as merely an external environment for it, so too in music, as a properly romantic art, the classical identity between the inner life and its external existence is dissolved again in a similar, even if opposite, way...¹¹⁹

The 'external environment' of architectonic forms, the context it affords for the 'proper' content of literal or figurative forms, is a manifestation not wholly adequate to classical Spirit; there is in this overt externality of architecture a predominance of device, of artistic operation above and beyond the 'content' which properly evokes externality as a medium, not as an externality in itself. In other words, architecture is informed primarily by issues of construction rather than issues of 'content' and thus differs from the more overtly 'classical' art of sculpture in that its main function is as a formal outline or profile of some aesthetic *Idee* rather than the communication of its content. Similarly in music, its device-ridden nature negates the expression of true interiority since the forms in themselves are too inward in their construction: just as architecture

¹¹⁶ *Vorlesungen* (Suhrkamp), 138.

¹¹⁷ *Lectures*, 894. Translation modified.

¹¹⁸ *Vorlesungen* (Suhrkamp), 138.

¹¹⁹ *Lectures*, 893. Translation modified.

cannot express any kind of content, that is anything external to itself, so music cannot express anything internal to itself - in both cases their content and form, their interior and exterior are undifferentiated. Hence, architecture is *general* externality and music is *general* interiority. Just as music expresses merely the 'element' of feeling, mere feeling in its most archetypal forms, its most structural expression, so architecture expresses merely the proportional environment, the mathematical context of the dimensions *within* which the literal content of sculpture can find expression. In both forms of art, then, the device becomes a predominant, self-present element of operation, an element of artifice:

Auch in dieser Rücksicht kann die Musik näher mit der Architektur verglichen werden, welche ihre Formen nicht aus dem Vorhandenen, sondern aus der geistigen Erfindung hernimmt, um sie teils nach den Gesetzen der Schwere, teils nach den Regeln der Symmetrie und Eurhythmie zu gestalten.¹²⁰

In this respect too music may be compared more closely with architecture which derives its forms, not from what exists, but from the spirit's invention in order to mould them partly according to the laws of gravity and partly according to the rules of symmetry and eurhythmy.¹²¹

In terms of the non-literal, non-figurative nature of these 'contents', both music and architecture demonstrate a degree of artifice which might be likened to 'autonomy' or a kind of self-subsistence: since their internal 'content' and their external 'form' are undifferentiated, the self-reference of these two artforms seems clear - they are, so to speak, semantically indeterminate. That music should appear *more* adequate to the self-subsistence of Spirit, as shown in the general argument for music, is now underlined by its device-ridden modes of manifestation. Spirit's self-subsistence, therefore, is structurally reflected at this stage in *autonomy*.

These modes of autonomy, music and architecture, are finally differentiated not by the preponderance of device, the distinctions drawn between these preponderances, but by the *media* in which the two operate:

¹²⁰ *Vorlesungen* (Suhrkamp), 138-9.

¹²¹ *Lectures*, 894. Translation modified.

In beiden Künsten geben zwar die quantitativen und näher die Maßverhältnisse die Grundlage ab, das Material jedoch, das diesen Verhältnissen gemäß geformt wird, steht sich direkt gegenüber. Die Architektur ergreift die schwere sinnliche Masse in deren ruhigem Nebeneinander und räumlicher äußerer Gestalt, die Musik dagegen die aus der räumlichen Materie sich freiringende Tonseele in den qualitativen Unterschieden des Klangs und in der fortströmenden zeitlichen Bewegung.¹²²

It is true that in both arts the relations of quantity, or more precisely proportion, provide the foundation, but the material shaped in accordance with these relations is directly opposite in the two arts. Architecture takes heavy visible masses in their peaceful and external spatial shape, whereas music takes the soul of tone, working itself free from spatial matter, in the qualitative differences of sound and in the movement of the ever-rolling stream of time.¹²³

Hegel then proceeds to compare music with the other figurative arts, sculpture and painting. Clearly, sculpture is the furthest from music in that its material is resolutely spatial, with all three dimensions and a figurative content, an adequate matching of its form and its content. Painting, as the lowest 'romantic' form is more inclined to a separation of the concrete manifestation and the 'content'

Zu der Malerei hingegen hat die Musik schon eine nähere Verwandschaft, teils wegen der überwiegenden Innerlichkeit der Ausdrucks, teils auch in bezug auf die Behandlung des Materials, in welcher, wie wir sahen, die Malerei bis nahe an das Gebiet der Musik heranzustreifen unternehmen darf.¹²⁴

With painting, on the other hand, music has a closer relationship partly on account of the prepondering inwardness of expression, partly in relation to the treatment of the material in which, as we saw, painting may undertake to touch on the territory of music very nearly.¹²⁵

And yet even this 'closeness' within the romantic forms to music belies a fundamental schism, an ontological abyss between the spatial sensuality of painting and the inward spirituality of music. Whereas painting *shows* an externality, a microcosm of late Cartesian systems, music is, in its very ontology, opposed to externality. Hence, as regards the composer:

...die eigentliche Region seiner Kompositionen aber bleibt die formellere Innerlichkeit, das reine Tönen, und sein Vertiefen in den Inhalt wird statt eines Bildes nach außen vielmehr ein Zurücktreten in die eigene Freiheit des Inneren,

¹²² *Vorlesungen* (Suhrkamp), 139.

¹²³ *Lectures*, 894. Translation modified.

¹²⁴ *Vorlesungen* (Suhrkamp), 140.

¹²⁵ *Lectures*, 895.

ein Ergehen seiner in ihm selbst und in manchen Gebieten der Musik sogar eine Vergewisserung, daß er als Künstler frei von dem Inhalte ist.¹²⁶

...yet the real region of his compositions remains a more formal inwardness, pure sound; and his immersion in the subject-matter becomes not the formation of something external but rather a retreat into the inner life's own freedom, a self-enjoyment, and, in some domains of music, even an assurance that as artist he is free from subject-matter altogether.¹²⁷

Music is thus a medium more attuned to the inwardness of romantic beauty, a beauty which negates limits of the concrete type and strives for a kind of freedom which, far from revoking the ontological, in fact constantly poses the ontological question of itself: what am I essentially? In this sense, Hegel evokes, yet again, the notion of mediation.

The constant quest for the *Wesen* in music is the formal element of its romanticism. It is an art form which is 'free' as far as possible from the content and one which represents an *extreme* in the romantic idiom:

Wenn wir nun im allgemeinen schon die Tätigkeit im Bereiche des Schönen als eine Befreiung der Seele, als ein Lossagen von Bedrängnis und Beschränktheit ansehen können, indem die Kunst selbst die gewaltsamsten tragischen Schicksale durch theoretisches Gestalten mildert und sie zum Genusse werden läßt, so führt die Musik diese Freiheit zur letzten Spitze.¹²⁸

Now, if in general we may regard activity in the realm of the beautiful as a liberation of the soul, as freedom from oppression and restrictedness since, by theoretical figure-forming for contemplation, art itself alleviates the most powerful and tragic fates and makes them become satisfying, so music carries this liberation to the most extreme heights.¹²⁹

Here, at last, we see the detailed proof in the text of our notion of music as what might be termed an *objectified syllogism*. It is in the strain for this extremity that music makes for itself an efficacy similar to that of Spirit, an efficacy which is captured in its unwieldy 'freedom from restrictedness', a *Lossagen von Beschränktheit*. This 'freedom' is to be likened, therefore, to the extremity of the two sides of the syllogism of necessity.

¹²⁶ *Vorlesungen* (Suhrkamp), 141.

¹²⁷ *Lectures*, 895.

¹²⁸ *Vorlesungen* (Suhrkamp), 141.

¹²⁹ *Lectures*, 895-6. Translation modified.

And yet this freedom in itself incurs a penalty. If music is free from the literal objective content of painting, then it must acquire for itself a subject-matter that is only vague, only general. In this sense, the unity of detail and structure, of form and content is somewhat attenuated in music. The structural considerations always outweigh the considerations of an articulated content:

Nun darf allerdings auch einem musikalischen Werke die innere Gliederung und Abrundung zum Ganzen, in welchem ein Teil den anderen nötig macht, nicht fehlen; teils ist aber hier die Ausführung ganz anderer Art, teils haben wir die Einheit in einem beschränkteren Sinne zu nehmen.¹³⁰

Now of course a work in music may not lack an inner articulation and a rounding of the parts into a whole in which one part makes the others necessary; but in the case of music the execution is of a totally different kind and we have to take the unity in a more restricted sense.¹³¹

This 'more restricted sense' in which musical unity is posited here encompasses merely the device-ridden operations of the musical medium: development, transformation. Hegel's approach to *meaning* here is classically immanent: meaning is 'already exhausted' [*bereits erschöpft*] in the theme.¹³² The repetitions, transformations, modulations, are all superfluous to the actual essence of the musical theme. This strangely ontological notion of the theme should come as no surprise, however. The notion of a closed theme, laden with its own internal meaning fits in with the organic schema of structural resemblance across different levels of the artwork. Hence, if music is immanent, to be understood by means of an internal operation on itself, as a kind of 'meaning object,' then the theme, as a level within that construct, should also apprehend itself according to an ontological model of meaning:

...wird es [das Thema] nun wiederholt oder auch zu weiteren Gegensätzen und Vermittlungen fortgeführt, so erweisen sich diese Wiederholungen, Ausweichungen, Durchbildungen durch andere Tonarten usf. für das Verständnis leicht als überflüssig und gehören mehr nur der rein musikalischen Ausarbeitung und dem Sicheinleben in das mannifaltige Element harmonischer Unterschiede an, die weder durch den Inhalt selbst gefordert sind, noch von ihm getragen bleiben;¹³³

¹³⁰ *Vorlesungen* (Suhrkamp), 142.

¹³¹ *Lectures*, 896.

¹³² *Vorlesungen* (Suhrkamp), 142.

¹³³ *Vorlesungen* (Suhrkamp), 142.

...if the theme is repeated or if it goes on to further contrasts and mediations, then the repetitions, mediations, transformations in different keys, etc. readily prove superfluous for an understanding of the work and belong rather to a purely musical elaboration and an assimilation into the manifold realm of musical harmonic differences etc. which are neither demanded by the subject-matter nor remain carried by it;¹³⁴

So whereas the visual arts are concerned with ever more detailed, more accurate, evocations of the external, music articulates self-quality by closing itself to the literal externalities of nature, by creating an internal environment of elements for its operations on itself. The initially ontological notion of the theme is now mediated by the broader semantic framework Hegel brings into play against closure:

Doch läßt sich freilich nicht leugnen, daß auch in einem musikalischen Werke durch die Art und Weise, wie ein Thema sich weiterleitet, ein anderes hinzukommt und beide nun in ihrem Wechsel oder in ihrer Verschlingung sich fortreiben, verändern, hier unterzugehen, dort wieder aufzutauchen, jetzt besiegt scheinen, dann wieder siegend eintreten, sich ein Inhalt in seinen bestimmteren Beziehungen, Gegensätzen, Konflikten, Übergängen, Verwicklungen und Lösungen explizieren kann.¹³⁵

Yet we cannot deny, it is true, that in a musical composition a topic can be unfolded in its more specific relations, oppositions, conflicts, transitions, complications, and resolutions owing to the way in which a theme is first developed and then another enters, and now both of them in their alternation or their interfusion advance and change, one becoming subordinate here and then more prominent again there, now seeming defeated and then entering again victorious.¹³⁶

The *Explizierung* of a content in this manner can be understood in two ways. First, Hegel might be attempting a generally metaphorical reading of music's internal operations such that the emergence of a theme might evoke the 'victory' of that mood, notion or idea over another. Conversely, Hegel might understand the internal workings of music here as mere devices which lend themselves to symbolic interpretation but which, in the final analysis, are merely internal operations, carrying no external meanings in themselves. The implicit/explicit problem of meaning in music is thus evoked within the framework of a semantic confusion: either such meanings are

¹³⁴ *Lectures*, 896.

¹³⁵ *Vorlesungen* (Suhrkamp), 142.

¹³⁶ *Lectures*, 897.

concretely semantic, literal in the strictest sense, or they are too vague, too bountiful in their semantic possibilities to be singular or concrete in their meaning:

Aber auch in diesem Falle wird durch solche Durcharbeitung die Einheit nicht wie in der Skulptur und Malerei vertiefter und konzentrierter, sondern ist eher eine Ausweitung, Verbreitung, ein Auseinandergehen, eine Entfernung und Zurückführung, für welche der Inhalt, der sich auszusprechen hat, wohl der allgemeinere Mittelpunkt bleibt, doch das Ganze nicht so fest zusammenhält, als dies in den Gestalten der bildenden Kunst, besonders wo sie sich auf den menschlichen Organismus beschränkt, möglich ist.¹³⁷

But, even so, such elaboration does not, as in sculpture and painting it does, make the unity more profound and concentrated; it is rather an enlargement, an extension, a separation of elements, a flight and a return, for which the subject-matter to be expressed does form the more general centre; but the content does not hold the entire work so closely together as is possible in the figures of visual art, especially where that art is restricted to the human organism.¹³⁸

Meaning in music is thus expansive and in drawing itself to itself, it expands the possibilities of its articulation across an ever broader semantic arena. That the content is a kind of 'more general centre' [*der allgemeinere Mittelpunkt*] suggests a model of musical meaning that is somehow free even of the intentionality of its conception:

Nach dieser Seite hin liegt die Musik, im Unterschiede der übrigen Künste, dem Elemente jener formellen Freiheit des Inneren zu nahe, als daß sie sich nicht mehr oder weniger über das Vorhandene, den Inhalt, hinaus wenden könnte.¹³⁹

In this respect, music, in distinction from the other arts, lies too near the essence of that formal freedom of the inner life to be denied the right of turning more or less away above the subject-matter, above what is given.¹⁴⁰

This point seems strange given Hegel's more general remarks on the nature of Spirit's return to itself. If music is 'too close' to the inner life, the absolute subjectivity of Spirit, then this suggests that some kind of 'distance' from it is advisable. Why is closeness a problem here? What are the operations in music's ontology that make it somehow imperfect?

¹³⁷ *Vorlesungen* (Suhrkamp), 142-3.

¹³⁸ *Lectures*, 897.

¹³⁹ *Vorlesungen* (Suhrkamp), 143.

¹⁴⁰ *Lectures*, 897.

Comparison with Poetry.

This can be explained in the passage Hegel devotes to the comparison of music with poetry, the 'most romantic' of all the arts. The relationship between music and poetry seems for Hegel the most close. His analysis of the nature of the two art forms' use of sound is particularly striking. Sound is only present in poetry as a *posited*. The sign of the written word evokes the human voice and yet, present in the written word is no sound whatsoever. Hence poetry, posited here not as an oral tradition but as a written tradition, represents a degrading of sound, of the spoken externality of words, for the merely significatory power of the written word. For poetry, sound is a mere accident of ideas and feelings, as a mere medium for their transmission. In music, however, sound becomes not merely a medium, but the formal and essential quality of the content itself.

In music, then, sound is not some secondary by-product of the dissemination but is located at the centre of that dissemination, as the essential feature of it. In this sense, the fixed mode of dissemination, sound, is bound into the music as simultaneously its medium, its form and its ontology. Hegel sees this as a kind of retreat into the medium away from content, away from the literal communications of the other more figurative arts. As poetry loses an external objectivity and retreats into its own self-proclaimed internal objectivity, so music renounces this internal objective realm and conflates external medium and internal objectivity in favour of a vague interiority. This point is obscure. Since poetry brings about a representation of the external objectivity of the world through the internal world of human feelings or the inner subjectivity of the author, it can negate the absolute objectivity of its medium, just as it can negate the pure externality of nature by a deliberate confusion of its dissemination: poetry is neither purely written nor purely oral in the literate tradition and its dissemination is open-ended. This is what Hegel means by its internal objectivity: poetry is like the final closure of Spirit itself which man apprehends in its completion as a kind of ideal object, as a bountiful external to itself and yet as a macrocosm of its own subjective world. Hence:

Die Poesie hingegen spricht die Empfindungen, Anschauungen und Vorstellungen selber aus und vermag uns auch ein Bild äußerer Gegenstände zu entwerfen, obgleich sie ihrerseits weder die deutliche Plastik der Skulptur und Malerei noch die Seeleninnigkeit der Musik erreichen kann und deshalb unsere sonstige sinnliche Anschauung und sprachlose Gemütsauffassung zur Ergänzung heranzurufen muß.¹⁴¹

Poetry...expresses the feelings, views and ideas themselves and can sketch a picture of external objects for us, although it cannot approach the clear plasticity of sculpture and painting or the depth of soul of music. It must therefore summon in supplementation our other sensuous perceptions and our wordless apprehension of our emotions.¹⁴²

This notion of an apprehension of the subjective feelings of the individual from a kind of 'non-sensual' distance suggests that poetry is somehow higher than music as an art form. Clearly there is some kind of affinity between music and poetry in the sense that they both close themselves from the externality of literal feeling in favour of a generalised moment of feeling. Yet even here, the distinction is maintained, as is evident in this passage concerned with musical settings of texts:

Auch in geistlichen Musiken ist der Text meistens entweder ein bekanntes Credo oder sonst aus einzelnen Psalmenstellen zusammengebracht, so daß die Worte der Veranlassung zu einem musikalischen Kommentar anzusehen sind, der für sich eine eigene Ausführung wird und nicht etwa nur den Text heben soll, sondern von demselben mehr nur das Allgemeine des Inhalts in der ähnlichen Art hernimmt, in welcher sich etwa die Malerei ihre Stoffe aus der heiligen Geschichte auswählt.¹⁴³

Even in sacred music the text is for the most part a familiar Credo or is put together out of some passages in the Psalms, so that the words are only to be regarded as an opportunity for a musical commentary which is an independent construction of its own; it is not meant in any way merely to emphasise the text but rather derives from it only the universal [element] of its subject-matter in much the same way that painting may select its material from sacred history.¹⁴⁴

The passage regarding the relationship of music to poetry makes the following points which are taken up later¹⁴⁵ under the notion of 'music as an accompaniment': first, music is distinct from poetry in that it has sound as a fundamentally ontological feature of its dissemination; second, music's dissemination is fixed and thus has an immediacy

¹⁴¹ *Vorlesungen* (Suhrkamp), 146.

¹⁴² *Lectures*, 900.

¹⁴³ *Vorlesungen* (Suhrkamp), 148.

¹⁴⁴ *Lectures*, 901. Translation modified.

¹⁴⁵ See *Lectures*, 933-937 and, in particular, 937-951.

that cannot acquire the internal objectivity of poetry; third, music has an affinity to poetry in that it is largely concerned with the more general or archetypal emotions; and finally, poetry reaches beyond the scope of music in that it can enter into the absolute subjectivity of Spirit which music only evokes as a possibility.

Music and Text: Simple Mediation?

Regarding music's treatment of its subject-matter, Hegel makes the following point:

[...so sagte ich bereits früher,] daß die Musik unter allen Künsten die meiste Möglichkeit in sich schließe, sich nicht nur von jedem wirklichen Text, sondern auch von dem Ausdruck irgendeines bestimmten Inhalts zu befreien, um sich bloß in einem in sich abgeschlossenen Verlauf von Zusammenstellungen, Veränderungen, Gegensätzen und Vermittlungen zu befriedigen, welche innerhalb des rein musikalischen Bereichs der Töne fallen.¹⁴⁶

...of all the arts, music has the maximum possibility of freeing itself not only from any text but also from the expression of any specific subject-matter, with a view to finding satisfaction solely in a self-enclosed series of the conjunctions, changes, oppositions, and modulations falling within the purely musical sphere of sounds.¹⁴⁷

This suggests a general sympathy in Hegel for the notion of musical autonomy. Yet the qualification *bloß* sows the seeds of a general dissatisfaction in Hegel with *merely* independent music. This articulates another difference between the Hegelian and Schellingian music aesthetics. It emerges here as located in the approach they take to music without text. Schelling makes no reference to music as an accompaniment in his *Philosophie* and we must assume, therefore, that music in its 'independent' form is Schelling's first consideration. Hegel, on the other hand, approaches the verbal arts as the most ideal (and we may read poetry as the zenith of those arts). Certainly, Schelling makes the same point, but for Schelling, music's absence of so-called literal content is an essential feature of its ontology. It is, by nature of this absence, the most 'real' of the arts. We have already encountered the distinctions between the Schellingian and Hegelian approaches to sound and time, distinctions which set their music aesthetics apart from the outset. Here, is a further indication that Hegel approaches

¹⁴⁶ *Vorlesungen* (Suhrkamp) 148.

¹⁴⁷ *Lectures*, 901-2. Translation modified.

music in a less ontological way than Schelling. For Hegel, the world presents us with a chain of apparently unmediated ontologies which must be uncovered as illusions or confusions of a deeper schism between the sensual and the ideal. Hence, music's apparent impenetrability is a sign of a deeper lying truth which is undermined by reified norms of cognition or consciousness.

In this sense, we might apprehend the Hegelian music aesthetic as an aesthetic of correction: music's ontological status is to be undermined, to be uncovered by the close watch of the good dialectician. Much misapprehension of the Hegelian music aesthetic stems from a misunderstanding of this point. Those that would dismiss Hegel as a brutish totaliser, as one who would violate the complexity of the world in order to squeeze wilful reality into a neat Hegelian formula, fail to recognise the significantly critical content of his work. As Julian Johnson has shown,¹⁴⁸ Hegel's main contribution to music aesthetics has been his theory of mediation, an aspect of his *Vorlesungen* that is frequently ignored. Similarly, Hegel's remarks given above might seem to indicate a glaring anachronism: that music had long since thrown itself free from the mimetic theories of the mid-eighteenth century and that Hegel's apparent difficulty with 'independent music' stems from his misunderstanding of the contemporary music. Whether Hegel liked this music or not, there is no doubt that critiques of this notorious passage are inadequate. If we read Hegel's apparent disdain for independent music not as an antiquarian residue of eighteenth-century Cartesian theories of music, but as a deliberate attempt to violate the normative ontology of instrumental music, then Hegel's apparent 'inadequacies' emerge as a deeply dialectical, critical, distrust of false ontologies. In this sense, music should, for Hegel, always be contextualised within a broader dialectic of mediation, be this between music's form and its content or between its ontology and the external. In this sense, music's apparent subservience to the text in the Hegelian aesthetic is, in fact, a spin-off of the dialectical imperative of the critical discourse. Hence text, as a ready externality, facilitates a simple mediation of music

¹⁴⁸ Julian Johnson, 'Music in Hegel's *Aesthetics*: a re-evaluation.' in *The British Journal of Aesthetics*, volume 31, no. 2, 1991.

and the external.¹⁴⁹ And yet this text-centrism is not the only mediation that Hegel attempts to furnish. By reading on we encounter the heart of the dialectic:

Erst wenn sich in dem sinnlichen Element der Töne und ihrer mannigfaltigen Figuration Geistiges in angemessener Weise ausdrückt, erhebt sich auch die Musik zur wahren Kunst, gleichgültig, ob dieser Inhalt für sich seine nähere Bezeichnung ausdrücklich durch Worte erhalte oder unbestimmter aus den Tönen und deren harmonischen Verhältnissen und melodischer Beseelung müsse empfunden werden.¹⁵⁰

Only if music becomes a spiritually adequate expression in the sensuous medium of sounds and their varied counterpoint does music rise to being a genuine art, no matter whether this subject-matter has its more detailed significance independently expressed in a libretto or must be sensed more vaguely from the notes and their harmonic relations and melodic animation.¹⁵¹

On the one hand, then, music is inadequate since it has no literal or detailed content of its own and, on the other, it can define for itself a sensual content which need not necessarily conform to a text of any sort. This dichotomy springs from the very heart of the dialectic: the romantic arts represent both a mediation of form and content and yet demonstrate their internal struggle, their mutual incompatibility. The notion, in the syllogism of necessity, of an internal mediation of extremes suggests the importance of articulating such extremes, of recognising in that syllogism the functional centrality of the self-subsistence of two opposites so that they can mark out for themselves a space, so to speak, in which to operate. It is in this mutual incompatibility [*wechselseitige Unangemessenheit*] that the striving for the middle term is born:

In dieser Rücksicht besteht die eigentümliche Aufgabe der Musik darin, daß sie jedweden Inhalt nicht *so* für den Geist macht, wie dieser Inhalt als allgemeine *Vorstellung* im Bewußtsein liegt oder als bestimmte äußere *Gestalt* für die Anschauung sonst schon vorhanden ist oder durch die Kunst seine gemäßere Erscheinung erhält, sondern in der Weise, in welcher er in der Sphäre der *subjektiven Innerlichkeit* lebendig wird. Dieses in sich eingehüllte Leben und Weben für sich in Tönen wiederklingen zu lassen oder den ausgesprochenen Worten und Vorstellungen hinzuzufügen und die Vorstellungen in dieses Element zu versenken, um sie für die Empfindung und Mitempfindung neu hervorzubringen, ist das der Musik zuzuteilende schwierige Geschäft.¹⁵²

¹⁴⁹ For more on mediation in the Hegelian aesthetic, see Johnson, 'Music...'

¹⁵⁰ *Vorlesungen* (Suhrkamp), 149.

¹⁵¹ *Lectures*, 902.

¹⁵² *Vorlesungen* (Suhrkamp), 149.

In this respect the proper task of music is to vivify some content or other in the sphere of the subjective inner life, not however for spiritual apprehension in the way that happens when this subject-matter is present in our consciousness as a general *idea*, or when, as a specific external *shape*, it is already present for our apprehension to acquire through art its appropriate appearance. The difficult task assigned to music is to make this inwardly veiled life and energy echo on its own account in notes, or to add to the words and ideas expressed, and to immerse ideas into this element of sound, in order to produce them anew for feeling and sympathy.¹⁵³

The dichotomy is located, then, within the problematic of musical content. The first characteristic of this content is defined in terms of an *inwardness*:

Die Innerlichkeit als solche ist daher die Form, in welcher sie ihren Inhalt zu fassen vermag und dadurch befähigt ist, alles in sich aufzunehmen, was überhaupt in das Innere eingehen und sich vornehmlich in die Form der Empfindung kleiden kann. Hierin liegt dann aber zugleich die Bestimmung, daß die Musik nicht darf für die Anschauung arbeiten wollen, sondern sich darauf beschränken muß, die Innerlichkeit dem Inneren faßbar zu machen, sei es nun, daß sie die substantielle innere Tiefe eines Inhalts als solchen will in die Tiefen des Gemüts eindringen lassen oder daß sie es vorzieht, das Leben und Weben eines Gehalts in einem einzelnen *subjektiven* Inneren darzustellen, so daß ihr diese subjektive Innigkeit selbst zu ihrem eigentlichen Gegenstande wird.¹⁵⁴

Inwardness as such is therefore the form in which music can conceive its subject-matter and therefore it can adopt everything which can enter the inner life as such and which above all can be clothed in the form of feeling. But in that case this implies that music's purpose cannot be an attempt to work for visual apprehension but must be limited to making the inner life intelligible to itself, whether by making the substantial inner depth of a subject-matter as such penetrate the depths of the heart or whether by preferring to display the life and energy of a subject-matter in a single subjective inner life so that this subjective deep feeling itself becomes music's own proper subject-matter.¹⁵⁵

In short this relationship of the subjective inner world to the feelings which consist in its content is the Hegelian *Ich = Ich*. Music brings the inner life into self recognition, into a familiarity with itself, just as sound represents the '=' of the double negation of objectivity. To this end, music's connection with feelings, as its form or content¹⁵⁶ and its existence as sound make it the most adequate of the arts at expressing subjectivity in its own terms. This should not be confused, however, with the final and perfect

¹⁵³ *Lectures*, 902.

¹⁵⁴ *Vorlesungen* (Suhrkamp), 149.

¹⁵⁵ *Lectures*, 902.

¹⁵⁶ The two seem interwoven here such that the inner life is described on the one hand as the 'form in which music can conceive its subject-matter' and, on the other hand, as the 'sphere' to which 'music has laid claim. *Lectures*, 902 and 902-3.

stage of poetry which is the art form which most adequately demonstrates Spirit's return to itself. Music is merely a type of closure, one which somehow prepares the way for the final closure of poetry. As we stated earlier, Spirit's new-found perfection makes it easier to represent something outside of itself; the diffusion of autonomous Spirit through the contingency of man, then, stems from the unwieldy purity of its form which is so perfect as to reflect itself with *unceasing efficacy* in the material realm. To this extent, poetry's more literal forms, despite their circumscription by subjectivity, are ciphers of this unceasing efficacy, the unceasing tendency to mediate the self and the external. Music's apparent absolute closure is thus something like a concentrated etude in closure from the Real. It is an extreme mode of romantic obscurity and is the *pathway* to poetry.

The romantic fascination with music, however, stems perhaps from the circumscribed manner in which music is seen to rehearse the issues of self-sufficient, immanent meaning. In this sense, music might seem an *unmediated* utterance:

Schon außerhalb der Kunst ist der Ton als Interjektion, als Schrei das Schmerzes, als Seufzen, Lachen die unmittelbare lebendigste Äußerung von Seelenzuständen und Empfindungen, das Ach und Och des Gemüts. Es liegt eine Selbstproduktion und Objektivität der Seele als Seele darin, ein Ausdruck der in der Mitte steht zwischen der bewußtlosen Versenkung und der Rückkehr in sich zu innerlichen bestimmten Gedanken, und ein Hervorbringen, das nicht praktisch, sondern theoretisch ist, wie auch der Vogel in seinem Gesang diesen Genuß und diese Produktion seiner selbst hat.¹⁵⁷

Outside art a sound as an interjection, as the cry of pain, as a sigh or a laugh, is already the direct and most living expression of states of soul and feelings, is the 'och' and 'oh' of the heart. What lies in it is a self-production and objectification of the soul as soul, an expression midway between (a) the unconscious immersion, and reversion to self, in inward specific thoughts, and (b) a production, not practical but contemplative, just as the bird has in its song this delight and this production of itself.¹⁵⁸

And yet the mere vagaries of expressive utterance are not the realm of pure subjectivity in art. Romantic art must rather circumscribe these external relations within its own

¹⁵⁷ *Vorlesungen* (Suhrkamp), 150.

¹⁵⁸ *Lectures*, 903. Translation modified.

confines, take the externality of meaning and internalise it. Hence, music must arrange sound within the confines of its own discursive space:

Die Musik muß im Gegenteil die Empfindungen in bestimmte Tonverhältnisse bringen und den Naturausdruck seiner Wildheit, seinem rohen Ergehen entnehmen und ihn mäßigen.¹⁵⁹

Music must, on the contrary, bring feelings into specific tone-relationships, deprive the natural expression of its wildness and crude deliverance, and mitigate it.¹⁶⁰

What music takes into the centre it transforms considerably. It is the art which, most of all the romantic arts, must transform the external into new internalised proportions and structures, just as *das Wahre* and *der Schluß der Notwendigkeit* articulate both their own completion and their pathways to such completion:

So machen die Interjektionen wohl den Ausgangspunkt der Musik, doch sie selbst ist erst Kunst als die kadenzierte Interjektion und hat sich in dieser Rücksicht ihr sinnliches Material in höherem Grade als die Malerei und Poesie künstlerisch zuzubereiten, ehe dasselbe befähigt wird, in kunstgemäßer Weise den Inhalt des Geistes auszudrücken.¹⁶¹

Interjections do form the starting-point of music, but music is itself art only by being a cadenced interjection, and in this matter has to dress up its perceptible material artistically to a greater extent than is the case in painting and poetry; not until then can the material express a spiritual subject-matter in an artistically adequate way.¹⁶²

The final point that should be made regarding Hegel's understanding of the relationship between music and poetry is that music approaches its subject-matter in a more acutely ontological manner: music attempts to offer, in the relations of tones, rhythms and proportions, the simple essence of the subject-matter which poetry can represent in a much clearer or more articulated form:

Wenn sich daher die Musik auch als begleitende Kunst mit der Poesie oder umgekehrt die Poesie sich als verdeutlichende Dolmetscherin mit der Musik verbindet, so kann doch die Musik nicht äußerlich veranschaulichen oder Vorstellungen und Gedanken, wie sie als Vorstellungen und Gedanken vom Selbstbewußtsein gefaßt werden, wiedergeben wollen, sondern sie muß, wie gesagt, entweder die einfache Natur eines Inhalts in solchen Tonverhältnissen an die Empfindung bringen, wie sie dem inneren Verhältnis dieses Inhalts

¹⁵⁹ *Vorlesungen* (Suhrkamp), 151.

¹⁶⁰ *Lectures*, 903. Translation modified.

¹⁶¹ *Vorlesungen* (Suhrkamp), 151.

¹⁶² *Lectures*, 903. Translation modified.

verwandt sind... [und] durch ihre die Poesie begleitenden und verinnigenden Töne auszudrücken suchen.¹⁶³

When therefore music is linked with poetry as an art accompanying it, or, conversely, when poetry as the elucidating interpreter is linked with music, music cannot propose to give an external illustration to ideas and thoughts as these are consciously apprehended by us, or to reproduce them, but on the contrary, as I said, must bring home to our feelings the simple essence of some subject-matter in such note-relationships as are akin to the inner nature of that subject-matter...and to do this by means of its notes that accompany and inwardize the poetry.¹⁶⁴

The Effect of Music

The assumption that music is a kind of subjective inwardness, objectified and closed within its own introspective world, runs through the whole of the Hegelian music aesthetic. This notion of an inwardness, in particular, is perhaps the most significant element of the Hegelian argument. Yet, as we have seen, the dialectic does not allow for the ontological complacency that such a notion might at first suggest. Indeed, the tension between the closure of music in on itself and the notion of immanent critique - the notion, that is, of the dialectic as entering into movement not as some pre-determined *method*, but as responding to the subject matter at hand, as grounded within that subject matter - propels music into a paradoxical position in the Hegelian system of the arts. This paradox is best articulated in the reflexivity of self and musical content.

As we have seen, 'content' for Hegel constitutes those elements of music which articulate something external to it. This might be the libretto or poem set to music or the more vague archetypal narrative of musical structure, what Hegel terms *ein unbestimmter Inhalt*.¹⁶⁵ The relationship of this undetermined content, the 'purely musical' content, to the self is complex. In a kind of embryonic reception theory, Hegel suggests that this relationship is essentially circular: first, music strains for a generalised or non-literal (non-textual) content; the heart or mind [*das Gemüt*] responds freely to this skeletal content, a kind of archetypal representation of the inward emotions, and is somehow stirred by it; the heart's response to this skeletal

¹⁶³ *Vorlesungen* (Suhrkamp), 152.

¹⁶⁴ *Lectures*, 904. Translation modified.

¹⁶⁵ *Vorlesungen* (Suhrkamp), 149.

account aligns itself with the content 'presented' in the music; the now almost undifferentiated nature of the two thereby furnishes a powerful 'feed back loop' where the heart recasts the musical content anew, adding to it its initial response as an intensification of it, from its 'undisclosed depth' [*unaufgeschlossene Tiefe*],¹⁶⁶ somehow casting it back into the music in an accumulative frenzy. This quasi-hermeneutic cycle, a kind of hedonistic indulgence in the undetermined materials of music, is a process whereby music 'volatiles' [*verflüchtigt*]¹⁶⁷ its objective existence. As we have already seen, the volatility of the musical signifier springs from the Hegelian notion of time in the *Naturphilosophie* as the *Selbstwerden* of *Selbstbewußtsein*, the becoming of self in the consciousness of self. As a form of becoming, then, music is able to affect the heart, or self-consciousness, by showing it the structures it works on itself, the structures it imposes on its own sense of its existence. *Selbstbewußtsein*, thereby evokes a unity of *Gestalt* and *Inhalt* that is persistent in the realm of subjectivity. The individual consciousness of the listener, then, is a microcosm of the absolutely subjective realm of Spirit.

Music's engagement with the particularised subjectivity of the individual is a mediation of the absolute subjectivity of Spirit and the absolute objectivity of the contingent realm; it is, in this sense, like the third term of the syllogism. As free self-engaged consciousness, particular subjectivity regards the objective realm as the storehouse of objects for its scrutiny, and it can uphold them as reflections of itself in the unceasing efficacy of its self-manifestation: objectivity is the other, which subjectivity yearns for as its opposite, its promise of balance. Yet, the constant slippage of the musical objectivity, its continual dissolution into the next moment and the manner in which it demonstrates, through archetypal models, the workings of self on itself, both draw the contemplative self into a negation of itself, into an engagement with the pseudo-self of the musical *unbestimmter Inhalt*:

¹⁶⁶ Ibid., 152.

¹⁶⁷ Ibid., 153.

Sie befängt daher das Bewußtsein, das keinem Objekt mehr gegenübersteht und im Verlust dieser Freiheit von dem fortflutenden Strom der Töne selber mit fortgerissen wird.¹⁶⁸

Therefore it captivates the consciousness which is no longer confronted by an object and which in the loss of freedom is carried away itself by the ever-flowing stream of sounds.¹⁶⁹

Hence, Hegel suggests, the 'power' of music lies in its ability to draw the self *from itself*, to regard the self as its own object of scrutiny and to lose the self-subsistence for which it has so long strained. Since both music and the self exist in the same medium, time, then self is drawn into that medium of time-sound and music takes over the structuring of the self's experience of itself by the use of the articulated time of the musical idiom:

Denn insofern es das subjektive Innere selbst ist, das ist die Musik sich mit *dem* Zweck zum Inhalt nimmt, sich nicht als äußere Gestalt und objektiv dastehendes Werk, sondern als subjektive Innerlichkeit zur Erscheinung zu bringen, so muß die Äußerung sich auch unmittelbar als Mitteilung eines *lebendigen Subjekts* ergeben, in welche dasselbe seine ganze eigene Innerlichkeit hineinlegt.¹⁷⁰

For music takes as its subject-matter the subjective inner life itself, with the aim of presenting itself, not as an external shape or as an objectively existing work, but as that inner life; consequently its expression must be the direct communication of a living individual who has put into it the entirety of his own inner life.¹⁷¹

Music as Mediation

Springing, once again, from the differences in their respective theories of time in the *Naturphilosophie* and *Ideen zu einer Philosophie der Natur*, the opposition of the notions of music on the one hand as, for Hegel, *ideal* and, on the other, as, for Schelling, *real*, belies some significant similarities. In particular, it was Schelling's apparent attendance at some of Forkel's lectures and Hegel's familiarity with the work of Forkel that forms the link in their aesthetics. Whilst the differences should not be minimised, the similarities are often striking, forming a systematic extension of some of the thoughts on music expressed by Wackenroder in the *Phantasien*. In particular, it is

¹⁶⁸ *Vorlesungen* (Suhrkamp), 154.

¹⁶⁹ *Lectures*, 906.

¹⁷⁰ *Vorlesungen* (Suhrkamp), 158-9.

¹⁷¹ *Lectures*, 909.

the notion of the relationship between time and soul that is most striking in the more general remarks of the two. The reference in Schelling's *Philosophie* to Pythagorean notions of the soul 'as number' or linear accounting of the passing of time, as experiencing itself within that medium, and the remarks discussed above regarding the archetypal representation in music of the Becoming of self-consciousness, both articulate a particular notion of consciousness, and the experience that we, as particular subjectivities, have of that consciousness.

The central assumption of this external representation is organic. The structures and proportions of the musical work set up profound resonances between themselves and the structures of the conscious individual, and thereby, as we have seen, either confuse that consciousness with a rich bounty of possible meanings, as in Schelling, or somehow infiltrate the consciousness of that individual by constantly deferring musical objectivity in the coming into being and passing away of each 'now'. The organicism of these partially synonymous concepts stems in Schelling from the emergence of organic resemblances across all levels of the world and in Hegel from the dialectical virility of his conception of a music as, on the one hand, profoundly closed in its ontology, and, on the other, as structurally sympathetic with the internal structures of consciousness.

The main point of departure, however, springs not only from the distinct notions of time in the two but also from the positioning of music in the respective aesthetic systems. As we have already said, an obvious difference is seen in the *real-ideal* contradiction, and yet this is not, in itself, the most fundamental demonstration of the difference. Most significant in this regard, rather, is the distinctly Hegelian notion of music as a kind of mediation. So far, the elements of the argument for music as mediatory that we have encountered are: the notion that music forms the centre or middle term of the romantic arts; the notion that music's medium, sound, is a kind of objectified object-free *empty self*; the notion that the musical note is both something external to subjectivity and yet somehow expresses it; the notion that music, whilst objective in strict terms, engages with a content that is purely *subjective*.

Each of these elements of the argument for music as a mediation springs from the tension discussed above between the notion of music as 'inwardizing' and, conversely, the implicit distrust in the dialectic of 'given' or totally 'closed' ontologies. There can be no obviated essence in the Hegelian system. Whilst Schelling is content to ascribe to music a one-sided *realness*, Hegel constantly attempts to balance the ontological objective closure of music with the archetypal representations of subjectivity that it provides. Music is not as capable of showing the *unceasing efficacy* of the external manifestation of Spirit as poetry, and the implicit notion of mediation in the Hegelian music aesthetics should not be confused with this by-product of unwieldy purity of form. It is, in fact, the very fact that music does not and cannot express itself as this happy self-subsistence, whilst, conversely, yearning for its own closure, that gives it this special quality.

What, then, are the essential features of this mediation? Or, rather, what two modes of being does music attempt to mediate? First, we can jettison the notion that mediation exists within the stage of *antithesis*. That stage is characterised by simple separations of extremes and they are mediated only to the extent that they can enter into a *simple* dialogue. It is clear that Hegel wishes to align the romantic arts, painting, music and poetry, with the stage of *synthesis* or the syllogism of necessity. Spirit, as we have seen, returns to itself at this stage and withdraws from the externality of the objective realm. The separation of internal and external that this process represents could conceivably constitute an *antithesis* in so far as it seems to recall the *Anklang*-driven structures of simple opposition familiar to us from the classical arts. Yet this reading is undermined by the notion of mediation presented in music. Music, it would seem, functions as a mediation of these two separated, isolated, modes of existence, a separation that Heidegger was later to describe in an 'etymologising' of the terms *Sein* and *Dasein*. For the moment, however, the separation exists as the confrontation of consciousness and objectivity. In drawing consciousness into an examination of itself, by positing the self as the its own object of scrutiny, music thereby suspends the

self/external hiatus. This is exactly what Hegel means when he suggests music as the representation of the Becoming of self-consciousness.¹⁷²

Hegel is also able to demonstrate these mediatory qualities in the musical structures themselves, as structural ciphers of its function within the broader aesthetic system. In rhythm, for example, Hegel recognises both the presence of external time and the internal animation, through bar and cadence, of time in rhythm. Hence, the relationship of self to self is interrupted in its linearity by external moments of periodised articulation:

Es [das Ich] beugt das Aufheben seiner, wodurch es sich zum Objekte wird, zum Fürsichsein um und ist nun durch diese Beziehung auf sich erst Selbstgefühl, Selbstbewußtsein usf. In dieser Sammlung liegt aber wesentlich ein *Abbrechen* der bloß unbestimmten Veränderung, als welche wir die Zeit zunächst vor uns hatten, indem das Entstehen und Untergehen, Verschwinden und Erneuen der Zeitpunkte nichts als ein ganz formelles Hinausgehen über jedes Jetzt zu einem anderen gleichartigen Jetzt und dadurch nur ein ununterbrochenes Weiterbewegen war. Gegen dies leere *Fortschreiten* ist das Selbst das *Beisichselbstseiende*, dessen Sammlung in sich die bestimmtheitslose Reihenfolge der Zeitpunkte unterbricht, in die abstrakte Kontinuität Einschnitte macht und das Ich, welches in dieser Diskretion seiner selbst sich erinnert und sich darin wiederfindet, von dem bloßen Außersichkommen und Verändern befreit.¹⁷³

It [the self] turns the process of self-sublation whereby it becomes an object to itself into self-awareness and now only through this self-relation does it come to have a sense and consciousness, etc. of itself. But this concentration of experiences essentially implies an *interruption* of the purely indefinite process of changes which is what time was as we envisaged it just now, because the coming to be and passing away, the vanishing and renewal of points of time, was nothing but an entirely formal transition beyond this 'now' to another 'now' of the same kind, and therefore only an uninterrupted movement forward. Contrasted with this empty progress, the self is what persists in and by itself, and its self-concentration interrupts the indefinite series of points of time and makes gaps in their abstract continuity; and, in its awareness of its discrete experiences, the self recalls itself and finds itself again and thus is freed from mere self-externalization and change.¹⁷⁴

This articulation of time, therefore, gives the self a complexity beyond merely empty time; it brings it to an awareness of the discrete moments of experience which constitute it and it is thereby saved from the monotony of the unknowing self, 'self-

¹⁷² *Vorlesungen* (Suhrkamp), 914-5.

¹⁷³ *Vorlesungen* (Suhrkamp), 164-5.

¹⁷⁴ *Lectures*, 914. Translation modified.

externalisation' [*das Außersichkommen*]. Of particular significance in the recognition of self is *Takt*.¹⁷⁵ As a unit, imposed upon time, *Takt* nonetheless articulates the possibility of the cessation of the monotony of self-ignorance. Since self recounts time in a mediated manner, that is it is articulated and marked, cordoned off into parcels by the self, then the articulation and parcelling of time in music constitutes a powerful tool or a model of self's recognition of itself:

Die Befriedigung aber, welche das Ich durch den Takt in diesem Wiederfinden seiner selbst erhält, ist um so vollständiger, als die Einheit und Gleichförmigkeit weder der Zeit noch den Tönen als solchen zukommt, sondern etwas ist, das nur dem Ich angehört und von demselben zu seiner Selbstbefriedigung in die Zeit hineingesetzt ist.¹⁷⁶

But the satisfaction which the self acquires, owing to the bar, in this rediscovery of itself is all the more complete because the unity and uniformity does not pertain either to time or the notes in themselves; it is something which belongs solely to the self and is inserted into time by the self for its own self-satisfaction.¹⁷⁷

It would seem from this passage that Hegel takes an essentially functionalist view of music. The suggestion here seems to be that music, in itself, is so clearly abstract that meanings are brought to it from external sources, as if music itself were somehow empty, incapable of any kind of overt communication. Indeed, the notion of an 'applied' semantic content seems to offer some useful links with our contemporary notions of meaning as a culturally-mediated construct. Yet there is still something absolutist in Hegel's notion of signification. Since music is so constructed as to appear unwieldy, extreme, then it follows that it somehow resonates with the unwieldy purity of subjectivity. In short, Hegel seems to want to balance the functionalist view of music with more romantic notions of music's immanence: on the one hand, music is empty of any explicit meaning and yet, on the other, its very mode of construction necessitates its organic/structural sympathy with the structures of consciousness. The self thus recognises in music the structures of its own becoming.

¹⁷⁵ It is probably too crude a reading of the term *Takt* to conflate it mererly with our notion of the 'bar' or 'measure'. Implicit to the term is a unit or measurment of time that carries a certain immanent structural meaning. Thus, the passage given below (*Vorlesungen*, 166) invest *Takt* with an immanent ability to give account of beat, pulse and periodicity. See also *Vorlesungen* 168-172.

¹⁷⁶ *Vorlesungen* (Suhrkamp), 166.

¹⁷⁷ *Lectures*, 915.

Whilst both rhythm and harmony exist in the medium of sound, they process from one moment to another. The manner in which Hegel sees them achieving this movement, the manner in which they bring self to self, comes about as a result of two quite distinct processes. Rhythm articulates time in pure linearity, it numbers the moments of the experiences of the self and brings self to self in a simply accumulative manner. Harmony, on the other hand, whilst still linear, brings the external proportions into play, the inter-relationships of the tones and chords to each other and their consequent functionality. The more proportional aspect of music, a dimension not, it must be said, wholly absent from mere rhythm but, rather, less explicitly engaged, is an aspect of the externality of self:

Die andere Seite nun, durch welche die abstrakte Grundlage des Taktes und Rhythmus erst ihre Erfüllung und dadurch die Möglichkeit erhält, zur eigentlich konkreten Musik zu werden, ist das Reich der Töne als *Töne*. Dies wesentlichere Gebiet der Musik befaßt die Gesetze der *Harmonie*. Hier tut sich ein neues Element hervor, indem ein Körper durch sein Schwingen nicht nur für die Kunst aus der Darstellbarkeit seiner *räumlichen* Form heraustritt und sich zur Ausbildung seiner gleichsam *zeitlichen* Gestalt herüberbewegt, sondern nun auch seiner besonderen physikalischen Beschaffenheit sowie seiner verschiedenen Länge und Kürze und Anzahl der Schwingungen nach, zu denen er es während einer bestimmten Zeit bringt, verschiedenartig *ertönt* und deshalb in dieser Rücksicht von der Kunst ergriffen und kunstgemäß gestaltet werden muß.¹⁷⁸

The other side, through which the abstract foundation of the bar and rhythm is fulfilled, thereby acquiring the possibility of becoming truly concrete music, is the realm of notes as notes. This more essential province of music comprises the laws of *harmony*. Here a new element enters because by its vibration not only does a body cease to be portrayable by art in its *spatial* form and move over to the development of, as it were, its *temporal* form, but, depending on its physical character, its varying length or shortness, and the number of vibrations it makes during a specific time, it *sounds* differently. Therefore, this is something which art must seize upon and mould to its artistic purposes.¹⁷⁹

It is interesting that Hegel inverts Schelling's assessments of rhythm and harmony since for Hegel rhythm is that element of music which most readily enters into the consciousness of the individual, and is, we might therefore assume, the most *ideal* element. Similarly, harmony is apprehended as the inverse of rhythm, as the objectivity

¹⁷⁸ *Vorlesungen* (Suhrkamp), 171-2.

¹⁷⁹ *Lectures*, 919. Translation modified.

of music's existence or, rather, the more objective side of music. It should be noted, however, that the 'easy' division of potences given in Schelling is not so easily compared with the Hegelian aesthetic. Whilst Schelling admittedly constructs a complex system of organic inter-relationships in his *Philosophie*, the divisions with which he starts seem more ontological than Hegel's. Indeed, clear labelling of the various aspects of music in terms either of the real or the ideal (or their indifference) is absent here. Each articulation of real or ideal quality seems, in Hegel, to undermine or complicate the previous point, and this complexity springs from the overtly *dialectical* nature of the project of the *Vorlesungen*.

Yet some similarities persist, as Hegel's notion of melody in music, given in this short comparison with harmony and rhythm, demonstrates:

Die Harmonie nämlich befaßt nur die wesentlichen Verhältnisse, welche das Gesetz der Notwendigkeit für die Tonwelt ausmachen, doch nicht selber schon, ebensowenig wie Takt und Rhythmus, eigentliche Musik, sondern nur die substantielle Basis, der gesetzmäßige Grund und Boden sind, auf dem die freie Seele sich ergeht.¹⁸⁰

Harmony comprises only the essential proportions constituting the necessary law for the world of notes; yet, as little as the beat, bar and rhythm, are they already in themselves music proper, for, on the contrary, they are only the substantive basis, the ground and soil which conforms to law and on which the soul expatiates in its freedom.¹⁸¹

This, then, is a straight forward summary of the first part of the more specific analysis of the expressive means of music we have already discussed. Yet, even here, there is an apparent contradiction to our previous notions of rhythm as the more ideal element of the two. Hegel merely lumps them together as *die substantielle Basis* and *der gesetzmäßige Grund* of music. This apparent contradiction immediately reveals itself as a kind of dialectical preparation for the 'unity' of melody:

Das Poetische der Musik, die Seelensprache, welche die innere Lust und den Schmerz des Gemüts in Töne ergießt und in diesem Erguß sich über die Naturgewalt der Empfindung mildernd erhebt, indem sie das präsente Ergriffensein des Inneren zu einem Vernehmen seiner, zu einem freien Verweilen bei sich selbst macht und dem Herzen eben dadurch die Befreiung

¹⁸⁰ *Vorlesungen* (Suhrkamp), 185.

¹⁸¹ *Lectures*, 929.

von dem Druck der Freuden und Leiden gibt - das Freie Tönen der Seele im Felde der Musik ist erst die Melodie.¹⁸²

The poetic element in music, the language of the soul, which pours out into the notes the inner joy and sorrow of the heart, and in this outpouring mitigates and rises above the *natural* force of feeling by turning the inner life's present transports into an apprehension of itself, into a free tarrying with itself, and by liberating the heart in this way from the pressure of joys and sorrows - this free sounding of the soul in the field of music - this is alone melody.¹⁸³

As a kind of internal mediation between harmony and rhythm, melody constitutes the most powerfully expressive element of music since it alone constitutes the whole articulation of the dialogue between the closed ontology of musical material and the structures it imposes by example upon the heart or soul. In this way, the melodic line represents the element of music which, by nature of its own groundedness in the musical material and its straining for the externality of expressing *something*, draws together the ontological closure of music and the opening of it into human consciousness:

...und so allein übt die Musik in ihrem eigentümlichen Elemente der Innerlichkeit, die unmittelbar Äußerung, und der Äußerung, die unmittelbar innerlich wird, die Idealität und Befreiung aus, welche, indem sie zugleich der harmonischen Notwendigkeit gehorcht, die Seele in das Vernehmen einer höheren Sphäre versetzt.¹⁸⁴

In this way alone does music in its own element of inwardness perfect the immediate expression of inner life, and it imparts to that expression, immediately becoming inner, the ideality and liberation which, while being obedient to the necessity of harmonic laws, yet at the same time lift the soul to the apprehension of a higher sphere.¹⁸⁵

Conclusion: *Aufhebung* and *Vermittlung*

The parallels already drawn between the notion of 'truth' in *Phänomenologie* or the *Schluß der Notwendigkeit* in *Wissenschaft der Logik* with music suggest two mediatory functions for music. First, as the most extreme of the romantic arts, it articulates one of the two sides of the *Schluß* which are to be brought into mediation. Second, as articulating within itself the self-mediating structures of consciousness, it stands as a kind of 'model' of mediation, as a kind of distilled, objectified demonstration

¹⁸² *Vorlesungen* (Suhrkamp), 185.

¹⁸³ *Lectures*, 929-30.

¹⁸⁴ *Vorlesungen* (Suhrkamp), 190.

¹⁸⁵ *Lectures*, 933.

of that process. It is particularly important, here, not to conflate these apparently contradictory functions, which, in themselves, constitute two extremes within a syllogism, to be mediated by dialectical thought. Indeed, it is this very dualism in the Hegelian aesthetic of music, the very conflict of the two sides - severe objectivity and self-regarding subjectivity - which locates the aesthetic within the dialectic.

Michael Rosen's rather scathing account of mediation in Adorno's thought suggests that his appropriation of Hegel's terminology is a 'bewitchment' or reification of the irrationality of Hegel's project or, rather, that Adorno's neo-Hegelianism exerts a bewitchment on the conceptual language of Hegel's thought:

So, in this case, it is not the later text [Adorno's *Negative Dialektik*] which 'completes' the earlier one [*Phänomenologie*], but the return to the earlier text which enables us to dispel the 'bewitchment' which its concepts place upon the later. Only when restored to their speculative-mystical shell does the irrational kernel of Hegel's concepts become apparent.¹⁸⁶

Whilst Rosen's reading of mediation is both rigorous and comprehensive, his critique demands a refutation. The necessity of this refutation springs from a deep misunderstanding in Rosen of the notion of dialectic as *immanent critique*. If, as Rosen suggests, the dialectic in Hegel demands an 'openness' in its procedure,¹⁸⁷ then it might seem to us that dialectical thought in Hegel is little more than a mystified 'metaphicised' scepticism, a mode of thought completely subservient to the overriding necessity of its own negativity. Yet this critique of Hegel (and Adorno) ignores perhaps the most fundamental feature of the dialectic, that it is its grounding in its historical moment and its very socio-cultural underpinnings, which facilitate its action. The critique given of Hegel's *false* completion, therefore, as summarised in our Introduction, springs from a woefully *unhistorical* engagement with the critical project of dialectic. Whilst Rosen recognises the roots of dialectic in *discussion, dialogue, debate*, he fails to engage with the purpose of the Hegelian project: to ground the self in its historically and, by implication, culturally determined environment of externality.

¹⁸⁶ Rosen, Michael, *Hegel's Dialectic and its Criticism*, Cambridge, 1984, 178.

¹⁸⁷ 'Dialectic is legitimated, therefore, not with reference to absolute (or Absolute) principles, but by the ability which it has to deal with objections and to satisfy them *on their own terms*' Ibid., 28.

Whilst it is reasonably easy to cast doubt on Hegel's conclusions in their particular forms, it is not so easy to dismiss Hegel as an unmitigated irrationalist. In failing to judge dialectic according to its deeply historical nature, and in failing to ground the distinctly *Hegelian* dialectic within the problematics of early nineteenth-century thought, Rosen shows a glaring insensitivity to the notion of *immanent critique* as a response to a *contemporaneous* problematic. The anthropological thrust of *Wissenschaft* demands more than mere critique of the minutiae, but a contextualisation of Hegel's other works within this broad notion of there being an innate, autonomous, quality to the various stages of the dialectic. In other words, the notion in *Wissenschaft* of a deep-rooted reflexivity in the cultural/social practices of man and the very structures of human thought, provides clear evidence of the anthropocentric radicalism of the Hegelian project. History is the domain of man, and man eschews the dialectic as if to find representations of his own unceasing efficacy in the objective realm. The 'quality' of each stage of dialectic is a deep-seated expression of the 'quality' of the epistemological landscape contemporaneous to that stage.


The somewhat encoded accounts in the *Vorlesungen* of music as grounded within a network of parallelisms with cognitive, social and historical phenomena, can be explicated, therefore, when grounded in an understanding of the broader project of the dialectic as essentially historical. As we have seen, many of the social and historical implications of Hegel's analysis have to be teased out of the text. In the 'classical' arts, for example, it is possible to decode the simple *Angemessenheit* of Concept and Reality as a kind of 'syntax' of that socio-historical paradigm. In the 'adequacy' of mortal monarchy to an expression of divinity, therefore, we can recognise a demonstration of a deep structural relationship between Kant's noumenal and phenomenal spheres, a relationship which is 'taken up' [*aufgenommen*] by the cultural products of that paradigm.

Both Adorno and Hegel, therefore, are keen to analyse the nature of the relationship between two types of activity: that which *confers* meaning and that which *produces*. Marxists would suggest that activities which infer meaning are mystified or

reified modes of production. Yet this conflation, common to 'vulgar' Marxism, is avoided in Hegel by mediation. Certainly, in a culture such as our own, where access to the various mechanisms of cultural dissemination has almost become a Darwinian test of the 'greatness' or 'success' of a work, there is no doubt that there is an insidious invasion of the work of art by the relations of production. Yet even here, it is not sufficient to confuse the manner in which a musical work is constructed with the manner in which it is disseminated. It is in this Hegelian notion of *Vermittlung* that we find a tentative solution to the conflation-separation dichotomy.

Just as in Schelling there is a complex interaction between autonomy and function which is deposited at the very heart of organic structure, so, in Hegel, there is a similar interaction. Mediation in this sense articulates, in aesthetic application at least, the manner in which, to use Adorno's term, art engages in a *mimesis* of its external environment and yet, manages to sustain what Foucault has termed a 'formidable materiality'. This apparent 'magical' state of affairs is sustained by resemblance-modelling across the two poles where the formidable materiality of music nonetheless demonstrates its own 'centredness' in that divide. In other words, music's material models itself to the environment in which it is propagated and takes into itself the Concept-Reality dilemma, the self-subsistence of the two realms and their mediation.

As characterised in the *Schluß der Notwendigkeit*, mediation can be likened, also, to a point of mutual interaction, to the moment where both self and other, internal and external, overlap or share a point of similarity. This is not a rebuttal of the polarised structure of the syllogism, but captures that sense (often invoked in textbook definition of metaphor) of a shared characteristic. This is our 'middle term'. We might represent the interactions of the various levels of mediation in the following manner where 'O' refers to *Reality*, 'S' to *Concept* and 'M' to *mediation*:



Thus, the various levels of the dialect, contextualised in two polar arrays (particular-general and subjective-objective) mediate between polarities by taking the universal structure of the syllogism into themselves. Just as Schelling attempted to show the organic resembling or modelling of various levels of the world structure, so Hegel stresses the unifying agent of internal process to deny the simple separation of internal and external, general and particular, objective and subjective. The distribution of becoming-truth across these various levels - the various qualitative configurations of the dialectic - is like a complex metaphorical array of syllogistic *modelling*.

As we have seen, then, syllogistic modelling manifests itself in music in the manner in which it: (i) articulates its own ontological boundaries; (ii) takes the external poles into itself; (iii) internalises the process of *becoming*; (iv) internalises *Vermittlung* and thus represents the multifaceted process of *Aufhebung* in modelled form. Each of these functions must sustain for itself a degree of autonomy, for such terms as *Selbstbeherrschung*, *Aufnehmung*, *das innerliche Werden*, *Vermittlung* and, finally, *Aufhebung* are not mere synonyms. They articulate, rather, a configuration of functions which characterise the Hegelian romantic paradigm.

What is so striking in Hegel's *oeuvre* is not the complexity of the texts nor merely their engagement with the philosophical debates of the time, but the element they bring to the project, above and beyond the merely philosophical, of man's groundedness in his environment.

Conclusion

Three distinct categories of philosophical enquiry into music, each of which revolves around the central notion of *closure* - the notion that art can somehow articulate its own separateness from the external environment from which it springs - emerge as central to this inquiry: *autonomy*, *ontology* and the *ideal*. As we have seen, closure articulates not merely a new response to the Cartesian aesthetic but also, one might say, gives an encoded account of the new structures of music dissemination in the era immediately after the vital revolution. Its firm basis in the commodity-equivalence-paradigm, its participation, that is, in the tabulating of small units of exchange - Foucault's *labour hours* - and its grounding in the metaphysical discourses of the nascent philosophical aesthetics of Hegel and Schelling, make the notion of closure the central category of the epistemology of the *Frühromantik*.

In short, closure seems to enter at those moments of existence that go beyond the realms of theory and somehow call for a limitation on the activities of deductive reason: when, that is, the object, now turning inwards upon itself, becomes 'saturated' with or threatened by the prescriptive, pejorative jibes of theoretical scrutiny. Music, in this sense, had been so prodded, violated, vilified by the Cartesian project that it withdrew itself from that mode of reasoning, hid itself below the detritus of the rationalist industry and, for a moment at least, closed itself completely to scrutiny. This was the moment of Wackenroder.

Autonomy

The three terms *autonomy*, *ontology* and *the ideal*, are by no means mere identical categories. They each articulate a different sub-species of activity within the general activity of closure. The notion of *autonomy* has, as we have seen, many synonyms in the *Frühromantik*. Amongst these are a group of terms each of which refers in a general sense to impenetrability: *vereinzelt*, *einsam*, *abgelegt*, *sinnlos*,

bedeutungslos, rechtfertigend, geheimnisvoll, innerlich, dunkel, unbeschreiblich, innewohnend, immanent, unversehrt, unbegreiflich, unergründlich, unbefigbar and so on. Each term, then, is either a category of impenetrability in the physical sense, or accounts for this aspect of closure in a more abstracted manner, in terms of its impenetrability to reason. Of the first category, the most notable are *einsam, rechtfertigend, vereinzelt, abgelegt, unbefigbar*¹ and, to lesser extent, *beschränkt*. They articulate the epistemological possibility of closure in terms of the *spatial* dimension, mapping out that area in which music operates as a kind of removed sphere of activity. Such notions, as we saw, are captured in Wackenroder in the metaphor of the Orient as a removed, magical, *Heimat alles Wunderbaren*,² and in the imagery of the *fröhliche grüne Insel*, floating like a lost realm on the *dunkele unergründliche Ozean*.³ In the second group, the more abstracted accounts of music's impenetrability to *reason*, we find two sub-groups of terms, one which is concerned overtly with *meaninglessness* and one which announces the drawing of lines of defence. In the first, we find *sinnlos, bedeutungslos, unbeschreiblich*, and *unbegreiflich*, each of which deals explicitly with the problematic of interpretative readings of musical content. In the second, concerned more to construct an inviolate boundary around music as a defence against instrumental reason, the terms *defensiv, rechtfertigend, unversehrt*, and *geheimnisvoll* and its synonym *dunkel* all articulate this sense of marking out a kind of safe area.

The terms *objektiv* and *körperlich*,⁴ along with *beschränkt* or *begrenzt*,⁵ whilst not exclusive to this group of synonyms concerned with impenetrability, capture some of the sense of this first major group, but this implied impenetrability is consequent upon the lines of defence having already been drawn. Similarly, *allegorisch, innewohnend* and *immanent* could be said to belong more to the notion of an articulated ontology than a mere defence, although the synonyms *innewohnend* and

¹ Schelling, *Philosophie der Kunst*, 109.

² Wackenroder, *Phantasien über die Kunst für Freunde der Kunst*, 158.

³ Ibid., 164. Literally 'happy green island' and 'dark unfathomable ocean' respectively.

⁴ Schelling, *Philosophie*, 133.

⁵ Ibid., 42.

immanent are consequent upon the articulation of this impenetrability so that the 'meaning' can somehow be 'held in' or restrained.

Ontology

Clearly the notion of impenetrability locked into the term *Autonomie*⁶ has some elements in common with the notion of *ontology*. Certainly, the notion of limits or of a defence against 'semantic seepage' can assist in the articulation of ontology, but the real drive of this discourse is inwards, regardless of the defences drawn up by autonomy. The strain for the characteristics of the inwardizing discourses of music lead us to the terms *eigentümlich*, *wesentlich*, *eigenständig*, *selbstbeherrschend* and *selbstbefriedigt*,⁷ all of which attempt to capture the notion of self-animation present in Wackenroder's terms *aus freier Willkür*⁸ and *zu eigenem Behagen*.⁹ The essential terms *immanent* and *innewohnend*, as consequent upon the first category of impenetrability, are also to be included in this group since they are concerned with the articulation of the internal dialogue. Indeed, Foucault's image of the 'clear discursive surface' of a 'secret but sovereign mass'¹⁰ captures most eloquently the sense of *interiority* that ontology or *Wesen*¹¹ suggests. The essentialising of this discourse, then, evokes images in the aesthetic of internal secrecy, premised, once again, on the notion of the impenetrable. Yet Wackenroder's invocation of the *Vogel Phönix*¹² can suggest also the category of *Selbstbelebung* or *Selbstbeherrschen* both of which bring the work of music into the heart of the proto-scientific paradigm of *Naturphilosophie*. This paradigm was not as overtly analytical, in the empirical sense, as the later positivist paradigm and yet it strained for an engagement with the externality of nature, that plethora of closed ontologies, without losing the virility of instrumental reason. The weakening of the 'reflexivity' between analysis and compositional pedagogy that Ian

⁶ *Philosophie*, 388.

⁷ Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Ästhetik*, (Suhrkamp) 166.

⁸ *Phantasien*, 164.

⁹ *Ibid.*, 164.

¹⁰ Michel Foucault, *The Order of Things*, 237-8.

¹¹ *Phantasien*, 183.

¹² *Ibid.*, 164.

Bent¹³ recognises as early as the beginning of the nineteenth century suggests there may be a case to argue for the emergence of a deep structural relationship between the ontologising of certain modes of *Naturphilosophie*¹⁴ and certain analytical approaches to the score. In a sense, the early analytical moments in the pedagogical discourses, still joined to or framed by the eighteenth-century neo-Aristotelean traditions of textbook teaching, point towards a verticality in the history of musical theory where analysis began to emerge as a separate autonomous discourse.

The notion of an ontological account of the musical work was premised on the Forkelian categories of the *internal* mechanisms of music's material: *Phrase, Periode, Stil, Gattung, Einhalt, Charakter*. The apparent empiricism of some of these early moments¹⁵ stands, it would seem, some distance from the sensual reasoning of *Naturphilosophie*. Such obsessive engagement with the internal devices of construction that some of these analyses represented would certainly have confronted the dialectical Hegel, the aestheticising Wackenroder and the hermeneutic Schelling with an apparently alternative vision of reasoning. Yet the notion of ontology, to which we have returned over and over again, provided a framework in which the analytical urge could gratify itself. Schelling's organicism, in particular, provided a model of interaction between these apparently differing world views where the works of art represented 'little universes' or self-engaged organisms which, as Ian Bent suggests:

...were not self-sufficient mechanisms, explainable in purely physio-chemical terms, nor were they natural entities governed by some unmeasurable external life-force; they were something between the two: functioning wholes that *regulate and control their own growth processes*.¹⁶

In this sense, the new reflexivity between music analysis and the nascent philosophical science of *Naturphilosophie* is based on three essential conditions which functioned as

¹³ Ian D. Bent (ed.) *Music Analysis in the Nineteenth Century*, volume 1, Cambridge 1994, xiii.

¹⁴ Most notably, perhaps, in Schelling's *Ideen* or his *System* and Hegel's *Naturphilosophie*.

¹⁵ Abt Vogler, *Zwei und dreisig Präludien für die Orgel und für das Fortepiano: nebst einer Zergliederung in ästhetischer, rhetorische und harmonischer Rücksicht, mit praktischem Bezug auf das Handbuch der Tonlehre von Abt Vogler* in Bent, *Analysis*, volume 1, 136-45. The term *Zergliederung*, here, captures a whole clutch of synonyms which articulate the analytical paradigm of the early nineteenth century. See Bent's account of it, *Ibid.*, 21-2.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 11-12.

'incubators' for the emergence of the analytical-ontological paradigm: first, the centralisation and rationalisation of the structures of music dissemination, establishing the new Leipzig/Vienna axis; second, the emergence of a new vision of the *Kulturation* as an organic whole, linked by the improved communications required by the new *Staatsvernunft*; third, the emergence of the philosophical paradigm of organicism and the consequent closure of the discrete parts of the world into self-contained microcosms of the complex whole.

The emergent ontological impulses suggest, then, a point of cohesion between the disparate social and philosophical ruptures, deeply embedded in a unified epistemological paradigm shift. Hence, the musical score begins to furnish an interiority, free from the functionalism of the Cartesian aesthetic, opening itself only to the most specialised scrutiny. The score, then, emerged as a Schellingian *Symbol* of the real side, as an intuiting of the infinite notion of ever more colossal ontologies, of *infinitude* itself, into the finite genres of the musical work. As a problematic final synonym of ontology, the *real* (or the *finite-intuiting*, *das Reale*, *das Reelle*) represents one side of the bipartite division of the artistic genres into sense-apprehended forms, such as music, and intellect-apprehended forms such as poetry or drama. As the *Symbol* of this *real* process, then, the score can be seen to present itself as an object of scrutiny through its causal connection with the sound-world it posits. Hence, since the causality in Schelling and Hegel's notions of sound and its connection with matter engenders a point of *Charakter* or *Eigentum*, an internal quality or essence, we can read this causal connection between the score and the 'musical work' as evoking the very *Charakter* of that work. In other words, the connection of the score to the authoritative centre of the work is premised by this causality and imbues the score with a sense of self-enclosed or self-animating authority. In short, we might liken this new approach to the possibility of an object of scrutiny for an embryonic *Musikwissenschaft* as a kind of *anatomical* discourse.

The Ideal

Less closely linked with the other two categories, and yet not antonymous with them, the notion of the 'ideal' confronts the inevitable tensions inherent in the attempt to find a common ground between the ontologising of Schelling, the mystifying of Wackenroder and the dialectics of the Hegelian aesthetic. Yet, the apparent contradiction in the Schellingian and Hegelian aesthetics in the confrontation of music as the real and music as the ideal, announces a deep-lying ambivalence in this term to the other two category groups we have already encountered. The synonyms for this term seem reasonably clear: *abstrakt, abstrahiert, schematisch, bodenlos, leer, geistlich, göttlich, subjektiv*. All of these suggest the absence of the material and the participation within the spiritual or subjective realm. By 'spiritual' we can infer not merely the otherworldly or divine but also those processes that are undertaken by the mind, since *Geist* means both Spirit and mind.

Some of the elements already discussed are common to the ideal, most notably the notion of separation or 'removedness', a sense of *das Wunderbare*, springing perhaps from Baumgarten and Meier's notion of *Verwunderung*. Hence the inclusion here of certain of those synonyms might seem appropriate: *unversehrt, selbstbewußt, selbstbefriedigt*. Yet it is not the sense of closure that most properly captures the sense of the ideal in the *Frühromantik*. Since certain elements of closure involve the impenetrability of the first group of synonyms, then that also includes the possibility of the notion of an *Objektivität*, or a *Körperlichkeit* since the status of the closed entity is often conflated to the merely objective or corporeal. Indeed, as we saw in the last chapter, Hegel's notion of Spirit's return to itself has many features common to the closure of objective ontology. In particular, the notion of Hegel's Spirit as a kind of inverse Schellingian *real*, where the seepage of meaning is plugged by the unceasing efficacy with which Spirit manifests itself in the objective realm. In short, Hegel's Spirit and, to a certain extent, Schelling's *göttliche Ausgießung* both demonstrate the deep structure of the ideal: as an unwieldy or colossal purity, it unceasingly displays itself in the objects of the real realm and thereby seeks modes of mediation with that

structurally sympathetic mode of existence. Since both ideality and reality share the notions of ontological interiority and quasi-objective closure and the Schellingian bounty of meaning of the real side, the connection of the ideal to the other synonyms is through both mediation and through certain points of common ground.

Diese Unendlichkeit muß sich gegenüber dem Verstand dadurch ausdrücken, daß kein Verstand fähig ist sie ganz zu entwickeln, daß in ihm eine unendliche Möglichkeit liegt, immer neue Beziehungen zu bilden.¹⁷

As far as understanding is concerned, this infinity must express itself such that no understanding is capable of developing it entirely, and such that in it there resides the infinite possibility to formulate ever new relationships.¹⁸

The ambivalence of the ideal is thus to be understood in terms of the Hegelian notion of self-Spirit, where Spirit, returned to itself, gives the broad metaphysical proof of the truth of closure. The ideal, therefore, is a mediation between the closure of the musical work and its proof. This infinity can also be understood in the Schellingian sense of a semantic bounty which, by its irreducibility, evokes a kind of inverse ideal, the 'ideally objective' or the objective in a form which captures an element of the infinite within itself, just as musical rhythm takes up the external world and articulates it as a 'meaning' from within itself. Meaning eschews from the real side, just as from the ideal side, by means of an extremity or purity, the first rule of theoretical protocol. Only in the extremity of the real or ideal side can the forms manifest themselves in unceasing efficacy in the opposite potency. The bounty of meaning that eschews in the most real of the Schellingian arts, music, places itself into the ideal, the Hegelian subjective, by means exactly of this principle of connection between *purity* or *austerity* and the *efficacy* with which it manifests itself in its opposite potency.

The synonyms of the ideal are thus its antonyms to the extent that the two extremes are mutually dependent upon each other and thereby somewhat synonymous at a deep structural level.


¹⁷ *Philosophie*, 58.

¹⁸ *Philosophy* 50.

Naturphilosophie as semiology?

So far, we have intimated that it may be possible to construct a unified, or at least a reasonably coherent, attitude to the distribution of meaning in the musical work at this time. Whilst the attempt to 'reconstruct' such a coherent attitude or a 'body of theory' from the three figures presented here could fall foul of a tendency to over-generalise, it is nonetheless possible that the organicism of the *Frühromantik* represents a kind of meta-semiology, an analysis of the 'meanings' of the world and the structures which eschew them. Certainly, the notion that a clearly articulated semiology of music exists in the texts of the *Naturphilosophie* is ludicrous. The semiological consequences of that body of theory have to be constructed through intimation and suggestion.

Perhaps the most powerful semiological image is that of the living organism. As we have seen, this model of structural sympathy across discrete parts of the whole is premised by the notion that such sympathies are somehow deeply embedded in the operations of the world. To this extent, the structures of meaning and their dissemination were, for a moment, embedded in the dendritic structures of the organism. If the sign and the referent represent a simplified, bipolar division of the world in a manner indebted to the Cartesian theories of meaning, the branches of the organic structure distributed this bipolarity across a complex set of internal resonating sympathies, such that the division is ever more internalised:



Whilst this conflation of the terms *universal* and *external*, *particular* and *internal* is something of a 'leap of faith' there is a sense in which, for music at least, the internal structures of the object of scrutiny, as representations in microcosmic form of the broad general of the whole, progress in this organic analysis through ever smaller discrete parts and thereby proceeding ever 'deeper' into the interiority of the music. This notion of the synonymy of *particular* and *internal* is thus an inversion of the later Schenkerian notion of 'depth' as synonymous with generality or universality.

The matter of the synonymy of the Schellingian potences with the bipolarity of sign and thing is more difficult to resolve. There may be something in the very structure of identity philosophy which confuses the bipolarity: Schelling's notion that the two potences can be inverted such that what was real becomes ideal and vice versa. Hence the alignment of the strictly Saussurean *sign* as a kind of synthesis of the material and conceptual elements with one or the other sides is problematic. But, if we take the bipolarity of the post-Cartesian semiology and assign it to the real and ideal potences, then the clear conceptuality of the sign and the clear materiality of the referent or, conversely, the clear conceptuality of the concept as referent and the clear materiality of the sign as objective, whilst conforming to the laws of the Schellingian identity philosophy, can also be allocated to one side or the other as a fundamental set of potences of the Schellingian semiology. Hence, given below is the allocation taking the 'thing' as the referent and the relatively conceptual 'sign' as the ideal where *T*, *t* refer to 'things', *S*, *s* to 'signs' and *A* to the Absolute.

[Real]				A	[Ideal]			
T					S			
T		S			T		S	
t	s	t	s		t	s	t	s
ts	ts	ts	ts		ts	ts	ts	ts

Clearly, as the rules of identity philosophy imply, this structure can be inverted such that the relatively material sign refers to the real and the relatively conceptual 'concept' refers to the ideal.

The conflation of sensuality and intellect that both Schellingian identity philosophy and the Hegelian dialectic infer is consequent upon the structural sympathies that resonate across the two poles. Hence, the spatial and temporal referent, the 'thing', is pinpointed by the three dimensions of space and the fourth dimension of time. Even here, as we have seen, there is an organic division that refers to the real-ideal divide of *Naturphilosophie*. Space articulates the most extreme forms of reality, the *Ding an und für sich* as the first potency. It is the merely empty objectivity of static materiality, wholly inviolate and wholly concrete. The dimension of time, on the other hand, is a negativity of the *Anundfürsichsein* of this first dimension, and, as the Becoming of Now into Now, it is the empty negation of the first negation of space. Hence, as a double negation, time places the process of signification, of the excretion of meaning, into a dimension that also controls the realm of the conceptual. Hence the spatiality of the material referent is the real within the real and the temporality is the ideal within the real; or expressed another way, the former is the referent within the referent and latter is the sign within the referent.

Conversely, the inversion of this structure, as good identity practice, invokes the sense of the sign as relatively material, as the temporally and spatially grounded side and the referent, as the static 'concept', as wholly subjective:

[Real]				A	[Ideal]			
S					T			
S		T			S		T	
s	t	s	t		s	t	s	t
st	st	st	st		st	st	st	st

The same is also true of this structure in that each pole has within it the structural representation of the opposite pole.

As regards a semiology of music, the notion of the internal and the particular sharing the same extreme end of the system returns us to the notion of the closure of the musical work. As we have seen, *Zergliederung*, as a largely anatomical metaphor,

suggests the sense of 'dissection' or the parcelling of an organism into its discrete parts.¹⁹ The early nineteenth-century analytical moments seemed, therefore, to redistribute the organic structures of *Naturphilosophie* in terms of a dismantling of the structure and a reassembling of them in a new configuration that made the organic structures clear.

As a kind of organism, then, the notion of depth seems somehow inappropriate as a metaphor for the 'essential' structures. Certainly, the notion of interiority, of investigations *within* the organism, gives a sense of the hierarchy of *Zergliederung* but the notion that one level of the structure might be more significant than another is alien to the proper rules of the identity philosophy of Schelling. To this end, therefore, it may be possible to ascribe to 'depth' some synonymity with interiority, but only to the extent that the 'deep' structures be apprehended as 'hidden' structures. In this sense, the analytical paradigm was more concerned with the *result* of its undertakings, with what it 'uncovered' [*entdeckt*] than with which level was of most structural significance.

The avoidance of hierarchisation, then, evokes the fundamental laws of the Schellingian identity philosophy and there is still much work to be done on the relationship between the meta-semiological structures of German Idealism and this nascent discourse of analysis. The account given here, of the analytical consequences of *Naturphilosophie*, consents to be largely metaphorical. Indeed, the Idealists' reading of music, an extension of Wackenroder's metaphorical frenzy, connects discrete elements of the organic structure in terms of *similarity*. As one pole of the connective devices of language, the metaphor transports meaning from one phenomenon to another by means of some central characteristic that is common to both. Thus the structural resemblances operating in the organism of the musical work are linked to the external world by means of metaphor which operates according to the dendrite of its own interiority.

¹⁹ The term had a tremendous currency in the early nineteenth century. Bent gives some of its synonyms as: *auffassen, betrachten, beurtheilen, entdecken, enträthseln, erklären, erläutern, phrasieren, zerlegen*. Bent, *Analysis*, xii.

Accounts of music are inevitably metaphorical, and yet the connections demonstrated in the organicist models show a profound sense of how to construct a metaphorical world system that forces the closure of a phenomenon into a broader contextualising dialogue or dialectic of the world. Whilst identity and dialectic are *not* mere synonyms, they have in common the notion that structures of resemblance can evoke a deep sense of the order of things. The semant of the musical work, therefore, provided for the Idealists a problematic or discursive space in which to rehearse the purely structural elements of their world systems. Hence, this inquiry has attempted to show how the history of music theory and the history of theory in the broader sense can converge to provide insight into the interiority of the world systems of early nineteenth-century German thought. In this regard, music has served as a cosmic model of that interiority.

Score and Musical Work: the Division of Labour in the *Frühromantik*

For the contemporary mind, perhaps one of the most disturbing aspects of the Idealist texts on music is their consistent avoidance of any detailed analysis of musical works and, perhaps more significantly, the complete absence in such texts of any engagement with the musical score. This might be explained in two ways: either these writers were insufficiently knowledgeable about music to engage with the notated medium or there was some fundamental, perhaps ideological, characteristic of Idealism which precluded such an engagement. It would seem, however, from our engagement with the demographic and epistemological environment of early nineteenth-century, that neither of the above explanations accounts wholly for the absence of any empirical analysis in Idealism's engagement with music.

This avoidance of detailed engagement with musical works/scores is usefully characterised in terms of the Marxian notion of the 'division of labour' [*Arbeitsteilung*].²⁰ This notion is addressed more specifically at the process of industrialisation which rationalises the forces of production thereby instigating ever more specialised modes of productive behaviour. The *division* of labour, in this sense

²⁰ See Karl Marx, *Das Kapital*, Hamburg, 1867, volume I, Chapter 1.

springs from an internal necessity in bourgeois society to parcel labour into ever more clearly delineated, differentiated, spheres of activity such that the efficacy of the production process is constantly reinforced and refined. There is thus a striking resonance of Hegel's *Schluß der Notwendigkeit* in this process: reason articulates the boundaries of its action according to the ever more refined mechanisms of polarisation. Hence, the notion of a *protocol* of theory, as posited in the Introduction to this thesis, is one which usefully engages in a characterisation of theory as a mode of *labour*. Its *proactive* function is thus subsumed into its socio-historical predicament. As a cipher of *labour*, as an aggrandised *forgetting* of labour, theory evokes, in early nineteenth-century Germany, the division of itself from other activities. Theory, as protocol-driven, is thus a self-articulating activity.

As we have seen, Bent recognises a breakdown in the 'reflexivity' of analysis and neo-Aristotelean pedagogy at the turn of the nineteenth century. Arguably, the 'reflexivity' of philosophy and music theory had been somewhat weakened with the demise of medieval cosmology and to characterise the 'division' of philosophy and analysis at this time as evidence of a division of labour is clearly ludicrous. Yet it might be pertinent to ascribe to the demise of the neo-Aristotelian pedagogy an intensification of a process that had been under way for some time. It is against this background of an *intensification* or *acceleration* of the division of labour that the wilful avoidance in Idealism of more overtly empirical engagements with musical material should be scrutinised. The early nineteenth century does not so much instigate a separation of philosophy and analysis but, rather, is characterised by an intensification in the mutual antagonism between the musical object of dissemination - the score - and the musical creation - the work.

This intensification is further articulated in the emergence of *specialised centres of distribution* such as Berlin, Leipzig and Vienna. As we saw in Chapter 1, the vital revolution or rapid population increases of the mid- to late eighteenth century placed the older corporatist relations of production under considerable strain. The decline of guild-restricted labour, improvements in communication and the ever more

distanced acquisition of musical scores from remote centres were the infrastructural requirements of a newly commoditised culture. In a sense, it is this 'distancing' of the centres of distribution (the expansion of their service areas) which might be likened to the notion of alienation [*Verfremdung*], a term frequently invoked in Marxian critiques of capitalist culture. The term can be applied here to capture the sense in which distance, both physical and cultural, expands between the producer and the consumer, and in this 'distancing' of score production from score consumption, the score itself becomes imbued with an 'authority'. It is this 'authority', a trace of the structures of the score's dissemination, which finds expression in the notion of *immanence*, captured in the texts of Idealism as *Selbstbeherrschung*, *Selbstbefriedigung* and so on.

The relationship between these apparently mutually exclusive realms - between the objective realm of the economics of musical dissemination and the introspective realm of Idealist speculation on music - is thus somewhat similar to a Schellingian (organic) resemblance, based on certain shared structural characteristics: on the one hand, the objective score is charged with an almost metaphysical authority since it is disseminated from highly specialised centres of distribution and, on the other hand, the work is charged with an introspective, immanent 'significance' or 'meaning' by virtue of the ontological tendency of aesthetic theory at this time. In short, then, this relationship goes well beyond a mere resemblance, a metaphorical resonance. It is, in this coherence, that the 'centredness' of German Idealism within a socio-historical environment is expressed - the Idealist texts articulate, in codified or 'mystified' form, an economic-political agenda. Hence, the taking up of the 'other' in to the centre of the object of scrutiny - the taking up of both metaphysical unity in to the objective score and articulated objective closure into the score - are expressions of a wilful agenda: the mystification of the forces and realtions of production attendant upon both phenomena.

Hence, the expanding distance between the producer and the consumer - their alienation from each other - is necessarily reflected in all levels of discourse. Indeed, one might say that it is in the extent to which this process of alienation is

mystified/codified that the ideological duplicity of the aesthetic is to be found: the more a text codifies the economic basis of immanence, the more acquiescent that text is to the bourgeois commoditised agenda. In this sense, then, alienation provides a way of (apparently) removing certain spheres of activity from the explicit discourse of economic causality. In providing what seems like the possibility of an activity which is removed from production, alienation fulfils the need in such a culture for an 'escape route' from the processes of production. In providing the 'other' to the isolated self, in providing the opposite extremes at work in the dialectic, in articulating the predicament of the self in terms of non-self, alienation sustains commoditisation on its relentless path to the moral relativism of late capitalism.

The term alienation, however, should be used with some caution. In its usual Marxian designation it articulates the 'distancing' of the producing self from the process of production and therefore is concerned more with the relations of production themselves and not explicitly with the relation of that process to consumption. Yet there is still the sense here that the process of alienating labour from production can be compounded by the 'distance' of the producing centre from the consuming self. It is in this dislocation of the producing self from the consuming self that the rift opens up between *score* and *work*: the delegation of score-dissemination to a third party (or to a distinct sphere of activity in the production process) is thus intimately bound up with the alienation of labour.

It becomes a much more difficult task, however, to locate the notion of a *work* within this account. Since works in this sense are the ontic constructions of a literate culture, their 'presence' has to be premised on the presence proper of the score. Yet this by no means gives rise to a simple even-handed causality of score to work. Certainly, it might be possible to see the work as a kind of 'reified' or 'mystified' score, since the former cannot exist without the latter, but there is little justification for merely conflating the two. The German term *Werk* is, indeed, a deeply ambiguous term. It invokes both notions of an 'undertaking' or a distinct activity within the process of production and also the idealised result of such a process, the 'opus', so to

speak. It does *not* capture the sense of the more material 'product' which is usually rendered *das Produkt* or *das Erzeugnis*. Only where the English term 'product' is used figuratively as in 'the product of a sick mind' can *Werk* be used: *das Werk eines kranken Geistes*.

It seems plausible, therefore, to ascribe to a work the quality of a score which has somehow been 'raised up' or 'sublated' [*aufgehbt*] in the Hegelian sense, which is to recognise the work as somehow qualitatively different from the score. In this sense, the musical work evokes a particularly 'modern' notion of the authoritative creative centre, a notion often intimately linked with the idea of 'genius'. Since such a work emanates from the subjective centre, it is difficult to ascertain where or how it might exist. Clearly, the notion of a work as somehow the singular property of the composer, as existing somehow 'in his mind', is inadequate. It seems to 'exist', rather, as a kind of posited 'general', as accumulated or constructed through the individual and collective experience of performances and/or, for the musically literate, through 'readings' of the score itself.

Positioning this 'constructed general' in the culture of post-cameral Germany is difficult. In a sense, it might be more appropriate to talk of an idealised musical material, an ontological generalisation of *die Musik an sich selbst*, in early nineteenth-century German aesthetics. Indeed, as we have seen, overt references to any scores or 'works' are rare in the philosophical texts of the *Frühromantik*. Clearly, this state of affairs could, as we have said, be explained by the unfamiliarity of Schelling, Hegel, and so on, either with the more rarefied practices of music theory or with much of the contemporary repertoire. Yet this only goes some way to explaining the relationship between the nascent practices of *Musikzergliederung* and *Musikästhetik*. Perhaps the most fruitful way in which to position the score/work dichotomy in this culture is to recognise in the Hegelian *Schluß* and the Schellingian *organische Struktur* largely synonymous attempts to bring about a re-integration of two distinct objects of scrutiny - the musical score and the musical work: the apparent division of labour articulated in the two ontic constructs of score and work articulates itself in an organic or mediated

manner. The score is the product of objective forces of relation and the 'work' is the *Geisteswerk* of creative subjectivity, returned to itself like a microcosm of the Hegelian Spirit. In short, *Musikzergliederung* constructed for itself an object of scrutiny ripe for dissection, laid out like a relic of some lost process, maintaining the faintest presence, within its confines, of a now distanced self, whereas *Musikästhetik* constructed for itself an 'object' which mediated between various levels of subjective activity from the poiesic to the hermeneutic.

Seen in this admittedly rather neo-Hegelian manner, the division of self and other evoked in the confrontation of these two distinct objects of scrutiny seems like a symptom, an Adornoesque mimesis, of the radicalisation of liberal capitalism. As an ascendant economic-political agenda, liberal capitalism was charged with the task of attaining for itself a culture capable of sustaining two apparently opposed processes: the ever more intensified rationalisation of the forces and relations of production and the accelerated retreat of the individual from that ever more objectified realm.

In the acrobatics of the organic and the syllogistic, then, we can recognise an attempt to balance these two opposed dynamics and it is, in particular, in Hegel's notion of mediation that the anxiety of the bourgeois citizen is most eloquently articulated. In our account of mediation, we suggested that it existed as an internalised process, as an internalised becoming of phenomena. As 'internalised externality', therefore, mediation evokes the manner in which an abstract ideal might take the 'opposite' or 'external' forces of objective production into itself - the notion of a musical 'work' or, indeed, of a generalised musical idiom, for example, being inexorably linked with the objective score. Similarly, the opposite must therefore also be true: that the objective results of production, scores, are imbued with the uniqueness of their creative (subjective) origin.

Idealism and these early modes of analysis, therefore, both spring from a single process. For the analyst, the notated medium offers some cipher of 'workness' or

creativity.²¹ For the Idealist, on the other hand, it is in the organic resemblances of subjective and objective that a greater unity can be discovered, the *third term*, a residue of a kind of cultural anxiety at the dislocation of the self from external nature. The division of score and work, therefore, can be seen either, from within the great systems of Idealism, as two sides of a syllogistic proposition or, from a more overtly politicised point of view, as ciphers of the alienation of the self from its labour. It is, however, in the huge rift that opens up between the prose styles of the analytical and Idealist texts that the coming-to-be of the brutalised bourgeois ego is most eloquently articulated: the separation of the musically subjective and objective as work and score is a mediated recounting of the very confrontation of commodity and bourgeois self.

This bourgeois self is thus a strange phenomenon. He is the victim of his own false consciousness, a consciousness he seeks to clothe in the systematic mystifications implicit to the category of the aesthetic, as if there were some non-material alternative to the objective processes of production. Yet it is in the notion of the 'absolute truth' of closure - of the ontic nature of music, for example - that the bourgeois citizen of the organic state expresses a *Sehnsucht* for consumption, a mystified and spiritualised consumption, magically transformed into the gratifying, alienated pleasures of the impotent self.

Yet how could it be that the austere complexities of German Idealism, with its self-denying, disciplined penchant for the systematic exposition of its materials, might articulate an uncritical acquiescence to consumerism? The answer lies in the metaphysical nature of the arguments which reduce socially mediated constructs such as closure, autonomy, the ideal, to articles of faith. Since Idealism is motivated by an anxiety - an anxiety which has an ethical starting point, one which yearns to be able to undermine the relentless savagery of commoditised culture - it uncritically accepts the illusion of 'otherness' as an escape from that savagery. Despite the nobility of the

²¹ This finds an objective - economic - resonance in the distanced authoritative centres of dissemination. It seems appropriate, therefore, to accept that there may be some kind of parallelism between this notion of 'creativity in the score' for the analyst and 'authority in the musical commodity' for the consumer.

attempt to find a critical 'other' against which to measure the objective, the construction the aesthetic - a systematised discipline of consumption, a mystified, distanced consumption that dislocates the self from bodily gratification - serves merely to create the illusion of an activity that is removed from the forces and relations of production. The danger in such an illusion is that it makes gestures towards a critique of the commodity, and yet, in so doing, it provides it with a radicalised metaphysical function, 'raising it up' from the brutal machinations of the capitalist relations of production to the level of an unquestionable absolute.

It would seem, then, that Michael Rosen's critique of Hegel as some kind of necromancer, casting his spell over much subsequent thought holds some water.²² Yet the acquiescence to the capitalist project demonstrated above, grounded first and foremost in the notion of 'dialectic as mystification', still does not grasp the essential complexity of the relationship between the Idealistic text and its historical predicament. Perhaps the most profound manner in which the critical Idealism of Hegel and Schelling transcends its historical predicament is in the implicit argument it constructs against ontological complacency. Whilst, on the one hand, the dialectical and organicist reasoning of Idealism is deeply embedded within its own historical configuration and, to a certain extent, a prisoner of that configuration, there is, on the other hand, much that can be saved from that tradition which has a striking contemporaneity even today - in particular, the unwillingness it has to accept 'simple' truths simply because they *seem* real. This avoidance of the empirical solution denies the object of scrutiny a simple ontological existence and leads to a mode of reasoning that is concerned first of all to dissipate the conspicuity of Cartesian and early empirical forms of reason.

The consequence of this historically grounded concern is radical. In dissipating the conspicuous ontology of the Cartesian paradigm, German Idealism is radical in the sense that its arguments spring from the materials under scrutiny, from their historical predicament and yet it maintains a critical distance from that predicament. In other words, Idealism encounters the new 'absolute' of the commodity, articulating its

²² Rosen, Michael, *Hegel's Dialectic and its Criticism*, Cambridge, 1984, 178-80.

ontological boundaries, and yet stands back from 'completed' or circumscribed forms. If we accept, then, that a commodity is some reified entity, reduced to its most simple economic function, carrying such a function within itself, as if that function were simply moulded into its own interior storehouse, then this avoidance of completed or circumscribed forms can be read in two contradictory ways: either Idealism mystifies the economic function of the commodity, so making it seem to spring from some natural metaphysical source, or it attempts to undermine the apparent simplicity of commoditised - closed - forms through the careful and critical application of dialectical and organic reason.

In the notion of musical autonomy, these two agendas jostle for supremacy. On the one hand, autonomy gives the score, the neat musical commodity of the literate post-Cartesian culture, a central position and facilitates the commoditisation of the dissemination of music in printed form. On the other hand, an 'autonomous' music sustains for itself a kind of cool, clear distance from the society from which it sprang, casting a critical eye over the social institutions from which it emerges, throwing the flaws of such institutions into clear relief. The confrontation of these two agendas springs, it would seem from the great dichotomy of liberal capitalism, an economic model characterised both by a sense of political life as properly an expression of the majority of the enfranchised populace and by the necessity for sustainable economic difference. In short, the great dichotomy of liberalism has always been expressed in its janus-faced attitude to the individual. As a constructed, culturally mediated model, the lowest unit of the liberal society, the individual has always been upheld as an autonomous 'free' protagonist, an agent of wealth generation and yet, he is nonetheless consistently in retreat from the processes of rationalisation that provide the economic framework for that 'freedom', he is the victim of such processes.

The anxiety of the *Frühromantik* is thus founded on this dichotomous state of affairs: the position of the individual as both the heroic protagonist and as the impotent victim and it is this anxiety that lies at the heart of German Idealism. In short, the profoundly dialectical problem of autonomous music is a problem that reflects the two

liberal individuals: critical autonomy as an encoded parallel of the heroic protagonist and uncritical (commoditised) autonomy as a similar parallel of the brutalised victim. It seems, then, that critiques of the Western European art music canon based purely on notions of its autonomy as a simple 'turning inwards' from or wilful rejection of the public domain are uncritical in their undialectical apprehension of the problem. It is certainly possible to draw simple causal connections between an impotent German bourgeoisie, frustrated by political isolation, and the 'inwardising' genres of the early nineteenth century. Yet such simple causal connections reduce the complexity of post-Cartesian culture to a mechanistic set of ideological agents. These 'vulgar' Marxian arguments fail to grasp the matter at hand as a sophisticated array of socially mediated codes. To decode this culture, therefore, requires not a simple ideological toolbox drawn from the nearest and dearest tradition, but a willingness to confront, on all levels, the mutual ambivalence of autonomy and function in the musically aesthetic object of scrutiny. The fact that such terms as autonomy, ontology and the ideal are not clearly articulated fixed points in this epistemological configuration bears witness to Idealism's awareness of its precarious position between covert propagandist mystification and radical critique of the newly commoditised culture.

This precariousness is eloquently expressed in the fluent interaction between the categories of the ontological and the ideal. The former seems, as we have said, to articulate a drive inwards, a retreat from external conspicuity into a secretive world of intimated treasures whereas the latter offers a schematic account of general forms, removed from the profanity of particularity. The interplay of these two categories in musical autonomy is complex. On the one hand, they share a synonymous function in the articulation of separation from the external, closing the sphere of the work from the mundanities of objective reality. Yet, on the other hand, their antagonism is based precisely around this relationship to the external. Since, for ontological modes of speculation, the inner space is the storehouse of truth, of the essential reality of the object of scrutiny, there are some useful resonances of the commoditised object that carries its economic function within its own internal storehouse of truth as a kind of

ontological materiality. This commodity parity in ontological thought is thus to be contrasted with the schemata of the ideal. In this mode of speculation, the sphere of activity is articulated not according to its unique interiority but according to its generality, the ability it demonstrates to show all levels of the world in a single closed and pure structure. Its 'ideality' is thus consequent upon its ability to spread itself outwards across all levels of discourse as a universal demonstrative model whilst maintaining its status as 'model'.

Autonomy is thus confronted with the dichotomous coexistence of a mutual compatibility and a mutual antagonism within its operation. In this sense, it is perhaps wisest to ascribe to autonomy the status of a sphere of activity, a socially mediated practice. As an activity, autonomy is thus encountered not as a unified ideological phenomenon but as a dynamic and complex *response* to a nascent culture in the process of cohering around the economic model of the commodity. Autonomy, therefore, is not commodity by another name.

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